Prepared Opening Statement by Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee
Review and Reform: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Executive Accountability
Wednesday, January 28, 2026
In less than three months, Section 702 – a vital national security tool our intelligence community relies on heavily – is set to expire without congressional action.
Section 702 makes up an estimated 60% of the President’s Daily Briefing.
Our government has used the tool to combat hacking and drug threats from foreign countries like China.
In recent years, the program has also put a stop to terror plots to harm Americans at home and abroad and empowers us to take the fight overseas.
As cyber threats to our critical infrastructure become more dangerous, 702 remains a valuable tool to stop these attacks before they happen.
At the outset, I want to be clear about two compatible truths.
First, FISA Section 702 is an essential national security and intelligence tool used to keep America safe.
Second, constant congressional oversight and vigilance is also essential to ensure this authority is exercised responsibly.
There’s still work to be done to ensure that the executive branch is held properly accountable.
Our intelligence community uses Section 702 every day to protect Americans.
That use is squarely in line with the government’s primary responsibility: to defend our country.
I’ve also expressed concerns about FISA’s reach more broadly.
I know many of us in Congress have worked hard to strike a legislative balance. Today, there’s still more work to be done.
The Department of Justice, starting under President Biden – despite the clear language of Congress’s last reauthorization – hasn’t meaningfully allowed us and our staffs into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts, despite a statutory mandate to do so.
I’m astonished the Trump administration has continued this misguided Biden-era policy.
Senator Durbin and I wrote to Attorney General Bondi concerning the Department’s so-called “procedures,” drafted by former Assistant Attorney General Matt Olsen.
We’ve yet to receive a meaningful response.
The Department can’t restrict Congress from exercising its statutory oversight authority over the FISA process, a process which Congress itself established in 1978.
As a result, any reauthorization should demand that these procedures be revoked and that Congress, as the Article I branch, shall be able to exercise its oversight authority without obstacle.
Other reforms from the last reauthorization have been very successful.
The querying of United States persons – while already rare – has significantly decreased, with near 100% compliance following the implementation of the most recent safeguards.
Further, the more recent errors we’ve seen by the FBI have been overwhelmingly clerical in nature, not bad faith ones.
In short, Congress’s reforms to 702 are making a difference. However, the government’s record with FISA more broadly is far from perfect.
By now, we’re all familiar with the FISA abuses against former Trump campaign advisor Carter Page.
A few details are worth clarifying here.
First, the abuses against Page happened under Title I of FISA – not 702.
Second, whenever we talk about FISA and Section 702, we hear a lot about warrants.
When the FBI surveilled Page, the agency obtained several warrants.
Now, because of my oversight work and agency reviews, we know that these warrants were invalid and didn’t follow the proper procedures.
Because the law as it stands doesn’t provide a clear remedy, the D.C. Circuit dismissed Page’s lawsuit against the government.
Right now, folks improperly surveilled under FISA are without recourse.
United States citizens shouldn’t be subject to invalid warrants to begin with, but when they are, there ought to be some kind of remedy.
We also ought to give Congress a role in the Amicus appointment process. Right now, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts pick their own Amici.
The roster of current Amici contains some people with deeply concerning partisan ties.
Amici in these courts are supposed to be a check and balance in the proceedings. As such, they need to be non-partisan.
Moreover, whistleblowers from the intelligence community shouldn’t be limited to providing protected disclosures to just the intelligence committees.
Whether whistleblowers want to disclose classified or unclassified information, they should have the ability to speak to other congressional committees.
For example, the Judiciary Committee has broad jurisdictional reach into the intelligence community. And for many years I’ve worked with intelligence community whistleblowers.
Making whistleblower laws even more clear is a priority.
I look forward to hearing from the experts joining us today on the necessity of the 702 program, as well as areas where Congress should improve transparency and oversight, without frustrating FISA’s purpose – to protect the American people.
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