Responses of Stephen N. Six  
Nominee to be United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit  
to the Written Question of Senator Chuck Grassley

1. On April 2, 2010, you issued a statement on the constitutionality of the health care law stating, “I do not believe that Kansas can successfully challenge the law. Our review did not reveal any constitutional defects, and thus it would not be legally or fiscally responsible to pursue the litigation.” Since enactment of the Affordable Care Act, two federal district court judges have held the individual mandate in the Act to be unconstitutional.

   a. Do you stand by your determination that there are no “constitutional defects” with the health care law?

Response: As Attorney General I had the research attorneys in our office review and analyze each of the constitutional claims advanced in the challenges to the federal healthcare legislation. The conclusion of the attorneys in the office and my conclusion after that review was that there was little to no chance of succeeding on the constitutional challenges. However, subsequent to April 2, 2010 when I made that statement, two federal district court judges have studied the constitutionality of the law and come to different conclusions. The issue is now in the federal appellate courts and will be resolved ultimately by the Supreme Court. If confirmed and appropriate for me to hear the case under the recusal authorities, I would follow any applicable Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent.

   b. Given that you took a public stance on this issue when you served as Kansas Attorney General, will you, if confirmed, recuse yourself from hearing cases related to the constitutionality of the health care law?

Response: It is difficult to make a decision about recusal on hypothetical cases that may relate in some way to the federal healthcare legislation when the issues or facts are unknown. If confirmed, I would follow the recusal statutes and judicial codes of conduct. After a review of the recusal authorities and a consideration of this issue, I believe that recusal may be the result.

2. According to a February 3, 2010 Office of Attorney General press release, your office conducted a multi-jurisdiction drug bust resulting in the arrest of 17 individuals for allegedly manufacturing and selling meth amphetamines. Unfortunately, it now appears that the prosecution of these individuals may be in jeopardy. On March 9, 2011, Judge Brazil, in State v. Bruce, No. 2010 CR 23 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Mar. 9, 2011) (order granting motion to suppress) (attached, for your reference), suppressed the wiretap evidence that was instrumental to the cases, holding that you failed to comply with federal law requiring the state’s principal prosecutor to authorize the application for electronic wiretaps. As the state’s
Attorney General, you were the principal prosecutor, but the wiretap application was approved not by you, but an Assistant Attorney General.

a. According to Judge Brazil, you applied for only two wiretaps during your tenure as Attorney General. The first was signed by you, but the second was not. Why did you authorize AAG Disney to sign the wiretap application, rather than signing it yourself?

Response: Mr. Disney was the Deputy Attorney General in charge of the criminal division. He proposed the procedure where I would authorize the wiretap but delegate the necessary steps to get the documents before the judge to him. Mr. Disney was an experienced prosecutor and I relied on his presentation in this area of criminal law.

b. When you gave written authorization to AAG Disney to apply for *ex parte* orders authorizing the interception of wire, oral or electronic communication in this case, were you aware of the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in *State v. Farha*, 218 Kan. 394 (1975) that a prior Kansas statute was unlawful because it purported to grant authority to an assistant attorney general to make an application for a wiretapping order, rather than vesting that authority in the principal prosecuting attorney, as called for by 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)? If you were aware of the case, how did it factor into your decision to delegate to AAG Disney?

Response: I do not recall being aware of this case.

c. Were you aware of the federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)) requiring minimum standards in authorizing the use of a wiretap in drug investigations when you gave AAG Disney authorization to apply for a wiretap? If so, how did this factor into your decision to delegate to AAG Disney?

Response: I participated in a briefing by Mr. Disney where the procedure described in 2a was proposed. I do not recall if he presented information on this statute. I was not independently aware of it.

d. Even assuming that Kansas state law permitted you to delegate the authority to apply for wiretaps –

i. Do you believe that 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) permits a state to adopt more permissive wiretap authorization standards than those required by federal law?

Response: I have never considered that issue. If confirmed and presented with this issue I would apply the applicable Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedents.
ii. Do you agree with the Kansas Supreme Court in *In re Olander*, 213 Kan. 282, 285 (1973) that both the Kansas legislature and the U.S. Congress “have carefully restricted the right to apply for the use of electronic bugging devices to a very select coterie of public officers” because “[n]o area of the law is more sensitive than that of electronic surveillance, since such activity intrudes into the very heart of personal privacy”? Please explain your answer.

Response: Yes. I believe that balancing the needs of law enforcement to infiltrate drug gangs with the personal privacy interests of all Americans is a very sensitive area and requires careful consideration.

e. According to Judge Brazil, both you and AAG Disney testified that the authorization you granted was signed specifically in regard to this case, “but the authorization on its face appears to be unlimited in time and circumstance.” Was it your intention to give AAG Disney unending authority to apply for wiretap orders?

Response: No.

f. Is it your belief that K.S.A. 75-710, which grants general authority to assistant attorneys general to act on behalf of the attorney general, supersedes K.S.A. 22-2515, which specifically designates that the attorney general must apply for an order authorizing electronic surveillance, despite the general principle of statutory interpretation that general statutory provisions do not repeal previously enacted specific statutory provisions unless done so explicitly? In your answer, please explain your understanding of how these two statutes operate together.

Response: After further consideration of the statutes as a result of this case, I believe the attorney general should not delegate procedural responsibility to obtain a wiretap to a Deputy Attorney General.

g. According to Judge Brazil’s findings of fact, you made a “cursory but not full examination of the application” prior to authorizing Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Barry Disney to apply for ex parte orders. *State v. Bruce*, No. 2010 CR 23, Order Granting Mot. to Suppress at 5. Is this accurate? If so, why did you fail to give your full attention to such an important case?

Response: Under the procedure described in 2a, I authorized the wiretap, but delegated actions in the wiretap process to the Deputy Attorney General in charge of the criminal division. At the time I believed I fully considered the request. In hindsight I should not have delegated actions in the wiretap process to the Deputy Attorney General in charge of the criminal division.
h. According to Judge Brazil, “there appears to have been no policy or procedure in place in the attorney general’s office to ensure compliance with federal or state wiretap legislation.” *State v. Bruce*, No. 2010 CR 23, Order Granting Mot. to Suppress at 4. Is this accurate? If so, why didn’t you have a policy to ensure compliance with the federal wiretap statute? If not, please explain the established policy or protocol and indicate whether it was followed in this instance.

Response: At the time I became attorney general I was not aware of any written policy in place in the Attorney General’s Office dealing with wiretaps and I am not aware of any policy that preexisted my tenure. When the application for a wiretap came before me, we followed the procedure set forth in the wiretap statute. Wiretaps were done infrequently and no one suggested and I did not think of developing a written policy.

i. Do you disagree with Judge Brazil’s decision in this case? Why or why not?

Response: If I had been aware of the authorities in Judge Brazil’s opinion at the time I made the decision to authorize a wiretap I would not have delegated actions in the wiretap process to the Deputy Attorney General in charge of the criminal division. I am not critical of the Judge’s opinion.

3. Several commentators, including Professor Goodwin Liu, previously nominated to be a Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, have said that *Lopez* and *Morrison* are difficult or “incoherent” standards in outlining the limitations of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Do you believe these cases provide a workable limit on Congress’ commerce power?

Response: In *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and *United States v. Morrison*, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) the Supreme Court set forth the limitations on Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and held that its power is not unlimited. I would apply those precedents and any other relevant cases of the Supreme Court if confirmed.

4. In your final analysis of the health care law, you determined that challenges to its mandate requiring that states increase eligibility for Medicaid or risk losing funds lacked merit saying, “the U.S. Supreme Court for nearly a century has repeatedly reaffirmed the power of Congress to impose requirements on the States as a condition of the receipt of federal funds.” However, Supreme Court precedent also suggests this power is limited. In *South Dakota v. Dole*, the Court stated that, “in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” In that case, the Court found that the loss of only 5% of federal funds available was not sufficient to constitute compulsion.

In your view, when, if ever, could a financial inducement to the states by the federal government constitute compulsion?
Response: I do not have an opinion about when pressure would turn into compulsion. The Supreme Court has held that Congress’ power is not unlimited. If confirmed and presented with this issue I would follow the precedent of the Supreme Court or any applicable Tenth Circuit decisions.

5. In testimony before this Committee, former Solicitor General Charles Fried said the unfunded mandate posed a “constitutional worry” because the funds at issue are “huge.” Is it your opinion that Mr. Fried’s concerns are misplaced? Why or why not?

Response: I am not familiar with Mr. Fried’s testimony or his analysis and have not formed an opinion. Regardless of any opinion I would hold, I would follow Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent on this issue.

6. As Attorney General, you signed onto an amicus brief in Citizens United v. FEC that argued the Supreme Court should refrain from overturning its decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. Austin held that a state statute prohibiting corporations from making independent expenditures in support of political candidates from its general treasury was constitutional. In a 5 to 4 decision the Supreme Court overturned its decision in Austin and held the campaign finance restrictions on corporations at issue in the case were unconstitutional.

a. Many have been highly critical of the Supreme Court’s decision. Do you believe Citizens United was correctly decided?

Response: If confirmed as a circuit court judge I would apply the precedent of Citizens United and all Supreme Court decisions regardless of my personal views.

b. If you have not already done so, please take this opportunity to review Citizens United. Do you believe it is a fair and accurate characterization of the Supreme Court’s decision to say that it “reversed a century of law”? Why or why not?

Response: The holding in Citizens United was based on the First Amendment and the Supreme Court’s many cases applying the First Amendment some of which are described by the court as conflicting lines of precedent. If confirmed I would apply the Citizens United precedent as well as any other applicable Supreme Court precedent.

7. Kansas has a statute providing in-state college tuition to children of illegal immigrants. While you were Attorney General, a similar law was struck down by a California appeals court, although this decision was later reversed by the California Supreme Court. At the time of the appellate court’s decision, you defended the legality of the Kansas law in the news, saying that “Federal courts have rejected [a legal] challenge to Kansas law.” However, it is my understanding that the federal
court never reached the merits in the case against Kansas’s statute, but dismissed the case for lack of standing.

a. Current federal law states,

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State … for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit … without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident.” (8 U.S.C. § 1623)

Do you believe the Kansas statute is consistent with federal law? Why or why not?

Response: The issue of any conflict between the federal statute and the Kansas statute was not considered during my time as Attorney General. If confirmed, should the issue come before the Tenth Circuit; I would apply relevant Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent.

b. If a state law directly conflicts with a duly enacted federal law, does the State Attorney General have a duty to refuse to defend the state law?

Response: As Attorney General it was my duty to presume laws passed by the state legislature were constitutional and to defend those laws if challenged. I do not recall having an occasion to consider whether a state attorney general has a duty to refuse to defend state law in a situation where that law was in a direct conflict with a federal law.

c. Did you ever perform an analysis to determine if a conflict existed? If so, what was your conclusion and why?

Response: I do not recall performing such an analysis.

8. Do you believe that our federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers?

Response: Yes, under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and as the Supreme Court discussed in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) our federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers.

9. What does the concept of separation of powers mean for the federal courts? If confirmed, will this be a governing principle which you will follow?

Response: Under our Constitution the separation of powers is a fundamental part of the foundation of our system of government. The separation of powers limits each branch of
government to its appropriate role. If confirmed as a circuit court judge, I would follow the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedents in this area.

10. Do you believe it is proper for a judge, consistent with governing precedent, to strike down an act of Congress that it deems unconstitutional? If so, under what circumstances, and applying what factors?

Response: Yes, if Congress exceeds its authority under the Constitution, as determined by Supreme Court precedents, it is appropriate for a judge to strike down an act of Congress.

11. What is the most important attribute of a judge, and do you possess it?

Response: The most important attributes of a judge are impartially applying the law to the facts and working hard. I believe I have those attributes.

12. Please explain your view of the appropriate temperament of a judge. What elements of judicial temperament do you consider the most important, and do you meet that standard?

Response: A judge should treat all litigants with respect and patience and work hard to listen and not prejudge issues. I believe I possess these attributes.

13. In general, Supreme Court precedents are binding on all lower federal courts and Circuit Court precedents are binding on the district courts within the particular circuit. Are you committed to following the precedents of higher courts faithfully and giving them full force and effect, even if you personally disagree with such precedents?

Response: Yes.

14. At times, judges are faced with cases of first impression. If there were no controlling precedent that dispositively concluded an issue with which you were presented, to what sources would you turn for persuasive authority? What principles will guide you, or what methods will you employ, in deciding cases of first impression?

Response: I would begin with the text of the statute or Constitutional provision at issue. I would also examine closely analogous Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit cases and cases that are closely related to the issue from other circuits. Additionally, if the Supreme Court has developed an approach or framework to decide a closely related issue or area of law, that can be a useful approach.

15. What would you do if you believed the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals had seriously erred in rendering a decision? Would you apply that decision or would you use your own judgment of the merits, or your best judgment of the merits?
Response: If confirmed, I would apply the binding precedent regardless of my personal views.

16. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe an appellate court should overturn precedent within the circuit? What factors would you consider in reaching this decision?

Response: Precedent within the Tenth Circuit can only be overturned by the entire court sitting en banc. The en banc proceedings should be used infrequently and only when an issue is of exceptional importance or when it is required to establish uniformity in the panel decisions, as discussed in the federal rules governing appellate procedure. The principle of stare decisis should govern any consideration to overturn circuit court precedent.

17. Please describe with particularity the process by which these questions were answered.

Response: I reviewed some of the cases to refresh my recollection and drafted the answers. I discussed the draft with a Department of Justice staff member. I submitted a final draft to the Department of Justice for submission to the Committee.

18. Do these answers reflect your true and personal views?

Response: Yes.
I understand from your testimony and your written account of events that, generally, you allowed your Assistant Attorneys General to handle the legal actions relating to the prosecution of Planned Parenthood. However, as you rightly concede in your letter, you were the state’s chief prosecutor and responsible for overseeing all cases in which your Office was involved, and it was under your name that legal actions preceded. Please address these questions candidly.

1. In testimony at your nominations hearing, you said that there was “never any decision on my part to pursue or not pursue” the case against Planned Parenthood. However, in a February 7, 2008, Associated Press article, you are quoted as saying the following in relation to the Planned Parenthood investigation, “That case was closed, and I’m not doing anything to reopen it.”¹ This quotation suggests that you made an affirmative decision to decline to reopen the case. How is this statement consistent with your testimony that you never made any decision whether or not to reopen the case against Planned Parenthood?

Response: As you may be aware, I was not involved in the investigation and prosecution of Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri, Inc., which began five years before I became Attorney General of Kansas. My understanding of the events before I became Attorney General is based on information taken from the following Kansas Supreme Court opinions:


*State of Kansas, ex rel, Stephen Six, Attorney General of Kansas v. Anderson*, (Kansas Supreme Court Case No. 99,050) The case was dismissed without written opinion. (Attorney General Morrison filed this case and I was substituted in after he resigned and I was sworn in)


I became Attorney General on January 30, 2008. It is my understanding that Attorney General Morrison completed his investigation of Planned Parenthood and closed the case six months before I took office. After becoming Attorney General, I did not re-review any previously closed cases in the office. At the time I took office, the case against Planned Parenthood, previously investigated by the Kansas Attorney General’s Office

and closed, was under investigation by a grand jury in Johnson County, Kansas and
Johnson County District Attorney Kline was prosecuting that same case.

2. When you made the statement quoted by the Associated Press, were you aware of
Judge Anderson’s determination that Planned Parenthood’s records – in his
possession as custodian by appointment of the Kansas Supreme Court – appeared to
have been manufactured in violation of Kansas criminal law?

Response: I do not recall being aware of it.

3. Given Judge Anderson’s concerns, as well as his statements questioning A.G.
Morrison’s decision to clear Planned Parenthood of wrongdoing, did you or anyone
in your office (including the criminal division) reevaluate A.G. Morrison’s decision
to clear Planned Parenthood of any wrongdoing?

Response: No. At the time I became Attorney General on January 30, 2008, the office
did not re-review any previously closed cases. Additionally at the time I became
Attorney General, the case against Planned Parenthood was the subject of a grand jury
investigation in Johnson County, Kansas and the case was being prosecuted by District
Attorney Kline, also in Johnson County, Kansas.

   a. If yes, what was the evaluation’s conclusion?

      Response: Please see the answer to question 3.

   b. If no, why weren’t Judge Anderson’s concerns -- a District Court Judge with
      first-hand knowledge of the situation -- considered important enough to
      warrant a reevaluation?

      Response: Please see the answers to questions 2 and 3.

4. I understand that the mandamus actions undertaken by the Attorney General’s
office against District Attorney Kline (See CHPP v. Kline) and Judge Anderson (See
Morrison v. Anderson) were commenced prior to your appointment. However, as
Attorney General, your office continued to pursue these actions. Given the issues
mentioned above, did you, or anyone in your office, reevaluate the legal positions
taken by A.G. Morrison in these cases? Please explain why or why not. If your
office did reevaluate the legal positions please explain the conclusion of that
evaluation.

Response: After I became Attorney General, the Kansas Supreme Court ordered that my
office file a brief in each case. The brief that was filed in the case represented the
position of the Attorney General’s Office. I do not recall re-evaluating any previous
position of the Attorney General’s Office in coming up with the position taken by my
office and filed with the Court. Assistant Attorneys General drafted the briefs and they
were filed with my approval. In the mandamus action filed by Planned Parenthood
against Kline, my office sought the return of the file taken by Kline from the Attorney General’s Office. It is my understanding that this is the same position taken by Morrison. In the mandamus action against Judge Anderson my office sought Court supervision of the medical records. It is my understanding that Morrison sought to have the records returned to Planned Parenthood.

5. **At your nomination hearing, I asked you whether you were ever pressured by Governor Sibelius or anyone in her administration not to pursue charges against Planned Parenthood. You responded in part, “I never had a discussion with her about any topics or any cases in the Attorney General’s office in our criminal division.” Did you, or anyone in your office, communicate with anyone in the Governor’s Administration about pursuing criminal charges against Planned Parenthood? If so, please explain the nature of those conversations and with whom they transpired.

Response: I did not discuss the topic of pursuing criminal charges against Planned Parenthood with anyone in Governor Sebelius’ administration. I do not recall anyone in my office telling me they discussed the topic with anyone in Governor Sebelius’ administration.

**CHPP v. Kline**

1. **When you became Attorney General you replaced A.G. Morrison in the mandamus action in CHPP v. Kline. A.G. Morrison’s mandamus action sought to have D.A. Kline return CHPP’s medical records. However, the final brief submitted in your name sought, “each and every copy of those records that [Kline] has made and any and all other evidence Kline developed and obtained while he was acting as Attorney General that he took with him to Johnson County.” (Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri, Inc. v. Kline, 197 P.3d 370, 393 (2008)). If it was not your intent to interfere in any way with D.A. Kline’s investigation, why was your request for Mr. Kline to return all the documents, and not simply provide your office with complete copies of all the documents in his possession?

Response: Former Attorney General Morrison intervened in the mandamus action filed by Planned Parenthood against Kline in July 2007 and sought return of the file containing the materials from the Judge Anderson inquisition taken by Kline when he left the Attorney General’s Office. I became Attorney General six months later on January 30, 2008. Pursuant to a Kansas Supreme Court Order my office filed a brief in May 2008 asserting that former Attorney General Kline should return the file as improperly taken State property. It is my understanding that this is the same position previously taken by Morrison. (Memo of AG Morrison In Support of Pet. for Mandamus, at 18)(“return any and all evidence produced in response to the now-closed inquisition to the Office of the Attorney General”). The Kansas Supreme Court in Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri, Inc. v. Kline, 287 Kan. 372 (Kan. 2008) ordered Kline to return a copy of the medical records and the investigation file taken
from the Attorney General’s Office but permitted him to keep a copy for his criminal case against Planned Parenthood.

2. It is my understanding that when Mr. Kline left the AG’s office, he made copies of the records but deposited the original medical records with Judge Anderson. Furthermore, it is my understanding that AG Morrison was informed of the location of the records within the first few days of assuming office. Is this a correct understanding of the status of the records?

Response: I became Attorney General more than a year after Attorney General Morrison was sworn in and the activities referenced in the question took place. I do not know the status of the records when Attorney General Morrison took office. The Kansas Supreme Court noted that no inventory of the file was completed when Morrison took office and that no Planned Parenthood records were in the office. *CHPP*, 287 Kan. at 384.

a. If so, why was it necessary for you to obtain copies of the records, when you had the originals available to you?

Response: When I became Attorney General on January 30, 2008, there were not any Planned Parenthood records in the office. Prior to my becoming Attorney General, the Kansas Attorney General’s Office had sought the return of the file taken by former Attorney General Kline when he left office. I did not re-evaluate the position taken by the Attorney General’s Office that former Attorney General Kline should return the file as improperly taken State property.

b. Did you seek to obtain just a return of the records which Mr. Kline obtained while AG, or did you also seek to obtain any other evidence, including evidence he may have obtained as a result of his investigation while in his position as District Attorney?

Response: My office filed a brief in the *CHPP v. Kline* mandamus action seeking the return of the file created by Kline while he was Attorney General of Kansas.

c. Was any of the evidence which Mr. Kline had gathered, other than the original medical records, shared with Planned Parenthood or their attorneys?

Response: No. It is my understanding that only the medical records were returned to Planned Parenthood’s attorneys.

3. The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Mr. Kline’s favor on the merits of the case, but ordered him to provide complete copies of all the documents to your office. Had you been successful in requiring Mr. Kline to return all of the documents, wouldn’t that have effectively prohibited any case against Planned Parenthood from going forward?
Response: At the time I became Attorney General a case against Planned Parenthood was going forward before a grand jury in Johnson County, Kansas. The grand jury case against Planned Parenthood continued until March 2008 when the grand jury refused to return an indictment.

My office was not involved in Kline’s prosecution of Planned Parenthood in Johnson County, Kansas. The Court’s recitation of the facts in *State v. CHPP*, 291 Kan. 322, 338 (2010) show that Kline had access to the Planned Parenthood records from Judge Anderson and that pursuant to Kline’s subpoena Judge Anderson testified and brought the records to court. Later in Kline’s case, as discussed in *State v. CHPP*, he issued another subpoena to Judge Anderson seeking the Planned Parenthood records that was quashed by Johnson County District Court Judge Stephen Tatum. Kline appealed Judge Tatum’s order and in *State v. CHPP*, 291 Kan. 322 (2010), the Kansas Supreme upheld portions of the order and reversed portions of the order and allowed Judge Anderson to produce the Planned Parenthood records. *State v. CHPP*, 291 Kan. at 363.

a. If so, do you believe this result would have been in the interest of justice, considering Judge Anderson’s concerns about “manufactured records”?

Response: As discussed in the answer to question 3, the case against Planned Parenthood was being investigated by a grand jury. As district attorney, Kline had subpoena power and pursuant to Kline’s first subpoena, Judge Anderson brought the Planned Parenthood records to court in Kline’s criminal proceedings. Kline again exercised his subpoena power to obtain the records later in the case and the district court quashed his subpoena.

4. Did you, or anyone in your office, have a conversation with anyone representing Planned Parenthood or any representative of Planned Parenthood regarding your brief filed in *CHPP v. Klein*? If so, please explain the nature of those conversations and with whom they transpired.

Response: I did not have any conversations with Planned Parenthood’s attorneys or any representative of Planned Parenthood on this topic. I do not recall anyone in my office telling me they had conversations with Planned Parenthood’s attorneys or any representative of Planned Parenthood about the brief filed by the Kansas Attorney General’s Office.

5. Did you, or anyone in your office, have discussions with then Governor Sibelius, or anyone in her Administration concerning the mandamus actions against D.A. Kline? If so, please explain the nature of those conversations and with whom they transpired.

Response: I did not discuss the topic of Planned Parenthood’s mandamus action against former Attorney General Kline with Governor Sebelius or anyone in Governor Sebelius’ administration. I do not recall anyone in my office telling me they discussed the topic with Governor Sebelius or with anyone in Governor Sebelius’ administration.
Morrison v. Anderson

1. When you became Attorney General you also replaced former A.G. Morrison in his mandamus action to require Judge Anderson to turn over the CHPP medical records in his custody. Were you, or members of your office, aware of Judge Anderson’s statement that to return the documents obtained from Planned Parenthood, as you requested, “would unacceptably increase the risk that evidence could be lost, destroyed or compromised…it is difficult to understand how this could benefit the citizens of Kansas”?

Response: I was not aware of Judge Anderson’s statement. I do not recall anyone in my office discussing Judge Anderson’s statement with me.

   a. If so, did your office take into account Judge Anderson’s concern in your continuation of the mandamus action? Please explain why or why not.

Response: Morrison filed the mandamus action against Judge Anderson six months before I became Attorney General. It is my understanding that Morrison sought to have the medical records returned to Planned Parenthood.

In the mandamus action against Judge Anderson, my office sought Kansas Supreme Court supervision and protection of these records. The motion suggested that the Court consider quashing the subpoena issued by Kline and leaving the records with Judge Anderson during the pendency of the mandamus case, placing the records in the custody of the Clerk of the Supreme Court or with District Court Judge Stephen Tatum who was assigned to the criminal case against Planned Parenthood. Any of these actions would, in my view, protect the records.

2. Did you or anyone in your office have a conversation with anyone representing Planned Parenthood or any representative of Planned Parenthood about seeking a judicial order compelling Judge Anderson to return the medical records in his possession? If so, please explain the nature of those conversations and with whom they transpired.

Response: Former Attorney General Morrison intervened in the mandamus case against Judge Anderson seeking return of the medical records in July of 2007, six months before I took office. After I became Attorney General on January 30, 2008, I did not speak with anyone representing Planned Parenthood or any representative of Planned Parenthood about this topic. I do not recall anyone in my office telling me they spoke with anyone representing Planned Parenthood or any representative of Planned Parenthood about the mandamus action against Judge Anderson.

3. Did you, or anyone in your office, have discussions with then Governor Sibelius, or anyone in her Administration, concerning the mandamus action against Judge
Anderson or the eventual emergency protective order sought by your office? If so, please explain the nature of those conversations and with whom they transpired.

Response: The mandamus case against Judge Anderson was filed under seal. I did not discuss the topic of the mandamus action against Judge Anderson or the motion for a protective order with Governor Sebelius or with anyone in Governor Sebelius’ administration. I do not recall anyone in my office telling me they discussed the topic with Governor Sebelius or anyone in Governor Sebelius’ administration.

4. During his investigation, Mr. Kline issued a subpoena to Judge Anderson to testify at a hearing regarding Planned Parenthood. Based on unsealed court documents, Judge Anderson notified the Kansas Supreme Court of the subpoena and that he intended to comply with it unless directed otherwise by the Court. Six v. Morrison, No. 07-099050-S (2008), Notice of Collateral Proceeding and Receipt of Subpoena for Records. The same day, you sought an emergency protective order to quash the subpoena. Is it common practice for the State Attorney General to interfere with subpoenas and requests for evidence by local prosecutors? If so, can you provide any examples of other cases where Attorney General has done so?

Response: The Kansas Attorney General’s Office filed the motion for the protective order to ensure that the Kansas Supreme Court was aware of the subpoena directed to the records that were the subject of the mandamus case against Judge Anderson pending before the Court and to ensure that any further movement of the records took place under the supervision of the Court. The motion suggested that the Court consider quashing the subpoena, placing the records in the custody of the Supreme Court Clerk during the pendency of the mandamus case against Anderson, or placing the records in the custody of Judge Stephen R. Tatum who was handling the criminal case filed by Kline against Planned Parenthood in Johnson County. The Kansas Attorney General’s Office believed that any of these actions would have provided Court supervision and protection of the records.

5. You cited privacy concerns in your emergency protective order request. You similarly alluded to such concerns in your testimony before the Committee and in the written statement you provided to me. But, it is my understanding that the medical records were redacted to remove any identifying information pursuant to a previous court order. Is this accurate?

Response: The Kansas Attorney General’s Office believed that the records contained information that could be used to identify a patient. Judge Anderson noted the redacted records could be used to identify a patient and the Kansas Supreme Court noted this risk of disclosure of patient privacy from the redacted records in Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri, Inc., 291 Kan. 322, 363 (2010).

a. When were the medical records first redacted, and by whom?
Response: I do not know. When I became Attorney General there were not any Planned Parenthood records in the office.

b. If the records were redacted to remove patient identification information, how did they pose privacy concerns?

Response: Please see the answer to 5.

6. Do you agree with Judge Anderson’s assessment that the medical records obtained from the abortion clinics in Kansas pursuant to subpoenas requested by former Attorney General Phil Kline were redacted of identities even beyond the requirements of HIPPA? *See Morrison v. Anderson*, Case No. 07-99050-S (response of Judge Richard Anderson to Petitioner Attorney General Paul J. Morrison’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus) (footnote 1).

Response: I have never reviewed the records. I have no reason to disagree with Judge Anderson’s assessment.

**General Questions**

1. It has been reported that between 2002 and 2003, Kansas abortion providers drastically underreported incidents of child sexual abuse/statutory rape, filing only 2 reports of child sexual abuse despite performing 166 abortions on children 15 years old or younger. Did you take any action to support or initiate an investigation into this apparent underreporting? If so, what action did you take?

Response: After I became Attorney General in January 2008, I am not aware of the Kansas Attorney General’s Office conducting such an investigation.

2. Did your office have access to reports provided by abortion providers under K.S.A. 65-445 to the Kansas Department of Health and Environment?

Response: After I became Attorney General on January 30, 2008, I am not aware of my office seeking access to any reports under K.S.A. 65-445. The statute provides that the reports may be disclosed to the Attorney General’s Office on a showing that reasonable cause exists to believe a violation of the Act occurred.

3. Are the reports provided by abortion providers under K.S.A. 65-445 redacted of patient identities?

Response: I have never reviewed any such reports. The statute, K.S.A. 65-445, provides that the reports should not contain the patient’s names.

4. Is it accurate to say that one of the reasons that Kansas’s law requires such reports is to ensure compliance with Kansas’s abortion restriction laws?

Response: Yes.
5. Did you ever receive a request from a District Attorney to assist in gaining access to those reports in order to move forward with a pending criminal case? If so, what was your response and why?

Response: I do not recall anyone discussing such a request with me. If a request was made in a criminal case by a District Attorney it likely would have been handled by the Assistant Attorneys General in the Criminal Division.

6. Did you, or anyone in your office, discuss the criminal proceeding against Planned Parenthood with Kansas Department of Health and Environment staff? If so, please explain what these discussions entailed.

Response: I did not discuss criminal proceedings against Planned Parenthood with Kansas Department of Health and Environment staff. I do not recall anyone in my office telling me they discussed criminal proceedings against Planned Parenthood with Kansas Department of Health and Environment staff.

7. Did you, or anyone in your office, ever seek to prevent Kansas Department of Health and Environment staff from working with law enforcement officers or District Attorney Office’s in investigations pertaining to violations of Kansas’s abortions laws?

Response: I did not seek to prevent Kansas Department of Health and Environment staff from working with law enforcement officers or a District Attorney’s office. I am not aware of anyone in my office doing so.

8. What is your understanding of the state of the law in Kansas, as enunciated by the State Supreme Court regarding who can enforce Kansas abortion law? Can a District Attorney do so, or is it limited to the AG’s office? It seems the Supreme Court has taken contrary views on this issue. Can you provide any clarification?

Response: My understanding is that the Kansas Attorney General’s Office does not have original criminal jurisdiction for criminal cases. The Kansas Attorney General’s Office is required to be asked by a district or county attorney to assume jurisdiction in a case in order to become involved as prosecutors.
Responses of Stephen N. Six
Nominee to be United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit
to the Written Questions of Senator Tom Coburn, M.D.

1. Some people refer to the Constitution as a “living” document that is constantly evolving as society interprets it. Do you agree with this perspective of constitutional interpretation?

Response: I do not agree with the idea that the Constitution is constantly evolving as society interprets it. While societal circumstances can change, the Constitution is only changed through amendments as set forth in Article V.

2. Justice William Brennan once said: “Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a preexisting society but to make a new one, to put in place new principles that the prior political community had not sufficiently recognized.” Do you agree with him that constitutional interpretation today must take into account this supposed transformative purpose of the Constitution?

Response: No.

3. Do you believe judicial doctrine rightly incorporates the evolving understandings of the Constitution forged through social movements, legislation, and historical practice?

Response: No.

4. The U.S. Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), that the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution “protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected to service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.” As Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller pointed out, Sir William Blackstone, the preeminent authority on English law for the Founders, cited the right to bear arms as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen. Leaving aside the McDonald v. Chicago decision, do you personally believe the right to bear arms is a fundamental right?

Response: The Second Amendment establishes that right and the Supreme Court affirmed that right.

   a. Do you believe that explicitly guaranteed substantive rights, such as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, are also fundamental rights? Please explain why or why not.

Response: The Supreme Court stated in McDonald v. City of Chicago, that certain rights, including most of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, have been determined by the Court to be “fundamental” to our country’s “scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition,” and have been deemed to apply against the States.
b. Is it your understanding of Supreme Court precedent that those provisions of the Bill of Rights that embody fundamental rights are deemed to apply against the States? Please explain why or why not.

Response: Yes. Please see response to 4(a).

c. The *Heller* Court further stated that “it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.” Do you believe that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right? Please explain why or why not.

Response: Yes. In *Heller*, the Supreme Court determined “the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.” If confirmed, I would apply the precedent in *Heller* as well as any other applicable cases.

5. Some have criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in *Heller* saying it “discovered a constitutional right to own guns that the Court had not previously noticed in 220 years.” Do you believe that *Heller* “discovered” a new right, or merely applied a fair reading of the plain text of the Second Amendment?

Response: The Supreme Court’s decision in *Heller* was based on the text of the Second Amendment and if confirmed I would apply the precedent in *Heller* as well as any other applicable Supreme Court cases.

a. Similarly, during his State of the Union address, the President said the Supreme Court’s decision in *Citizens United v. FEC*, 558 U.S. ___ (2010), “reversed a century of law” and others have stated that it abandoned “100 years of precedent.” Do you agree that the Court reversed a century of law or 100 years of precedent in the *Citizens United* decision? Please explain why or why not.

Response: The holding in *Citizens United* was based on the First Amendment and the Supreme Court’s many cases applying the First Amendment some of which are described by the court as conflicting lines of precedent. If confirmed I would apply the *Citizens United* precedent as well as any other applicable Supreme Court precedent.

6. What limitations remain on the individual Second Amendment right now that it has been incorporated against the States?

Response: As the Supreme Court discussed in *McDonald v. City of Chicago* and in *Heller* some limitations remain, such as possession of a firearm by felons or the mentally ill or “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.”
a. Is the Second Amendment limited only to possession of a handgun for self-defense in the home, since both *Heller* and *McDonald* involved cases of handgun possession for self-defense in the home?

Response: The Supreme Court in *Heller* and *McDonald* identified certain types of laws that would not infringe on the Second Amendment, however, the Court did not define the extent of Second Amendment rights under all scenarios. If confirmed, I would apply the Supreme Court’s precedents in *Heller* and *McDonald*.

7. In *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Justice Kennedy relied in part on the “evolving standards of decency” to hold that capital punishment for any murderer under age 18 was unconstitutional. I understand that the Supreme Court has ruled on this matter, but do you agree with Justice Kennedy’s analysis?

Response: If confirmed, I would apply the binding precedent of the Supreme Court in *Roper* as well as any other applicable precedent.

a. Do you agree that the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment “embodies a principle whose application is appropriately informed by our society’s understanding of cruelty and by what punishments have become unusual?”

Response: If confirmed as a circuit court judge and faced with an issue involving the Eighth Amendment and capital punishment, I would be required to follow the Supreme Court precedents and the analytical framework in *Roper v. Simmons* on what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

b. How would you determine what the evolving standards of decency are?

Response: I would follow the guidance of the Supreme Court in *Roper* and any other applicable binding precedents.

c. Do you think that a judge could ever find that the “evolving standards of decency” dictated that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all cases?

Response: The Supreme Court has determined the death penalty is constitutional except in limited circumstances. Given this binding precedent, I do not believe a lower court judge could decide otherwise.

d. What factors do you believe would be relevant to the judge’s analysis?

Response: Given that a lower court judge could not decide that the death penalty was unconstitutional in all circumstances, I do not believe such analysis would be appropriate.

e. When determining what the “evolving standards of decency” are, justices have looked to different standards. Some justices have justified their
decision by looking to the laws of various American states,\(^1\) in addition to foreign law, and in other cases have looked solely to the laws and traditions of foreign countries.\(^2\) Do you believe either standard has merit when interpreting the text of the Constitution?

Response: In interpreting the Constitution I would look to domestic sources of law and legal authorities unless instructed otherwise by the Supreme Court. In Roper the Court held that state laws and foreign laws are relevant but not controlling. I would not consider state law or foreign law in Constitutional interpretation unless binding Supreme Court precedent required it.

i. If so, do you believe one standard more meritorious than the other? Please explain why or why not.

Response: Please see response to 7(e).

8. In your view, is it ever proper for judges to rely on foreign or international laws or decisions in determining the meaning of the Constitution?

Response: In interpreting the United States Constitution I would use domestic legal sources, unless instructed to do otherwise by binding Supreme Court precedent.

a. Is it appropriate for judges to look for foreign countries for “wise solutions” and “good ideas” to legal and constitutional problems?

Response: I would not look to the law of foreign counties in evaluating legal and constitutional problems unless directed to do so by the Supreme Court.

b. If so, under what circumstances would you consider foreign law when interpreting the Constitution?

Response: If confirmed, I would not use foreign laws when interpreting the Constitution unless directed to do so by the Supreme Court.

c. Do you believe foreign nations have ideas and solutions to legal problems that could contribute to the proper interpretation of our laws?

Response: I believe the United States Constitution and laws should be interpreted with domestic legal authorities not foreign sources.

d. Would you consider foreign law when interpreting the Eighth Amendment? Other amendments?

Response: If confirmed, I would not consider foreign law in interpreting the Constitution unless directed to do so by binding Supreme Court precedent.

\(^1\) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-65.
\(^2\) Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2033-34.
Responses of Stephen N. Six  
Nominee to be United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit  
to the Written Follow-Up Questions of Senator Chuck Grassley

1. In Question 2(d)(i), I asked if you believed that 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) permits a state to adopt more permissive wiretap authorization standards than those required by federal law. You responded, “I have never considered that issue.” Part of my evaluation of your nomination will be based on my assessment of your ability to properly interpret federal statutes and applicable precedent. This was an issue you should have considered prior to delegating the authority to authorize wiretaps, but apparently did not. Please take this opportunity to review the statute and any relevant case law and answer the question.

Response: Section 2516(2) provides that an appropriate state level official may, if authorized by state statute, apply to a judge for a wiretap and “such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518.” Case law has interpreted this provision as allowing states to enact more restrictive legislation than the federal statute, but not less restrictive. *State v. Farha*, 218 Kan. 394, 400 (1975).

2. In response to Question 2(d)(ii), you said that “balancing the needs of law enforcement to infiltrate drug gangs with the personal privacy interests of all Americans is a very sensitive area and requires careful consideration.” Do you believe that you gave “careful consideration” to this case when delegating the wiretap application to Mr. Disney, despite your admission that you were not aware of relevant Kansas and federal statutes and case law when making that decision? If no, why did you not give this matter “careful consideration”?

Response: The Deputy Attorney General presented the procedure of delegating steps in the wiretap application process to me and I relied on his presentation that the procedure complied with the requirements of the wiretap statute. The procedure in this case was that an Assistant Attorney General and the law enforcement officers working on the case determined that the office should request judicial approval for a wiretap. The Assistant Attorney General then presented this information to the Deputy Attorney General who agreed that an application was warranted. The Deputy Attorney General then briefed me on the request to proceed with judicial review of a wiretap application and the supporting reasons required by the wiretap statute. I authorized proceeding with an application. The Assistant Attorney General, the law enforcement officer and the Deputy Attorney General completed the application, supporting affidavits and presented the materials and sworn testimony to a judge for review. The judge reviewed the materials and approved the wiretap. At the time of the procedure described above, I thought we were complying with the legal requirements of the wiretap statute. I now believe I should not have delegated steps in the wiretap application process to a Deputy Attorney General. I should have reviewed this area of law myself. I am responsible for the error.
3. In your response to Question 2(e), you said that you did not intend to give Mr. Disney unending authority to apply for wiretap orders. If that was the case, why didn’t the delegation stipulate that it was limited to these specific circumstances?

Response: I discussed the application procedure with the Deputy Attorney General and from this conversation he understood he was required to get my authorization to proceed with an application for a wiretap. I would agree that the written delegation is not limited to these specific circumstances. I cannot say that the delegation would have been better if it was limited in writing to these specific circumstances because, as I stated in the answer to question 2, I should not have delegated steps in the application process to the Deputy Attorney General.

4. In Question 2(f), I asked you to explain your understanding of how K.S.A. 75-710 and K.S.A. 22-2515 operated together. You did not answer that question. Please take this opportunity to carefully consider the question and provide an answer.

Response: Section 75-710 provides that “[a]ssistants [appointed by the Attorney General] shall act for and exercise the power of the attorney general to the extent the attorney general delegates them the authority to do so.” Section 22-2515, the specific statute relating to applications for a wiretap, provides that the application for a wiretap may be made by “[t]he attorney general, district attorney or county attorney.” In State v. Farha, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that this language in K.S.A. 22-2515, as applied to the Kansas Attorney General’s Office, meant that the Attorney General was required to authorize an application for a wiretap under this statute, not an assistant appointed by the Attorney General. 218 Kan. at 403. Section 22-2515, as the specific statute authorizing who can apply for an application, would control over the more general statute, K.S.A. 75-710, relating to delegation of authority of the Attorney General.

5. In your response to Question 2(f), you stated that “After further consideration of the statutes as a result of this, I believe the attorney general should not delegate procedural responsibility to obtain a wiretap to a Deputy Attorney General.” Further, in response to Question 2(i), you stated that “If I had been aware of the authorities in Judge Brazil’s opinion at the time I made the decision to authorize a wiretap I would not have delegated actions in the wiretap process to the Deputy Attorney General in charge of the criminal division.”

a. In light of this, please explain why the relevant Kansas and federal statutes and case law were not considered when making the decision to delegate authority.

Response: I made a mistake in not researching this area of law myself and personally reviewing these authorities. That was my error. The Deputy Attorney General presented the process of delegating necessary steps to get the application documents reviewed and signed by the judge after I authorized proceeding with the application. The Deputy Attorney General’s presentation was that the
proposed process complied with the Kansas wiretap statute. I do not recall the specific authorities that were included in his presentation.

b. Do you not agree that it was part of your responsibility to be aware of these authorities?

Response: Yes, it was my responsibility.

6. In your responses, you repeatedly stated that Mr. Disney proposed the wiretap authorization procedure and you relied on his presentation. To the best of your knowledge, do you believe that Mr. Disney was unaware of the relevant authorities? Alternatively, do you believe he was aware of them but misapplied them in this case?

Response: I understand that the Deputy Attorney General’s position was that a delegation could be appropriate if it is written, specific and limited. The reasoning was that K.S.A. 75-710 was amended after the State v. Farha case. The amendment relating to the delegation of the Attorney General’s authority states: “Assistants appointed by the attorney general shall perform the duties and exercise the powers as prescribed by law and shall perform other duties as prescribed by the attorney general. Assistants shall act for and exercise the power of the attorney general to the extent the attorney general delegates them the authority to do so.” Additionally, his position was that the delegation in this case was written and specifically delegated the authority to one individual, unlike the delegation rejected in In re Olander, 213 Kan. 282 (1973). This position is essentially the argument advanced by Chief Justice Fatzer in the dissent in Farha and In re Olander, 213 Kan. 282 (1973)(relying on United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2nd Cir. 1973)(“having the chief prosecuting officer pass on application which his assistants prepare and, after he has approved them, having them presented to the issuing judge. [The objective of 18 U.S.C. 2516(2)] will not be furthered by requiring the chief prosecuting officer to appear personally before the issuing judge.”). The district court that reviewed the application procedure in this case held that this position was a misapplication of the relevant authorities. I am responsible for the delegation and the error.

7. As a federal appellate judge with the duty to apply the applicable precedents, how would you ensure that relevant statutes and precedents are not overlooked, as you concede happened here?

Response: Due to the responsibilities and demands of the job of Attorney General in many different areas of law, I relied on briefings or memoranda from Deputy and Assistant Attorneys General on legal cases and matters assigned to them or in their area of expertise. I usually would not re-research the legal conclusions or re-read the case law relied upon by these Deputy or Assistant Attorneys General. Previously, when I served as a state district court judge for three years, I researched the legal issues and read the case law on issues that appeared before me. If confirmed as a circuit court judge, I would continue my previous practice and review the briefs submitted in the case, all the relevant
cases and statutes at issue, and any other legal sources important to the case. I believe this would ensure that relevant statutes and precedents are not overlooked.

8. In Question 5, I asked you about former Solicitor General Charles Fried’s statement about the constitutionality of an unfunded mandate. You said you were not familiar with Mr. Fried’s testimony, and for that reason did not answer the question. Attached for your convenience is a copy of Mr. Fried’s testimony (see pp. 34-35 for the relevant statement). Please take this opportunity to review his testimony and provide a thoughtful answer to the question.

Response: From the reference cited I noted the following comment by Professor Fried:

“FRIED:

The case that comes to mind is South Dakota against Dole, which required the states -- and that wasn't even a funding mandate -- required the states to alter the drinking age, and threatened them with the withdrawal of 5 percent of highway funds if they didn't comply.

And the Supreme Court said, "Well, 5 percent is so little that it's not that much of a threat."

Implicit in that is would you believe 10 percent? How about 50 percent?

_And the unfunded mandate here is huge. And that's why I said to Senator Grassley that I think there really is a constitutional worry about that._” (Fried Testimony provided with these questions, pgs 34-35, emphasis in the copy provided.)

I agree with Professor Fried’s testimony that _South Dakota v. Dole_, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) is the Supreme Court case that provides guidance in analyzing when a congressional incentive moves from pressure into unconstitutional coercion. In _South Dakota_, the Supreme Court determined that the incentive offered by Congress to states to raise the drinking age did not rise to the level of improper coercion. Professor Fried asks whether a financial penalty of 10% or 50% imposed on a state for failing to follow a mandate imposed on the states would cross the line drawn by the Supreme Court in _South Dakota_. Because it is difficult to know the legal and factual context in which a challenge may be presented and because the issue could come before me if confirmed, it would be inappropriate to state agreement in advance on when pressure turns to compulsion in an unfunded mandate. Professor Fried’s comment concludes that the unfunded mandate in the federal healthcare legislation is huge and “is a constitutional worry. . .” His comment about “constitutional worry” in the federal healthcare legislation has been reflected in the opinions of the various federal district courts that have ruled on the federal healthcare legislation. As Attorney General my office reviewed the constitutional issues in the federal healthcare legislation and on April 2, 2010, concluded that there was little to no chance of succeeding on the constitutional claims. Subsequent to that decision several federal district courts have ruled on the constitutional concern identified by Professor
Fried. As a former state official I am concerned about the challenges presented by the federal government placing unfunded mandates on the state. If confirmed, were challenges to the federal healthcare legislation to come before me, as I stated in response to your first set of questions 1(b), given my public statements on the federal healthcare legislation I believe recusal may be appropriate.

9. In Question 6(b), you did not answer whether or not you believed it was a fair and accurate characterization of *Citizens United v. FEC* to say that it “reversed a century of law.” Please take this opportunity to review the decision, and provide a thoughtful response regarding whether or not you believe this characterization is accurate.

Response: In *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), the Court analyzes conflicting lines of First Amendment cases and overrules *Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce*, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)(holding “that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity”) and *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)(overruling the part relating to a statutory restriction on independent corporate expenditures). *Citizens United*, 130 S. Ct. at 886, 913. The Supreme Court states that in overruling *Austin* “[w]e return to the principle established in *Buckley* and *Bellotti*, that the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.” *Citizens United*, 130 S. Ct. at 913. The Court squared the facts before it with these conflicting lines of First Amendment precedent and said it was restoring pre-1990 Court precedent. If confirmed as a judge, I would faithfully apply the Supreme Court’s precedent in *Citizens United*.

10. In Question 7(a), I asked you about the consistency of Kansas’ statute providing in-state college tuition to children of illegal immigrants with 8 U.S.C. § 1623. You responded that this issue “was not considered during my time as Attorney General.” Respectfully, I did not ask whether it was ever considered during your time as Attorney General. Please take whatever time necessary and answer the question I initially asked: do you believe the Kansas statute is consistent with federal law? Why or why not? Again, I am trying to understand your approach to legal analysis; simply stating that you would apply relevant precedent does not answer the question, and is not sufficient.

Response: I have not developed an opinion on the legal issues involved in these statutes. Any conflict between the federal and state law would implicate the Supremacy Clause which states: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court has long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are “without effect.” *Maryland v. Louisiana*, 451 U.S. 725 (1981). Because this issue may come before me if confirmed, it would be inappropriate to comment on the relationship between the state and federal statutes or how I would decide such an issue. If confirmed as a judge and were this issue to come before the court, I would review the
relevant Supreme Court precedent and any applicable Tenth Circuit precedent and faithfully apply that legal authority.

11. In your response to Question 9, I asked what the concept of separation of powers means for the federal courts. In response, you stated that “[t]he separation of powers limits each branch of government to its appropriate role.” Please take this opportunity to reconsider the question, and provide a thoughtful answer regarding what you believe is the “appropriate role” for the federal courts in our system of government.

Response: Separation of powers in the United States Constitution is a foundational concept that power should not be concentrated in one branch of government and should be qualified by checks and balances within the three branches of government. Within this framework the appropriate role of the federal courts is to interpret the law. The federal courts “check” that the legislative and executive branches of government are not exceeding their authority under the Constitution. The role of the federal courts within this framework is to also “balance” or use its constitutional authority to limit the power of the other two branches when they exceed constitutional authority. The federal courts depend on the executive branch because the judiciary has “neither force nor will but merely judgment” and rely on the executive branch to enforce its judgments. *The Federalist No. 78*, p. 394 (G. Willis ed. 1982)(A. Hamilton). The role of the federal judiciary is to serve “as the bulwark[k] of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments.” *The Federalist No. 78*, p. 526 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)(A. Hamilton). That role of the federal courts is further developed in *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803), where Justice Marshall held that the Constitution was the “supreme law of the land” and that “a law repugnant to the constitution is void,” thereby establishing the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review.

12. In Question 10, I asked you what factors you would consider when determining whether to strike down an act of Congress as unconstitutional. You did not answer. Please take this opportunity to answer the question.

Response: If confirmed as a circuit court judge I would start with the presumption that laws enacted by Congress are constitutional. If Congress passes a law that is inconsistent with individual rights secured to the American people under the Constitution, such as rights secured in the Bill of Rights, it is appropriate for a judge to determine that the law as applied in the case before the court is unconstitutional, or to strike down the law as unconstitutional. Similarly, if Congress passes a law that exceeds its enumerated powers or impermissibly encroaches on state sovereignty, then it is appropriate for a judge to declare the law unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has used different factors in reviewing these different types of constitutional challenges. If confirmed as a circuit court judge I would review the Supreme Court precedent that applied to the type of review presented in the case and faithfully apply that precedent.

13. In response to Question 2 in the Additional Questions for the Record, pertaining to your handling of the legal actions relating to the prosecution of Planned...
Parenthood, you stated that you were unaware of Judge Anderson’s determination that Planned Parenthood’s records appeared to have been manufactured in violation of Kansas criminal law. Please explain why you were unaware of this important finding by Judge Anderson relating to a recent investigation by the Attorney General’s Office.

Response: I became Attorney General on January 30, 2008. More than one-half a year before I became Attorney General, the Kansas Attorney General’s Office had closed its investigation of Planned Parenthood and cleared it of criminal charges in regard to the records referenced in this question. When I became Attorney General I did not re-review any previously closed cases or engage in a review of the reasons why any cases in the office had been previously closed or whether the office had correctly or incorrectly completed its work prior to my tenure. In the mandamus case against Judge Anderson, previously filed by Attorney General Morrison in July of 2007, the same Assistant Attorneys General who handled the case prior to my tenure continued to do so. As Attorney General I was responsible for the work of all the Assistant Attorneys General in the office but I was not involved in reviewing the documents in the case or drafting the motion and show cause response filed with the Kansas Supreme Court. I did approve the documents filed by my office with the Kansas Supreme Court. These documents do not discuss the statement by Judge Anderson.

14. In Question 4 in the Additional Questions for the Record, pertaining to Morrison v. Anderson, I asked you if it was common practice for the Attorney General to interfere with subpoenas and requests for evidence by local prosecutors, and if so, to provide some examples of other cases where the Attorney General has done so. You did not answer this question. Please take this opportunity to do so.

Response: No. I am not aware of any such examples during my time as Attorney General.