February 2, 2020

The Honorable Amy Klobuchar  
Chair  
Subcommittee on Competition Policy, Antitrust, and Consumer Rights  
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Mike Lee  
Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Competition Policy, Antitrust, and Consumer Rights  
U.S. Senate

I want to thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify on the important topic of ensuring that news publishers are compensated at competitive rates for the right to access their content.¹

At the request of the News Media Alliance, I wrote a study that assesses the underpayment to news publishers from Facebook and Google (the “dominant platforms”) attributable to the power imbalance between individual news publishers and the dominant platforms, and to describe how a pending bill in Congress, the Journalism Competition and Preservation Act (JCPA), could effectuate competitive payments to all news publishers, regardless of their political bent, effectively simulating a world in which the power imbalance were removed.² My study is attached as an appendix to this testimony. In addition to the private harms to news publishers from what is likely billions of dollars per year in underpayments, allowing market forces to determine the access charge results in a host of social harms, including underemployment of journalists and other news employees, less accountability for local governments, greater spread of partisanship and misinformation, removal of economic stimulus to local economies, and a reduction in the diversity of viewpoints.

Why Antitrust Cannot Get at the Anticompetitive Conduct Addressed by the JCPA

The dominant platforms appropriate the value added of news publishers by reframing articles in rich previews containing headlines, summaries, and photos; and by curating the content alongside advertisements. This reframing and curation decreases the likelihood of a user clicking into the article, thereby depriving news publishers of clicks while enriching the dominant tech platforms. The underpayments that would be addressed via this legislation are for the right to access news publishers’ content in the first instance. The anticompetitive conduct being challenged here concerns value appropriated for news content before it has been scraped, indexed, posted, aggregated, or displayed. In economic

¹. I currently serve as an economic expert in two litigation matters, one adverse to Apple and another adverse to Google.

parlance, the platforms are exercising their “monopsony” or buying power, effectively marking down the value added of news publishers to zero, as news publishers are so beholden to the platforms for referral traffic that they have no where else to turn. Because this underpayment for access is achieved via the power imbalance, as opposed to a classic restraint in trade such as a tie-in or exclusive-dealing arrangement, the platforms’ flexing of their monopsony muscles cannot be addressed via antitrust law.

In a competitive input market for online news content, where news publishers enjoyed free agency and could play one platform against another, payments to news publishers for the right to access content would approach the incremental contribution of news publisher content (legitimate news) to the platforms’ advertising revenues. By exploiting their monopsony power over news publishers, however, the dominant platforms effectively pay a price of zero for accessing and “crawling” the news publishers’ content. My study finds that allowing current market forces to dictate the news publishers’ payments ensures that news publishers are compensated at rates significantly below competitive levels. And this underpayment results in underemployment of journalists and other news employees, as well as host of social ills associated with local news deserts, including less competent local governments, greater spread of partisanship and misinformation, removal of economic stimulus to local economies, and a reduction in the diversity of viewpoints, particularly among minority populations.

The best way to correct this market failure is for the government to permit the news publishers and broadcasters to coordinate in their dealings with the digital platforms over payment terms and conditions, as contemplated in the JCPA. Under an expanded bill being considered, the JCPA would allow a joint-negotiation entity to form that could then avail themselves of good-faith protections during a good faith negotiation period. In the event an agreement could not reached, news publishers would have the additional right to invoke “baseball-style” arbitration, in which both parties would offer their best estimate of the fair market value of the services being exchanged and a panel of arbitrators choose the most compelling offer of the two. The fair market value to be determined at arbitration would represent the news publishers’ collective contribution to the platforms’ revenues. It would not vary in proportion to the number of links the platform offered or links that were clicked through. Hence, the oft-used “link tax” reference is a misnomer. This model is very similar to Australia News Media Bargaining Code that recently resulted in payments from the tech platforms to news publishers. Current proposals being de liberated by this Committee would deviate from the Australia model, however, to ensure that large publications cannot avail themselves of the protections should they opt out of the joint-negotiation entity.

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3. Roughly 70% of all 2018 referrals to newspapers originated from Facebook and Google (including Google Search, Google News, and Google Chrome Suggestions). See John Saroff, Working Together to Make Sense of Facebook’s News Feed, CHARTBEAT, Jan. 18, 2018 (“Facebook has been an important referral partner for publishers. Chartbeat tracks just over 50 billion page views a month across thousands of publishers in 65 countries. In aggregate, 13% of those page views (and 30% of all “external” page views) are driven by referrals from Facebook. In both metrics, Facebook is the second largest referrer behind Google search which, by comparison, drives 21% of total page views and 40% of external referrals.”), available at https://blog.chartbeat.com/2018/01/18/working-together-make-sense-facebooks-news-feed/.
To compound the news publishers’ financial problems, Facebook and Google also allegedly engage in a host of classic restraints that are recognized under antitrust law and depress payments to publishers from the sale of advertisements from click-throughs to be artificially depressed. According to a complaint filed by ten state attorneys general in December 2020, Google and Facebook conspired to prevent the ascendency of a process called “header bidding,” which was used by news publishers as a workaround to reduce their reliance on Google’s ad platforms and thereby capture a larger pay share on ads sold on their sites. In particular, header bidding permitted news publishers to solicit bids for ad placements from multiple ad exchanges at once. In March 2017, Facebook announced it was testing a header-bidding program with several major publishers; but by September 2018, those plans were abandoned, as Google and Facebook entered into an agreement not to compete for news publishers. As part of the agreement, Facebook allegedly received special information and speed advantages to help it succeed in the auctions, as well as a guarantee that Facebook would win a fixed percentage of auctions that it bid on, in what appears to be a market-allocation scheme.

Google is separately being sued by a class of news publishers for unilateral exclusionary conduct, including but not limited to: (1) extending its power across the “ad stack” via acquisitions in the ad-server segment and via manipulation of its auction to favor its own ad exchange; (2) placing a tax on rival ad exchanges to discourage header bidding by publishers; and (3) requiring that publishers use Google’s ad exchange in order to get the best bids from its ad servers (a “tie in”). According to the complaint, this unilateral exclusionary conduct allegedly reduced the publishers’ pay shares on the sale of advertising from click-throughs. Like Google and Facebook’s alleged coordination to stymie header bidding, these classic restraints fall squarely within the ambit of antitrust. In any event, if news publishers are able to prevail in those antitrust lawsuits, they would recover payments for underpayments for click-throughs in the past; the JCPA would allow news publishers, by contrast, to capture competitive payments for the right to access their content going forward.

Facebook and Google Wield Monopsony Power in the Acquisition of News Publishers’ Content

Facebook and Google possess significant buying or monopsony power in the acquisition of news publisher content generally. Monopsony is the flip side to monopoly, or selling power in the output market. The relevant question here is whether Facebook or Google (or both) possess monopsony power in the acquisition of news content for their respective platforms. As it turns out, for many of the same reasons that end users and advertisers lack substitution opportunities to Facebook and Google, input providers such as merchants (for Amazon), app developers (for Apple and Google) and news publishers

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4. With no sense of self-awareness, the platforms assail the JCPA for allowing the formation of a “cartel” of newspapers. To the extent the States’ allegations concerning Project Jedi Blue are proven to be true, Google and Facebook would be the only known operating cartel in the digital news landscape. Importantly, the antitrust exemption in the JCPA would allow the news publishers to coordinate only in their dealings with dominant platforms. The news publishers would not be allowed to coordinate in their dealings with customers, workers, or any other economic agents.
(for Google and Facebook) lack substitution possibilities, and thus are beholden to these platforms. The input providers are chasing the set of customers assembled by the platforms; by locking in customers, the platforms simultaneously lock in the suppliers. Accordingly, evidence of Facebook’s and Google’s selling power in their respective output markets is also evidence of their buying power in their respective input markets. The platforms’ massive buying power can be demonstrated indirectly, via evidence of high market shares combined with high barriers to entry. For example, Facebook and Google accounted for over half of U.S. digital display advertising in 2019; combined shares in excess of 50 percent are consistent with collective market power under U.S. antitrust jurisprudence. Google and Facebook capture approximately 61 percent of all digital advertising dollars because of their ability to collect consumer data across the web.

Buying power also can be proven directly via evidence of payments below competitive levels or the ability to exclude rivals. Direct evidence of the platforms’ buying power includes: (1) payments to news publishers significantly below competitive levels, (2) news publishers are compelled to accept these take-it-or-leave-it terms by the platforms, indicating the power imbalance; (3) the platforms have used exclusive agreements with third parties to exclude horizontal rivals, and they have prevented rivals from acquiring news content via acquisition.

Payments to news publishers can be measured in a “but-for” world where the platforms’ buying power were removed, thereby making the news content (input) market competitive. Economic theory dictates that in competitively supplied input markets, input providers tend to capture 100 percent of their marginal revenue product (MRP). Fortunately, the three measures of incremental revenue generated by news publishers for the platforms serve as a reasonable approximation for the news publishers’ MRP. By compelling the dominant platforms to pay news publishers the fair-market value of their value added, Congress could replicate payments to news publishers in a world absent Google and Facebook’s buying power. News content is a “must-have” input for the platforms, as news drives most of the conversation. Must-have inputs, such as broadcasting and sports networks, command something closer to their MRP for cable programming, as their selling power counteracts a portion of cable’s buying power. These must-have input providers capture pay shares of between seven and eleven percent of the cable operators’ total revenue; pay shares that vastly exceed the pay shares currently captured by news publishers from Google and Facebook.

The Social Harms Flowing from the Underpayments to News Publishers

There are myriad social harms of news publishers not receiving competitive compensation. The news industry has incurred losses in advertising revenue every year since 2006, around the time that the platforms solidified their market power over digital

6. Nicole Perrin, Facebook-Google Duopoly Won’t Crack This Year, EMARKETER, Nov. 4, 2019, available at https://www.emarketer.com/content/facebook-google-duopoly-won-t-crack-this-year.
advertising. This is not to say that Facebook’s and Google’s domination of digital advertising came entirely at the expense of news publishers. Rather, it is to provide context as to how any underpayment to news publishers can exacerbate an environment that is already quite dire. The effect of shrinking advertising revenues—in part caused by underpayment from dominant platforms—is less cash flow to support journalists, a clear employment effect flowing from the exercise of monopsony power by the dominant platforms. According to Pew Research, newsroom advertising declined from $37.8 billion in 2008 to $8.8 billion in 2020; over the same time period, newsroom employees declined from 71,070 to 30,820. As a result of the deteriorating news media landscape described above, hundreds of local news publishers have been acquired or declared bankruptcy. The elimination of local news threatens democracy. Another critical role of traditional news outlets is providing fact-based journalism in the face of disinformation campaigns. The reduction in traditional news publishers has coincided with more Americans using social media platforms to access news. Local newspapers also provide an important role in keeping governments accountable.

Moreover, the negative employment trends among news publishers, exacerbated by underpayments from the dominant platforms, can have ripple effects throughout local economies. When reporters, correspondents, and broadcasts news analysts, along with the other supporting employees at a publishing firm, lose their jobs, they lose incomes to spend at grocers, restaurants, and other local businesses. This reduction in spending can have a multiplier effect that ripples throughout a local economy and removes stimulus that was once there. There are also social harms of news publisher closure on a community, including the lack of social cohesion and a reduction in the diversity of viewpoints. These findings support a proportionate intervention to effectuate competitive payments to news publishers and thereby mitigate these social harms. At a high level, and as contemplated by the JCPA, the solution to the power imbalance is to permit news publishers to conduct joint negotiations for payments from platforms with good faith negotiations followed by, if necessary, an adequate enforcement mechanism that ensures equitable payment to all news publishers.

**Rebutting the Platforms’ Attacks on the Bill**

It is easy to rebut economic criticisms of this proposal. Detractors from this proposal, including but not limited to the platforms, have argued that: (1) This effort is meant to enrich the largest news publishers; (2) it is better to attack the power imbalance

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7. Newspaper advertising revenue has declined 82 percent by nearly $40 billion from 2000 to 2020. See Pew Research Center, Newspapers Fact Sheet, June 29, 2021, available at https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/newspapers/. Newsroom staff has declined 57 percent from 2004 to 2020. Id. Since 2000, newspaper circulation has dropped by half, with 31 million fewer daily newspapers in circulation in 2020 than were published when the century started. Id.


leading to near-zero payments for access with antitrust intervention; (3) news publishers derive significant value via referrals from platforms, which should be deducted from the value added by news publishers to platforms when determining compensation; and (4) the JCPA will lead to higher prices for consumers. I address each of these arguments and explain why they are not persuasive as a matter of economics or competition policy.

With respect to purportedly benefiting only the largest news publishers, while it is true that large news publishers benefit by coordinating with smaller news publishers in their dealings with Google, smaller news publishers benefit by even more, as small news publishers would be subjected to even greater levels of exploitation if they were compelled to deal with Google unilaterally. A handful of the very largest news publishers have a modicum of countervailing bargaining power against the platforms. This is not so for the vast majority of news publishers. Accordingly, the largest beneficiaries of this proposal are the smallest news publishers.

The argument that this proposal is meant to enrich the largest news publishers also ignores the likely allocation mechanism of a joint-negotiation entity, which would prevent large publishers from appropriating a disproportionate share of the award. Even if the allocation were done purely in proportion to a news publisher’s pro-rata share of clicks, no single news publisher would achieve all of the payments, as the allocation of clicks across news publishers is well distributed. To the extent news publishers elect to distribute some portion of funds according to full-time journalists, high-quality news sites that deliver informative yet non-click-worthy news could achieve payments in excess of their pro-rata share of clicks.

With respect to using antitrust to attack the problems raised here, greater enforcement of existing antitrust laws against Google or Facebook, even if successful, could recover only a fraction of the underpayment described here, which flows from the platforms appropriation of value added from the news publishers’ content, including from impressions, regardless of whether a news story is clicked on by a user. A Sherman Act Section 2 complaint against a platform would require publisher plaintiffs (or an agency) to (1) challenge a restraint of trade, preferably in a contract with third-party publishers or advertisers; and (2) establish a causal connection between said restraint and the underpayment to news publishers. While restraints in contracts with publishers or advertisers might be contributing to artificially suppressed news publishers’ pay shares on ads sold against news publishers’ stories generated by click-throughs, there are myriad factors, including network effects, customer lock-in, and other natural barriers to entry, also potentially contributing to the underpayment from ads sold against news publishers’ stories; at best, a successful antitrust lawsuit challenging a platform’s restraints would raise payments from that platform by the increment attributable to the restraints for ads sold against news publishers’ stories. Such a lawsuit would not address the platform’s appropriation of news publishers’ value-add from impressions that do not result in a click-through, and thus would not restore the payments to competitive levels for the entirety of the value-added by news publishers to platforms. Moreover, a successful antitrust lawsuit against (say) Google would provide zero relief for news publishers in their dealings with Facebook. And a successful antitrust lawsuit against Google or Facebook would require
several years to adjudicate, and the appeals might not be resolved for nearly a decade. In the interim, news publishers would be left twisting in the wind. Given news publishers’ precarious financial state, it is not clear how long many could survive without an intervention today.

The dominant platforms might argue that they are generating traffic for news publishers, and they are thus owed payments by the news publishers, or at least such incremental benefits should be deducted from the value added by news publishers to platform advertising revenues. This is wrong for at least two reasons. First, although the platforms designed a compelling product that retains users and advertisers via network effects, the platforms are not entitled to keep 100 percent of the incremental value that news publishers bring to their platforms. The traffic generated by the platforms should not be considered payment because news content is what brings users (and advertisers) to the platforms in the first instance. And news publishers would garner that traffic in a more competitive search or social media markets, without having to surrender access to their content as they do now.

Second, platforms are already being compensated for this traffic generation via a monopoly tax imposed on the advertising revenue. As noted above, the anticompetitive restraints that support the size of the tax are the subject of fresh antitrust litigation. Google takes a cut of 22 to 42 percent of U.S. ad spending that goes through its ad systems—two to four times as much as the fees charged by rival digital advertising exchanges. An employee at Google said the platform can get away with it because “smaller pubs don’t have alternative revenue sources.”

The purpose of granting the antitrust exemption and placing some structure on the ensuing joint negotiations is to compensate news publishers for the uncompensated value they bring to the platforms. As noted above, the platforms are reframing news stories in rich previews containing headlines, summaries, and photos. The platforms are not compensating news publishers for any of this lost traffic or lost subscription revenues. The proper focus of the inquiry should be the incremental platform advertising revenues generated by the news publishers. After all, this value added to the platforms would be the payments to news publishers in a competitive input market. Accordingly, such “offsets” should be ignored.

Finally, the notion that the JCPA will result in higher prices for consumers defies basic pricing principles and economic logic. Under the best-case scenario for news publishers, a joint-negotiation entity will achieve an award in the billions of dollars per year, which will be allocated to its members according to metrics such as pro-rata share of traffic generated and investments in journalism. From the platforms’ perspective, that payment will be considered lump-sum, which per standard pricing theory means that it will

11. Id.
not enter into their pricing calculus. By the classic Lerner index in microeconomics, only costs that vary with small changes in output affect pricing decisions. Moreover, both Google and Facebook have embraced “zero prices” for users, choosing instead to generate revenue from advertisers. That these platforms would suddenly reject this pricing model—which has succeeded wildly in drawing in users and keeping them there—due to a lump-sum transfer to news publishers is flatly uneconomic and should be rejected by this Committee as scaremongering.

Appendix: Addressing the Power Imbalance Between News Publishers and Digital Platforms: A Legislative Proposal for Effectuating Competitive Payments to Newspapers
Addressing the Power Imbalance Between News Publishers and Digital Platforms: A Legislative Proposal for Effectuating Competitive Payments to Newspapers

Hal J. Singer

Introduction and Executive Summary ................................................................. 2

I. Google and Facebook Possess Significant Buying Power in the Acquisition of Newspaper Content .................................................................................................................. 7
   A. Indirect Measures of Buying Power: High Market Shares and Barriers to Entry ................................................................................................................................. 8
      1. High Market Shares .................................................................................. 9
      2. Barriers to Entry .................................................................................. 11
   B. Direct Measures of Monopsony Power: Ability to Push Payments to Publishers Below Competitive Levels or Exclude Rival Search Engines (Google) or Rival Social Network Platforms (Facebook) ........................................ 13

II. Newspapers Would Capture Nearly All of Their Incremental Revenue Contribution in the Absence of the Platforms’ Buying Power ........................................ 15
   A. Payments to Input Providers Under Competitive Conditions .................. 15
   B. Payments to Input Providers Under Monopsony Conditions .................. 16
   C. Evidence That Payments to Newspapers Are Below Competitive Levels .... 18
      1. Current Payments to Newspapers .................................................................. 18
      2. Converting Payment Levels to Pay Shares ............................................... 19
      3. Regulatory Benchmarks ........................................................................... 20

III. Underpayment to Newspapers Results in Myriad Social Harms ..................... 22
    A. Employment (Output) Effects in the Input Market .................................. 22
    B. Removal of Economic Stimulus to Local Economies .............................. 24
    C. Threats to Democracy from News Deserts ............................................. 24
    D. The Rise of Fake News and Disinformation Campaigns ......................... 25
    E. Harms to Community and Culture ......................................................... 26

IV. The Likely Arguments Against Assigning Coordination Rights to News Publishers Are Unavailing ................................................................. 27
    A. Argument One: The Effort Is Meant to Enrich the Largest Newspapers .... 27

1 Managing Director of Econ One and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown’s McDonough School of Business. Funding for this report was provided by the News Media Alliance. The opinions here represent those of the author and not those of his affiliated institutions. The author would like to thank Madeleine Bowe, Kevin Caves, Omer Gold, Jacob Linger, and Augustus Urschel for their contributions to the report. The author is currently engaged in an antitrust case involving Google unrelated to news publishers.
B. Argument Two: It Is Better to Attack Platform Power with a Mix of Antitrust Enforcement and Other Regulations

C. Argument Three: Newspapers Derive Significant Value Via Referrals from Platforms, Which Should Be Deducted from the Value Added by Newspapers to Platforms When Determining Compensation

Conclusion

Appendix 1: Pay Shares in Comparable Industries

A. Pay Shares for Music Rightsholders

B. Pay Shares for Broadcasters in Retransmission Consent Arrangements

C. Pay Shares for Regional Sports Networks

D. Pay Shares for Athletes in Professional Sports Leagues
Introduction and Executive Summary

The purpose of this study is to explore the underpayment to newspapers from Facebook and Google attributable to the power imbalance between individual news publishers and the dominant platforms, and to describe how a pending bill in Congress, the Journalism Competition and Preservation Act (JCPA), could effectuate competitive payments to news publishers, effectively simulating a world in which the power imbalance were removed. Facebook and Google (the “dominant platforms”) appropriate the value added of news publishers generally—and newspapers specifically—by reframing articles in rich previews containing headlines, summaries, and photos; and by curating the content alongside advertisements. This reframing and curation decreases the likelihood of a user clicking into the article, thereby depriving news publishers of clicks while enriching the dominant tech platforms. By exploiting their monopsony power over newspapers, Facebook and Google effectively pay a price of zero for accessing and “crawling” the newspapers’ content.

This study finds that allowing current market forces to dictate the newspapers’ “pay shares”—that is, the portion of platform revenues that redounds to newspaper publishers—ensures that newspapers are compensated at rates significantly below competitive levels. This underpayment results in underemployment of journalists and other news employees, as well as host of social ills associated with local news deserts, including less competent local governments, greater spread of partisanship and misinformation, removal of economic stimulus to local economies, and a reduction in the diversity of viewpoints, particularly among minority populations. The best way to correct this market failure is for the government to permit the news publishers (either newspapers alone, or all news publishers) to coordinate in their dealings with the digital platforms over payment terms and conditions, as contemplated in the JCPA.

The report is not intended to isolate that portion of the underpayments to news publishers that can be attributable to the platforms’ exclusionary conduct. Facebook and Google engage in a host of potentially anticompetitive strategies vis-à-vis news publishers—both within a platform’s firm boundaries and across the platform’s firm boundaries with third parties—that likely sustain the power imbalance and contribute to the suppression of payments to news publishers. For

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2 H. R. 5190 (March 7, 2019), § 3(b)(1)(A).
3 I use the term “news publishers” to refer to any publisher of legitimate news content, through any medium. I use the term “newspapers” to refer to the subset of news publishers in the newspaper industry.
4 Damien Cave, An Australia With No Google? The Bitter Fight Behind a Drastic Threat, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 22, 2021 (citing Tama Leaver, a professor of internet studies at Curtin University in Perth).
example, Facebook’s algorithm rewards click-worthy stories, an attribute of stories not produced by legitimate news publishers, by moving them to the top of users’ news feed. Facebook also co-mingles sponsored content or ads alongside user-generated content in its news feed, thereby equating the quality of legitimate news and potentially fake news (not all sponsored content is fake news). Both strategies tend to commodify legitimate news, diminishing its value. Prior to introducing its Instant Articles program, Facebook defaulted users to an in-app browser that degraded the download speeds of news publishers. News publishers care about download speeds because users are quick to abandon a story that takes too long to download; news publishers can avoid this degradation by complying with Facebook’s porting requirement, but at a cost of losing clicks (that would have occurred on their own sites) and thus advertising dollars. Because legitimate news organizations need advertising revenues to staff reporters and editors, Facebook’s policies discriminate in favor of intentionally fabricated news, which has only minimal quality and managerial costs, and against legitimate news. In December 2020, Facebook unveiled an AI assistant tool called “TLDR,” which reportedly “could summarize news articles in bullet points so that a user wouldn’t have to read the full piece,” further depriving news publishers of traffic. Although Facebook has yet to release it, the new tool reportedly could also provide audio narration, which conveniently would not include a link to the original article.

Google employs a different set of potentially anticompetitive strategies against news publishers. For example, it inserts snippets of news stories from legitimate news sites on its search results page, which induces some users to forgo clicking on the link and thereby deprives news sites of clicks and the associated

6 Postings with comments and likes on a person’s status are given more weight in the Facebook algorithm. See, e.g., The Facebook Algorithm Explained, BRANDWATCH, Jan. 9, 2019, available at https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/the-facebook-algorithm-explained/. A change to Facebook’s algorithm in January 2018 to prioritize content based on audience engagements has been estimated to have decreased referral traffic from Facebook to news publishers’ sites by one third. How Much Have Facebook Algorithm Changes Impacted Publishers?, MARKETING CHARTS, Apr. 4, 2019, available at https://www.marketingcharts.com/digital/social-media-107974.

7 Christopher Mims, Facebook Is Still In Denial About Its Biggest Problem, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 1, 2017 (“On a network where article and video posts can be sponsored and distributed like ads, and ads themselves can go as viral as a wedding-fail video, there is hardly a difference between the two.”), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-is-still-in-denial-about-its-biggest-problem-1506855607.

8 Sally Hubbard, Why Fake News Is an Antitrust Problem, FORBES, Jan. 10, 2017, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbybytes/2017/01/10/why-fake-news-is-an-antitrust-problem/?sh=70b171930f1e (“In a test by The Capitol Forum, Facebook’s in-app browser loaded on average three seconds slower than regular Safari on iOS. Studies show that 40 percent of desktop users and 53 percent of mobile users abandon websites that take more than three seconds to load.”).


10 Facebook appears to reward content that appears on Instant Articles. See id. (“According to Facebook, users click on Instant Articles 20 percent more than other articles, and they share Instant Articles 30 percent more than mobile web articles on average.”).

11 Id.
advertising revenues. Like Facebook, Google also aggregates news sources with and without editorial oversight; such commodification (or “atomization”) of news can also cause reputational harm to news publishers by signaling no quality difference between replicators of news and the original source. Google’s placement of news on accelerated mobile pages (AMP) required the creation of costly and otherwise unnecessary parallel websites by publishers that are hosted, stored and served from Google’s servers rather than the publishers. To the extent that Google and news publishers are horizontal competitors for the same readership and advertisers, this conduct can be understood as a form of raising rival’s costs. When a publisher attempts to avoid this AMP-related incremental cost by moving its content behind a paywall, its rise in subscriptions is offset by declines in traffic from Google and other platforms.

According to a complaint filed by ten state attorneys general in December 2020, Google and Facebook conspired to prevent the ascendancy of a process called “header bidding,” which was used by news publishers as a workaround to reduce their reliance on Google’s ad platforms and thereby capture a larger pay share on their sites. In particular, header bidding permitted news publishers to solicit bids for ad placements from multiple ad exchanges at once. In March 2017, Facebook announced it was testing a header-bidding program with several major publishers; but by September 2018, those plans were abandoned, as Google and Facebook entered into an agreement not to compete for news publishers. As part of the agreement, Facebook allegedly received special information and speed advantages to help it succeed in the auctions, as well as a guarantee that Facebook would win a fixed percentage of auctions that it bid on, in what appears to be a market-allocation scheme.

Although these strategies and restraints are consistent with the claim that Facebook and Google enjoy monopsony power vis-à-vis news publishers, and
although they likely support the platforms’ ability to underpay news publishers, isolating the incremental harms flowing from a particular anticompetitive restraint is outside the scope of this report. In contrast to an antitrust matter, which would focus on a set of restraints, this report focuses on the underpayments to news publishers flowing from the power imbalance between the platforms and individual news publishers generally, whether achieved by natural barriers or artificial barriers (restraints) or some combination of the two. In a competitive input market for online news content, where news publishers enjoyed free agency and could play one platform against another, payments to news publishers would approach the incremental contribution of news publisher content (legitimate news) to the platforms’ advertising revenues.

This report is organized as follows. Part I assesses the significant buying (monopsony) power of Facebook and Google in the acquisition of news publisher content generally. Monopsony is the flip side to monopoly, or selling power in the output market. The relevant question here is whether Facebook or Google (or both) possess monopsony power in the acquisition of news content for their respective platforms. As it turns out, for many of the same reasons that end users and advertisers lack substitution opportunities to Facebook and Google, input providers such as merchants (for Amazon), app developers (for Apple and Google) and news publishers (for Google and Facebook) lack substitution possibilities, and thus are beholden to these platforms. The input providers are chasing the set of customers assembled by the platforms; by locking in customers, the platforms simultaneously lock in the suppliers. Accordingly, evidence of Facebook's and Google’s selling power in their respective output markets is also evidence of their buying power in their respective input markets. The platforms’ massive buying power can be demonstrated indirectly, via evidence of high market shares combined with high barriers to entry. For example, Facebook and Google accounted for over half of U.S. digital display advertising in 2019; combined shares in excess of 50 percent are consistent with collective market power under U.S. antitrust jurisprudence. Buying

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21 Indeed, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission recently sued Google and Facebook, respectively, under the antitrust laws, alleging restraints in support of monopolization in some of the same markets (such as advertising and search advertising) as those studied here. Complaint, U.S. et al. v. Google LLC, Oct. 20, 2018, ¶1 (“For many years, Google has used anticompetitive tactics to maintain and extend its monopolies in the markets for general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising—the cornerstones of its empire.”) [hereafter Google Complaint]; Complaint, Federal Trade Commission v. Facebook Inc., Dec. 9, 2020, ¶28 [hereafter Facebook Complaint] (“By monopolizing personal social networking, Facebook thereby also deprives advertisers of the benefits of competition, such as lower advertising prices and increased choice, quality, and innovation related to advertising.”).

power also can be proven *directly* via evidence of payments below competitive levels or the ability to exclude rivals. Direct evidence of the platforms’ buying power includes: (1) payments to news publishers significantly below competitive levels, (2) news publishers are compelled to accept these take-it-or-leave-it terms by the platforms, indicating the power imbalance; (3) the platforms have used exclusive agreements with third parties to exclude horizontal rivals, and they have prevented rivals from acquiring news content via acquisition.

**Part II** explores how payments to newspapers would be measured in a “but-for” world where the platforms’ buying power were removed, thereby making the news content (input) market competitive. Economic theory dictates that in competitively supplied input markets, input providers tend to capture 100 percent of their marginal revenue product (MRP). Fortunately, the three measures of incremental revenue generated by newspapers for the platforms serve as a reasonable approximation for the newspapers’ collective MRP. By compelling the dominant platforms to pay newspapers the fair-market value of their value added, Congress could replicate payments to news publishers in a world absent Google and Facebook’s buying power. Newspapers are a “must-have” input for the platforms, as news drives most of the conversation. Must-have inputs, such as broadcasting and sports networks, command something closer to their MRP, as their selling power counteracts a portion of cable’s buying power. These must-have input providers capture pay shares of between seven and eleven percent of the cable operators’ total revenue; pay shares that vastly exceed the pay shares currently captured by newspapers from Google and Facebook.

In **Part III**, I assess the myriad social harms of newspapers not receiving competitive compensation. The news industry has incurred losses in advertising revenue every year since 2006,\(^\text{23}\) around the time that the platforms solidified their market power over digital advertising. This is not to say that Facebook’s and Google’s domination of digital advertising came entirely at the expense of newspapers. Rather, it is to provide context as to how *any* underpayment to newspapers can exacerbate an environment that is already quite dire. The effect of shrinking advertising revenues—in part caused by underpayment from dominant platforms—is less cash flow to support journalists, a clear employment effect flowing from the exercise of monopsony power by the dominant platforms. Employment among newspaper employees fell from 71,000 in 2008 to 31,000 in 2020.\(^\text{24}\) As a result of the deteriorating news media landscape described above, hundreds of local newspapers have been acquired or declared bankruptcy.\(^\text{25}\) The elimination of local news threatens democracy. Another critical role of traditional

\(^{23}\) *Id.*


news outlets is providing fact-based journalism in the face of disinformation campaigns. The reduction in traditional newspapers has coincided with more Americans using social media platforms to access news. Moreover, the negative employment trends among newspapers, exacerbated by underpayments from the dominant platforms, can have ripple effects throughout local economies. When reporters, correspondents, and broadcasts news analysts, along with the other supporting employees at a publishing firm, lose their jobs, they lose incomes to spend at grocers, restaurants, and other local businesses. This reduction in spending can have a multiplier effect that ripples throughout a local economy and removes stimulus that was once there. Finally, there are also social harms of news publisher closure on a community, including the lack of social cohesion and a reduction in the diversity of viewpoints.

These findings support a proportionate intervention to effectuate competitive payments to newspapers and thereby mitigate these social harms. At a high level, and as contemplated by the JCPA, the solution to the power imbalance is to permit newspapers to collectively bargain for payments from platforms, with voluntary negotiations between the platform and newspaper collective, followed by, if necessary, an adequate enforcement mechanism that ensures equitable payment to all news publishers. Part IV provides a prebuttal of anticipated economic criticisms of this proposal. Detractors from this proposal, including but not limited to the platforms, will likely argue that: (1) This effort is meant to enrich the largest newspapers; (2) it is better to attack platform power with antitrust intervention; and (3) newspapers derive significant value via referrals from platforms, which should be deducted from the value added by newspapers to platforms when determining compensation. I address each of these arguments and explain why they are not persuasive as a matter of economics or competition policy.

I. Google and Facebook Possess Significant Buying Power in the Acquisition of Newspaper Content

Monopsony, or buying power in the input market, is the flip side to monopoly, or selling power in the output market. Some firms, like single-company towns, might enjoy power on the buying side for labor, but lack selling power in any output market. Other firms, like Apple, might enjoy selling power in the sale of laptops due to brand prestige, but lack buying power over office supplies or any other standard inputs used by thousands of other firms. And still other firms possess both buying power and selling power. The relevant question here is whether Facebook or Google (or both) possess monopsony power in the acquisition of news content for their respective platforms. As it turns out, for many of the same

Social harms are a form of “negative externalities”: costs not fully borne by parties to the transactions at issue—the news publishers and dominant tech platforms—but instead by society at large. Degradation in fact-based news coverage has been found to impose substantial long-term costs to society. See, e.g., Roberto Cavazos, The Economic Cost Of Bad Actors On The Internet: Fake News In 2019, available at https://www.cheq.ai/fakenews (estimating that “the epidemic of online fake news is costing the global economy $78 billion each year.”).
reasons that end users and advertisers lack substitution opportunities to Facebook and Google, input providers such as merchants (for Amazon), app developers (for Apple and Google) and news publishers (for Google and Facebook) lack substitution possibilities, and thus are beholden to these platforms. The input providers are chasing the set of customers assembled by the platforms; by locking in customers, the platforms simultaneously lock in the suppliers. Accordingly, evidence of Facebook’s and Google’s selling power in their respective output markets is also evidence of their buying power in their respective input markets.

A. Indirect Measures of Buying Power: High Market Shares and Barriers to Entry

In April 2020, Facebook and other social media groups were a source of news for 47 percent of Americans, and 73 percent reported getting news from any online source (including from social media). Indeed, Facebook has become the world’s most popular source of news. According to testimony submitted to the Antitrust Judiciary Subcommittee, news publishers feel extremely beholden to Google and Facebook for accessing viewers and advertisers. The Judiciary Report concludes that “several dominant firms have an outsized influence over the distribution and monetization of trustworthy sources of news online, undermining the availability of high-quality sources of journalism.” A small change in an algorithm by either platform can materially decrease traffic to news publisher sites.

In interviews with staff of the Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee, “numerous businesses described how dominant platforms [including Google and Facebook] exploit this gatekeeper power to dictate terms and extract concessions that third parties would not consent to in a competitive market.” News publishers in particular testified that “dominant firms can impose unilateral terms on publishers, such as take-it-or-leave-it revenue sharing agreements.” This evidence is consistent with monopsony power. In addition to the House Antitrust Subcommittee, which found Facebook is a monopolist over social networks, the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the UK’s House of Lords, Germany’s

29 Majority Report at 62.
30 Id. at 62-63.
31 Id. at 63.
32 Id. at 39.
33 Id. at 64 (citing Submission of Source 140).
34 Competition & Mkts. Auth., Online Platforms and Digital Advertising, Market Study Final Report 26 (July 1, 2020) (finding that Facebook’s “market power derives in large part from strong network -8-
Federal Cartel Office, and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) have all found Facebook enjoy monopoly power in the output market for social networks. Indeed, the ACCC concluded that Facebook and Google have significant buying power over the distribution of news online: “Google and Facebook are the gateways to online news media for many consumers.”

As demonstrated below, buying power can be proven directly via evidence of payments below competitive levels or the ability to exclude rivals. Buying power can also be demonstrated indirectly, via evidence of high market shares combined with high barriers to entry.

1. High Market Shares

In a competitive market for online search, news publishers could play one platform against another in an effort to extract as high a payment as possible for their input (legitimate news). But there are simply no other viable alternatives, as Google controls the vast majority of searches, and thus eyeballs. As of July 2020, Google accounted for a combined 89 percent of the U.S. desktop search (81 percent) and mobile search (94 percent) markets. Impressively, Google has built upon this market share for more than a decade: A 2009 internal Google document estimated Google’s share of general search in the United States to be 71.5 percent, followed by Yahoo with 17.0 percent, and Bing with 7.5 percent. The United Kingdom’s CMA estimated that, as of mid-2020, Google’s index of the web is three to five times the size of Bing’s. Google’s dominance in online search gives it dominance over the effects stemming from its large network of connected users and the limited interoperability it allows to other social media platforms.

35 House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee, Breaking News? The Future of UK Journalism, 1st Report of Session 2019–21 (HL Paper 176) (Nov. 19, 2020) (“This change in the business model of journalism has created an existential threat to the industry, particularly combined with a host of other challenges ranging from a surge in ‘fake news’ to the ability of giant technology platforms such as Facebook and Google to undercut the power of publishers and their revenues.”) available at https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3707/documents/36111/default/.
36 See Bundeskartellamt, B6-22/16, Case Summary, Facebook, Exploitative business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GWB for inadequate data processing, 8 (Feb. 15, 2019) (“The facts that competitors can be seen to exit the market and that there is a downward trend in the user-based market shares of the remaining competitors strongly indicate a market tipping process which will result in Facebook.com becoming a monopolist.”) available at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Missbrauchsaufsicht/2019/B6-22-16.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4.
38 Id. at 226.
40 Id. at 177.
41 Id. at 179 (citing Marissa Mayer email).
search advertising market: As of 2019, Google controlled nearly three quarters of the search advertising market.\(^{43}\)

Similarly, Facebook (including its acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp) is by far the most popular social networking platform on the planet. As of December 2019, Facebook had 1.8 billion monthly active persons (MAP), WhatsApp had 2.0 billion MAP, and Instagram had 1.4 billion MAP.\(^{44}\) Its closest social networking competitors had far fewer monthly active users: Snapchat had 443 million MAP, Twitter had 582 million MAP, and LinkedIn had 260 million MAP.\(^{45}\) Facebook reports 2.5 billion daily active users across its family of social networking platforms.\(^{46}\) According to an internal report obtained by the House Subcommittee, from September 2017 to September 2018, Facebook alone reached more than 75 percent of U.S. Internet users.\(^{47}\) Based on Facebook’s production to the Subcommittee, social media users spent more time on Facebook (48.6 minutes per day) than on Snapchat (21 minutes) or Twitter (21.6 minutes) in 2018.\(^{48}\)

The two platforms monetize access to their users via the sale of advertising. Given their control over end users, the market for digital advertising also is highly concentrated. According to eMarketer, Facebook accounted for 42.2 percent U.S. digital display advertising in 2019, while Google accounted for 10.6 percent.\(^{49}\) The UK’s CMA similarly found that Facebook and Instagram generated over half of display advertising revenues in 2019 in the United Kingdom.\(^{50}\) Combined shares in excess of 50 percent are consistent with collective market power under U.S. antitrust jurisprudence.\(^{51}\) Moreover, their combined shares are growing: As of 2017,


\(^{44}\) Majority Report at 132.

\(^{45}\) *Id.* at 92. The House Report does not consider TikTok to be a social media platform. *Id.* at 93 (“Although it meets the broad definition of social media as a social app for distributing and consuming video content, TikTok is not a social network.”). And LinkedIn has been relegated to a “niche strategy” of appealing to professional connections. *Id.* at 91. It bears noting that the FTC’s recent antitrust complaint against Facebook does not include LinkedIn in the relevant market definition. *Facebook Complaint* ¶ 58 (“Personal social networking is distinct from, and not reasonably interchangeable with, specialized social networking services like those that focus on professional connections.”). I nonetheless reference LinkedIn’s statistics here to be over-inclusive.

\(^{46}\) *Id.* at 132.

\(^{47}\) *Id.* at 137 (citing Cunningham Memo).

\(^{48}\) *Id.* at 138.


\(^{50}\) Competition & Mkts. Auth. Report at 10.

\(^{51}\) The concept of collective market power is well-understood in antitrust. *See, e.g.*, Remarks of J. Thomas Rosch Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, June 1, 2009 (“But firms who are participants in a duopoly or a tight oligopoly market collectively enjoy power that is akin to monopoly power in the sense that that they have the power to increase prices and reduce output in the market as a whole.”); Daniel Crane, 90 *Market Power Without Market Definition*, NOTRE DAME LAW REV. 31-79 (2014) (“The Justice Department’s high-profile case against Apple220 and five major book
Google and Facebook accounted for 99 percent of year-over-year growth in U.S. digital advertising revenue. According to Morgan Stanley, in the first quarter of 2016, 85 cents of every new dollar spent in online advertising went to Google or Facebook. This level of dominance implies that the two platforms can push down payments to news publishers below competitive levels.

Facebook and Google have leveraged their platform power into vertical markets that match advertisers to publishers, formerly occupied by independent “ad tech” intermediaries such as LiveRamp. CMA estimates that Google captures over 50 percent of the search and digital display advertising market across the ad tech stack. This power over the ad tech stack allows Google to exercise buying power vis-à-vis all publishers, including news publishers, as noted at the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing in September 2020. And in December 2020, ten states brought an antitrust suit against Google alleging monopolization of the ad tech stack. The House Antitrust Judiciary Subcommittee attributes these high shares of digital advertising to high barriers to entry, specifically to behavioral data online, which can be used in targeted advertising; advertisers can only access these data through engagement with Facebook’s and Google’s ad tech. Their advantage also derives from the aforementioned network effects—the larger the platform, the more efficient for the advertiser who can measure frequency to particular consumers and can buy larger segments efficiently.

### 2. Barriers to Entry

The discussion in the Introduction pertained to artificial barriers to entry or tactics employed by the dominant platforms, some of which likely contribute to the power imbalance between platforms and news publishers. Other barriers to entry that limit outside options for news publishers derive from natural forces. For publishers concerning e-book pricing rests on seemingly obvious evidence of the exercise of collective market power creating anticompetitive effects.”; Einer Elhauge, How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy—And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It, HARVARD BUS. LAW. REVIEW 207-286 (2020) (“To whatever extent one thinks managers do pay attention to vote share or re-election odds, this new economic analysis mathematically proves that prices will be increased by high levels of horizontal shareholding across a set of firms that have collective market power.”).


56 Texas Complaint, supra.

57 Majority Report at 131.
example, Facebook and Google enjoy strong network effects that keep would-be rival social network platforms at bay. As the number of users on Google’s online search platform increases, advertisers gain access to a larger trove of consumer data, which cannot be offered by a rival. And as more users engage with Facebook’s social network, rival social networks have a harder time attracting customers, as no one wants to be alone on a network. Social network platforms must attract a critical mass of users to become attractive to advertisers.\textsuperscript{58} Social \textit{network} platforms “facilitate their users finding, interacting, and networking with other people they already know online,” in contrast, social \textit{media} platforms “facilitate the distribution and consumption of content.”\textsuperscript{59} Unlike a social media sites such as YouTube, social \textit{network} platforms have a “robust social graph” connecting content among a group of friends—that graph is extremely difficult to assemble for a social networking entrant.\textsuperscript{60} Accordingly, the Majority Report concludes that YouTube and other social \textit{media} sites do not compete against Facebook in any meaningful sense.

Switching costs also prevent competition for these platforms vis-à-vis news publishers. Facebook’s users cannot take their photos and personal information to an upstart.\textsuperscript{61} Google and Facebook also enjoy strong data advantages arising from their incumbency, providing further user lock-in.\textsuperscript{62} Because website performance degrades with additional "crawlers" obtaining data to create a webpage index, most websites only allow one crawler, which is Google’s “Googlebot,” blocking any new search engine crawler.\textsuperscript{63} The only English-language search engines that maintain their own comprehensive webpage index are Google and Bing; Yahoo and DuckDuckGo purchase access to the index from Google or Bing.\textsuperscript{64} Finally, online search and social networking markets are prone to tipping towards monopoly because incumbents can exploit economies of scale and scope. Facebook can spread its fixed costs over a billion worldwide monthly active users,\textsuperscript{65} a massive scale economy. Because Google offers complementary services in addition to general search (e.g., maps, local business answers, news, images, videos, definitions, and “quick answers”), Google enjoys additional scope economies; a rival search engine would have to offer a similar suite of products to compete effectively.

\textsuperscript{58} Id. at 89.
\textsuperscript{59} Id. at 91.
\textsuperscript{60} Id. at 91.
\textsuperscript{61} Id. at 144 (citing Omidyar Network Report and Production of Facebook).
\textsuperscript{62} Id. at 43-44.
\textsuperscript{63} Id. at 79 (citing research by Zack Maril).
\textsuperscript{64} Id. at 79.
\textsuperscript{65} Statista, Leading Countries Based on Facebook Audience Size as of October 2020, \textit{available at} https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on-number-of-facebook-users/ (estimating 2.7 billion monthly active users worldwide and 190 million in the United States). The House Judiciary Committee estimates Facebook has 1.8 billion “monthly active persons” (MAPs), not including the MAPs of Instagram and WhatsApp. \textit{Majority Report} at 92 (“The social network marketplace is highly concentrated. Facebook (1.8 billion users) and its family of products—WhatsApp (2.0 billion users), Instagram (1.4 billion users)—have significantly more users and time spent on its platform than its closest competitors, Snapchat (443 million users) or Twitter (582 million users).”).
B. Direct Measures of Monopsony Power: Ability to Push Payments to Publishers Below Competitive Levels or Exclude Rival Search Engines (Google) or Rival Social Network Platforms (Facebook)

At the Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee’s sixth hearing, Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-WA) noted that Google’s control over both the buy-side and sell-side of the ad stack allowed Google to “set rates very low as a buyer of ad space from newspapers, depriving them of their ad revenue, and then also to sell high to small businesses who are very dependent on advertising on your platform.”66 In Part II.C., I review the actual payments and offers made by Facebook and Google to newspapers to date; that the two platforms are able to impose payments significantly below competitive levels (in many cases, a payment of zero) and below the pay shares for other “must-have” input providers in comparable industries is direct evidence of their monopsony power.

In 2020, the ACCC found that the power imbalance between platforms and news publishers has “resulted in news media businesses accepting less favourable terms for the inclusion of news on digital platform services than they would otherwise agree to,”67 That news publishers are compelled to accept these take-it-or-leave-it terms is also consistent with the claim that platforms’ enjoy significant buying power; if news publishers had alternative pathways to advertisers and viewers, and if other parameters of the contract such as pricing were held constant, they might not accept these “less favorable” terms.

Another form of direct evidence of monopsony power is the ability to exclude rival platforms, which would otherwise put upward pressure on payments to news publishers. Google has used exclusive agreements to ensure its prime real estate on the browser and home page of the mobile user screen. In particular, Google imposed exclusionary terms in contracts effectively requiring phone and tablet makers that used its Android operating system to pre-install both Chrome and Google Search.68 Among desktop browsers, Google Search enjoys default placement in 87 percent of browsers, equal to the sum of Chrome (51 percent of the U.S. browser market), Safari (31 percent), and Firefox (5 percent).69 Among mobile phones, Google Search is the default on Android and on Apple’s iOS mobile operating system, accounting for nearly all smartphones in the United States.70 According to the House

66 CEO Hearing Transcript at 169 (Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), Member, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm on the Judiciary).
68 Majority Report at 177.
69 Id. at 81.
70 Id. at 82.
Subcommittee’s review, as well as antitrust analyses,71 Google conditioned access to the Google Play Store on Android devices on making Google Search the default search engine, a requirement that gave Google a significant advantage over competing search engines; Google also used revenue-sharing agreements to establish default positions on Apple’s Safari browser (on both desktop and mobile) and Mozilla’s Firefox.72 In October 2020, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division commenced litigation to challenge several of those exclusionary agreements.73

The platforms also excluded rivals from acquiring news content via acquisition. Facebook acquired two large rival social network platforms, Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014. According to internal documents produced to the House Subcommittee, Facebook “acquired firms it viewed as competitive threats to protect and expand its dominance in the social networking market.”74 Similarly, Google acquired DoubleClick in 2007 and AdMob in 2010 in their infancies, both of whom could have evolved into serious horizontal rivals to Google in the market for digital advertising; indeed, DoubleClick arguably had reached significant scale to impose meaningful price discipline on Google at the time of its acquisition.75

Potential horizontal competitors to Facebook often enter as a complement to Facebook’s offering by relying on the Facebook’s application programming interfaces (APIs) called Facebook’s Open Graph. When Facebook detects that an app is too close of a substitute or presents a threat to Facebook’s monopoly, it can deny access to its API to foreclose competition. For example, Facebook restricted API access to Pinterest, a visual discovery engine for finding ideas like recipes or style inspiration, and Facebook’s CEO admitted that Pinterest was a competitor to Facebook during the House hearings.76 Internal documents reveal that Facebook perceived that Vine, a video-sharing app acquired by Twitter, had “replicated Facebook’s core News Feed functionality,” and cut off Vine’s access to Facebook APIs;77 Twitter shuttered the app in 2016. Other perceived rivals that lost access to

71 Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Android and Competition Law: Exploring and Assessing Google’s Practices in Mobile, 12 EUR. COMPETITION JOURNAL 159-194 (2016) (“… Google’s MADA strategy leverages the company’s market power in certain services and apps for which there is no clear substitute (most notably Google Play and YouTube) in order to compel device manufacturers wishing to manufacture commercially-viable devices to install other services and apps (including Google Search and Google Maps) for which there are substitutes. This is a clear case of tying.”).
72 Majority Report at 82.
74 Majority Report at 149.
76 Hal Singer, Top 10 Admissions from Tech CEOs Secured at the Antitrust Hearing, PROMARKET, July 30, 2020.
77 Majority Report at 167.
Facebook’s API include MessageMe (competing with Facebook Messenger) and Arc (competing with Facebook).  

Similarly, the most likely horizontal competitors to Google’s search, such as local restaurant reviews, begin as complements in vertical search. When Google spies a potential threat, it can invade the vertical space and use its gatekeeping power to steer searches to its affiliated clone. Not only is this strategy effective at extending its monopoly into the edge for vertical search, but also at preserving its monopoly in general search. Google also demanded that certain verticals permit Google to scrape their user-generated content, further impairing competition.

II. Newspapers Would Capture Nearly All of Their Incremental Revenue Contribution in the Absence of the Platforms’ Buying Power

This section demonstrates, using economic theory, that newspapers would capture something close to their MRP in the absence of Facebook’s and Google’s buying power. Using standard economic principles, I show how a buyer of news, such as Facebook or Google, can still earn substantial profit from the deployment of news, even when it obliged to compensate newspapers at a competitive rate, defined by the MRP.

A. Payments to Input Providers Under Competitive Conditions

Under competitive conditions, standard economic models predict that each input to production receives compensation (the “factor price”) equal its MRP, which in turn predicts the share of revenue paid to that input. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, a firm that lacks monopsony power faces a horizontal (or “perfectly elastic”) supply curve for each factor of production. For example, if the factor in question is labor—meaning that the employer is buyer—and if the employer faces a perfectly competitive labor market, then the employer takes the market wage as given, and can hire as much labor as it requires at the market wage, $w_c$. Accordingly, the price of labor cannot be affected by changes in the quantity demanded (purchased) by the employer, $LD$. As illustrated in Figure 1, the buyer has a downward-sloping demand curve for the factor of production, reflecting declining marginal productivity as more and more of the factor is used. As long as the demand curve for the factor is above the (horizontal) supply curve, it is economically rational for the employer to

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78 Id. at 168–69.
79 Id. at 84.
80 Elementary economics shows that competitive firms pay labor a share of revenue commensurate with labor’s productivity, based on the marginal product of labor. See, e.g., ROY RUFFIN & PAUL GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 331-36 (Harper Collins 5th ed. 1993) (explaining that standard economic theory makes predictions regarding the share of payments made to labor that are borne out in the data; economic theory explains why the share of payments going to labor remained relatively constant over several decades (from 1948 to 1990) even though the capital stock more than doubled over this time period). See also MICHAEL KATZ & HARVEY ROSEN, MICROECONOMICS 264-265 (Irwin McGraw-Hill 3rd ed. 1998)
continue purchasing more of the factor, because the marginal benefits of doing so exceed the marginal costs.

**Figure 1: Competitive ("Perfectly Elastic") Factor Supply Curve**

![Factor Supply Curve Diagram]

The same principles apply to any perfectly fungible, competitively supplied factor of production, such as paper clips: Virtually any businesses can presumably purchase as many perfectly interchangeable paper clips as it requires at the market price. Because the supply of paperclips is (from the point of view of any individual buyer) effectively unlimited, an individual business cannot bid up the market price of paperclips by purchasing “too many” of them, nor can it suppress the market price of paperclips by purchasing “too few.”

Importantly, that the factor price is equal to MRP does not necessarily imply that the buyer earns zero profit from the factor. As illustrated in Figure 1, whenever the factor demand curve is downward-sloping, the buyer can earn profit on the inframarginal units of the factor (to the left of competitive output along the labor demand curve, where the buyer is willing to pay more than the competitive wage). Even under perfect competition, the inframarginal units of the factor generate more revenue than they are paid. The buyer’s profit on the inframarginal units is given by the area of the triangle under the factor demand curve. It bears noting that even if newspapers were to capture 100 percent of their incremental revenue contribution under a regulated outcome, the platforms would continue to earn margins—equal to the difference between MRP and payments—on all of the other (non-newspaper) input providers to their platform.

**B. Payments to Input Providers Under Monopsony Conditions**

In markets with monopsony power, buyers maximize profits by depressing factor prices below the MRP. This means that there is a gap between the amount that a factor is compensated and the amount of revenue the factor generates for the buyer at the margin. The more monopsony power that a buyer has, the larger is the gap, and the more compensation is suppressed below the competitive level.
As illustrated in Figure 2, a buyer with monopsony power faces an *upward-sloping* factor supply curve. The extent to which a buyer can push down factor prices is dictated by its monopsony power. Monopsony power can be measured using the elasticity of supply, which measures the responsiveness of the quantity of the factor supplied to changes in the factor price. A lower elasticity of supply implies a greater exercise of monopsony power—that is, a greater gap between a worker’s wage and her MRP. To illustrate, note that the degree of factor price suppression in Figure 2 depends on how steep the factor supply curve is. Steeper factor supply curves are associated with lower supply elasticities, and thus greater suppression of factor prices.\(^{81}\)

There is a direct parallel between a monopolist—a *seller* with market power—and a monopsonist—a *buyer* with market power. Just as the monopolist’s optimal markup over marginal cost varies inversely with the elasticity of consumer demand, the monopsonist’s optimal markdown below MRP is inversely related to the elasticity of factor supply. The solution to the monopolist’s problem of what price to charge is given by \((p-c)/p = 1/ED\), where \(p\) is the price, \(c\) is the marginal cost, and \(ED\) is the elasticity of consumer demand. By symmetry, the solution to the monopsonist’s problem of what factor price to pay is \((MRP-w)/w = 1/ES\), where \(w\) is the factor price, \(MRP\) is the worker’s marginal revenue product, and \(ES\) is the elasticity of factor supply.\(^{82}\) Buyers can suppress factor prices below (or further below) competitive levels by engaging in conduct that has the effect of dampening the factor supply elasticity.

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\(^{81}\) For a linear factor supply curve such as that depicted in Figure 2, the elasticity of supply varies with movements along the curve. Nevertheless, for any given point on the curve, an increase in the steepness of the curve implies a lower supply elasticity.

\(^{82}\) See, e.g., ROGER BLAIR, SPORTS ECONOMICS 354 (Cambridge University Press 2012).
C. Evidence That Payments to Newspapers Are Below Competitive Levels

In a competitive factor market, economic theory dictates that newspapers’ compensation would approach their MRP. That is clearly not happening today, as indicated by public records of payments to newspapers.

1. Current Payments to Newspapers

Facebook SEC Form 10-Ks show its maximum payment for content across all content providers, including newspapers. The 10-K includes information of Facebook’s “cost of revenue,” which includes, among other things, costs associated with partner arrangements, including traffic acquisition and content acquisition costs, credit card and other transaction fees related to processing customer transactions, and cost of consumer hardware device inventory sold. Between 2016 and 2018, Facebook’s cost of revenue ranged between 13 and 17 percent of its total revenue. Accordingly, Facebook’s payment for content acquisition, a subset of this share, was less than 13 to 17 percent of its revenues. And Facebook’s payment for newspaper content would be even smaller.

Facebook reportedly made a deal in 2019 with a number of newspapers to pay “trusted news sources” an undisclosed amount for their services. According to MarketWatch, these deals could range from a couple hundred thousand dollars for smaller, regional publications to $3 million for larger, national publications. According to the Wall Street Journal, Facebook was only offering payment to roughly 50 out of the 200 news providers on Facebook News.

Google reportedly offered a total of $1 billion over three years to a number of news providers in Germany, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, the U.K., and Australia. While many companies accepted this deal, one major German news source, Axel Springer, refused. In the cases of France and Belgium, Google made indirect deals by putting money into a “Special Fund for French Media” and through supposedly buying ads on Belgian media websites as a fix to Belgian demands for copyright fees. Neither of these cases suggests an outright deal or offer to publishers. Following France’s

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implementation of a new rule enacted under a recent European Union law that creates "neighbouring rights," in February 2021, Google agreed to pay $76 million over three years to a group of 121 French news publishers to settle a dispute.87 In October 2021, Facebook reached an agreement with the French press alliance to pay national and regional newspapers for “using excerpts of their articles when they are shared on the social network.”88

2. Converting Payment Levels to Pay Shares

Economists recognize that “[i]n a world of perfect competition, the output contribution of individual production factors equals their respective revenue shares.”89 Thus, under competition, the share of total revenue that each factor receives is proportional to the relative importance of that factor in generating output. When factor markets are less than perfectly competitive, the share of revenue paid to the noncompetitive factor(s) may fall because (1) a monopsonist pays compensation below the competitive level; and (2) a monopsonist uses less of the factor than would be employed under competition.

For example, noted economist Professor Alan Manning has explained that, in professional sports, there is “a clear link between the removal of anti-competitive labor practices and rises in the share of revenue going to athletes.”90 The same principles can be applied to the broader economy. A 2013 paper observes that “the constancy of the share of income that flows to labor has been taken to be one of the quintessential stylized facts of macroeconomics,”91 but that in recent years “prominent measures of labor’s share in the United States have declined significantly.”92

More recent research has reached similar conclusions for both labor and capital, two critical inputs to production: A recently published paper in the Journal of Finance concludes that, in sectors throughout the economy, “the shares of both labor and capital are declining and are jointly offset by a large increase in the share of pure profits,” and that observed “increase[s] in industry concentration can

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87 Mathieu Rosemain, Google’s $76 million deal with French publishers leaves many outlets infuriated, REUTERS, Feb. 12, 2021, available at https://reut.rs/3jrG74t.
90 Manning (2020) at 10.
92 Id. at 2.
account for most of the decline in the labor share.”\textsuperscript{93} Similarly, a 2020 study published in the \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics} concludes that rising market power “can account for a number of secular trends in the past four decades, most notably the declining labor and capital shares as well as the decrease in labor market dynamism.”\textsuperscript{94}

Conversion of newspaper payments to pay shares is straightforward. Google’s annual U.S. advertising revenues in 2020 was roughly $49 billion.\textsuperscript{95} Facebook’s annual U.S. advertising revenues in 2020 was roughly $22 billion.\textsuperscript{96} Accordingly, a one percent pay share for U.S. newspapers would amount to annual payments of $490 million by Google and annual payments of $220 million by Facebook. Based on the reported payments to U.S. newspapers reviewed above, it is reasonable to assume that the current pay shares are less than one percent. In the next section, I examine the pay shares in comparable industries.

3. \textbf{Regulatory Benchmarks}

Benchmarking is a common tool used by economic scholars and practitioners.\textsuperscript{97} A benchmark is more informative when it reflects attributes with the “but-for world” envisioned here—that is, everything is the same except for the power imbalance between newspapers and platforms. The salient characteristics of that but-for world include (1) the group seeking fair-market compensation constitutes only one of several input providers for the dominant platform; (2) the payment to the input provider is governed directly or indirectly by an enforcement mechanism as opposed to being set entirely through market forces; and (3) the group seeking fair-market value bargains collectively. Even imperfect benchmarks,


\textsuperscript{95} Per Google’s 10-K, total Google Search ad revenue in 2019 is $98 billion globally and $45 billion in the US, meaning 46% of Google Search ad revenues come from the US. Using Google’s quarterly 10-Q filings, I obtain actual quarterly revenues for Q1-3 2020 and estimate Q4 based on previous Q4 performance, implying forecasted 2020 global Google Search ad revenues of $107 billion. I multiply this figure by the 46% share of global Google Search revenues that stem from the US to obtain $49 billion for 2020.

\textsuperscript{96} Per Facebook’s 10-K, total U.S. and Canada advertising revenue in 2019 is $33.5 billion, and the total active users for U.S. and Canada is $245.5 million, implying average revenue per user of $136.4. Facebook also states that there are 220 million US users in 2019. Multiplying this figure by the ARPU from the U.S. and Canada aggregate, this implies U.S.-only advertising revenues of $30 billion. Statista reports that in 2019, 31.8 percent of Facebook’s advertising revenues come from Instagram, to which newspapers make no contribution. To net out the advertising revenues from Instagram, I multiply $30 billion by (1-0.318) to obtain US only, Facebook (non-Instagram) 2019 revenues of $20.5 billion. Using Facebook’s quarterly reports for 2020 Q1-3, I perform a similar calculation and arrive at $21.9 billion in U.S. (non-Instagram) advertising revenues for 2020.

\textsuperscript{97} See e.g., Justin McCrary & Daniel Rubinfeld, \textit{Measuring benchmark damages in antitrust litigation}, 3(1) \textit{Journal of Econometric Methods} 63-74, 63 (2014) (“We have found the benchmark approach to be the most commonly used damages methodology.”).
which satisfy one or two of the criterion of the but-for world, can offer insight as to the reasonableness of the implied pay shares that are sought here. Table 1 presents an overview of potential benchmarks, discussed below, including the associated pay shares for the input providers.

**Table 1: Pay Shares in Potential Benchmarks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Benchmark</th>
<th>Pay Shares</th>
<th>Protected Class Represents Only One of Many Inputs</th>
<th>Regulated Allocation</th>
<th>Collective Bargaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artists and Publishers Under Music Streaming Royalties</td>
<td>65-70%</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasters Under Retransmission Consent</td>
<td>~11%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Sport Networks</td>
<td>~7%</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletes in Professional Sports Leagues</td>
<td>50-60%</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 1 shows, none of the potential benchmarks satisfies all three salient characteristics of the but-for world. The derivation of these pay shares are provided in Appendix 1. While broadcasters and regional sports networks (RSNs) represent only one of many inputs on their respective platforms, making them a close comparable, broadcasters cannot bargain collectively vis-à-vis cable operators, and RSN licensing fees are not set in a regulated environment. Yet the pay shares for broadcasters (approximately eleven percent of cable revenues) and RSNs (approximately seven percent of cable revenues) vastly exceed the pay shares currently captured by U.S. newspapers from Google and Facebook (less than one percent). Relative to these comparables, this deficit in pay shares indicates that newspapers are not capturing anything close to competitive rates, and is thus indicative of Google’s and Facebook’s buying power vis-à-vis newspapers.

The pay shares for music rightsholders (65 to 70 percent) and athletes in professional sports leagues with unions and free agency (60 percent) likely overstate the fair-market value of pay shares here, as those input providers account for the totality of the relevant inputs in the production process in their respective fields. Nevertheless, those benchmarks are informative of a related but-for world in which all content providers, including but not limited to newspapers, broadcasters, bloggers, and video services, could achieve fair-market value for their revenue contributions to the platforms. In other words, if the platforms’ monopsony power over all content providers were vanquished, Facebook and Google could be forced to pay content providers more than half of their advertising revenues.
III. Underpayment to Newspapers Results in Myriad Social Harms

This section reviews the social harms flowing from the underpayments to news publishers. There are myriad social harms flowing from underpayments to newspapers, beginning with employment effects in the input market (e.g., journalism jobs).

A. Employment (Output) Effects in the Input Market

The net effect of shrinking advertising revenues—in part caused by underpayment from dominant platforms—is less cash flow to support journalists, a clear employment effect flowing from the exercise of monopsony power by the dominant platforms. Employment among newspaper employees fell from 71,000 in 2008 to 31,000 in 2020. The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that over the next decade, the total employment of reporters, correspondents, and broadcast news analysts will continue to decline.

The decline in newspaper advertising revenue coincides with the rise of platform power. From 1956 through 2005, advertising revenue for U.S. newspapers steadily increased, peaking around $50 billion in 2005. The rise of platform power was assisted by favorable legislation in the 1990s and early aughts. In the mid-aughts, Facebook and Google began to consolidate their power, with competitors MySpace (Facebook’s precursor), and Infoseek, Lycos, and Altavista (Google’s precursors) steadily disappearing. Since 2006, U.S. newspaper advertising revenue declined from $49 billion in 2006 to $18 billion in 2016. Figure 3 shows the rise and fall of newspaper advertising revenues since 1956.

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101 For example, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act in 1996 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, shielding platforms from certain liabilities, and gave the new platforms generous tax incentives.

102 Id.
Platforms have contributed to shrinking newspaper advertising revenues in two ways. Platforms are not only a direct competitor to newspapers for advertising dollars (a horizontal relationship), but platform dominance can also be used to squeeze newspapers (a vertical relationship) for lower input prices. In 2016, the news industry incurred losses in total weekday circulation, despite gains for certain top-selling sites.\textsuperscript{103} The news industry also incurred losses in advertising revenue in 2016, marking a steady decline since 2006.\textsuperscript{104} According to one news publisher’s testimony to the Antitrust Subcommittee, “digital subscription revenues remain a minor revenue stream and do not appear to be on a path to replace the decline in print subscriptions” for the vast majority of newspapers.\textsuperscript{105}

Since dominant platforms aggregate content on their sites, newspapers have little choice but to permit sharing their content this way, as they are dependent on the platforms for traffic. But by providing snippets of content, the platforms permit users to obtain the news without clicking through to the underlying source, depriving the publisher of traffic and its associated ad revenues.\textsuperscript{106} This, in turn, also creates less of a need to subscribe to the newspaper platform. The platforms do not compensate newspapers for this lost traffic.

\textsuperscript{103} Barthel, supra.
\textsuperscript{104} Id.
\textsuperscript{105} Submission from Source 220, to H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 7 (Oct. 14, 2019) (on file with Comm.).
B. Removal of Economic Stimulus to Local Economies

The negative employment trends among newspapers, exacerbated by underpayments from the dominant platforms,\textsuperscript{107} can have ripple effects throughout local economies. When reporters, correspondents, and broadcasts news analysts, along with the other supporting employees at a publishing firm, lose their jobs, they lose incomes to spend at grocers, restaurants, and other local businesses. This reduction in spending can have a multiplier effect that ripples throughout a local economy and removes stimulus that was once there.\textsuperscript{108}

Local newspapers also provide a valuable service to local businesses by creating a way to connect with community members and advertise their products and services.\textsuperscript{109} When underpayments intensify news publisher closure, local businesses no longer have access to this mode of communication and advertising. Furthermore, research has shown that there is a causal link between local newspaper closures and higher municipal borrowing costs, likely due to the reduction in independent oversight.\textsuperscript{110} This translates into an approximate increase of $650,000 per average municipal bond issuance.\textsuperscript{111} Higher borrowing costs are ultimately borne by local taxpayers, thereby reducing real disposable incomes and removing further stimulus from local economies.\textsuperscript{112}

C. Threats to Democracy from News Deserts

As a result of the deteriorating news media landscape described above, hundreds of local newspapers have been acquired or declared bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{113} One study estimates that the United States has lost nearly 1,800 newspapers since 2004

\textsuperscript{107} See Part III.B.1
\textsuperscript{111} Id. at 446.
either to closure or merger, leaving the majority of counties in America beholden to a single publisher of local news, and 200 counties are without any paper.114

The elimination of local news threatens democracy. A critical function of a local newsroom is coverage of local and state government affairs.115 Without this coverage, Americans are more likely to rely on national news and partisan heuristics to make political decisions.116 A robust local news business is also a natural pipeline by which government officials effectively communicate to an electorate (and vice versa). Research shows that in areas with higher local news coverage, voters are better informed on their congressmen and that politicians more actively pursue their constituents’ interests through moderating their partisan voting, more frequently standing witness to committee hearings, and generating more federal funding for their districts.117 Local newsrooms may also provide a check on local government corruption and mismanagement.118 Moreover, robust local news coverage is positively correlated with higher rates of voter turnout,119 more support for local services,120 and greater levels of social cohesion.121

D. The Rise of Fake News and Disinformation Campaigns

As professional news dwindles, fake news fills the void. The House Judiciary Report notes that “the gap created by the loss of trustworthy and credible news sources has been increasingly filled by false and misleading information.”122 This comes as no surprise since the dominant platforms “face little financial consequence when misinformation and propaganda are promoted online.”123 Instead, these platforms incentivize publishers to gain the most attention possible, regardless of

122 Majority Report at 62.
123 Id. at 67.
the methods or integrity.\textsuperscript{124} Using preference-based algorithms, the platforms create echo chambers in which fragmented views of the news are reinforced, leading to further mistrust.\textsuperscript{125} This is in contrast to traditional news outlets, which focus instead on forming audience relationships and building a reputation for quality and trust.\textsuperscript{126}

The reduction in these traditional newspapers has coincided with more Americans using social media platforms to access news.\textsuperscript{127} This shift is expected to lead to a greater spread of both partisanship and misinformation,\textsuperscript{128} leading to significant social harms. For instance, misinformation could have resulted in hastening the COVID-19 epidemic by influencing citizens’ behavior and response to government countermeasures.\textsuperscript{129} In an August 2020 survey, “relatively high levels of misperception” could be found among those receiving news information from social media sources, while the “lowest levels of misperceptions” was found among those receiving information from “local television news, news websites or apps, and community newspapers[.]”\textsuperscript{130} Underpayment to these trusted news sources has contributed to their lower prevalence, proliferating this shift to less reliable sources.

E. Harms to Community and Culture

There are also social harms that can be harder to quantify—such as the negative impacts of news publisher closure on a community. A well-functioning media creates a shared understanding of the world. It creates a way for residents to become more active in their community and to learn about what their neighbors care about. Being informed on events like local theater productions, carnivals, and community events allow residents to not only be in close physical proximity to those in our area, but to be in close social proximity as well.\textsuperscript{131}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{125} Id.
\textsuperscript{129} Matteo Cinelli, et al., \textit{The COVID-19 social media infodemic}, 10(16598) SCI REP (2020).
\textsuperscript{130} Matthew Baum, et. al., \textit{The State of the Nation: A 50-State COVID-19 Survey, Report #14: Misinformation and Vaccine Acceptance}, THE COVID-19 CONSORTIUM FOR UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC’S POLICY PREFERENCES ACROSS STATES (a joint project of Northeastern University, Harvard University, Rutgers University, and Northwestern University), September 2020, at 11, \textit{available at} http://www.kateto.net/covid19/COVID19%20CONSORTIUM%20REPORT%2014%20MISINFO%20SEP%202020.pdf.
Furthermore, the absence of local news reduces the diversity of viewpoints. For example, minority owned media outlets have historically focused on issues that larger news providers do not cover or have underreported. However, while there are over 100 African American-owned newspapers, only one has a circulation above 50,000. Small, community-oriented, local news sources are integral for reporting on issues that impact minority groups. Underpayment to these local news sources can amplify their chance of shutting down or result in consolidation, which can also general social ills. According to former Harvard Law School dean and professor, Martha Minow, “Concentrated ownership displaces local control of media and shifts editorial decisions to people without a stake in particular local communities.” Ultimately, the reduction of local news leaves a gap in the diversity of opinions.

**IV. The Likely Arguments Against Assigning Coordination Rights to News Publishers Are Unavailing**

This section anticipates and “prebuts” three economic arguments that the platforms are likely to make in opposition to this proposal offered here.

**A. Argument One: The Effort Is Meant to Enrich the Largest Newspapers**

One of the favorite talking points of the bill’s detractors is that it would consolidate power among the largest news publishers at the expense of new publishers. Although it is true that large newspapers benefit by coordinating with smaller newspapers in their dealings with Google, smaller newspapers benefit by even more, as small newspapers would be subjected to even greater levels of exploitation if they were compelled to deal with Google unilaterally. A handful of the very largest newspapers have a modicum of countervailing bargaining power against the platforms. This is not so for the vast majority of newspapers. Accordingly, the largest beneficiaries of this proposal are the smallest newspapers.

The argument that this proposal is meant to enrich the largest newspapers also ignores the likely allocation mechanism of a collective, which would prevent large publishers from appropriating the entirety of the award. Even if the allocation were done purely in proportion to a newspaper’s pro-rata share of clicks, no single

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135 See, e.g., Matthew Boyle, *House GOP Leader Kevin McCarthy Slams Establishment Media-Pushed Journalism Act: ‘Antithesis of Conservatism’*, BREITBART, Apr. 1, 2021 (“the system [the JCPA] would create that essentially allows the creation of establishment media cartels that would hurt new media companies.”).
newspaper would achieve all of the payments, as the allocation of clicks across newspapers is well distributed. To the extent newspapers elect to distribute some portion of funds according to full-time journalists, high-quality news sites that deliver informative yet non-clickworthy news could achieve payments in excess of their pro-rata share of clicks.

Finally, large news publishers are hardly flush with cash, yet deliver large social benefits. Absent any intervention, we are heading towards a dystopia in which citizens rely exclusively on tech platform for all news. The effort is not meant to enrich large publishers, but instead meant to address a power imbalance that is producing communication distortions and too few journalists.

B. Argument Two: It Is Better to Attack Platform Power with a Mix of Antitrust Enforcement and Other Regulations

Some traditional anti-monopoly groups have stated their resistance to granting countervailing bargaining power to newspapers in their dealings with dominant platforms. In a joint statement, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI), Public Knowledge, Consumer Reports, and Consumer Federation of America stated their opposition to an antitrust exemption for newspapers, arguing that while “[c]ongressional action, along with more vigorous enforcement of existing law, to help promote more vibrant competition in the changing markets for news may well be warranted[,] a new antitrust exemption will only hurt consumers, citizens, and businesses that are not invited to the negotiations that this exemption is supposed to facilitate.”

The AAI subsequently published a white paper that expanded on the supposed “pitfalls of countervailing power” as a policy response to the dominant platforms. The AAI recognizes that the imbalance in bargaining power is a “serious social and economic problem,” but argues that an antitrust exemption is not the proper solution. The AAI argues that an exemption would not lead to competitive outcomes, could foster collusion between the bargaining collective, could harm the small entities in the market, and would be inconsistent with antitrust’s consumer-welfare standard. It bears noting that antitrust’s much beleaguered consumer-welfare standard, propagated by Judge Bork and the Chicago

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138 Id. at 15.
139 Id. at 15-17. Id. at 13 (“But, these long-circulating ideas have recently been picked up by some progressives seeking to expand the antitrust laws to account for goals beyond or instead of consumer welfare or even total welfare.”).
School,\footnote{See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, 99 Washington University Law Review 1-66, 35 (2021) ("Nevertheless, the term “consumer welfare” has been so contaminated by Bork’s inclusion of producer profits in its definition that it is no longer helpful. ... Describing antitrust’s goal as the promotion of “consumer welfare” focuses on monopolistic prices paid by consumers. While that is true as far as it goes, articulating the goal in this way raises conceptual problems when we think about suppliers of inputs, including labor.")} cannot capture the social harms at issue here—namely, the threat posed to workers in the journalism industry or the associated harm to the democratic process from a news desert.

The AAI also worries that granting an antitrust exemption for newspapers could lead to a slippery slope of other industries seeking the same sort of exemption:

Today, it is the news content providers seeking an industry-specific exemption from the antitrust rules to countervail the power of Big Tech. But, if they are successful, other industries will follow. Such industry-specific exemptions should be resisted. Instead of reacting to innovation that is upending traditional business models by abandoning competition, we must instead adapt our competition laws, enforcement strategies, and policies to ensure they can effectively safeguard and promote competition in new and changing markets. To do otherwise risks converting the antitrust laws from a tool to foster competition into a tool for creating and maintaining monopolistic market structures.\footnote{Alexander at 20 ("Today, it is the news content providers seeking an industry-specific exemption from the antitrust rules to countervail the power of Big Tech. But, if they are successful, other industries will follow. Such industry-specific exemptions should be resisted. Instead of reacting to innovation that is upending traditional business models by abandoning competition, we must instead adapt our competition laws, enforcement strategies, and policies to ensure they can effectively safeguard and promote competition in new and changing markets. To do otherwise risks converting the antitrust laws from a tool to foster competition into a tool for creating and maintaining monopolistic market structures.")}

The AAI’s slippery-slope argument would have condemned the antitrust exemption originally extended to labor and to farm cooperatives, as they were the first exemptions granted. From a policy perspective, it sometimes makes sense to permit atomistic economic agents to bargain against a monopolist (or monopsonist), as it does here. In any event, given the extremely limited scope of the antitrust exclusion proposed—newspapers would not be allowed to coordinate in their dealings with consumers—it is unclear how collective bargaining of newspapers vis-à-vis the dominant platforms would have unintended consequences in the form “increased prices” for consumers,\footnote{Id. at 2 (“The arguments in favor of countervailing power as a response to increasing and seemingly intractable market concentration are not driven by methodological, fact-based analysis; indeed, the economic evidence strongly suggests that countervailing market power, particularly among intermediaries in the supply chain, leads to increased prices, inefficiency, and worse outcomes for consumers in most cases.”) (emphasis added).} as suggested in the white paper.
The AAI recommends three alternative policies to an antitrust exemption. *First*, the AAI advocates for increased antitrust enforcement against consolidation and monopolistic practices.143 By “preventing concentration in the first place,” the AAI hopes to head off market concentration before anticompetitive effects can be felt. *Second*, if current law—when fully enforced—is insufficient to reduce market concentration, the AAI recommends an “enhancement” of antitrust law to tackle entrenched monopolies where market power was lawfully obtained.144 *Third*, the AAI recommends other public policy tools outside of antitrust, but does not offer any specific policy remedy to do so, at least in the white paper.145 In a follow-up paper, the AAI expands that these public policy tools could take the form of new legal or regulatory protections that would aid in facilitating “consumer differentiation between real and fake news.”146 In what follows, I briefly explain why each of these alternatives fails to effectively address the power imbalance here. It follows that no combination of these alternatives would effectively address the power balance.

With respect to the AAI’s first option, greater enforcement of existing antitrust laws against Google or Facebook, even if successful, could recover only a fraction of the underpayment described here, which flows from the platforms appropriation of value added from the newspapers, including from impressions,

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143 Id. at 20 (“By preventing concentration in the first place and attacking monopolization directly, we can get at the root of the problem that countervailing power seeks to solve. This enforcement should include not just Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but Sections 2 and 7, as well.”).

144 Id. at 21 (“Unlike many other countries, the United States’ antitrust laws do not prohibit entrenched monopoly or market power, provided it was lawfully obtained and is not illegally maintained. Nor does the U.S. law contain an analogue to the laws against abuse of superior bargaining position that many jurisdictions have enacted. If the current laws, when fully enforced, are insufficient to prevent the growth and entrenchment of market power, a better solution than further loosening those laws to allow countervailing power would be to enhance existing antitrust laws to allow them to better prevent market concentration, reduce accumulated market power, or deter exploitation of market power. Done thoughtfully, such a solution has the potential to increase competition, consistent with the fundamental principles of antitrust policy”).

145 Id. at 21 (“Antitrust is but one means for preventing and countering undesirable market behavior. The increased concentration and imbalanced bargaining power driving the current interest in countervailing power stems not just from lax antitrust enforcement or ineffective competition policy, but from a wide range of public policy trends and failures. And in some cases, the ills people seek to correct with countervailing power are actually the result of competition working and industries changing. Rather than gutting antitrust by opening up a new line of merger defense and undermining the per se rule against competitor collaborations, we should seek multifaceted solutions that check corporate power, decrease inequality, and unwind the incentives for winner-take-all approaches to markets”) (emphasis added).

146 Randy Stutz, Antitrust Law and Dominant-firm Behavior in the Digital Technology Sector: Toward an Actionable Agenda for Policymakers, American Antitrust Institute, June 28, 2021 at 10, available at https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/AAI-Knight-Paper-2-FINAL.pdf, (“Policymakers should recognize that antitrust litigation may not be sufficient if they wish to help preserve the business models of legitimate news producers or ensure that citizens do not consume misinformation and disinformation. Other legal or regulatory protections, including to facilitate consumer differentiation between real and fake news, should be deployed in tandem with antitrust litigation if policymakers wish to prevent the proliferation of problematic news content.”).
regardless of whether a news story is clicked on by a user. A Sherman Act Section 2 complaint against a platform would require publisher plaintiffs (or an agency) to (1) challenge a restraint of trade, preferably in a contract with a third-party publishers or advertisers; and (2) establish a causal connection between said restraint and the underpayment to newspapers. While restraints in contracts with publishers or advertisers might be contributing to artificially suppressed newspaper pay shares on ads sold against newspaper stories generated by click-throughs, there are myriad factors, including network effects, customer lock-in, and other natural barriers to entry, also potentially contributing to the underpayment from ads sold against newspaper stories; at best, a successful antitrust lawsuit challenging a platform’s restraints would raise payments from that platform by the increment attributable to the restraints for ads sold against newspaper stories. Such a lawsuit would not address the platform’s appropriation of newspaper value-added from impressions that do not result in a click-through, and thus would not restore the payments to competitive levels for the entirety of the value-added by newspapers to platforms. Moreover, a successful antitrust lawsuit against (say) Google would provide zero relief for publishers in their dealings with Facebook. Finally, a successful antitrust lawsuit against Google or Facebook would require several years to adjudicate, and the appeals might not be resolved for nearly a decade. In the interim, newspapers would be left twisting in the wind. Given the newspapers’ precarious financial state, it is not clear how long many could survive without an intervention today.

With regard to the AAI’s second proposed remedy, an “enhancement” of antitrust law to attack market concentration could, in theory, solve the power imbalance between platforms and news publishers, depending on what that enhancement was. Yet the AAI paper never defines what the enhancement would entail. Whatever enhancement is in mind, any solution to fundamentally reform antitrust law appears extremely unlikely to occur. One solution to address the power imbalance, not articulated in the paper, would be to break up the dominant platforms into smaller entities. A breakup via antitrust enforcement of a new antitrust law, however, could take a decade or more to achieve, as the legislation was crafted and voted on, and the follow-on case applying the new law wound itself through the courts. While a breakup via legislative fiat, as contemplated in Rep. Jayapal’s bill, might occur sooner, it is not clear the AAI supports structural separation. Although such an enhancement of the antitrust law might solve the present problem in the distant future, until a fundamental rewrite of antitrust law becomes a political possibility, it is more practical and realistic to carve out an

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147 Alexander at 21 (“If the current laws, when fully enforced, are insufficient to prevent the growth and entrenchment of market power, a better solution than further loosening those laws to allow countervailing power would be to enhance existing antitrust laws to allow them to better prevent market concentration, reduce accumulated market power, or deter exploitation of market power. Done thoughtfully, such a solution has the potential to increase competition, consistent with the fundamental principles of antitrust policy. Moreover, it is far preferable to locking in a second-best outcome based on monopoly or collusion at every level.”) (emphasis added). That is the extent of the enhancement discussion.
exemption from existing law. In contrast to the AAI’s second proposal, the JCPA would provide immediate relief to news publishers.

With regard to the AAI’s third proposal, it is not clear how additional regulations, such as a protection that could “facilitate consumer differentiation between real and fake news,” would solve the power imbalance between platforms and news publishers. Even assuming that Congress or a regulatory agency devised a method to perfectly identify what news was “real” and what news was “fake” to consumers, and assuming the program did not violate the First Amendment, such a program would have zero effect on the power imbalance between small “real” news publications and the dominant platforms. The rise of “fake news” may be a symptom of tech platform dominance, but it is not the cause of it. In the presence of such a news-differentiation program, a newspaper whose content online was correctly labeled as “real” news would presumably generate more impressions than a “fake” news content generator. But because the newspapers are not presently rewarded for their contribution to platform engagement through impressions, they would still be maximally exploited and receive near-zero compensation for the increase in popularity on the platforms.

C. Argument Three: Newspapers Derive Significant Value Via Referrals from Platforms, Which Should Be Deducted from the Value Added by Newspapers to Platforms When Determining Compensation

The dominant platforms might argue that they are generating traffic for newspapers, and they are thus owed payments by the newspapers, or at least such incremental benefits should be deducted from the value added by newspapers to platform advertising revenues. But platforms are already being compensated for this traffic generation via a tax imposed on the advertising revenue. Indeed, the payments to newspapers from traffic generated by the platforms is potentially taxed at monopoly levels, and the allegedly anticompetitive restraints that support that tax are the subject of fresh antitrust litigation. Accordingly, such “offsets” should be ignored.

148 Id. at 10.
149 The AAI appears to note that if such a protection were offered, any legal challenge to a platform’s facilitation of fake news would likely lead to failure in the courts. Id. at 24. (“To the extent harmful qualitative effects of platform-based news distribution are provable, they appear to move in an opposite direction than the quantitative effects: As the overall quality of news content appears to have declined, the overall quantity (counting both real and fake news) appears to have increased. Because these incommensurable effects appear to diverge, courts likely would struggle to craft an effective competition-restoring remedy even if a case based on qualitative harm could be won. To the extent the remedy would lead to higher quality news but less news content (or higher prices), the court may be uncertain whether, on balance, the competitive benefits of the remedy would outweigh the competitive costs relative to the status quo.)
The purpose of granting the antitrust exemption and placing some structure on the ensuing collective bargaining is to compensate newspapers for the uncompensated value they bring to the platforms. Recall that the platforms are reframing news stories in rich previews containing headlines, summaries, and photos. And they are also curating the content alongside advertisements. This reframing and curation decreases the likelihood of a user clicking into the article, thereby depriving news publishers of clicks while enriching the dominant tech platforms.151 This reframing and curation also creates less of a need for users to subscribe to the newspaper platform. The platforms are not compensating newspapers for any of this lost traffic or lost subscription revenues. The proper focus of the inquiry should be the incremental platform advertising revenues generated by the newspapers. After all, this value added to the platforms would be the payments to newspapers in a competitive input market.

**Conclusion**

Allowing current market forces to dictate the newspapers’ pay shares ensures that newspapers are compensated at rates significantly below competitive levels. This underpayment results in underemployment of journalists and other news employees, as well as host of social ills associated with local news deserts, including less competent local governments, greater spread of partisanship and misinformation, removal of economic stimulus to local economies, and a reduction in the diversity of viewpoints, particularly among minority populations. The best way to correct this market failure is for the government to permit the news publishers (either newspapers alone, or all news publishers) to coordinate in their dealings with the digital platforms over payment terms and conditions, followed by an enforcement mechanism to ensure that fair market value is being paid for the access being granted to the publishers’ content.

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Appendix 1: Pay Shares in Comparable Industries

A. Pay Shares for Music Rightsholders

Like the newspaper industry, the music industry was disrupted by new forms of digital consumption, which caused traditional revenue sources to decline significantly.\textsuperscript{152} Music industry stakeholders (such as music publishers, record labels) worked with digital streaming platforms to establish a sustainable monetization system, which has greatly improved the health of the industry and benefited content providers.\textsuperscript{153} Compensation for music publishers is driven by royalty rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), a tribunal that sets rates for five-year periods. Digital streaming platforms must pay music publishers per the rates defined by the CRB. Accordingly, this benchmark entails a regulated allocation that permits collective bargaining among input providers to a dominant platform. Unlike the but-for world contemplated here, the protected stakeholders (record labels, artists, publishers, and songwriters) constituted the totality of input providers to the platform.\textsuperscript{154}

Once collected, music publisher royalty rates result in a lump sum payout that is distributed to artists and publishers proportionally to the consumption of their music. The mechanical royalty rates for music publishers apply to all publishers simultaneously—that is, the publishers do not have to negotiate individually with the platforms covered by the statutes. In that sense, the bargaining is collective. According to the late economist Alan Krueger, streaming services such as Spotify typically pay 65 to 70 percent of their revenue in royalties to music right holders.\textsuperscript{155}

B. Pay Shares for Broadcasters in Retransmission Consent Arrangements

In the 1980s, cable subscribers grew rapidly to more than 50 million, but cable operators did not compensate broadcasters for what has been widely


\textsuperscript{155} KRUEGER, supra, at 181 (Crown Publishing 2019) (“Streaming services such as Spotify typically pay 65 percent to 70 percent of their revenues in royalties to music rights holders (record labels, artists, publishers, and songwriters).”). See also Jem Award & Janko Roettgers, WITH 70 MILLION SUBSCRIBERS AND A RISKY IPO STRATEGY, IS SPOTIFY TOO BIG TO FAIL?, Variety, Jan. 24, 2018 (“One way to get there would be more favorable deals with labels. Its business model calls for paying out around 70% of its annual revenue in royalties.”).
considered “must-have” programming.\textsuperscript{156} Instead, cable operators were offering customers local broadcast stations via their cable subscription with no remuneration for the local broadcasters. Congress grew worried that broadcasters were subsidizing the growth of their competitors, and that the potential long-term health of the U.S. television industry could be impaired. As a result, Congress enacted retransmission consent rules in the 1992 Cable Act. Sections 531 through 537 of the Act established a regulatory mechanism to compensate broadcasters for carriage of their broadcast signals by cable operators and direct broadcast satellite providers.

The new law required all multichannel video distributors, including cable operators and digital broadcast satellite providers, to obtain permission from broadcasters before carrying their programming. It provided that once every three years, broadcast stations could elect between must-carry and retransmission consent; if the cable operator rejects the broadcaster’s proposal, the station can prohibit the cable operator from retransmitting its signal. In essence, these rules altered the bargaining dynamic between a dominant platform and input providers, thereby affecting payments to input providers; thus, this benchmark can be considered a regulated allocation. But unlike the but-for world contemplated here, broadcasters—presumably because they are not atomistic relative to cable operators—were not allowed to coordinate in their dealings against cable operators.

While popular network-affiliated stations tended to opt for a retransmission fee, unaffiliated local stations tended to choose must carry and profited from advertisements only. For those that choose retransmission fees, broadcasters negotiate directly with the cable company; the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) does not specify fees or get involved in disputes.\textsuperscript{157} Between 1992 and 2005, broadcasters were primarily paid in kind (e.g., providing advertising spots, carrying affiliate channels) by cable operators. Yet retransmission fees grew rapidly from $0.2 billion in 2006 to $12.2 billion in 2020.\textsuperscript{158} The cable companies’ revenues are estimated at $116.8 billion in 2020.\textsuperscript{159} Accordingly, the broadcasters’ implied pay share in 2020 is approximately 11 percent.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{156} See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee, for Authority to Transfer Control, MB Dkt. No. 03-124, Memorandum Opinion and Order (released Jan. 14, 2004) ¶¶ 87, 201 (finding that regional sports programming and local broadcast programming were “must-have” inputs, which if were denied to distribution rivals, would impair their ability to compete effectively).


\textsuperscript{159} Wayne Friedman, Total U.S. MVPD Revs Up, OTT Rising Faster, Media Post, Mar. 14, 2017. (“BMO Capital Markets says there will be 1% revenue growth for U.S. MVPDs (multichannel video program distributors) to $116.8 billion in 2020, from $115.5 billion in 2015.”)

\textsuperscript{160} Equal to $12.2B / $116.8B.
C. Pay Shares for Regional Sports Networks

Staying in the cable space, another must-have input for cable operators is local sports programming,161 often supplied by independent regional sports networks (RSNs). Although there is no requirement that cable operators carry RSNs, independent RSNs can (and have) submitted discrimination complaints to the FCC pursuant to section 616 of the Cable Act, asserting that a cable operator that is vertically integrated into competing content afforded the RSN inferior carriage due to its lack of affiliation and horizontal rivalry. These protections also (weakly) alter the bargaining dynamics between cable operators and RSNs relative to pure market forces, and thus can be considered a regulated allocation. Unlike the but-for world contemplated here, RSNs cannot coordinate in their dealings with cable operators. Because RSNs, like broadcasters, account for only one of several input providers to a dominant platform, this benchmark can be informative. According to Kagan, the RSNs’ affiliate fees averaged approximately $6 per subscriber per month in 2017,162 while the average revenue per user per month for Comcast was $85 around the same period,163 implying a pay share of roughly seven percent. While RSN are must-have inputs and thus have some countervailing power, RSNs’ pay shares are likely deflated relative to a competitive equilibrium due to the lingering power imbalance between cable operators and RSNs that was not sufficiently addressed in the 1992 Act.

D. Pay Shares for Athletes in Professional Sports Leagues

De-unionization has been cited as a contributing factor in the long-term decline in the labor share in the U.S. economy.164 Economists recognize that “[t]he bargaining power of unions tends to increase workers’ share of the surplus generated in the production process.”165 Athletes in the major U.S. professional sports leagues, by contrast, are unionized. Moreover, they have acquired free

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161 See, e.g., John Ourand, Comcast’s Burke takes on critics of company’s dual strategies, SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Apr. 13, 2009.
162 Ben Munson, Total U.S. TV retransmission fees expected to reach $12.8B by 2023, Kagan says, FIERCE VIDEO, June 20, 2017 (“Kagan anticipated seven RSNs—YES Network ($6.74), FOX Sports Detroit ($6.69), MSG Network ($5.69), SportsNet LA ($5.60), FOX Sports Arizona ($5.48), Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia ($5.32) and Spectrum SportsNet/Deportes ($5.08)—are projected to come in above the $5 mark.”).
agency, which allows them to play one team against another in the quest to capture as much of their MRP as possible. Scully calculated compensation as a share of revenue for Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the National Football League, and the National Hockey League; for each sport, he found that compensation increased substantially to around 50 percent of league revenue after free agency was introduced. Similarly, Vrooman, another sports economist, explains that “as the result of internal competition among sportsman owners, monopsonistic exploitation has virtually vanished over the last decade in all [major professional sports] leagues. All leagues have similar carrying capacities for player costs at two-thirds of revenues and current payroll cap percentages are almost identical at about 60 percent.” In contrast, athlete compensation as share of revenue is substantially lower among (non-unionized) mixed martial arts (MMA) athletes, or among collegiate athletes, neither of which are unionized or permit free agency. Although this benchmark captures two elements of the but-for world contemplated here—regulated allocation and collective bargaining—athletes represent most if not all of the inputs (save things like venues and entertainers) into the sports platforms. Accordingly, this benchmark is informative but likely overstates the but-for pay shares for newspapers.

166 Lawrence Kahn, The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory, 14(3) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 75-94, 81 (2000) (“Baseball salaries as a percentage of team revenues rose from 17.6 percent in 1974 to 20.5 percent in 1977 to 41.1 percent in 1982, further suggesting that free agency has had a structural effect on baseball salary determination.”).

167 Gerald Scully, Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings, 25(2) MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, 77-86, 77-78 (2004) (“Is 50% or so as the player share the upper bound in professional team sport? One suspects that it is not... If all players were free agents, salary as a share of revenues would rise substantially.”).

168 John Vrooman, Theory of the Perfect Game: Competitive Balance in Monopoly Sports Leagues, 34(1) REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 5-44, 42 (2009) (“As the result of internal competition among sportsman owners, monopsonistic exploitation has virtually vanished over the last decade in all [major professional sports] leagues. All leagues have similar carrying capacities for player costs at two-thirds of revenues and current payroll cap percentages are almost identical at about 60 percent.”)


170 See, e.g., White v. NCAA, 2006 WL 8066803, Class Certification Order, at *5 & n.4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2006) (“[P]layer costs are less than 15.5 percent of revenues of NCAA member institutions. This percentage is extremely low... In the NBA and NFL, player compensation is approximately 55-65 percent of total revenues. These percentages offer a reasonable comparison and estimate of player inputs in the production of sports entertainment.”)