

**Questions for the Record from Senator Charles E.  
Grassley for Inspector General Horowitz  
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary “Examining  
the Inspector General’s First Report on Justice  
Department and FBI Actions in Advance of the 2016  
Presidential Election”  
Submitted on June 25, 2018**

1. Some have suggested that your review did not find that DOJ and FBI officials exhibited political bias against President Trump and in favor of Secretary Clinton. To set the record straight, during the course of your review, did you find that some DOJ and FBI officials exhibited bias against President Trump during the course of the Clinton investigation?

Our report’s findings with regard to bias and the potential effect of bias on investigative decisions are discussed in Chapter 12 of our report.

2. Did you find, but exclude from your report for any reason, text messages exhibiting pro- Trump or anti-Clinton bias?

In Chapter 12 of our report, we provided examples of text and instant messages we discovered in which five FBI employees who had significant roles in the Midyear investigation expressed their political opinions. Because the scope of our investigation was to assess whether improper considerations influenced investigative decisions made during the Midyear investigation, our report did not include every text or instant message we discovered in which any FBI employee expressed a political opinion in favor or against one of the candidates. We limited our analysis only to those employees who had a significant role in the Midyear investigation.

3. Your report found no documentary evidence that DOJ prosecutors harbored political bias. Did you have access to DOJ prosecutors’ text messages as you did for FBI personnel? If not, why not?

As we describe on page 395 of our report, in response to our request for text messages and instant messages sent from and received by specified Department personnel, we were informed that the Department does not retain text messages for more than 5 to 7 days. Accordingly, we did not have access to any text messages of prosecutors that may have existed. After reviewing a draft of the report, the Department prosecutors who worked on the Midyear investigation told the OIG that they did not use text messages, and that the only text messages they received were from the Midyear agents about logistical arrangements. The OIG included in our report a recommendation that the Department consider taking steps to improve the retention and monitoring of text messages Department-wide.

4. Your report indicates that although the Strzok-Page texts indicate bias in the pre-July 5, 2016 timeframe, many of the key decisions during that period were made by DOJ prosecutors instead. However, those decisions were based on information provided by the investigators, who clearly demonstrated bias. In light of that, is it possible to rule out that bias impacted the prosecutors' decisions?

Our report's findings with regard to the decisions made by the prosecutors are detailed in Chapter 5 of the report. As described there, the prosecutors interacted with multiple members of the FBI Midyear team, not just those FBI employees for whom we discovered text messages expressing political opinions. The Midyear prosecutors also reviewed documentary evidence, conducted legal research, and attended certain investigative interviews. In addition, as stated on page 149 of our report, we "found evidence that in some instances Strzok and Page advocated for more aggressive investigative measures than did others on the Midyear team [including the prosecutors], such as the use of grand jury subpoenas and search warrants to obtain evidence."

5. For those individuals who exhibited bias, how many of them work on the investigation into the alleged collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia? For those who worked on that investigation, how many were removed from that inquiry following evidence of their biased texts? How long did each of them work on that matter before being removed?

As discussed in Chapter 12 of the report, three of the five individuals for whom we identified text or instant messages expressing political opinions – Strzok, Page, and FBI Attorney 2 - worked on the FBI's investigation into the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and were later assigned to the Special Counsel. Strzok and FBI Attorney 2 left the Special Counsel investigation following the OIG's discovery of their text and instant messages, respectively. Page had already left the Special Counsel investigation by the time her text messages were discovered. As stated on page 397 of our report:

In addition to their roles in the Midyear investigation, both Page and Strzok were involved in the FBI investigation into the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election. Strzok was assigned to lead the Russia investigation in late July 2016. Page also worked on the Russia investigation, and told us that she served the same liaison function as she did in the Midyear investigation. Both Page and Strzok accepted invitations to work on the Special Counsel staff in 2017. Page told the OIG that she accepted a 45-day temporary duty assignment but returned to work in the Deputy Director's office at the FBI on or around July 15, 2017. Strzok was removed from the Special Counsel's investigation

on approximately July 28, 2017, and returned to the FBI in another position, after the OIG informed the DAG and Special Counsel of the text messages discussed in this report on July 27, 2017.

As stated on page 415 of our report:

FBI Attorney 2 told us that he was also assigned to the investigation into Russian election interference and was the primary FBI attorney assigned to that investigation beginning in early 2017. FBI Attorney 2 told us that he was then assigned to the Special Counsel investigation once it began. FBI Attorney 2 left the Special Counsel's investigation and returned to the FBI in late February 2018, shortly after the OIG provided the Special Counsel with some of the instant messages discussed in this section.

6. During the course of your review, you found that several FBI officials investigating Secretary Clinton for her use of a non-government email for official purposes were doing the same thing. Each agency and every employee has an obligation to comply with the Federal Records Act and to collect and preserve federal records. We know that the FBI “has not requested from Ms. Page or Mr. Strzok any information from their personal email accounts, nor has the FBI conducted searches of non-FBI-issued communications devices or non-FBI email accounts associated with Mr. Strzok or Ms. Page.” We also know that your office did not get access to their personal devices nor to former Director Comey's devices or accounts, which he also used for official work. Since you did not get access, you don't know whether they intentionally used personal devices to evade scrutiny from your office and their obligation to preserve federal records. Further, you don't know whether classified information transited their personal accounts.

If government officials can hide their official business on personal devices, government watchdogs and Freedom of Information Act requestors are left in the dark.

- a. Can you do your job effectively without access to those federal records, and what needs to be done to stop officials from hiding the public's business from public scrutiny?

Compliance with the Federal Records Act and the preservation of federal records is necessary for the OIG to be able to conduct effective oversight. We will continue to be attentive in our investigations to instances in which Department employees use private email systems to conduct official business, and to make misconduct findings when such use violates law, rule, or regulation, or policy. In addition, we will monitor the policies and training provided by Department components to its employees to ensure employees are

aware of the policies and their obligations. We also will make further recommendations to the Department and its components as warranted.

- b. In light of the fact Comey, Strzok, and Page used personal email accounts and devices for official work, could that serve as a predicate to seek a search warrant for that material on the colorable basis their use was possibly in violation of the Federal Records Act? If so, why did your office not seek a search warrant to review records on their personal devices? If not, please explain.

As noted at pp. 427-428 n.218 of our report, we determined that we lacked legal authority to obtain the content of Strzok's personal email account from the email service provider, which would have required the OIG to obtain a search warrant from a federal judge under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). In order for the OIG to seek a search warrant, the Department would have had to open a federal criminal investigation. Although 18 U.S.C. § 2071 is a criminal statute on which a search warrant can be predicated, as described at page 257 of our report in connection with the applicability of this statute to use of private email by Secretary Clinton, such a prosecution requires proof of willful concealment, removal, or destruction of federal records. As further noted on page 257 of our report, the Department's prosecutors did not consider as viable a prosecution of Secretary Clinton for violation of Section 2071 because that section had "never been used to prosecute individuals for attempting to avoid Federal Records Act requirements by failing to ensure that government records are filed appropriately." During our review, we were told by former Director Comey and his chief of staff, as discussed on page 425-26 of our report, that as a matter of practice, when Comey used his personal email for FBI business, he copied or forwarded the email to an official FBI.gov account to ensure that it was preserved and then double deleted the email in his personal account. As discussed on page 427, Strzok provided similar testimony. Page's testimony to us about her use of a personal email account in relation to FBI matters is discussed on page 428 of our report. Based on this record, we did not believe that we had sufficient evidence to obtain a search warrant.

- c. Mr. Strzok's attorney has publicly claimed that he cooperated fully with your inquiry. However, did you seek voluntary access to his personal devices or accounts and did he refuse your request?

As described in footnote 218 of our report, we asked for access to Strzok's personal email account, which Strzok refused. Instead, Strzok told us that he would produce any work-related emails in his personal email account, and subsequently advised the OIG during an interview that upon

conducting a review of his personal email account, he located no work-related emails.

- d. Who else did you seek voluntary access to their personal devices or accounts from and what was each of their responses?

We did not request access to the personal email account or devices of anyone other than Mr. Strzok.

7. The Justice Department claimed there was not a prosecutable case against Secretary Clinton for intentionally alienating federal records in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2071. The decision is difficult to fathom given Secretary Clinton and her attorneys deleted thousands of work-related emails that were later recovered by the FBI that she never turned over to the State Department. Your report noted that prosecutors concluded there was insufficient evidence to show that Secretary Clinton and her aides intended to alienate federal records. Your report also noted that prosecutors acknowledged that conclusion was “undercut” by the fact that Secretary Clinton and her aides communicated via personal email at times. Another reason given by prosecutors to not charge her under § 2071 was that the law had never been used under these circumstances before. That is the same excuse then-Director Comey gave about 18 U.S.C. § 793(f), which imposes a gross negligence standard on the handling of classified information.

Notably, until Robert Mueller, no prosecutor ever charged someone who registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act for not registering earlier. It appears the DOJ and FBI made every effort to turn a blind eye to clear violations of § 2071 yet Mr. Mueller has aggressively investigated and charged people under theories that have not been used before. That is a clear double standard.

- a. What do you think of the claim that prosecutors can only pursue cases where there is an exact parallel in a previous case?

Decisions on whether to pursue a prosecution should be guided by the facts and the law, as well as Department policies and practices, including those referenced in the Department’s Justice Manual (formerly known as the U.S. Attorney’s Manual). As stated on page 157 of our report, “Ultimately, assessing the strength of the evidence and applying the provisions of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual in determining whether to pursue federal criminal charges is a matter within the discretion and judgment of the prosecutors.”

- b. Do you believe that § 2071 is an important law that ought to be enforced and applied equally?

Yes.

- c. Has your office done any work to assess Department-wide compliance with the Federal Records Act? Will you be conducting any such work in the future?

The OIG has not conducted specific Department-wide audits or reviews of compliance with the Federal Records Act, and we do not have any currently planned. Nevertheless, we have identified concerns in past OIG reviews about the Department's records and retention policies, and have made recommendations about them to the Department.

For example, in the OIG's March 2015 review on DOJ's "Handling of Sexual Harassment and Misconduct Allegations by the Department's Law Enforcement Components," the OIG recommended that DOJ law enforcement components "acquire and implement technology and establish procedures to effectively preserve text messages and images for a reasonable period of time, and components should make this information available to misconduct investigators and, as appropriate, for discovery purposes."

- d. What controls are in place, if any, to ensure that officials do not escape IG and FOIA scrutiny by intentionally diverting official communications to personal devices or accounts?

The existing personal email policy limits use to exigent circumstances and requires that the user copy an official DOJ email address and double delete the email in his or her personal account. "Exigent circumstances" is not defined. We refer you to the Department for a more complete response on the steps taken to train and discipline employees for violations of the existing personal email policy.

- e. According to your report, the DOJ and FBI looked at 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (e); 18 U.S.C. § 793(f); 18 U.S.C. § 1924; and 18 U.S.C. § 2017. Compared to the effort and focus on all the other laws, did the DOJ and FBI put equal weight on § 2071? If so, please explain how you reached that conclusion.

We did not address this specific question in our report. However, as noted on page 163 of our report, "Various witnesses told the OIG that the investigation focused on identifying what classified information transited former Secretary Clinton's server, who introduced it, and why."

8. According to your report, there was no persuasive explanation for the FBI's delay in getting a search warrant for Clinton emails on Anthony Weiner's laptop. Strzok,

McCabe, and Comey sat on that information for almost a month and seemed inclined to sweep it under the rug until after the election. They acted only after prodding from the New York FBI office and fears that the information would leak. After thorough investigation, you concluded that none of the excuses given for not acting on the information received were valid. You didn't find a smoking gun record that said they ignored the lead to help Clinton's campaign, but you do have very clear circumstantial evidence of political bias by Strzok. After all, he vowed to stop then-candidate Trump from being elected and you found his excuse for inaction was without merit. Based on the overwhelming circumstantial evidence, is it a fair inference that the month of inaction was due to political bias?

We address this issue in detail in Chapter 10 of our report.

9. After the delay with the Weiner laptop material, it is unclear what the FBI actually did. There were 347,000 emails on the laptop relevant to the Midyear investigation. At one point, your report says the FBI reviewed approximately 48,000 of those emails. But in the next paragraph it says they reviewed approximately 6,000.

- a. How many of the Weiner laptop emails did FBI agents actually read in full and which FBI agents read them?

As we state in Chapter 11 of our report, "the FBI reviewed in full 'approximately 48,982' items on the Weiner laptop." Members of "[t]he Midyear team flagged all potentially work-related emails" on the Weiner laptop and "[a]ny work-related emails that were unique...were individually reviewed by the Lead Analyst, Strzok, and FBI Attorney 1 for evidentiary value."

- b. Does the FBI still have possession of the hundreds of thousands of unreviewed emails from the Weiner laptop and the laptops used by Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson?

As stated in footnote 106 on page 122 of our report, "On June 11, 2018, the FBI informed the OIG that the FBI still had in its possession the culling laptops [that were used by Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson] and all other evidence collected during the Midyear investigation."

- c. With respect to emails on the Weiner, Mills, and Samuelson laptops, the FBI failed to obtain consent or compulsory process to search those emails for any evidence of what Clinton's lawyers told the Platte River Network technician just before he used BleachBit to delete her emails in March 2015. During the time that the FBI learned of the deletion, President Obama and Director Comey had both already signaled that no prosecution was likely and the agents texted

about the intense pressure to finish their review as quickly as possible, preferably before the political conventions. Can you rule out the possibility that the rush to finish before the conventions contributed to the decision not to investigate potential obstruction of Congress or the FBI in deleting the emails?

As stated on page 152 of our report, “The Midyear team did not obtain or review some evidence that we found might have been useful to the investigation. The team’s reasons for not doing so appear to have been based on limitations they imposed on the scope of their investigation, the desire to complete the investigation well before the election, and their belief that the foregone evidence was likely of limited value.” As discussed in Chapter 5 of our report, the Midyear team took steps to investigate potential obstruction, including (1) interviewing witnesses regarding the culling process and the deletion of emails; and (2) obtaining PRN records of communications between PRN staff and Clinton’s staff and attorneys from around the time of the deletions in 2015. As far as the limitations in the consent agreements for the laptops referenced above, the witnesses told us that they were established based on probable cause and privilege concerns.

As discussed on pages 156-157 of our report, we questioned why the Midyear team did not pursue criminal charges against Paul Combetta for obstructing Congress or the FBI. “The prosecutors told us they did not charge Combetta...because of...concerns about the strength of the admissible evidence and because they did not believe criminal charges were in the federal interest given his willingness to cooperate with immunity.” We did not find evidence that this decision was inconsistent with Department policy, or based on improper considerations or bias. As stated on page 157, “Ultimately, assessing the strength of the evidence and applying the provisions of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual in determining whether to pursue federal criminal charges is a matter within the discretion and judgment of the prosecutors.”

10. On July 2, 2016, The FBI and DOJ allowed Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson to be present at Hillary Clinton’s interview even though they were fact witnesses in the case and had to be granted immunity before providing their laptops to the FBI. In a talking points memo created by the FBI for distribution to employees, the FBI dismissed Mills’ presence in the Clinton interview by saying “no FBI policy or rule prohibited her attendance at Secretary Clinton’s interview.”<sup>8</sup> Are you aware of any other FBI case where a fact witness was allowed to be present during the interview of the main target in an investigation?

As stated on page 162 of our report, “[W]e found the decision to allow the Clinton interview to proceed in the presence of two fact witnesses, who also were serving as Clinton’s counsel, was inconsistent with typical investigative strategy and gave rise to

accusations of bias and preferential treatment.” We did not, however, seek to determine whether a fact witness was allowed to be present during the interview of the target of an investigation in any other FBI case.

11. The IG Report identified text and instant messages sent on FBI mobile devices and computer systems by five FBI employees who were assigned to the Midyear investigation. The report found that these employees “brought discredit to themselves, sowed doubt about the FBI’s handling of the Midyear investigation, and impacted the reputation of the FBI.” You testified to the House Judiciary Committee that the FBI was withholding the names of the rogue agents from Congress because they worked on counterintelligence. Recent news reports have allegedly identified some of the officials and the fact that they work in the Office of General Counsel.<sup>10</sup> What are the names of all unnamed individuals and what role did they play in the Clinton and Trump investigations?

The OIG responded on August 7, 2018 to a June 14, 2018 request from Chairman Grassley seeking this information by referring the Committee to the FBI.

12. According to the FBI’s Letterhead Memorandum summarizing the Clinton investigation, Platte River Networks held a conference call with “President Clinton’s staff” on March 25, 2015. The Letterhead Memorandum also said Paul Combetta had a conference call on March 31, 2015, with David Kendall and Cheryl Mills. Documents acquired from the FBI and Combetta’s 302 form show that he deleted Secretary Clinton’s email archives on March 31, 2015 with BleachBit. At the time of deletion, and at the time of both conference calls, Secretary Clinton’s emails were subject to both a congressional subpoena (to the State Department, which she had deprived of possession of some work related emails on her private server) and preservation notice to her. Yet, her emails were deleted anyway. The FBI inexplicably limited their review of Secretary Clinton’s emails and those of her associates to the time period of her tenure as Secretary of State, which excluded any emails after February 2013 that could shed light on any improper intent related to the deletion of her emails. Oddly, the FBI knew of the conference calls and the BleachBit deletions yet willingly entered into immunity agreements with Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson that excluded review of records around the time of the conference calls and email deletions.

- a. In your experience, is it normal for the FBI to knowingly turn a blind eye to potential obstruction when the evidentiary timeline so clearly suggests that may have occurred?

See response to question 9(c) above.

- b. In light of this timeline why did DOJ and FBI not seek to review emails

beyond Secretary Clinton's tenure as Secretary of State?

As discussed in Chapter 5 of our report, the Midyear team obtained PRN records dated subsequent to Clinton's tenure as Secretary of State, including records from around the times of both the culling process and the deletion of emails from Clinton's server. These post-tenure records included emails sent and received by PRN staff. Members of the Midyear team told us that they mostly limited the consent agreements, search warrants, and 2703(d) orders to Clinton's tenure as Secretary of State, because this is when she had access to classified information. They stated that any relevant emails to or from Clinton after her tenure mostly would consist of communications protected by attorney-client privilege.

13. Instead of using a search warrant or subpoena to acquire Cheryl Mills' and Heather Samuelson's laptops, the DOJ and FBI entered into immunity agreements that limited the scope of review to emails within Secretary Clinton's tenure and the FBI agreed to destroy the laptops after the review. In a text message production to the Committee, Strzok and Page, discussed problems they had with "Richard" about that very issue. It references concerns from Strzok that "Richard" did not want to use a search warrant to seize Mills' or Samuelson's laptops.

The text exchange indicates that "Richard" caused the FBI to pursue a less aggressive route in acquiring the laptops, which eventually resulted in the FBI agreeing to enter into immunity agreements with both of them and to a very limited scope of review that did not include records beyond Secretary Clinton's tenure.

- a. Who is Richard and did the IG interview him? Was he the decision-maker, or was he communicating the instructions to limit the FBI's tools for acquiring the laptops from someone else? If so, who?

The OIG interviewed all individuals who had a significant role in the Midyear investigation. Due to privacy considerations, other than individuals named in our report, we respectfully decline to identify the names of other FBI or DOJ employees in a public hearing record.

- b. In what other instances did the DOJ require FBI officials to use a less aggressive route in acquiring evidence during the investigation and who was responsible for those decisions?

In Chapter 5 of our report, we provided examples of disagreements between members of the FBI Midyear team and the Midyear prosecutors, including circumstances when FBI employees advocated for more aggressive investigative measures than those that were ultimately chosen by the prosecutors. For example, as discussed on page 91 of our report, we found evidence that Strzok advocated in favor of applying for a search warrant for Cheryl Mills's Gmail account, but the

prosecutors “rejected the [search warrant] affidavit in favor of a 2703(d) order, based on insufficient probable cause and privilege concerns.” As discussed throughout Chapter 5, the decisions regarding how to obtain evidence generally were made by the four line prosecutors, in consultation with the DOJ National Security Division’s (NSD) Counterintelligence and Export Control Section’s (CES) Chief David Laufman and NSD Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) George Toscas.

14. The FBI has thus far refused to provide the Committee with copies of the emails between McCabe and Comey which, according to Mr. Bromwich, allegedly show that McCabe kept Comey apprised of his conversations with reporters.

a. As a threshold matter, do you object to the Committee possessing a copy of those emails?

We understand that the FBI has since provided the requested emails to the Committee. At no time did the OIG object to the FBI or DOJ doing so.

b. Why are they not addressed in your report on Mr. McCabe?

The OIG reviewed all emails between Comey and McCabe during the relevant time period as part of our investigation. We addressed in our report in March 2018 report regarding Mr. McCabe those emails that we considered to be probative on the issues we analyzed in that report.

c. In addition, since you have reviewed the emails, do they:

i. Show that McCabe told Comey of his contacts with the media?

The OIG is unable to provide information relating to this matter other than the content of our publicly issued report.

ii. Show that Comey approved of his contacts with the media?

See above.

iii. Exonerate McCabe from unauthorized contact with the media?

See above.

15. Mr. Comey began drafting the Clinton exoneration statement in May 2016, months before interviewing 17 witnesses, including Secretary Clinton. In his book, he called its drafting “routine” and that “[i]n neither case are minds closed to a different outcome if subsequent evidence dictates, but competent people think ahead.” In light

of his statement and general investigative practices, did Mr. Comey also draft a charging statement for Secretary Clinton?

The OIG did not find evidence during our review that Comey prepared a draft statement in the event charges were brought against Secretary Clinton.

16. Your report indicated that two former officials refused to voluntarily cooperate and answer questions for your office related to former Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs Peter Kadzik. Who were those two former officials?

Due to privacy considerations, other than individuals named in our report, we respectfully decline to identify the names of other FBI or DOJ employees in a public hearing record.

**United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary**  
**Hearing on “Examining the Inspector General’s First Report on the Justice**  
**Department and FBI Actions in Advance of the 2016 Presidential Election”**  
**Questions for the Record**  
**Michael Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. Department of**  
**Justice Submitted June 25, 2018**

**QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN**

1. Did anything in your investigation indicate that the FBI or Justice Department cannot be trusted to conduct objective, fact-based investigations?

No.

2. Have you seen any evidence of a “deep state” conspiracy among law enforcement to harm the President?

The scope of the OIG’s review is described on pages 2-3 of our report. It included investigating allegations that certain underlying investigative decisions in the Midyear investigation were based on improper considerations. We expanded our scope upon the OIG’s discovery of text messages and instant messages between some FBI employees on the investigative team, conducted using FBI mobile devices and computers, that expressed statements of hostility toward then candidate Donald Trump and statements of support for then candidate Clinton, as well as comments about the handling of the Midyear investigation, to determine whether these communications evidenced a potential bias that affected investigative decisions in the Midyear investigation. The scope of the OIG’s review did not include assessing whether there was evidence of a so-called “deep state” conspiracy against then candidate Trump.

3. Have you seen any evidence of a “secret society” in the FBI working to undermine the President?

The scope of the OIG’s review did not include assessing whether there was evidence of a “secret society” in the FBI working to undermine then candidate Trump.

4. The President and others have suggested that your report vindicates the President’s decision to fire Director Comey.

**a. Did you investigate the President’s reasons for firing Director Comey?**

No.

- b. Did you uncover evidence regarding the President’s firing of Director Comey in the course of your review?**

The President's removal of former Director Comey was not within the scope of the OIG's review.

**c. If so, what did you do with that evidence? Did you turn over any of that evidence to the Special Counsel?**

The President's removal of former Director Comey was not within the scope of the OIG's review.

5. Your office did an exhaustive review of the communications and decisions leading up to the announcement on July 5, 2016, that the FBI was not recommending charges against Secretary Clinton.

**a. Was there any evidence that bias influenced the decision to recommend against charging Secretary Clinton?**

On page 149 of our report, we state that we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that improper considerations, including political bias, directly affected the specific investigative decisions we examined, or that the justifications offered for these decisions were pretextual. Further, as we stated on page 261 of our report, we found that the prosecutors' decision to recommend against prosecuting Clinton was based on their assessment of the facts, the law, and past Department practice in cases involving the relevant statutes. We did not identify evidence of bias or improper considerations. Our report also recognized that the text and instant messages we discovered during our review and described in our report cast a cloud over the FBI's handling of the Midyear investigation and the investigation's credibility.

**b. Was there any evidence that bias influenced any of the decisions about the steps taken during the investigation?**

As stated on page 149 of our report, in connection with the Midyear investigation, we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that improper considerations, including political bias, directly affected the specific investigative decisions discussed in Chapter 5 of our report. On page 329 of our report, we also stated that "we did not have confidence that Strzok's decision to prioritize the Russia investigation over following up on the Midyear-related investigative lead discovered on the Weiner laptop was free from bias."

6. There have been claims that your report exonerates the Trump campaign from any involvement in Russian interference in the election.

**a. Is that a finding of your report?**

The scope of the OIG's review did not include assessing allegations relating to Russian

interference in the 2016 Presidential election.

**b. Did you examine or reach any conclusion about possible collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia with regard to the 2016 election?**

The scope of the OIG's review did not include assessing allegations relating to Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election.

7. Rudy Giuliani and others have cited your report as grounds to end Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. Do any of your recommendations call for an end to Special Counsel Mueller's investigation?

No.

8. Your report quotes former Attorney General Loretta Lynch's description of a conversation she had with former FBI Director James Comey about leaks coming out of the FBI's New York Field Office. Specifically, she recounted, "he said it's clear to me that there is a cadre of senior people in New York who have a deep and visceral hatred of Secretary Clinton. And he said it is, it is deep. [H]e said it was surprising to him or stunning to him." (IG Report, p. 387)

**a. Did you investigate whether there are senior officials in the FBI's New York Field Office who have a "deep and visceral hatred of Secretary Clinton"?**

As described in our response to question 8(c), we looked for evidence that political bias or other improper considerations impacted decisions about the Weiner laptop, including by personnel in the FBI's New York Office. However, the scope of the OIG's review did not include assessing as a general matter whether senior FBI officials in New York had a "deep and visceral hatred of Secretary Clinton."

**b. If not, why not? Will you include this issue in the ongoing investigation of leaks and disclosures?**

We stated on page 429 of our report that the scope of our review included examining allegations that Department and FBI employees improperly disclosed non-public information, and that the Attorney General had raised with FBI leadership her concerns about leaks from the FBI's New York Office. We focused, in particular, on the April/May and October 2016 time periods, and we identified profound concerns about the volume and extent of unauthorized media contacts by FBI personnel that we uncovered during our review. As we stated on pages 429-430, although identifying individuals who have improperly disclosed non-public information presents challenges, we will separately report on the results of our investigations as they are concluded, consistent with the Inspector General (IG) Act, other applicable federal statutes, and OIG policy.

- c. Did you consider whether the “deep and visceral” hatred of Hillary Clinton might have influenced officials actions taken by personnel in the New York field office, including actions related to the emails discovered on Anthony Weiner’s laptop?**

We reviewed the relevant communications of FBI personnel in New York who were substantively involved in investigative activities relating to the Weiner laptop, for the time period related to our review of the FBI’s handling of the Weiner laptop in connection with the Midyear investigation. We did not identify any indication in those materials that political views or bias played a role in their actions.

- d. If not, why not? Will you include this issue in the ongoing investigation of leaks and disclosures?**

See response to 8(c), above.

9. Your report talks about the need to refrain from discussing open investigations. Specifically, it cites the principles in the “Linder Letter” against disclosures to Congress because of the perception of “undue political and Congressional influence over law enforcement and litigation decisions.” (IG Report, p. 25)

- a. Can you please explain the principles of the Linder letter and why they are important?**

We discuss the Linder letter generally on pages 24-25 of our report, and, in connection with Comey’s decision to send the October 28, 2016 letter to Congress, on pages 371-372 of our report.

- b. Are you examining whether disclosures about the Clinton investigation were used to influence official actions, including whether they were used to exert pressure on law enforcement to reopen the investigation in October 2016? If not, will you?**

The FBI’s decision to reopen the Midyear investigation in October 2016 is discussed in Chapter 9 of the report. The concern that information about the decision to reopen the investigation would be leaked is discussed at pages 345-346 of our report in connection with the decision to notify Congress on October 28, 2016, of the reopening.

10. Your report also covers leaks of non-public information by the Department and FBI during the Clinton email investigation.

- a. Were you aware that Erik Prince – the founder of the private security firm Blackwater and a prominent Trump supporter – testified to the House Intelligence Committee that sources in the New York Police Department told him about Clinton emails on Anthony Weiner’s computer? (Prince testimony before**

House Intelligence Committee, Nov. 30, 2017, pp. 97-100)

As noted on page 428 of our report, the OIG is investigating unauthorized disclosures of non-public information, and is therefore unable to respond specifically to this question. As we state on page 430, we will separately report on those investigations as they are concluded, consistent with the Inspector General (IG) Act, other applicable federal statutes, and OIG policy.

**b. Were leaks to Mr. Prince part of your investigation? If they were not, will you include that in your ongoing investigation of leaks?**

See response to question 10(a), above.

**c. Will you also consider whether these leaks were an effort to pressure prosecutors to reopen the Clinton investigation in the weeks leading up to the election?**

See response to question 10(a), above.

11. Do the same policies and practices for disclosure of information regarding investigations discussed in your report, including policies regarding statements about the subjects of a completed investigation, apply to the Office of the Inspector General?

The OIG follows the provisions of the Inspector General Act with regard to disclosure of information about completed investigations. With regard to disclosure of information about criminal investigations, to the extent they are not inconsistent with the Inspector General Act, the OIG generally follows the policies and practices discussed in Chapter 2 of our report.

**Written Questions from Senator Durbin for Inspector General Horowitz and Director  
Wray  
June 25, 2018**

For questions with subparts, please answer each subpart

**Questions for Inspector General Horowitz**

1. In numerous places the Inspector General’s report references the problem of leaks from agents in the FBI New York Field Office who were opposed to Hillary Clinton’s candidacy. For example, on page 349 the report cites then-Director Comey saying “I have to be careful that people in New York aren’t, by virtue of political enthusiasm, trying to take action that will generate noise that will have an impact on the election.” On page 359, the report notes that then-Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates was told that one of the reasons the FBI gave her for why Comey felt he had to send his October 28 letter to Congress was “they felt confident that the New York Field Office would leak it and that it would come out regardless of whether he advised Congress or not.”

The IG report does not make findings or draw conclusions about these anti-Clinton leaks from the FBI or about anti-Clinton bias among agents at the FBI New York Field Office. On page 430 the report discusses leaks of information from the FBI and says “We will separately report on those investigations as they are concluded”.

- a. **To what specific investigations does this statement on p. 430 refer?**

As noted on page 428 of our report, the OIG is investigating unauthorized disclosures of non-public information by FBI personnel. As we state on page 430, in addition to the significant number of communications between FBI employees and journalists, we identified social interactions between FBI employees and journalists that were, at a minimum, inconsistent with FBI policy and Department ethics rules. For example, we identified instances where FBI employees received tickets to sporting events from journalists, went on golfing outings with media representatives, were treated to drinks and meals after work by reporters, and were the guests of journalists at nonpublic social events. We will separately report on those investigations as they are concluded, consistent with the Inspector General (IG) Act, other applicable federal statutes, and OIG policy.

- b. **Who is conducting the investigations referenced on p. 430? Are these OIG investigations, or are these investigations part of the FBI Inspection Division investigation into leaks that Comey ordered and that is discussed on page 429 of the report, or are these other investigations entirely?**

The OIG is conducting the investigations referenced on p. 430.

- c. **When are these investigations expected to be completed? In 2018?**

We are working diligently to complete the investigations, and issued a summary recently on October 16, 2018, on one such investigation and will report on other investigations as they are concluded, consistent with the Inspector General (IG) Act, other applicable federal statutes, and OIG policy.

- d. **Will text messages and other electronic communications of agents in the New York Field Office be reviewed as part of the investigations cited on p. 430?**

The OIG will review all available, relevant evidence as part of these investigations.

- e. **Will the Inspector General's report on these investigations as they are concluded be shared with the public?**

As noted, the OIG will report its findings consistent with the Inspector General (IG) Act, other applicable federal statutes, and OIG policy.

**Questions for the Record for Department of Justice Inspector General Horowitz and  
FBI Director Christopher Wray  
Submitted by Senator Richard  
Blumenthal June 25, 2018**

Questions for Inspector General Michael Horowitz

1. After your report came out, President Trump claimed that the report “totally exonerated” him. He also claimed that thanks to the report, Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation “has been totally discredited.”

- **Does your report exonerate Donald Trump?**

The scope of the OIG’s review did not include assessing allegations relating to Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election.

- **Does your report implicate the credibility of the Special Counsel’s investigation in any way?**

The scope of the OIG’s review did not include assessing the credibility of the Special Counsel’s investigation.

2. Your report describes a “culture of unauthorized media contacts” at the FBI and notes that “Department and FBI officials raised considerable concerns about alleged leaks of information, particularly in October 2016, regarding the [Clinton] investigation.” [pp. 428, 430]. As your report states, because there were “dozens of FBI employees that had contact with members of the media,” the IG could not determine the source and the leak investigations are ongoing. [pp. 430].

Near the end of the 2016 election, Rudy Giuliani appeared to boast about receiving unauthorized disclosures regarding the Clinton email investigation. After Director Comey re-opened the investigation, Giuliani was asked if he had heard about Comey’s plan before the American people knew about it. His response: “You’re darn right I heard about it.” When several of my colleagues asked you during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on June 18, 2018, whether you plan to investigate these leaks, you refused to either confirm or deny the existence of such an investigation. The New York Times has since reported that Mr. Giuliani admitted to being questioned by FBI agents about whether he was the recipient of such leaks prior to the 2016 presidential election, in effect confirming that the existence of this investigation.

- **Can you confirm that you are investigating whether agents at the FBI’s New York Field Office leaked information to the Trump campaign about the Clinton investigation in order to help the Trump campaign?**

As noted on page 428 of our report, the OIG is investigating unauthorized disclosures of non-public information by FBI personnel. Those investigations are ongoing and therefore it would be inappropriate to provide any additional information at this time.

As stated in chapter 12 of the report, the OIG will report its findings at the conclusion of these investigations, consistent with requirements under the Inspector General Act and applicable law.

3. One FBI agent interviewed during the 2016 election described the FBI as “Trumplandia” and noted that many of his colleagues viewed Hillary Clinton as the “antichrist.” Your report states that FBI Office of General Counsel Director James Baker “recounted hearing that FBI employees not involved in the Midyear investigation hated former Secretary Clinton and made comments such as, ‘[Y]ou guys are finally going to get that b----,’ and ‘[W]e’re rooting for you.’” [pp. 189]. The report also states that the notes taken by FBI Agent Peter Strzok at a May 12 meeting involving the Midyear team reveals that the team cited the “overwhelming conservative outlook” among FBI staff in its discussion of whether Comey should admonish Clinton’s conduct publicly. [pp. 199].

- **Is there a pervasive liberal bias at the FBI?**

The scope of the OIG’s review is described on pages 2-3 of our report. The scope of the OIG’s review did not include assessing whether there was a pervasive pro-Clinton, or liberal bias at the FBI.

- **Is there a pervasive pro-Clinton bias at the FBI?**

See response to immediately preceding question, above.

- **In the May 12 meeting mentioned above, was the FBI staff’s “overwhelming conservative outlook” listed as one of the reasons the Midyear team thought former Director Comey should publicly admonish Secretary Clinton’s actions despite DOJ policy prohibiting such statements?**

Information gathered during the OIG review that is responsive to this question is found on page 199 of the report.

- **Read fairly, your report appears to suggest the FBI workforce has a variety of political views, but that these views are generally checked at the door when making official decisions – is that accurate?**

The scope of the OIG’s review did not include assessing the political views of the FBI workforce and whether they generally checked their views when making official decisions. The OIG’s findings with regard to political bias of personnel who were involved in the Midyear investigation are discussed at length in Chapter 12.

4. President Trump stated that this report reveals “bias against [him],” while also claiming that “if you look at the FBI, and you went in and polled the FBI, the real FBI, those guys love me.” He has also claimed to have the support of “the real FBI. Not the

scum on top.”

- **Did your investigation find evidence that there is widespread bias against President Trump at the highest levels of the FBI?**

The scope of the OIG’s review did not include assessing whether there was “widespread bias against President Trump at the highest levels of the FBI.” Our report focused on the actions of FBI and DOJ personnel involved in the Midyear Investigation, and our findings related to bias and the appearance of the bias by the specific individuals involved in the Midyear Investigation are discussed throughout our report.

- **Did your investigation find evidence that there is widespread bias towards President Trump among the rank and file of the FBI?**

See response to immediately preceding question, above.

5. Your report concludes, “[w]e did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that improper considerations, including political bias, directly affected the specific investigative actions we reviewed.” [pp. 497]. The report also states that “[n]one of the witnesses we interviewed could point to specific examples of anyone involved in the investigation allowing political or other improper considerations to impact the decisions on how best to obtain evidence.” [pp. 88].

- **Do you stand by these statements?**

Yes.

6. As to the politically charged text messages between FBI Attorney Lisa Page and Agent Peter Strzok, your report states, “our review did not find documentary or testimonial evidence directly connecting the political views these employees expressed in their text messages and instant messages to the specific investigative decisions we reviewed.” [pp. xi]. In fact, the report concludes that “in some instances Strzok and Page advocated for more aggressive investigative measures than did others on the Midyear team, such as the use of grand jury subpoenas and search warrants to obtain evidence.” [pp. 149.]

- **Did Strzok or Page have information about an FBI investigation into then-candidate Donald Trump that could have undermined his campaign if it became public?**

As described on page 404 of our report, Strzok stated that had he -- or the FBI in general -- actually wanted to prevent Trump from being elected, they would not have maintained the confidentiality of the investigation into alleged collusion between Russia and members of the Trump campaign in the months before the election. Page similarly stated that the FBI’s decision to keep the Russia investigation confidential before the election shows that they did not

take steps to impact the outcome of the election.

- **If either Strzok or Page truly wanted to use their FBI positions to “stop” President Trump from being elected, wouldn’t leaking the existence of this investigation to the press be consistent with that goal?**

See response to immediately preceding question, above.

- **Did Strzok or Page leak this information to the press?**

We are not aware of Strzok or Page making any unauthorized disclosures about the existence of the investigation into alleged collusion between Russia and members of the Trump campaign.

7. This report states that you “found no evidence that Comey’s statement was the result of bias or an effort to influence the election,” or that his decision to send the October 28 letter was “influenced by political preferences.” [pp. vi, 238, 371].

- **Did you conclude that Comey’s decision to recommend no criminal charges against Secretary Clinton was in any way inappropriate or politically motivated?**

As we stated on page 238 of our report, we found that the documentary and testimonial evidence reflected that Comey’s decision to recommend no criminal charges was the result of his consideration of the evidence that the FBI had collected during the course of the investigation and his understanding of the proof required to pursue a prosecution under the relevant statutes. We further stated that we found no evidence that Comey’s public statement announcing the FBI’s decision to close the investigation was the result of bias or an effort to influence the election. Nevertheless, we concluded that Comey’s unilateral announcement was inconsistent with Department policy, usurped the authority of Attorney General, and did not accurately describe the legal position of the Department prosecutors.

- **Did your investigation conclude that any of Comey’s actions were based on political bias?**

See response to immediately preceding question, above.

- **Does your report conclude that Comey lied or was deliberately dishonest?**

The report does not include such a conclusion.

- **Did your report conclude that Comey was biased against Donald Trump?**

The report does not include such a conclusion.

8. The report also states that the legal conclusion that led the Justice Department not to prosecute Secretary Clinton was “consistent with the Department’s historical approach in prior cases under different leadership, including in the 2008 decision not to prosecute former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for mishandling classified documents.” [pp. vi-vii, 260-262].

- **Was the recommendation to decline charges within the appropriate bounds of prosecutorial discretion?**

As stated on page 261 of our report, we found that the prosecutors’ decision not to prosecute Secretary Clinton, or anyone else, was based on their assessment of the facts, the law, and past Department practice in cases involving these statutes. We did not identify evidence of bias or improper considerations. Our findings with regard to the decision not to prosecute are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of the report.

- **Did your report find that the Midyear team looked at every case that had been brought under the relevant statute and found that Clinton’s conduct did not rise to the type of conduct that had been prosecuted under those statutes in the past?**

The prosecutors’ consideration of the relevant facts and legal authorities in reaching their recommendation that prosecution was not warranted is described in Chapter Two (see pp. 30-36) and Chapter Seven (see pp. 255-257) of our report.

- **Did your investigation conclude that former Director Comey’s decision to change the characterization of Secretary Clinton’s actions from “grossly negligent” to “extremely careless” in his public statement a product of political bias?**

As we stated on page 238 of our report, we found no evidence that Comey’s public statement announcing the FBI’s decision to close the investigation was the result of bias. We describe on page 191 the decision to omit the phrase “gross negligence” from Director Comey’s public statement.

- **Were you satisfied with the Midyear team’s explanation that the decision to change this term was to ensure that it was not confusing to the public?**

As described on page 249 of our report, by describing former Secretary Clinton’s conduct as “extremely careless,” while failing to explain what the Midyear team concluded was the lack of proof for the requirements of Section 793(f)(1), Comey created confusion about the FBI’s assessment of her culpability and the reasons for recommending that prosecution be declined. We further noted that the focus in the statement on former Secretary Clinton’s “extremely careless” handling of classified information foreseeably and predictably led the public to question why former Secretary

Clinton was not being charged with “gross negligence.”

9. In late September 2016, after the Clinton email investigation had been closed, FBI officials found emails between Sec. Clinton and Huma Abedin on a laptop owned by Anthony Weiner. The FBI did not take action to review those emails until almost a month later. The report made clear, however, that the IG “searched for evidence that the Weiner laptop was deliberately placed on the back-burner by others in the FBI to protect Clinton, but found no evidence in emails, text messages, instant messages, or documents that suggested an improper purpose.” [pp. ix, 330.]

- **Do you stand by this conclusion?**

In responding to this question, it is critical to reference the portion of text immediately preceding the passage quoted in the question. As stated on page 329 of our report:

“In assessing the decision to prioritize the Russia investigation over following up on the Midyear-related investigative lead discovered on the Weiner laptop, we considered the text messages that Strzok exchanged with Page expressing hostility for then candidate Trump and preference for a Clinton victory. We were particularly concerned about text messages sent by Strzok and Page that potentially indicated or created the appearance that investigative decisions they made were impacted by bias or improper considerations. Most of the text messages raising such questions pertained to the Russia investigation, and the implication in some of these text messages, particularly Strzok’s August 8 text message (“we’ll stop” candidate Trump from being elected), was that Strzok might be willing to take official action to impact a presidential candidate’s electoral prospects. Under these circumstances, we did not have confidence that Strzok’s decision to prioritize the Russia investigation over following up on the Midyear-related investigative lead discovered on the Weiner laptop was free from bias.”

The OIG stands by the statement in our report on page 330, which follows the above text, that we found no evidence that the Weiner laptop was deliberately placed on the back-burner “by others” in the FBI to protect Clinton.

## **Questions for the Record from Senator Sheldon Whitehouse**

### **Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on “Examining the Inspector General’s First Report on Justice Department Decisions Regarding the 2016 Presidential Election”**

**June 18, 2018**

#### **Questions for Inspector General Horowitz Questions**

(1) Did the report your office conducted conclude that the team on the Midyear investigation into Secretary Hillary Clinton’s use of a private e-mail server treated Secretary Clinton with “kid gloves?”

At pages 148-162 of our report, we analyzed whether the investigative decisions that we reviewed taken in connection with the Midyear investigation were based on improper considerations, including political bias. Our findings with regard to the handling of the Midyear investigation are detailed in Chapter 5 of the report.

(2) Your office’s report notes that 18 U.S.C. Section 793(f)(1), the “gross negligence” provision of the statute governing the gathering, transmitting or loss of defense information, has been the focus of much of the criticism of the Department of Justice’s decision to decline criminal prosecution of Secretary Clinton. Do you agree with the report’s finding that the prosecutors’ “interpretation of Section 793(f)(1) was consistent with the Department’s historical approach in prior cases under different leadership, including in the 2008 decision not to prosecute former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for mishandling classified documents?”

Yes, as we stated on page 262 of our report, we found that the prosecutors’ interpretation of the requirements of Section 793(f)(1) was consistent with prior Department declination decisions that the prosecutors considered and that we reviewed. As noted in Chapter Two, in 2008 the Department declined to prosecute former Attorney General Gonzales based on an interpretation that would have required them to prove that his state of mind was “criminally reckless,” or that he had “a state of mind approaching ‘deliberate intention’ to remove classified documents from a secure location.”

(3) As you know, the FBI has been criticized for failing to place a higher priority on obtaining legal authority to access and review the potentially relevant emails on the Weiner laptop. The resulting delay has been pointed to as indicia of law enforcement bias.

(a) By September, 2016, when the potentially relevant e-mails were initially discovered, was the FBI investigating ongoing foreign interference by an adversary into our democracy and the upcoming election?

As noted in our report, at the time the Weiner laptop emails were discovered, the FBI was already investigating alleged Russian interference in the upcoming election.

(b) Do you agree that, according to the statements he provided to your office, FBI Assistant Director Bill Priestap continues to believe that he made the correct judgment

in not categorizing the laptop review as a “mission critical activity,” given the other “extremely significant matters” being handled by the Counter-Intelligence Division?

The evidence we gathered relating to the FBI’s prioritization of the Russian interference investigation is described at pages 296-300 of the report. Our report did not question the judgment made by Assistant Director Priestap. However, as noted at page 329, in view of Strzok’s text messages, particularly Strzok’s August 8 text message (“we’ll stop” candidate Trump from being elected), we did not have confidence that Strzok’s decision to prioritize the Russia investigation over following up on the Midyear-related investigative lead discovered on the laptop was free from bias.

(c) In your view as Inspector General, would it be an appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion to place higher investigative priority on ongoing interference into democratic elections by a foreign adversary than on information deemed unlikely to change the outcome of a previously closed investigation?

The OIG did not seek to address that question as part of this review. Further, in connection with the Weiner laptop events in October, as detailed in Chapter Nine of our report, no one told us that the delay in seeking a search warrant for the Weiner laptop was due to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

(4) Your report found “profound concerns about the volume and extent of unauthorized media contacts by FBI personnel” uncovered in the OIG’s review. In the home stretch of the 2016 campaign, in fact, Trump supporters Rudy Giuliani, former U.S. attorney and New York City mayor, and James Kallstrom, who had run the FBI’s New York field office in the late 1990s, appeared regularly on Fox News to chastise then-FBI Director James Comey for not pressing charges against Clinton and to relay outrage from agents within the bureau who, according to Kallstrom, “feel like they’ve been stabbed in the back.” According to reporting by Pro Publica in May, 2017, “[t]here was another motivation for Comey’s decision to ‘speak’ [with respect to the re-opening of the Clinton e-mail investigation]: FBI officials feared that news of the new emails would leak out, damaging the Bureau and its director. The primary source of anxiety was the FBI’s own New York field office, which was handling the Weiner case and harbored deep pockets of anti-Clinton sentiment. ... Comey’s deputy also made clear [to a Justice Department official protesting his plan to release the information] that the FBI director was ‘very concerned’ about a leak — that the news ‘was coming out anyway.’”

(a) In April, 2018, former FBI Director Comey stated that, prior to being fired, he had “commissioned an investigation to see if we could understand whether people were disclosing information out of the New York office or any other place that resulted in Rudy’s report on Fox News and other leaks that we were seeing in the media.” While I understand that you can neither confirm nor deny the existence of an ongoing investigation, can you assure this Committee that the commissioned investigation was treated in a manner consistent with Department practice and that related decisions were made free of political interference and bias?

We are unable to provide a specific response to this question because of Department policy that generally proscribes confirming or denying the existence of an ongoing investigation. However, as noted on page 428 of our report, the OIG is investigating unauthorized disclosures of non-public information by FBI personnel. As we state on page 430, in addition to the significant number of communications between FBI employees and journalists, we identified social interactions between FBI employees and journalists that were, at a minimum, inconsistent with FBI policy and Department ethics rules. We will separately report on those investigations as they are concluded, consistent with the Inspector General (IG) Act, other applicable federal statutes, and OIG policy.

- (b) On November 4, 2016, Representatives Elijah Cummings and John Conyers wrote to you calling on your office to conduct an investigation into FBI leaks to Giuliani and others surrounding the status of the Clinton e-mail and Clinton Foundation investigations. What did your office do in response to the above-mentioned letter?

See response to the immediately preceding question.

- (5) According to a tweet by President Trump, “The IG Report totally destroys James Comey and all of his minions including the great lovers, Peter Strzok and Lisa Page, who started the disgraceful Witch Hunt against so many innocent people. It will go down as a dark and dangerous period in American History!” Did Lisa Page and Peter Strzok start a “disgraceful witch hunt against so many innocent people?” Did they personally start any investigation into either Secretary Clinton or Russian interference in the 2016 election?

The FBI’s decision to open the Midyear investigation is discussed on pages 39-41 of our report. As we indicate, neither Peter Strzok nor Lisa Page personally initiated the Midyear investigation. The scope of this OIG review did not include assessing the decision to open the Russian interference investigation.

- (6) According to a tweet retweeted by President Trump, “This IG Report makes it clear, as did Rod Rosenstein’s memo, that Trump was absolutely justified, unquestionably justified, in firing Jim Comey. So I think the Mueller Investigation is on pretty weak grounds right now.”

- (a) Did the report opine on the reasons for which President Trump fired former Director Comey or whether he was justified in doing so?

No. The President’s removal of former Director Comey was not within the scope of the OIG’s review.

- (b) Is it a conclusion of your report that the Mueller investigation is on pretty weak grounds?

No. The scope of the OIG’s review did not include assessing allegations relating to Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election.