U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of the Assistant Attorney General  
Washington, D.C. 20530

July 17, 2020

The Honorable Lindsey Graham  
Chairman  
Committee on the Judiciary  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Marco Rubio  
Acting Chairman  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein  
Ranking Member  
Committee on the Judiciary  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Mark Warner  
Ranking Member  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:

We write in further regard to matters pertaining to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and other matters contained in the December 9, 2019 report by Department of Justice (Department) Inspector General Michael Horowitz.

As we described in our letter of February 7, 2020, the Attorney General has determined that it is now in the public interest to release to Congress additional documents and information related to these matters to the extent consistent with national security interests and with the January 7, 2020 order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). We began to provide such documents to you on February 7. A twelfth production is enclosed herein, Bates numbered SENATE-FISA2020-001106 to SENATE-FISA2020-001167. This submission contains a February 9, 2017 Electronic Communication and an annotated New York Times news article. The attached production is unclassified in its current format.

Pursuant to longstanding Department policy, the Department has made redactions relating to certain personally identifiable information or to ongoing investigations, enforcement activities, and certain law enforcement operations, methods, or techniques.

Today’s submission, along with forthcoming productions of additional documents, is based on extraordinary and unique circumstances, and should not be construed as precedent setting in any regard. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.
We hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional assistance regarding this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Stephen E. Boyd
Assistant Attorney General

Enclosures
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: Interview of Primary Subsource

Date: 02/09/2017

From: [Redacted]

Contact: [Redacted]

Approved By: [Redacted]

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted]

Synopsis: [Redacted] Interview of Primary Subsource. Primary Subsource was interviewed for three days, this is a consolidated write-up of the interview.

Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20421231

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. [Redacted] Info from Primary Subsource
2. (U) Proffer Agreement signed by Primary Subsource

Details:

Declassified by FBI - C58W88B61
on 7/16/2020
This redacted version only
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: 02/09/2017

During the course of three days, Primary Subsource was interviewed in the FBI's Washington's Field office (WFO) by FBI personnel along with attorneys from the US Department of Justice, National Security Division. Primary Subsource was accompanied by his attorney Primary Subsource' Attorney. Below is a consolidated write-up of the three days of interviews.

24 January 2017 (1330 – 1700)

FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

Present:

Primary Subsource, interviewee
Primary Subsource's Attorney, interviewee's attorney
FBI Agent, FBI Special Agent
FBI SIA, FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst

, Chief, National Security Division, US Department of Justice

I. Background

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was born in the city on . He describes his family as , which included and . Primary Subsource completed his high school course in . He indicated that his is probably tied
Title: **Interview of Primary Subsource**
Re: [Redacted], 02/09/2017

To the fact that [Redacted] was a [Redacted] city. During his high school years, he traveled to the [Redacted] for [Redacted] and was also an [Redacted]. [Redacted], he attended a high school in [Redacted]. In [Redacted], he also spent some weeks in [Redacted] which at that time was [Redacted].”

(U//FOUO) For university, Primary Subsource attended [Redacted] between [Redacted], at which time he graduated with a degree [Redacted]. Primary Subsource began work during and after college with a number of [Redacted]. He worked for [Redacted] and [Redacted]. While with [Redacted], he made friends with a number of individual in the field of [Redacted]. He was also employed by a [Redacted] company, [Redacted], during which time he traveled [Redacted]. Also, during and immediately after his time at [Redacted], he traveled [Redacted] with an [Redacted] and served as a facilitator. The [Redacted] is associated with the Library of Congress, and during [Redacted], he assisted and traveled with the delegation [Redacted] and other cities in the [Redacted].

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource desire had always been to obtain a graduate degree in the United States. He applied to a number of schools, and received the best - and one of the only - offers from the [Redacted]. He said that his choice of [Redacted] didn’t involve [Redacted], but it just happened that the school gave him a full fellowship for his [Redacted] studies in [Redacted]. He graduated from [Redacted] and wanted to stay and work in the [Redacted], with the hope of getting his Ph.D. He eventually was accepted not to a [Redacted], but to [Redacted]
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [Redacted], 02/09/2017

program with a focus on SIA and SIA (as he described it, "I served as the SIA"). During and after his time at SIA, he worked at the SIA in varying ranks - Primary Subsource - Primary Subsource. He worked on research projects for SIA and SIA. [ANALYST NOTE: Later in the debriefing, an attorney asked if we’d all heard about ]

uncovering __________. We indicated that we had, and that it was our understanding that he had done that work with SIA Primary Subsource confirmed that.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource explained that he soon hit a glass ceiling at SIA because of his SIA and his lack of a SIA. At that time, he was also SIA, who was SIA and was noted as SIA on his SIA. He left SIA in SIA and began to try his hand at independent consulting. For a time, he did various analytical pieces on SIA with SIA. In time, some of the work moved into the area of due diligence and business intelligence. Primary Subsource says that he saw opportunities to use his existing network of friends and colleagues in the United States and Russia - e.g. high school SIA; SIA, SIA, SIA - and began work for SIA, again doing research and analysis and due diligence work. At SIA, he served as the SIA, which meant that he directed others in doing business intelligence on various topics/sub-regions, including SIA. He helped analysts under him figure out how to best handle assignments and talk to clients. He also put together weekly, bi-weekly and monthly reports. Primary Subsource worked for
Title: Interview of [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

SIA through the summer of SIA, at which time SIA parent company went bankrupt and SIA.

(U//FOOU) Primary Subsource described his travel to SIA up through the SIA period as sporadic and personal. He took a trip back to SIA during SIA in order to do research for his SIA. The rest of his trips SIA during this time – which he said took place every SIA years or so – were centered on SIA, SIA and celebrating New Year’s.

II. Primary Subsource Early Relationship and Eventual Employment with Christopher Steele and Orbis Business Intelligence

(U//FOOU) Primary Subsource first met Christopher Steele [hereafter Steele] in the mid-to-late SIA. The introduction was brokered through SIA, who, according to Primary Subsource, SIA with Steele’s SIA. In the period that SIA was looking for work, following the end of his tenure at SIA, SIA was involved with helping SIA to try and find new employment opportunities. SIA found out that Steele was setting up a new business, Orbis, and that he was on the lookout for analytical help. SIA suggested that Primary Subsource might consider looking at Orbis, and helped to broker an email introduction to Steele. According to Primary Subsource, this was just one of the companies SIA helped to broker introductions.

(U//FOOU) Primary Subsource met in person with Steele at a Starbucks in SIA. They met for about an hour in the coffee shop, and then went to Steele’s hotel, where they sat and talked for about 30 minutes. Primary Subsource said that they really didn’t talk in-depth about background, but rather discussed basic biographical
information, his contacts/network, and his connections in SIA. No work was offered at this time, but Steele said that “if we [Orbis] get a project, we’ll get in touch.”

(U//FOUO) In circa SIA, Steele contacted Primary Subsource and asked that he fulfill a project— an open source analysis of what thought were three of the best sectors of low-risk investment. wrote a few pages, highlighting risks and opportunities, and submitted them to Steele. still wasn’t sure at this time what Orbis’ primary focus was— he said that it was not clear if it was about due diligence and business intelligence. For the short risk assessment report, was paid a few hundred dollars, direct-deposited into his account. He said he was very appreciative of this, because he didn’t really have an income at this time.

(U//FOUO) Later in SIA, Steele told him that he had read and liked his risk assessment and was formally brought on board with Orbis. He signed a confidentiality agreement, which he didn’t think twice about signing because it was fairly standard—he compared it to the types of paperwork he signed at SIA, including sexual harassment policy, etc. All contact with Steele was being done at this time via email and Skype. signed the confidentiality agreement, scanned it, and sent it back to Steele via email. did not sign a “non-compete” agreement with Orbis, and he described his work with Orbis initially as “ work” and “ projects” as he was still with Orbis was just part of his overall portfolio at this time.

(U//FOUO) Initially, his work with Orbis was in the open source sphere.
Title: [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

He did not have any visibility into Orbis’ end clients. He commented that during his time with Orbis, he has always been trying to understand the tangible results of his work – attorney added that his client, “never asked, and was never told [about final clients].” The project requirements were always kept vague with few concrete parameters – e.g. “Can you do some checking on this?” Also, initially with Orbis, his sole contact was with Steele. He was in email and Skype communication with Steele and was informally introduced to other Orbis employees during Skype calls, but was never flown out to the UK to meet with Steele and the Orbis team.

(U//FOOU) In [REDACTED], he had his first Orbis-financed trip. His specific project involved inquires about a [REDACTED] [which did not name] and the company’s owner, which he described as a former Russian senator and Duma deputy. It was a due diligence assignment, and he was meant to look for company/management links to organized crime and Russia’s regional and federal power structures. For this, he was wired $3,000. He used $1,500 to purchase a round-trip ticket, and $1,500 to cover expenses for the trip. He used his existing contacts and daisy-chained from them to try to identify others with relevant information. For example, explained, he would use pre-existing contacts to find out if anyone he knew had worked in public relations or advertising for a [REDACTED]. He did not pay anyone for information, and reported back to Steele verbally either via Skype or in-person in London.

(U//FOOU) In circa [REDACTED], he traveled for the in his life. It was both a personal trip and a business trip. Orbis paid for the trip, and during his time in the UK, met Steele – “for the second or third time in my life” – and
also introduced to other Orbis employees, including [redacted] and [redacted], about whom [redacted] described as an analyst who had graduated from an English university. [redacted] described the time with Orbis as "general meetings, [pitching] potential projects, and discussing general rumors about Putin and Putin’s new third term as president. There was talk about what the "biggest rumors" or the "biggest compromising info" regarding the Russian government was.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] could not remember exactly when he had first learned that Steele [redacted]. He thought it was around 2012 or 2013. He couldn’t remember if someone told him that fact, someone mentioned it, or if it was just "common knowledge" that he had picked up over time. [ANALYST NOTE: In discussing his knowledge of Steele’s former intelligence service employment, [redacted] remarked that he didn’t really care to know such things and wanted to “stay out of the government’s business” - to which his attorney said, “Well, you haven’t done a very good job of that.”]

(U//FOUO) [redacted] continued to work on a number of projects for Orbis on all kinds of subjects, including Russian leadership, banking, and the [redacted]. He would provide reports every month or every other month.

(U//FOUO) Through [redacted] and Orbis were in a contractual relationship, and it was [redacted] hope that [redacted] would result in [redacted] and [redacted] eventual ability to get a security clearance and set up his own business. However, with the [redacted] bankruptcy of [redacted] parent company - and the subsequent closing of [redacted] itself - [redacted] found himself in a difficult situation. [redacted]. He
needed an entity to fill the gap - and as Orbis couldn’t do it [as SIA, the attorney put it, because Orbis was a British company] - went to a friend, SIA, who is the receptive about bringing on board with but said that they could only help him out if he had a source of income. At that point, introduced Steele and and a formal arrangement was set up between Orbis and served as the “contract vehicle” through which would be paid a monthly salary for his work for Orbis. became a salaried employee of and SIA. Out of the approximately people employed as was the only one - as far as he knows - who was working solely for Orbis, and believes that only knows of his work for Orbis. Prior to this arrangement, the only paperwork tie between and Orbis was through the banking/wire transactions, but after this, the only regular paperwork tie would be between and SIA. said that he received after deductions, etc. about in cash/month. [ANALYST NOTE: also gave a figure of per month, but is not clear how much charges Orbis for services, which would indicate the profit makes from Orbis-related work.] Since is on a monthly salary with , Steele can reach out directly, give assignments and direct his travel.

III. Policies and Procedures While Traveling Abroad for Orbis; Contacts with Russian Intelligence and Security Services

(U//FOUO) was asked how he “covers” his queries with his
sources. He typically tells his sources that he is working on a research project or an analytical product. He was also asked if there were friends, associates and/or sources who knew that he was collecting information for Orbis. He said "yes and no," and explained that some of his closer friends understand that he works in the area of due diligence and business intelligence. Many of them think that he is doing projects for entities like [SIA], the [SIA], or think tanks [SIA]. They don’t know that he works for Orbis, as he signed a non-disclosure agreement and told not to talk about the company. He has never mentioned Chris Steele or Orbis to his friends and associates. He emphasized that "you [the FBI] are the first people he’s told."

(U//FOUO) [Primary Subsource] was asked if he takes notes on the information he is collecting from his sources, or if he keeps any kind of records. He was told by Steele that it is a security risk to take notes; he hasn’t kept notes or electronic records. He occasionally makes scribbles and/or chicken scratch notes here and there, but gives verbal debriefs in [SIA] following his trips [SIA]. Altogether, with respect to the election-related reporting, he had three trips [SIA] [SIA]. He also had one additional United Kingdom trip. While [SIA], he was primarily [SIA]

(U//FOUO) [Primary Subsource] had no communications with Steele while [SIA]. He was always advised by Steele that they were not to have communications, or to minimize communications, saving them for only emergency or urgent matters.
Title: Interview of [Name]
Re: [Date], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) During the conversation about Source 1 [see below], Primary Subsource was asked if Orbis had ever asked him to broker direct contact with one of his [Name] sources, or whether Orbis was comfortable keeping [Name] as the intermediary between the sources and the company. Primary Subsource indicated that Orbis has always kept him Primary Subsource as the intermediary.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource indicated that, to his knowledge, he has not had any contacts with the Russian intelligence or security services. [ANALYST NOTE: His attorney emphasized “to his knowledge” during this part of the discussion.] Primary Subsource said that he had contacts with Russian government officials, as he said, in the SIA - but he denied any contact - again, “as far as he knew,” with anyone in the SVR, GRU or FSB.

IV. Initial US Election-Related Assignments for Orbis

(U//FOUO) Around March 2016, Primary Subsource and Chris Steele had a voice conversation during which time Steele asked Primary Subsource to see what he Primary Subsource could find out about Paul Manafort, including his reputation in the United States, his connections to the Yanukovich regime in Ukraine, and any corruption ties. He related some of Steele’s collection-related questions - “Do you know [about] Manafort? Find out about Manafort’s dealings with Ukraine, his dealings with other countries, and any corrupt schemes [to which Manafort is connected].” Primary Subsource said that he was “clueless” about who Manafort was, and that this was a “strange task” to have been given. It was strange because Primary Subsource had not done US-related projects for Orbis before, and he was a bit uncomfortable working on a topic dealing with SIA Steele did not give him a tight deadline on this assignment. At this
Title: Interview of  
Re: [Redacted], 02/09/2017

point, [Redacted] was on salary with Orbis through [Redacted], and there was no difference in financial remuneration for this assignment. He had no inclinations as to why, or for whom, Steele was asking about Manafort. [Redacted] carefully asked around some of his [Redacted] friends. He said he may have asked friends and contacts in Russia, but he couldn’t remember off-hand. He added that, for this topic, his friends and contacts in Russia couldn’t say very much because they were “too far removed” from the matter. [Redacted] recalled that he was able to find articles about Manafort’s ties to Ukraine and the Philippines. [Redacted] reported some of the findings on this assignment to Steele using SIA [Redacted], a secure messenger app, which he has used, in addition to Skype, for communicating with Steele.

(U//FOUO) In the last week of [Redacted], [Redacted] took an Orbis-related trip to [Redacted]. He was working primarily on a business intelligence matter - a [Redacted]. For this trip, Chris also asked [Redacted] to look for information dealing with the US presidential election, including compromising materials on Donald Trump. [Redacted] said he could not remember if Steele had asked him to ask around for compromising materials on just Trump, or Trump and Hillary Clinton - at which point [Redacted] attorney indicated that [Redacted] had told him [the attorney] previously that it had been both presidential candidates. The request did not shock [Redacted], but it was - again - outside the normal scope of work and it wasn’t completely comfortable for him. Like the Manafort assignment, it was not really a Russia-specific job and it involved, indirectly, his [Redacted].” He was nervous and cautious when asking around about the topic in Russia, but he felt like he had to report something back to Steele about it. Steele did not place any higher priority on the
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: 02/09/2017

election-related requirements: it was still a side effort to the SIA. It was, to Primary Subsource, “unpleasant,” but he made inquiries and had a few election-related conversations, but it wasn’t the main focus of his trip.

V. Primary Subsource Contacts on his SIA Trip SIA

(U//FOUO) Source 2

(U//FOUO) Source 2 is in SIA around Primary Subsource has known Source 2 for about SIA years. They first met at a SIA and struck it off well. He is now a good friend. Source 2 comes from a SIA and, more distantly, SIA.

Source 2 himself is a SIA. He runs his own Facebook page, and has served as SIA of two different SIA.

SIA. He has been source of information regarding economic sanctions, and actions taken by SIA - a friend of Source 2 knows a SIA handling the company’s public and governmental relations (PR/GR). Another of Source 2 close friends works as a SIA. Source 2 is an avid SIA. He often tries to monetize his relationship with Primary Subsource, suggesting that the two of them should try and do projects together for money.

(U//FOUO) Source 3
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource

Re: , 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Source 3 was born in SIA. She is a close, personal friend to Primary Subsource. She is originally from SIA, and then SIA. They have been friends since [the equivalent of] the 8th grade - SIA. Upon reflection, Primary Subsource corrected himself, indicating that she had been a year behind him in the SIA. She moved SIA in SIA, where she worked in the SIA field. She did a bit of SIA, and also SIA. She went to the SIA, where she took what is now called SIA, as her first language, SIA as her second language, and also studied SIA. Source 3 added that Source 3 family has a vacation home in SIA. Source 3 worked for SIA, SIA. In the SIA, Source 3 moved to SIA, where she served as SIA. For about a year now, Source 3 has lived in SIA. Source 3 said that he was not exactly sure what she does now in SIA, but she has done SIA and worked SIA a Russian SIA. (U//FOUO) Source 3 and Primary Subsource have remained friends for many years. Her SIA helped him financially years ago - he would borrow money from her SIA, and her SIA wouldn’t ask for repayment. More recently, he has helped out Source 3 financially - probably around SIA over the last SIA years.

(U//FOUO) Source 3 has a vast network of people who are employed in the SIA. Source 3 SIA Primary Subsource has been able to collect
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: Primary Subsource, 02/09/2017

Information for Orbis across a wide range of topics - major Russian firms; Russian state entities, including the Kremlin. Source 3 "big connection" - though emphasized that it is not necessarily her direct contact - is person, but she knows a couple of SIA who have good access to and upon whom SIA has relied to get out his own messaging. wasn't sure, but he thought these contacts may include who met while he was at .

(U//FOUO) Through Source 3, has also become good friends with the SIA, who was assaulted in Russia for SIA.

(U//FOUO) Source 3 is one of the individuals who knows that works for due diligence and business intelligence. (As an aside at this point, insisted that probably has a better idea about this than does Source 3 because is always trying to monetize his relationship with . reiterated again to the interviewers that will often pitch money-making ideas or projects - "Let's work together. I can try and get to answer a question, but I'll need some money to do it.") Source 3 has an understanding that is "connected." In fact, either morning or morning, Source 3 reached out to and asked him for help in , on how living in the United States are viewing the Trump administration. She is asking him by the weekend, probably so she can sell it to a friend in Moscow.
(U//FOUO) Source 3 was one of the key sources for the "Trump dossier." She is directly quoted at points; however, it is not sure if she realizes that the quotations come from her. Right now, Source 3 is keeping quiet with her used to work in the country of ...

(U//FOUO) Source 4 is a SIA. He is Primary Subsource met him while he was on an exchange scholar program at SIA for about SIA in SIA. Source 4 spent a lot of time with Source 4 during Source 4 time in SIA.

(U//FOUO) Source 4 specializes in regional politics, particularly SIA, but also addresses US-Russian relations, US elections, and a host of issues involving US-Russian competition and conflict, including SIA.

(U//FOUO) Source 4 everyday job duties as a SIA vary. One day, he could be SIA for a visiting SIA; the next day, he could be SIA a large group of SIA; while the next, he could be handling SIA. At SIA, he also has contact with friends and associates in the SIA. As explained, it would not be uncommon for Source 4 to remark to things like, "I just heard such-and-such from someone in the
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: , 02/09/2017

SIA ,” or “I just heard this from a Deputy Minister,” or “I just overheard such-and-such about an issue.”

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource and Source 4 drink heavily together, and always looks forward to getting together with Source 4 when is in town. Primary Subsource knows that Source 4 travels to SIA .

(U//FOUO) Source 1 has known Source 1 since late SIA , when Source 1 was part of a SIA . He has visited both SIA and SIA as part of visits to the United States. Source 1 is about years old and comes from SIA , where he served in city and regional government positions, including SIA and SIA . Source 1 explained that things did not work out well for him in SIA , so he moved to SIA and began working in the SIA - particularly with respect to SIA . From the SIA , Source 1 worked for SIA . Over the last few years, he had served in the capacity of SIA .

(U//FOUO) Source 1 background as a former SIA means that, from a young age, he has been involved in political activities. He’s been in some form of politics since he was a teenager. He is also a SIA , but could not recall if it was in economics, political science or philosophy. Source 1 has been taking politics with Source 1 since his days as a SIA at the SIA . Now, they meet together whenever Primary Subsource goes to SIA .
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: _, 02/09/201

(U//FOUO) Orbis knows more about Source 1 because, as a favor to
Source 1, Orbis reached out to Orbis to see if Orbis could help get
Source 1 a scholarship for language courses in the
United Kingdom. Source 1 asked for assistance, and
Source 1 turned to Orbis for help. As part of this, Source 1 explained who
was, and why he was asking Orbis for assistance.

(U//FOUO) Source 1 is always trying to get to start projects
and make money together - related how, like others,
always asking questions like, “Can you get us some projects?” or
“What can you get us financing?” or “Let’s do something together dealing
with SIA!” doesn’t consider this as his source
tasking him” but as simply the normal course and scope of networking
in these circles. Did help with an academic book
about Source 1. He made about SIA for his assistance with the academic book. For it,
got to the Library of Congress, performed archival research,
and also talked to academics he knew.”

(U//FOUO) knows that Source 1 travels to the
(U//FOUO) Source 1 has a good relationship with . Source 1 considers a good friend,
and he Source 1 hears, from many things about, and from,
circles. From Source 1 relationship with , has been able to collect information of interest to Orbis,
including Russian domestic politics and more specialized subjects like
SIA. understands that Source 1 relationship with stems from Source 1 tenure in SIA. There,
Source 1 had contacts with the regional Federal Security Service (FSB),

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Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [Redacted], 02/09/2017

as well as with individuals in the SIA who were associated with politically-conservative and strongly Russian SIA circles. It was through these connections that Source 1 was introduced to [Redacted].

was asked if Source 1 was a devout Orthodox believer - did not believe so, but thought that he might have been at one time.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource has never met [Redacted]. He’s never been to one of Russian intelligence officer, and said that he doesn’t believe he’s ever been in the same room as [Redacted].

(U//FOUO) Source 5

(U//FOUO) Source 5 is an SIA Primary Subsource has met her in person, and they are also connected through [Redacted]. They have been friends [Redacted] for about SIA years. They have many mutual SIA friends. She is tied to Russia’s SIA, and she has ties to the SIA, as well as to the Russian intelligence and security services. [Redacted] remarked that things have become “personal” between Source 5 and SIA because of stories that have been written [ANALYST NOTE: This may be a reference to the fact that in SIA Page-Sechin meeting references in the “Trump dossier” would have been derived from Source 5].

VI. Dossier Report Number 2016/95

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Primary Subsource to review Report 2016/95. This material was collected during the period where the
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: , 02/09/2017

An election-related theme was still a "side project." The election-related material became a much more important project in the July-August 2016 period.

(U//FOUO) This report involves reporting from "Source E" - reporting which ties, at least in part, to related the story about his contact with Source 6. In either late June or July 2016 - he reached out to journalist for . He asked some of the same questions Orbis had asked him with regarding Trump's Russian connections, and put him in contact with another of his colleagues, USPER 2 said that USPER 2 had contact information, and that was someone with whom he should speak. Source 6 was, according to someone with whom "they" were talking. There was even talk about meeting up with USPER 2 in person, but it did not happen.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource reached out to Source 6 via email twice. He never received a response from the first attempt, but after the second attempt, he received in circa late 2016 a very strange phone call from a Russian male who he believed to be Source 6, but who never identified himself. The individual on the other end of the call never identified himself. The two of them talked for a bit, and the two of them tentatively agreed to meet in person in US City at the end of July. At the end of July, Primary Subsource traveled with SIA to US City, but the meeting never took place and no one ever called back. Altogether, he had only a single phone call with an individual he thought to be Source 6. The call was either a cellular
call, or it was a communication through a phone app. will look back at his phone to see if he can get caller information.

VII. Dossier Report Number 2016/94

(U//FOUO) This report involves the purported Carter Page meeting with Sechin, as well as the purported Carter Page meeting with Igor Diveykin. indicated that the sourcing for this report derives from his conversations with Source 5 and .

(U//FOUO) As recalls, Carter Page was one of 4-5 names that Steele provided to . Carter Page, as relates, had his meetings in Moscow in early July 2016 – either the 5th through the 8th, or the 5th through the 6th. Source 5 told that she had heard that Carter Page was going to meet with Sechin, and then later, in writing, confirmed that the Page-Sechin meeting had actually taken place. said that he would confirm the date, time and circumstances under which confirmed to him that the Page-Sechin meeting had taken place. He will check his phone, but he recalls that he received the confirmation from Source 5 via text in September 2016 when he was at SIA . was able to confirm that the Page-Sechin meeting took place through one of her contacts – SIA . Altogether, summarized, Source 5 told him about the Sechin-Page meeting, and then later confirmed via text that the meeting had taken place.

(U//FOUO) Source 5 travels to the SIA
VIII. Media Contact/Outreach to Primary Subsource

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource received two media inquiries on the dossier. One was from a specialized journal, while the other was from another journal. He has not responded to either inquiry.

25 January 2017

FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

Present:

Primary Subsource, interviewee

, interviewee’s attorney

, FBI Special Agent

, FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst

, Deputy, National Security Division, US Department of Justice

I. Recent Communication by Christopher Steele

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource reported that Christopher Steele had reached out to him today. He has not replied, but is planning to do so either tonight or tomorrow. His plan is to simply say that he has been meeting with his SIA.
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: , 02/09/2017

II. Documents

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource brought three documents for the interviewers. The first was the Russian-language text interaction between Primary Subsource and Source 5 regarding the Sechin-Page meeting in July 2016. The second were copies of profiles for Source 1, Source 2, Source 3, Source 4, Source 5, and Source 2, with an added picture of a profile belonging to . The third document was a copied pastiche of a number of profiles, business cards and pictures, which will be explained in further detail below.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #1, the text interaction between Source 5 and Primary Subsource, he explained that the date he had given yesterday was incorrect. The text interchange took place in versus , and it would have been during visit to immediately following his trip. He was in when they had the interaction. Interviewers indicated that it would be translated, but wanted to point out that the Russian initials [which, transliterated into English would be I.I.S.] stand for Igor Ivanovich Sechin.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #2, these are pictures and profiles of the friends and associates in network discussed the previous day. Attorney balked at the use of the term “network,” stating that the preferred term was “social circle.” One of the interviewers noted that profile shows her as having studied at .

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #3, the following information was provided:
Title: [Redacted]

Re: [Redacted], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) In the upper left hand corner, [Redacted] identified [Redacted] as the head of the Russian [Redacted]. He has never met [Redacted] and has never had direct interaction with him, but [Redacted] and [Redacted] have direct contact. [Redacted] are on friendly terms.

(U//FOUO) Underneath [Redacted] photo is a business card from [Redacted], noted as Deputy Director, [Redacted]. Underneath that business card is what appears to be a Windows Outlook references to [Redacted] and [Redacted] work in the same office, and may actually serve under [Redacted]. [Redacted]

[Redacted] said stood for SIA. It was from [Redacted] and [Redacted] that heard about the fears and concerns among [Dmitriy] Medvedev’s people about what the Kremlin was doing with respect to involvement in the US presidential election. [Redacted] remarked how the Russian influence issue was considered an “open secret” and that he was hearing similar stories from other sources—probably [Redacted].

(U//FOUO) Next to the Windows Outlook screenshot on [Redacted] there is a list of pricing with the title, translated from Russian as “collection banknote United States.doc.” [Redacted] attorney emphasized that he did not believe this represented anything illegal or illicit on the part of his client. [Redacted] explained this in reference to [Redacted] and his interest in [Redacted]. During [Redacted] travel to [Redacted], he went to [Redacted] and, while there, withdrew bank notes from [Redacted].
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: , 02/09/2017

a number of different bank ATMs brought those notes to Source 3, who would exchange the Scottish bank notes for rubles - using the current exchange rate. As he remarked the previous day, Source 2 is an SIA and has been doing so for decades. The pricing list is a "wish list." [As an aside, identified another of Source 2's friends, SIA

(U//FOUO) In the upper right hand corner, identified Russian Government Employee. She is currently serving as the head of SIA, which is run by Russian Government Employee, [ANALYST NOTE: This may be a misidentification. The head of SIA, Russian Government Employee], who in turn is connected with SIA. In her position, has direct access to SIA said that he has not used as a source for the reports, but that they are good friends and that he has known her for at least SIA years.

III. Russian official, Russian official, Veterans Pension System, and Dossier Report 2016/111, including Paragraph #5

(U//FOUO) Underneath the picture of , identified on the card as SIA, has known for several years. They were together, during which time recalls that he tried to get conversation started about Ukraine and sanctions.
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: 02/09/2017

Primary Subsource first said that he knows that Russian official has been back in Russia since August 2016, but then thought a bit more and said, "maybe summer 2016." Primary Subsource described Russian official as "not a direct source, but he does appear in the [Trump] dossier." According to Primary Subsource, Russian official is the only person he knows SIA, but he isn't positive about that. He recalls that they had a conversation later in spring 2016 during which time Russian official said that he had "put in a word" and wondered if it had helped. They had a 5-10 minute chat [ANALYST NOTE: It is unclear if it was the same spring 2016 conversation or a later conversation] during which time Russian official confided in that he was getting tired of doing what he wasn't really supposed to be doing in his job - Russian official didn't want Russia "exposed" in the US election. It was Primary Subsource understanding that was moving back to Russia and hoped for an

(U//FOUO) As an aside while talking about Russian official, Primary Subsource explained that since his time at SIA, he has maintained distance from diplomats at the Russian Embassy. He and USPER had contact with a SIA secretary at the Embassy - a stranger who was pestering them. They gave this individual open source information. Primary Subsource identified this individual as Russian official and knew Russian official about SIA, while he was working at SIA. Russian official asked for information about Ukraine and the Orange Revolution, and USPER recommended
that they keep him at a distance. - he related to the interviewers that - [This was how, explained , he picked up information about how the Russian official had to travel to - sometimes driving and sometimes flying - to deliver cash Russian official completely dropped off the map sometime around 2007-2008.

(U///FOUO) Looking at Report 2016/111, was asked about the report’s use of the descriptor, “a trusted compatriot.” - as in paragraph one, “Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016…” was asked if he was the “trusted compatriot” in these reports. said that it might be him, but that it could also be others. attorney then jumped in, stating that the “literary device” used by Steele in the dossier was not consistent and not clear, so he wanted to be careful about matching that descriptor to his client. said that, to the best of his knowledge, he is not sure if he was the only one working on this issue for Orbis [and therefore he is not clear if he is always the “trusted compatriot” mentioned in the documents].

(U///FOUO) Interviewers drew attention to paragraph 5 of the same report, where Mikhail Kalugin [written as Kulagin] is mentioned. is not clear how this paragraph was put together. indicated that no MFA official told him because of the election issue. About was his replacement - . Kalugin had described Bondarev as
Title: [Interview of Primary Subsource]
Re: [redacted], 02/09/2017

"a bright young guy." has no idea where the language in this paragraph regarding being "clean in this regard" (with respect to knowledge and involvement in US election matters).

IV. Dossier Report 2016/94

(U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraphs 1 and 2, interviewers went back over explanations from the previous day, particularly the issue of whether had heard from that the Page-Sechin meeting was going to happen, that it had happened, or both. explained that he didn’t recall who had told him that the meeting was going to happen - it might have been through , but the more he thought, the more he believed it was from someone else, and he couldn’t recall who. He reported the meeting to Steele in July, and then, in October, he received text with the confirming information from someone does not know the identity.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraph 3 on Carter Page’s meeting with Igor Diveykin, said that this information came from and had a phone conversation, or maybe Skype, but remembers that it was a voice communication which lasted about 30 minutes. said it was during the summer, because he remembers having the conversation while was at the public swimming pool and "whatever" with . was relating information that she was hearing from her sources - did not ask her about the identities of these sources. could probably follow-up with about the sources, but he explained that he has no reason to doubt . He trusts .

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(U//FOUO) On the Diveykin identification, this was the name her sources gave her. He was in the Domestic Policy entity and was one of the people in charge of US-Russia relations [ANALYST NOTE: ...description was someone unclear here, because he added, “election-related stuff,” but then went back to referring to it as “US-Russia relations.”] Source 3 suggested that there was an attempt to masquerade things or craft a façade because “the folks who were in domestic policy were working external [foreign] policy, while the folks doing external were working domestic matters.”

(U//FOUO) Source 3 explained that, on the whole, his conversations with Source 3 were done in an opaque way, so as to be careful security-wise. Source 3 and Source 3 knew that when they talked, they were talking about the US election issue, but wouldn’t necessarily refer to it.

(U//FOUO) Source 3 is the one who told Source 3 that the Russian government was sitting on “kompromat” as stated in paragraph 4.

(U//FOUO) Source 3 attorney stated that it was his client’s assessment that this information from Source 3 was credible and accurate. It is Source 3 conclusion that the information in paragraph 3 came from his conversation with Source 3.

(U//FOUO) Source 3 is “inconclusive” about where exactly the information in paragraph 4 came from. He thinks he and Source 3 may have spoken about it – Source 3 is tied to both and Ivanov – but he would not have described Source 3 as “an official close to Ivanov.” When asked by interviewers how he described Source 3 to
Christopher Steele said that he described her as "my friend who knows someone in the Kremlin with direct/indirect access to Sergey Ivanov."

IV. Dossier Report 2016/134

(U//FOUO) The information in the first paragraph of this report came from text interchange with Source 5 in October 2016.

(U//FOUO) was less conclusive about the construction of paragraph 2. The final sentence about the lifting of sanctions was taken from text in October, but never mentioned to that Page had been offered any brokerage of the 19% Rosneft stake. There were speculations and “open secrets” about Rosneft and foreign offerings. For example, an energy analyst and professor [ANALYST NOTE: This appears to be identical to who as of was the of Russia’s suggested in broad terms to during the that once sanctions were lifted, could find itself in a “privileged” state. As an aside, remarked that is often dismissed intrinsically as being a Gazprom lobbyist.


(U//FOUO) began his explanation of the Prague and Michael Cohen-related reports by stating that Christopher Steele had given him 4-5 names to research for the election-related tasking. He could only remember three of the names: Carter Page, Paul Manafort and Michael Cohen. When he talked to in the fall of 2016 - he believes
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [redacted], 02/09/2017

it was a phone call – he rattled off these names and, out of them, he was surprised to hear that [redacted] immediately [later softened this to “almost immediately”] recognized Cohen’s name.

(U//FOUO) In Report 2016/135, [redacted] did not know the origins of paragraph 1. He said that it didn’t come from him, and that he doesn’t know where the information is from. He described it as “too general.”

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 2 of the same report (2016/135), [redacted] recognized material from his conversations with [redacted] in the middle of the paragraph. [redacted] had told [redacted] that Cohen and three other unidentified people had flown [or, as [redacted] put it later, “assumed they had flown”] into Prague in August-September 2016 and had met with a group from Russia. [redacted] asked her who else besides Cohen had come into Prague from the US side – she didn’t know, but she was willing to go back and find out. She never got back to him about this. [redacted] also asked about the participants on the Russian side. She didn’t know, but she indicated that her “best guess” or “her understanding” was that they were from “Legal Affairs” or “Legal Department.” [redacted] indicated that [redacted] did not say why she thought that. [redacted] wasn’t aware that such an entity existed – he was not able to find it through research.

(U//FOUO) Reflecting on the Prague-related material, [redacted] believes he had 2, maybe even 3, conversations with [redacted] on this topic later in October. Nothing on Prague and Cohen was collected during the SIA trip in SIA. The first conversation is the one during which he believed [redacted] noted her recognition of Cohen’s name. The second conversation is the one in which she discussed Prague, the visit of Cohen plus three other individuals,
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: , 02/09/2017

and the meeting with the Russian side. There may have been a third conversation on the topic, but could not recall exactly and said that they had also talked about "a private subject."

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 2, doesn’t believe he discussed Paul Manafort with . Source 3 didn’t bring up Carter Page or Manafort during these October conversations. The direct quote "...to sweep it all under the carpet..." is from , . did not say, however, why Cohen went to Prague instead of Carter Page.

(U//FOUO) In Dossier Report 2016/166, Source 3 is the one who provided the Rossotrudnichestvo information and the identification of . Source 3 said that during either the second or third conversation with , about the Cohen matter, had initially thought the meetings involved the "legal department" but then identified and Rossotrudnichestvo. kept pushing for information about the identities of the US participants, but she did not know. On the Russian side, requested that she go back to her sources, and it was after that she came back with the identification of . However, said that was working "under Rossotrudnichestvo cover," as is stated in the report. had done his own research and confirmed that existed.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, is the one who mentioned "deniable cash payments" and "wires." pushed for the substance of the meeting in Prague, but he is not sure if was brainstorming here, or if she is relating information from her sources.

(U//FOUO) As an aside here, spoke about some personal details regarding .
Title: Interview of SIA
Re: , 02/09/2017

SIA reiterated a story from the previous day - had just reached out to him the other day to ask him to an article about Russian speakers and Trump. currently has a visa to come to the United States. To questions posed by FBI SA and comments made by his attorney, indicated that he could carefully , perhaps even meet her in a third country. To try and get additional information of interest to the FBI would require in-person conversation, and quipped that he'd never been . said that he had plans to visit her earlier this year , but that it didn't work out. said that she knew that he had plans to visit her in , because the two of them had talked through the plans. When asked if would be comfortable talking to the FBI, said that he wasn’t sure.

(U//FOUO) summarized that, when it comes to the dossier, the Page material regarding Sechin came from , while the Cohen/Prague material came from .

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 3 of Report 2016/166, said that he believes that the material "strongly corresponds" to a recent, December 2016 conversation that he had with . This was a separate, follow-on conversation to the October conversations mentioned before. The material is not word-for-word from his conversation with , but partially-based on their December 2016 telephone conversation. For example, in their conversation, while he doesn’t remember her saying , he does recall her saying . He recalls that she talked
about "affiliates" but she did not mention the Democratic Party in the way that the report says. As he mentioned earlier, he stated their conversations were held in the overall context of the US elections and hacking, but he is not sure if she mentioned a specific political party or candidate at this time. She did mention "porn traffic" as mentioned in this paragraph. 

Source 3 does not recall reference to a specific time frame of March through September 2016.

(U//FOOU) Source 3 did mention both who she mentioned - as stated in the report - work "under the FSB." She mentioned and all of his smaller subsidiaries and companies.

Source 3 said that, which said was one of companies. Primary Subsource admitted to the interviewers that his understanding of this topic (i.e. cyber) was "zero" and that is not an IT specialist herself. Source 3 never said that was involved in any of this. He said that paragraph 3 has references and keywords involving payments and cover-up from his conversation with Source 3.

(U//FOOU) With respect to paragraph 4, gave this as a kind of example. She didn’t offer any specific information or evidence, but that this (e.g. Romanian hackers heading to Bulgaria to lay low) is a kind of example [ANALYST NOTE: It seemed by description that this might be analysis]. is not sure where the term "bolt hole" is from, and tried, unsuccessfully, to think about what Russian term this might be representing. When asked if everything in this paragraph came from, said that it was difficult to say with certainty. It sounds like material that would say. Looking back through the paragraph, said that
everything before the term "lay low" is definitely from Source 3, while he is not sure about everything after that term. Source 3 is not sure about the specifics in this paragraph and agreed with interviewers that the report has more specific language (place names; ethnicity of hackers) than other reports. Interviewers brought up the fact that had mentioned the previous day that spoke and had a family vacation home. Source 3 did not know if the family home was in , but asked if was "on the coast" because that's where typical family vacation homes were located.

VI. Source 6, RIA Novosti, and Dossier Report 2016/95

(U//FOUO) was asked to go back over the reports discussed in brief the previous day regarding his interaction with . said that Christopher Steele had asked him to find sources linked to the Trump team, who could answer the overarching questions regarding Russia's connections to the team, etc. turned to his contacts at , and his contacts there told him that there was "this guy, " that he should talk to.

(U//FOUO) first met with , who is still around (as understands) and who is one of . said that has offices, and the two of them met over lunch at a Thai restaurant. He didn't want to ask very targeted or revealing questions for the election assignment, so he kept them broad in scope ("Do you know anyone who can talk about all of this Trump-Manafort stuff, or Trump and Russia?" commented about how there was a great
amount of speculation about Russian influence and Russian ties, but that he was skeptical and nothing substantive had turned up. USPER said he should also speak with his colleague, USPER 2. USPER said that “there [is] this guy USPER 2 interviewed and he USPER 2 could probably get his contact information.” USPER said that he believes, in the end, USPER gave him an email, and that he never met with USPER 2. [USPER 2 added that he will see if he still has the email]

(U//FOUO) emailed Source 6 in either June or July 2016 - but it was after Primary Subsource trip SIA SIA. Primary Subsource did not receive a response from this email, but says that it was at that point that “things got strange.” In July 2016, he received a telephone call from an unidentified Russian guy. He thought it was Source 6 - he still thinks it was Source 6 - but the individual never identified himself as Source 6. They talked for about 10 minutes, and then arranged to meet together up US City.

(U//FOUO) remembered that they made plans to meet US City, and that Source 6 offered to come up “anytime” Source 6 was available. Source 6 wouldn’t commit to a specific time, but Primary Subsource said that he could be US Primary Subsource “for a couple of days.” Source 6 could not recall if Source 6 said he lived US City or not, but Primary Subsource guessed that he did. Following this, Source 6 - SIA traveled US City with prepared questions, but Source 6 was a no-show. The visit would have been near the end of July. Later, Source 6 spoke with USPER 2, who mentioned to Source 6 that Source 6 had been asking about him. Source 6 said that Source 6 had asked him USPER 2 “who the hell you were” and that it would be
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: Source 6, 02/09/2017

hard to reach out to him now because he was in Source 6. Primary Subsource remembers providing Christopher Steele with the information about Source 6 whereabouts in Source 6. (U//FOUO) tried one more follow-up with Source 6 in September 2016. He decided to use his friend from Source 6, who is involved in Source 6 SIA project, so, knowing that Source 6, sent him a brochure about SIA project in the hope that it would generate a response. and became Source 6, but Source 6 could not remember which of them initiated the SIA.

(U//FOUO) Altogether, and the person he believed - and still believes - to be Source 6 had one 10-15 minute conversation. says that “Source E” in Report 2016/95 sounds like it is from this conversation. During the phone call, he remembers mentioning Manafort and Page. recollects that this 10-15 minute conversation included a general discussion about Trump and the Kremlin, that there was “communication” between the parties, and that it was an ongoing relationship. recalls that the individual believed to be said that there was “exchange of information” between Trump and the Kremlin, and that there was “nothing bad about it.” said that some of this information exchange could be good for Russia, and some could be damaging to Trump, but deniable. The individual said that the Kremlin might be of help to get Trump elected, but did not recall any discussion or mention of Wikileaks.

(U//FOUO) Besides the 10-15 minute conversation, had no further contact with (or the person he believed to be ).
Title: **Interview of Primary Subsource**

**Re:** [Redacted], 02/09/2017

VI. Trump, the Ritz Carlton and Dossier Report 2016/80

(U//FOUO) The interviewers brought **Primary Subsource**'s attention to the report regarding Trump's alleged unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz Carlton Hotel - specifically paragraph 3 of Report 2016/80. **Primary Subsource** said that this information came, partially, from **Source 2**. **Source 2**'s circle of associates and friends, **Primary Subsource** explained, is primarily in the **SIA** sphere, but his social network is vast, and he has other, random associates. In fact, as another example, **Source 2** travels to **SIA**.

(U//FOUO) When **Primary Subsource** asked **Source 2** in early June 2016 (the **SIA**) about whether he knew of any compromising materials on Trump, **Source 2** said that there was a "well known story" about Trump's activities in the very hotel the Ritz Carlton. **Primary Subsource** asked to make preparations for the **SIA** event. The "well known story" involved the allegation that Trump was "into water sports" and had engaged in that activity "in the presidential suite" at the Ritz Carlton. In terms of whether the story was true, **Source 2** explained that people "know" but that it "only becomes fact if people come forward." **Source 2** said that the hotel is bugged, and "heaven only knows" who or what has been filmed by the FSB. **Source 2** said to **Primary Subsource**: "Go and check out the story." **SIA**

(U//FOUO) As **Primary Subsource** explained it, the fact of hotel bugging and the
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource

Re: , 02/09/2017

use of filmed “kompromat” is not uncommon. related the names of those who have been targeted in this way - [Yuriy] Skuratov, [Mikhail] Kasyanov, and Vladimir Rushkov [unclear, maybe Rychkov]. has also been able to comment on hotel bugging because it is generally known, as he explained to interviewers, that if you want to visit Moscow and not be vulnerable to being bugged, you have to stay away from the Ritz Carlton, the Hotel Moskva, and the Hotel Peking.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph 4 in Report 2016/80, he had a meeting with the managers. During a free minute, he asked about “this stuff about Trump at the hotel.” His interlocutors laughed it off, stating that “all kinds of things happen at the hotel” and with celebrities, “one never knows what they’re doing.” said that it wasn’t a denial. And asking the hotel staff who were assisting with the arrangements, one girl commented that “anything goes” at the hotel, and added that, “officially, we don’t have prostitutes.”

(U//FOUO) For this story, Christopher Steele was given the names of the management at the Ritz Carlton. said that he reported Trump’s unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz as “rumor and speculation” and that he had not been able to confirm the story.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, paragraphs 1, 4 and 5, identified “Source B” as through . reported that he and had “had a conversation” about the content in the report. said that they had “embarrassing stuff- sexual/pornographic material” on a number of folks, “including Trump.” said that the end of paragraph 4 regarding the
ability to blackmail Trump was “logical conclusion” rather than reporting. The conversation with \[\text{Source 1}\] took place in June 2016 at \[\text{SIA}\] - the particular café near the \[\text{SIA}\] insists on having meetings in \[\text{SIA}\] himself. \[\text{Primary Subsource}\] said that the mention of the file in paragraph 5 was part of a conversation between \[\text{Primary Subsource}\] and \[\text{Primary Subsource}\], but \[\text{Primary Subsource}\] has no idea where the mention of “Department K of the FSB” is from. He does not recall hearing that, or mentioning that to Christopher Steele. Additionally, the years over which the “kompromat” file was collected were also never mentioned, to \[\text{Primary Subsource}\] recollection.

26 January 2017

FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

Present:

\[\text{Primary Subsource}\], interviewee

\[\text{Primary Subsource}\], interviewee’s attorney

\[\text{Primary Subsource}\], FBI Special Agent

\[\text{Primary Subsource}\], FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst

\[\text{Primary Subsource}\], Deputy, National Security Division, US Department of Justice

I. Recent Communication by Orbis Representative: Overall Wellbeing
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource

Re: Primary Subsource, 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource and his attorney related that Chris Steele had “signaled” to this morning. One of Steele’s associates at Orbis, an analyst who said he has seen approximately 12 times - called remarked that “had been lying too low.” said that “[Orbis] hadn’t heard from him over the past 10 days, and that they wanted to know what was going on.” told that he’d been staying in a hotel and at his place, and that he had been talking to an attorney about his.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource did not speak with Steele during this conversation. heard from that Steele was still “lying low” but that “everyone” was concerned about wellbeing. [ANALYST NOTE: The attorney commented that the fact reached out is yet another indication of how his client was put through the recruitment cycle - initially recruited by Chris Steele, but passed off to underlings for day-to-day management.] and discussed some possible future assignments - “small due diligence assignments unrelated to politics” - and indicated that they would run stuff by him if something came up - but [and it was not clear if this was actual comment or reflection] probably not much in the area of Russia. There was talk about wiring past due monies for to . Or, added, there was also discussion about getting him money through “someone we know [in the United States]” was hesitant about arranging payments in any way that “looked strange.”

(U//FOUO) told that since the Buzzfeed story hit the news, Orbis has received 20,000 emails.
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) No one from SIA has reached out to check on Primary Subsource's welfare. That said, Primary Subsource typically works from his home. He works off-hours, given the time difference between Moscow and London. There is space and some desks he can use at SIA, but most of his work is done at home.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource commented that, unless his name goes public, he is fine when it comes to his source network. He doesn't believe he can travel - he feels that he would be in danger and, as he put it, SIA.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource indicated that Orbis does know the identities of some of his sources - they have some first and last names. For example, Orbis knows the identity of Source 2, who, added Primary Subsource.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource said that he had gone back to check for electronic communication records, but he said that he had deleted most of the election-related communications "months ago." He also has a different phone from the one he used previously. He didn't delete communication involving USPER 2 [see previous day's interview], and he had reported that communication to Christopher Steele.

(U//FOUO) Dossier Report 2016/86

(U//FOUO) was asked a number of questions regarding the sourcing and information about the FSB cyber-related dossier report.

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 1, the "former senior intelligence officer" is Former Russian Intelligence Officer, through Source 1. Source 1 told this information directly to Primary Subsource in SIA at the SIA.
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re:        , 02/09/2017

cafe.

(U//FOOU) Some of the material in paragraph 2 was not familiar to . In general, the material tracks with comments made to
by Source 2 , with corroboration via open source material. Looking more over the paragraph, said that the
material begins with the sentence, "To compensate for this shortfall..." does not recall using the terms “first tier” (in
the first sentence) in his reports to Steele - he is not sure that
information came from him.

(U//FOOU) The material in paragraph 3 could be referencing material
gleaned from one of . When he was years old, was caught
"facilitating payments for a pornographic website." He was offered a
deal - cooperate with the FSB or potentially go to jail. He ended up
doing some work for the FSB, but doesn't know what type of
work did for the FSB [ANALYST NOTE: This is in contradiction to
his statement the first day, at which time he indicated that
he did not have any contacts associated with the Russian intelligence
and security services.]

is a couple of years younger than , and he returned to "normal life" [that is, post
FSB activity] around . told that he
came to know many other people who have been put in a similar situation
(with the FSB). Presently, works in ; however,
it is unclear for whom - he thought that might be working for , for the banking
industry, and/or doing something in the way of . When
asked if would consider a "contractor," said "yes, like myself, but in a different [sector]."
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: , 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) In the same paragraph - paragraph 3 - the portion that begins with “In one case a US citizen...” was derived from a conversation with Source 1. Source 1 related this story, indicating that the US citizen was a friend who does work with “educational apps or something.”

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 4, could not attribute it to any source in particular. The “foreign director of a company,” recalled, is a foreign director on the board of SIA, but he did not know the exact identity.

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 5, said that some of the information came from his discussions with the Russian SIA, Russian contact - who, reiterated, SIA had mentioned to him that “an FSB cyber operative” is an incorrect source characterization and that SIA had mentioned to him that Telegram had been compromised.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph 6, could not attribute it conclusively to any particular source. He said that he can’t confirm it, but he believes the source may have been Source 2. Some of it is open source, however.

(U//FOUO) General Summarizing about Sources

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked if, generally speaking about the dossier as a whole, the mentions of Dmitry Peskov [Putin’s press secretary] and Sergey Ivanov can be typically sourced to Source 3. said yes - Source 3 has direct and indirect contact with a deputy, or multiple deputies, in SIA. As stated earlier,
she is also tied into Source 3. he could try and get the names and the deputies and assistants she uses for getting her information.

(U//FOUO) When it comes to any material on Source 2, is friends with Russian official. Source 2, got to talk to the Source 3. During that interaction, the Source 2 indicated that power and authority when it came to press relations had centralized on Peskov. Source 2 friend indicated that “[we’re] all under Peskov now,” which took to mean that authority within the Presidential Administration’s PR/GR circles had entered a pyramid-type stage with Peskov at the top of the pyramid.

(U//FOUO) On the material regarding the replacement of Sergey Ivanov with Anton Vaino, this was also derived from Source 3, as well as “two other friends” [which left vague and didn’t identify]. The part of the reports connecting Ivanov’s replacement by Vaino to the fallout over Russia’s influence efforts against the US election was, according to Source 3, his analytical conclusion. Source 3 “confirmed that it had to be true,” said Source 3 told him something like “[Ivanov’s dismissal because of US-election related fallout] just had to be true” or else she said something like “Of course, it has to be that…”

(U//FOUO) General Summarizing of Debriefings by Orbis

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked about how Christopher Steele would go about debriefing him after his visits, specifically about how
Steele asked him about distinguishing between what his sources have told him versus his analytical judgments. He said that Steele would often ask him, “Are you sure [about what your source is telling you],” and sometimes would repeatedly press him about a certain report – emphasizing “Are you sure? Are you sure?” He was very careful about caveating during debriefs with Steele. He would tell Steele if something was his analytical judgment (“As an analyst, I think…”), explain his confidence levels (“It is possible vs. likely” or “It is plausible”), and even tell Steele whether something had just not been explicitly denied (“No one has denied it when I’ve brought it up.”). At times he would tell Steele that “I’ve told you what I know.” When pressed by Steele to try to get additional information, he would explain that he did not want to go back to his friends “3 or 4 times” to try to get additional material – it would look bad and it would raise suspicions. Steele might ask, for example, “Do any of your sources know if Ivanov was sacked because of the US presidential election?”

(U//FOUO) Not wanting to cause suspicions with friends and associates, he would try and corroborate the reporting he received in other ways. The interviewers also asked if he would characterize his sources to Steele (“Source told me X” or “Source told me Y”). He said that was not always the case.

(U//FOUO) said that his verbal debriefings with Christopher Steele were held at Orbis’ office, not at hotels. Steele would debrief solo, and would take handwritten notes of what was telling him. remarked that it [Steele taking handwritten notes] was just like “you [the FBI interviewers] are doing today.”
(U//FOUO) Going back over his note-taking, said that he would not really write detailed notes about his source meetings. Even on the flight, returning from trips, he might scratch out a few tentative points – i.e. "5 days, 17 meetings" – and maybe some cryptic reminders. He might also write a text message to himself, but he compared it to preparation to a conference panel presentation – a few notes jotted on a notecard before one heads to the panel. He told the interviewers that he had destroyed any of these scribbled notes.

(U//FOUO) was asked how Steele tasked him – by email, Skype or phone. said it was a combination of these things. described the US election-related tasking came in three waves: (1) the initial tasking about Paul Manafort; (2) the tasking about any compromising materials on Donald Trump; (3) tasking about Sergey Ivanov’s involvement in the US election; and (4) later on, in the fall of 2016, 4-5 names to ask about [which talked about earlier, including Carter Page and Michael Cohen].

(U//FOUO) was asked if Steele had ever mentioned going to the press about with the election-related information. To knowledge, Steele never went to the press about this material. never heard Steele voice anything suggesting that this material needed to get into the hands of the press.

(U//FOUO) was asked if he was tasked with anything else similar to what was in the dossier, but does not appear in the dossier. He said no, and repeated that these types of taskings [on the election matter] made him uncomfortable. Steele pushed to try and either follow-up with people or corroborate the reporting, but wasn’t able to do so. Moreover, added, attempts at
getting corroboration on these subjects made him uncomfortable - he was very nervous about the Russians finding out about it.

(U//FOUO) The interviewers later asked to review his annotated version of the dossier, asking specifically if there were any additional source names that had not been covered in the 3-day interview. said that there were no other source names.

(U//FOUO) said that he did not have any UK-based friends or social network connections from whom he collects information.

(U//FOUO) More Information about Trips SIA

(U//FOUO) talked about his trips SIA - SIA also had a trip to SIA in 2016.

(U//FOUO) SIA 2016

(U//FOUO) The 2016 trip was completely paid by Orbis.

(U//FOUO) SIA 2016

(U//FOUO) He remarked that the trip was "odd," explaining that, upon entry, he was interviewed more pointedly than usual. This was the only time it has happened. For about five minutes, he was peppered with questions and statements like, "What exactly are you planning to do here? Who are you visiting? Your photo looks different." kept his answers vague - he said he was visiting his . All the while, his questioners at entry were checking on the computer. He reported this incident to Steele.
(U//FOUO) Going back over the SIA trip, the interviewers asked if he made it up to SIA, particularly since some of the material in the dossier mentions SIA. He did travel to SIA. He went for a “private weekend” to SIA, that had nothing to do with work. He flew SIA from SIA. He said that none of the material in the dossier was derived from his weekend trip to SIA.

(U//FOUO) The SIA trip was completely paid by Orbis.

(U//FOUO) 2016

(U//FOUO) What alarmed SIA most about his SIA 2016 visit was “how perfectly it all went.” Nothing bad happened. There were a number of events for which he was the facilitator. He had to make sure people were where they were supposed to be, and he also gave a SIA presentation, but it went off without a hitch.

(U//FOUO) During the SIA trip, SIA gave a brief presentation to the delegation. SIA was one of 3-4 speakers during a set of talks. SIA is the only person during this trip whose name made it into the dossier; however, the material on SIA was not derived from the SIA trip. SIA did not spend any time with SIA during the SIA trip. SIA said that he saw Source 4, Source 2, and SIA. SIA did not collect anything on the SIA trip.
(U//FOUO) Steele debriefed Primary Subsource after the SIA trip. Nothing specific was provided; he and Steele just had "ongoing conversations" about the general situation. Orbis contributed to the costs of the SIA trip, but the trip was paid by SIA. It was during this layover period in London that Primary Subsource received the text confirming Page’s meeting with Sechin.

(U//FOUO) SIA 2016

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource traveled to the UK at the end of SIA 2016. The trip was jointly financed by Orbis and Primary Subsource himself. He met with Steele, but most of the rest of Orbis staff was on a retreat in Dublin. He and Steele went out, had a glass of champagne, and had only general conversations. There was no discussion of the election, and no discussion of the election-related project.

(U//FOUO) St. Petersburg & Dossier Report 2016/112

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource explained that the overall subject of this report - Govorun, Alfa Bank - has been a topic he has been working for over ten years. It hearkens back to his time with USPER, where they would hypothesize about relationships between Russian corruption and the Alfa Fellowship.

(U//FOUO) As an aside, Primary Subsource told another corruption-related story wherein Source 1 told Primary Subsource that [someone had told him] about how Marat Bashirov, who had been head of the Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) and has been sanctioned by the EU, left the LPR after 5-6 months to become a top lobbyist for Renova Group - specifically Renova’s arm dealing with heating and power distribution. Bashirov is a Moscow-based lobbyist who is working to get the EU sanctions lifted.
(U//FOUO) St. Petersburg-Related Information

(U//FOUO) The material regarding St. Petersburg and Trump real estate deals came from Source 2. Source 2 suggested that one person to look at regarding compromising material on Trump was [Aras] Agalarov, as well as SIA, one of the biggest real estate developers.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource also talked to a friend of his who [ANALYST NOTE: either had or knew someone who had] escorted Trump while in St. Petersburg. Friend, who he knew as a SIA in SIA, was a SIA who lived in Moscow. She was about SIA years old when she died, suddenly, last SIA. Primary Subsource heard the news from her boyfriend, who sent him a picture of her gravesite. She wrote stories which were on the critical side of the Russian government. SIA... . He saw her in Russia during a project circa 2013 SIA, adding that it was about 6-7 months before the Olympics. He also saw her SIA in 2015 at a get-together SIA. He said she was also SIA... SIA...

(U//FOUO) Reactions of Primary Subsource Friends to the Dossier

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource has had friends reach out to him about Trump and the dossier. He’s considered it normal joking -
He simply jokes back. None of his friends or social network has broken off contact because of the election or the release of the dossier.

**Friends’ Travel to the United States; Approachability**

(U//FOUO) **Source 3** was asked if he’d ever met **Source 3** in the United States. Said that he met **Source 3** in the United States during her visit in 2016. She had a trip to a number of destinations in the United States, and she stopped over in **SIA**. She, **Primary Subsource** and **SIA** went shopping and to a restaurant together. **SIA** said that she came out for her **SIA**. He doesn’t know exactly where she visited while in the United States, but he thought it was **SIA**.

(U//FOUO) **Primary Subsource** believes that **Source 3** had also traveled previously to the United States – perhaps as many as **SIA** times. He knows that she was on a **SIA** visiting **SIA** in the mid-2000s. She has stayed at hotels, as well as at **Primary Subsource** place.

(U//FOUO) **Primary Subsource** is not sure if **Source 3** would talk to the FBI. He can’t speak for her. He said that she is in a **SIA** right now. **Primary Subsource** thinks if **Source 3** received a plausible job offer, she might come over. **Source 3** offered that he could carefully inquire about her plans over the coming year (2017) and see if there are possibilities – he reiterated that he owes **Source 3** an **SIA** over the next few days about the views of Russian speakers in the United States towards Trump.
Interview of Primary Subsource

Re: , 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Source 4

(U//FOUO) Source 4 has not been to the United States in probably

years.

(U//FOUO) Source 1

(U//FOUO) Source 1 traveled to the United States in circa

- not long after

met him in the United States.

reiterated Source 1 ties with

(U//FOUO) Source 5

(U//FOUO) Source 5 has occasional travel to Europe and Southeast Asia

. She would probably be willing to travel to the United States;

however, Source 5 reiterated that she reportedly has “senior

connections” in and . Off-handedly, said that

Source 5 has her own “kurator” [handler] but when interviewers

pressed him on this point, he softened that statement, indicating that

Source 5 “projects an image that she has these types of [secret]

connections” and “knows the [intelligence] lingo.” He never reported to

Steele that Source 5 had a “kurator.”

(U//FOUO) Contacts with Russian Intelligence and Security

Services [Redux]: and

(U//FOUO) Given his language ability and his overseas travel as an

student, was asked if he had ever been approached by

Russian intelligence and/or security services when he was a student in

. said no. The only individuals with whom he has contact

who were connected to Russia’s intelligence and security services were
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: 02/09/2017

(1) his friend, Friend SIA, who worked for the FSB in order to stay out of jail SIA, (2) Russian official SIA, the SIA in SIA who mentioned in the previous interview; and (3) FNU Russian journalist SIA, who interacted with him and USPER in SIA Russian journalist, was the head of SIA and would pester USPER for information. [ANALYST NOTE: This contradicted earlier statements regarding having no contact with Russia’s intelligence and security services, and it also contradicted his earlier statements regarding not really knowing if Russian was actually connected to Russia’s intelligence and security services.]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource also related a story regarding Source 2 interaction with the FSB. Primary Subsource said that he remembered this story “right before I talked to you [the FBI] this week.” Circa Source 2 was SIA, Source 2 told him about this, and also SIA a picture of the doors at SIA SIA. At FSBHQ, Source 2 was questioned SIA SIA he Source 2 had made about the leadership of Russia’s SIA. Source 2 was also lightly threatened. According to Source 2, he Source 2 was told that “he SIA Source 2 should be more careful; that he SIA should watch his mouth and act responsibly.” Source 2 ended up SIA about this interaction, and received a lot of joking about SIA.
Title: [Redacted] Interview of [Redacted] Primary Subsource
Re: [Redacted], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource brushed aside the idea of being approached by the intelligence and security services as a student. He explained that it was the late SIA [Redacted], and the university setting was rather lax. He did not really attend SIA [Redacted] class all that often because his language was already good and the classes weren’t that useful. People smoked in class and dressed down.

(U//FOUO) and Russia’s Diplomatic Corps

(U//FOUO) was asked if he had ever considered a career with Russia’s diplomatic corps. He explained that he went to a SIA [Redacted] for SIA [Redacted], which he identified as SIA [Redacted]. Most of the graduates were told, SIA [Redacted], for example, that they were slated for big things in life and would be aimed towards university at SIA [Redacted], SIA [Redacted], or SIA [Redacted], with future careers in diplomacy, interpretation or “going abroad.” SIA [Redacted] years later, SIA [Redacted] remarked, probably 4 of the students are abroad, in places like London and elsewhere.

(U//FOUO) told the interviewers that he never seriously considered going into the diplomatic corps. He never tested for it, and he never applied for any of the major universities listed above [which would feed into Russia’s diplomatic corps].

(U//FOUO) Additional Contacts from SIA

(U//FOUO) was asked if — beside Source 3 and others he has mentioned — if he has used other old friendships, schoolmates, and known associates from SIA as sources of information. Primary Subsource balked, meandered in the conversation, and did not really answer the question. The interviewers did not press him on this at this point.
Title: Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: , 02/09/201

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource Contacts in Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was asked about his contacts in the MFA. He remarked that, over the years, he has collected numerous business cards of MFA personnel, usually through contact at conferences and events. He met Yuriy Ushakov a few times - and remarked how Ushakov is known to operate “independent” of Lavrov. Primary Subsource also met Sergey Kislyak at a couple of events - he recalled one event that happened on his SIA.

(U//FOUO) After thinking about it a bit more, whispered out loud to himself, “”. The interviewers asked him for additional details. could not remember the individual’s surname at first. He said that “” was from SIA, and that he was a “strange character”. met last year. He met briefly in Moscow. background was in PR/GR with the SIA. studied , and then took a career with the MFA. described MFA job as “a delivery boy” but added that it was strange because “did not seem to be qualified for the job that he had [at the MFA].” Eventually, recalled that surname was Surname.