



**Statement for the Record**

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**FOR A HEARING ON**

***“Election Security”***

**BEFORE THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY**

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**Washington, DC**

Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, and members of the Committee, thank you for today's opportunity to testify regarding the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) ongoing efforts to assist with reducing and mitigating risks to our election infrastructure. DHS is eager to share with you the progress we have made to establish trust-based partnerships with our Nation's election officials who administer our democratic election processes.

Recognizing that the 2018 U.S. mid-term elections are a potential target for malicious cyber activity, DHS is committed to robust engagement with state and local election officials, as well as private sector entities, to assist them with defining their risk, and providing them with information and capabilities that enable them to better defend their infrastructure. Safeguarding and securing cyberspace is a core homeland security mission.

Given the foundational role that elections play in a free and democratic society, in January 2017 the Secretary of Homeland Security designated election infrastructure as a critical infrastructure subsector. Under our system of laws, federal elections are administered by state and local election officials in thousands of jurisdictions across the country. These officials manage election infrastructure and ensure its security and resilience on a day-to-day basis.

As such, DHS and our federal partners have formalized the prioritization of *voluntary* cybersecurity assistance for election infrastructure similar to that which is provided to a range of other critical infrastructure entities, such as financial institutions and electric utilities.

Since 2016, DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has convened federal government and election officials regularly to share cybersecurity risk information and to determine an effective means of assistance. The Election Infrastructure Subsector (EIS) Government Coordinating Council (GCC) has worked to establish goals and objectives, to develop plans for the EIS partnership, and to lay the groundwork for developing an EIS Sector-Specific Plan (SSP). GCC representatives include DHS, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), and 24 state and local election officials. Participation in the council is entirely voluntary and does not change the fundamental role of state and local jurisdictions in overseeing elections.

The Department and the Commission have worked with election industry representatives to launch an industry-led Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), a self-organized, self-run, and self-governed council with leadership designated by the sector membership. The SCC serves as industry's principal entity for coordinating with the government on critical infrastructure security activities and issues related to sector-specific strategies, and policies. This collaboration is conducted under DHS's authority to provide a forum in which government and private sector entities can jointly engage in a broad spectrum of activities to coordinate critical infrastructure security and resilience efforts which is used in each of the critical infrastructure sectors established under Presidential Policy Directive 21, *Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience*. The process is a well-tested mechanism across critical infrastructure sectors for sharing threat information among the federal government and critical infrastructure partners, advancing risk management efforts, and prioritizing services available to sector partners in a trusted environment.

NPPD also engages directly with election officials—coordinating requests for assistance, risk mitigation, information sharing, and incident coordination, resources, and services. In order to ensure a coordinated approach from the federal government, NPPD has convened stakeholders from across the federal government through an Election Task Force (ETF). The ETF serves to provide actionable information and offer assistance to assist election officials with strengthening their election infrastructure by reducing and mitigating cyber risk, and increasing resilience of their processes.

Within the context of today’s hearing, I will address the unclassified assessment of malicious cyber operations directed against U.S. election infrastructure and our efforts to help enhance the security of elections that are administered by jurisdictions around the country.

### **Assessing the Threat**

DHS regularly coordinates with the intelligence community and law enforcement partners on potential threats to the Homeland. Among non-federal partners, DHS has been engaging state and local officials, as well as relevant private sector entities, to assess the scale and scope of malicious cyber activity potentially targeting the U.S. election infrastructure. Election infrastructure includes the information and communications technology, capabilities, physical assets, and technologies that enable the registration and validation of voters; the casting, transmission, tabulation, and reporting of votes; and the certification, auditing, and verification of elections.

In addition to working directly with state and local officials, we have partnered with trusted third parties to analyze relevant cyber data, including the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), the National Association of Secretaries of State and the National Association of State Election Directors. We also used our field personnel deployed around the country to help further facilitate information sharing and enhance outreach, which has resulted in the identification of suspicious and malicious cyber activity targeting election infrastructure. On October 7, 2016, DHS and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released a joint statement on election security and urged state and local governments to be vigilant and seek cybersecurity assistance. Our message today remains the same.

### **Enhancing Security for Future Elections**

NPPD is committed to ensuring a coordinated response from DHS and its federal partners to plan for, prepare for, and mitigate risk to election infrastructure. We understand that working with election infrastructure stakeholders is essential to ensuring a more secure election. NPPD and our stakeholders are increasing awareness of potential vulnerabilities and providing capabilities to enhance the security of U.S. election infrastructure as well as that of our democratic allies.

Election officials across the country have a long-standing history of working both individually and collectively to reduce risks and ensure the integrity of their elections. In partnering with these officials through both new and ongoing engagements, NPPD is working to provide value-added—yet voluntary—services to support their efforts to secure elections.

**Improving Coordination with State, local Tribal, Territorial (SLTT) and Private Sector partners.** Increasingly, the nation’s election infrastructure leverages information technology (IT) for efficiency and convenience, but also exposes systems to cybersecurity risks, just like in any other enterprise environment. Just like with other sectors, NPPD helps stakeholders in federal departments and agencies, SLTT governments, and the private sector to manage these cybersecurity risks. Consistent with our long-standing partnerships with state and local governments, we have been working with election officials to share information about cybersecurity risks, and to provide voluntary resources and technical assistance.

The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) works with the MS-ISAC to provide threat and vulnerability information to state and local officials. Created by DHS over a decade ago, the MS-ISAC is partially funded by NPPD. The MS-ISAC’s membership is limited to SLTT government entities, and all fifty states and U.S. territories are members. It has representatives co-located with the NCCIC to enable regular collaboration and access to information and services for state chief information officers.

**Providing Technical Assistance and Sharing Information.** NPPD actively promotes a range of services including:

**Cyber hygiene service for Internet-facing systems:** Through this automated, remote scan, NPPD may provide a report identifying vulnerabilities and mitigation recommendations to improve the cybersecurity of systems connected to the Internet, such as online voter registration systems, election night reporting systems, and other Internet-connected election management systems.

**Risk and vulnerability assessments:** We have prioritized State and local election systems upon request, and increased the availability of risk and vulnerability assessments (RVAs). These in-depth, on-site evaluations include a system-wide understanding of vulnerabilities, focused on both internal and external systems. We provide a full report of vulnerabilities and recommended mitigations following the testing.

**Incident response assistance:** We encourage election officials to report suspected malicious cyber activity to the NCCIC. Upon request, the NCCIC can provide assistance in identifying and remediating a cyber incident. Information reported to the NCCIC is also critical to the federal government’s ability to broadly assess malicious attempts to infiltrate election systems. This technical information will also be shared with other state officials so they have the ability to defend their own systems from similar malicious activity.

Knowing what to do when a security incident happens—whether physical or cyber—before it happens, is critical. NPPD supports election officials with incident response planning including participating in exercises and reviewing incident response playbooks. Crisis communications is core component of these efforts, ensuring officials are able to communicate transparently and authoritatively to their constituents when an incident unfolds. In some cases, we do this directly with state and local jurisdictions. In others, we partner with outside

organizations. We recognize that securing our nation's systems is a shared responsibility, and we are leveraging partnerships to advance that mission.

**Information sharing:** NPPD maintains numerous platforms and services to share relevant information on cyber incidents. State election officials may also receive information directly from the NCCIC. The NCCIC also works with the MS-ISAC, allowing election officials to connect with the MS-ISAC or their State Chief Information Officer to rapidly receive information they can use to protect their systems. Best practices, cyber threat information, and technical indicators, some of which had been previously classified, have been shared with election officials in thousands of state and local jurisdictions. In all cases, the information sharing and/or use of such cybersecurity risk indicators, or information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents complies with applicable lawful restrictions on its collection and use and with DHS policies protective of privacy and civil liberties.

**Classified information sharing:** To most effectively share information with all of our partners—not just those with security clearances—DHS works with the intelligence community to rapidly declassify relevant intelligence or provide tearlines. While DHS prioritizes declassifying information to the extent possible, DHS also provides classified information to cleared stakeholders, as appropriate. DHS has been working with state chief election officials and additional election staff in each state to provide them with security clearances. By working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in February 2018 election officials from each state received one-day read-ins for a classified threat briefing while they were in Washington, DC. This briefing demonstrated our commitment to ensuring election officials have the information they need to understand the threats they face.

**Field-based cybersecurity advisors and protective security advisors:** NPPD has more than 130 cybersecurity and protective security personnel available to provide actionable information and connect election officials to a range of tools and resources to improve the cybersecurity preparedness of election systems; and to secure the physical site security of voting machine storage and polling places. These advisors are also available to assist with planning and incident management for both cyber and physical incidents.

**Physical and protective security tools, training, and resources:** NPPD provides guidance and tools to improve the security of polling sites and other physical election infrastructure. This guidance can be found at [www.dhs.gov/hometown-security](http://www.dhs.gov/hometown-security). This guidance helps to train administrative and volunteer staff on identifying and reporting suspicious activities, active shooter scenarios, and what to do if they suspect an improvised explosive device.

### **Election Security Efforts Moving Forward**

DHS has made tremendous strides and has been committed to working collaboratively with those on the front lines of administering our elections to secure election infrastructure from risks. The establishment of government and sector coordinating councils will build the foundations for this enduring partnership not only in 2018, but for future elections as well. We will remain transparent as well as agile in combating and securing our physical and cyber infrastructure. However, we recognize that there is a significant technology deficit across SLTT

governments, and State and local election systems, in particular. It will take significant and continual investment to ensure that election systems across the nation are upgraded and secure, with vulnerable systems retired. These efforts require a whole of government approach. The President and this Administration are committed to addressing these risks.

In closing, there is a fundamental link between public trust in our election infrastructure and the confidence the American public places in basic democratic functions. Ensuring the security of our electoral process is a vital national interest and one of our highest priorities at DHS. Our voting infrastructure is diverse, subject to local control, and has many checks and balances. As the threat environment evolves, DHS will continue to work with federal agencies, state and local partners, and private sector entities to enhance our understanding of the threat; and to make essential physical and cybersecurity tools and resources available to the public and private sectors to increase security and resiliency.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today, and I look forward to your questions.

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Mr. Masterson currently serves as a senior cybersecurity advisor at the Department of Homeland Security, where he focuses on election security issues. Previously Masterson served as a commissioner at the U.S. Election Assistance Commission from December 2014 until March 2018 including serving as the Commission's Chairman in 2017-2018. Prior to that, he held staff positions with the Ohio Secretary of State's office, where he oversaw voting-system certification efforts and helped develop an online voter registration system. He holds a law degree from the University of Dayton School of Law and BS and BA degrees from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.