1. If you had to describe it, how would you characterize your judicial philosophy? How do you see the role of the judge in our constitutional system?

Response: My judicial philosophy would be best characterized as an unwavering commitment to the rule of law. Regardless of personal views, a judge is bound by the applicable statutes and precedent, and must apply the law in a consistent, impartial manner. Furthermore, an appellate judge may not remake the record created below or substitute his views for those of the lower tribunal on a fact finding.

Our constitutional system is based on a separation of powers between the branches of government, and the judiciary’s role in reviewing the decisions of the democratically elected branches is a limited one. Moreover, it is a judge’s role to faithfully apply the laws enacted by Congress regardless of a judge’s personal policy preferences.

2. What assurances can you give that litigants coming into your courtroom will be treated fairly regardless of their political beliefs or whether they are rich or poor, defendant or plaintiff?

Response: It is essential for our administration of justice and public confidence in the court system that judges treat all parties equally, fairly, and respectfully. I believe that my professional reputation that I have developed while working in both the government and private practice reflects a commitment to those principles. If confirmed, I would continue to adhere to those principles and apply the law in a neutral, impartial manner.

3. In your opinion, how strongly should judges bind themselves to the doctrine of stare decisis? How does the commitment to stare decisis vary depending on the court?

Response: The integrity of our judicial system depends on predictability and stability in the rule of law. It is therefore imperative that judges bind themselves to the doctrine of stare decisis. If confirmed as a circuit court judge, I would be bound by all Supreme Court precedents as well as prior panel and en banc decisions by the Federal Circuit. Only in exceptional circumstances should an appellate court overturn its prior precedent through en banc review.
1. At your confirmation hearing I asked questions pertaining to the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). I appreciated your taking the time to familiarize yourself with some of these issues prior to the hearing. While in *White v. Department of Air Force*, 391 F.3d 1377 (2004), the Federal Circuit appears to have backed off of the “irrefragable proof” standard announced in *LeChance v. White*, 174 F.3d 1378 (1999), I have concerns that the irrefragable proof standard has not been completely extinguished.

   a. In *White*, the Federal Circuit used a formulation of gross mismanagement that could cause confusion. The Court held that “for a lawful agency policy to constitute ‘gross mismanagement,’ an employee must disclose such serious errors by the agency that a conclusion the agency erred is not debatable among reasonable people.” In your understanding of *White*, are disclosures of “gross mismanagement” subject to a higher standard than the reasonable belief standard applied to other disclosures? Please review any applicable precedent in addressing this question.

Response: One of the elements that an aggrieved employee must show to prove that a federal agency violated the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) is that the aggrieved employee made a disclosure protected under the WPA. The Act defines a protected disclosure as any disclosure the employee reasonably believes evidences “(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The protected disclosure standard thus has two requirements: (1) a reasonable belief by the employee, and (2) a wrongdoing by an agency. The Federal Circuit, in *White v. Department of Air Force*, 391 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004), did not state that the reasonable belief requirement changes with the type of alleged wrongdoing, but, in focusing on the meaning of “gross mismanagement” in the context of an agency policy dispute, the opinion contemplates that each statutory item of wrongdoing has its own meaning.

   In *White*, which dealt with whether an agency policy constituted “gross mismanagement,” the Federal Circuit articulated the test for a protected disclosure as follows: “could a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee reasonably conclude that the actions of the government evidence gross mismanagement?” *Id.* at 1381 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that legitimate differences in opinion as to the wisest policy choice for an agency do not rise to the level of “gross mismanagement.” The court went on to hold that a disputed, but lawful, agency
policy constitutes “gross mismanagement” when the error in policy “is not debatable among reasonable people.” *Id.* at 1382.

The non-debatable requirement for gross mismanagement does not apply to all categories of wrongdoing listed in section 2302(b)(8). For example, *White* points out that “[t]his non-debatable requirement does not, of course, apply to alleged violations of statutes or regulations.” *Id.* at 1382 n.2. Likewise, the non-debatable requirement is not part of the standard for a disclosure of a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. *See Chambers v. Department of the Interior*, 515 F.3d 1362, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

b. In your understanding of Federal Circuit precedent, is there any context where a whistleblower would be required to rebut by “irrefragable proof” the “presumption that public officers perform their duties correctly, fairly, in good faith, and in accordance with the law and governing regulations”?

Response: I am not aware of any Federal Circuit precedent, since the 2004 *White* opinion, discussing an “irrefragable proof” standard in the whistleblower protection context. *White* explained that a whistleblower is not required under the WPA to present irrefragable proof that agency officials did not perform their duties correctly.

c. Do you believe “substantial evidence” would be a more appropriate standard in this context for whistleblower cases?

Response: I do not have an opinion as to what the appropriate evidentiary standard should be in this context. If confirmed, I would follow the provisions provided in the WPA, as well as the amendments to the WPA set forth in the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) enacted last year. Likewise, I would be bound by any applicable precedent that was not overruled by the WPEA.

2. What is the most important attribute of a judge, and do you possess it?

Response: Of the many important attributes of a judge, I believe the most important is fidelity to the rule of law. A judge may not substitute his own views for that of Congress or governing precedent. I believe I possess this attribute.

3. Please explain your view of the appropriate temperament of a judge. What elements of judicial temperament do you consider the most important, and do you meet that standard?

Response: A judge should be respectful, patient, and courteous to litigants and fellow judges. A judge should also maintain an open-mind and fully understand and weigh the competing points of view before rendering a decision. I believe I meet this standard.
4. Are you committed to following the precedents of higher courts faithfully and giving them full force and effect, even if you personally disagree with such precedents?

Response: Yes.

5. Under what circumstances do you believe it appropriate for a federal court to declare a statute enacted by Congress unconstitutional?

Response: Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, a court should avoid deciding a constitutional issue if the case can be resolved on a different basis. A federal statute is presumed to be constitutional and should not be struck down unless it violates a provision of the Constitution or if Congress clearly exceeded its constitutional powers.

6. At times, judges are faced with cases of first impression. If there were no controlling precedent that was dispositive on an issue with which you were presented, to what sources would you turn for persuasive authority? What principles will guide you, or what methods will you employ, in deciding cases of first impression?

Response: If the matter concerned the interpretation of a statute, I would first and foremost look to the text of the statute itself. If the statute is clear, then I would follow its plain meaning. I would also look to related statutory provisions that are part of the same Act to confirm that the same terms are used consistently and also that no terms are rendered superfluous. If the statutory text was ambiguous, I would apply accepted canons of statutory construction, including reviewing the legislative history. I would also review decisions relating to the issue by other circuit courts or district courts for their persuasive value.

7. In your view, is it ever proper for judges to rely on foreign law, or the views of the “world community”, in determining the meaning of the Constitution? Please explain

Response: No, it is not proper for judges to seek to reconcile our Constitution with foreign law or the views of the world community. The Supreme Court has, on occasion, consulted English common law in ascertaining the meaning of certain constitutional provisions.

8. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe an appellate court should overturn precedent within the circuit? What factors would you consider in reaching this decision?

Response: An appellate court is bound by its prior panel and en banc decisions, which the court can overrule only when it is sitting en banc. En banc review may be warranted in rare and exceptional circumstances, such as when there are conflicting decisions in the court’s precedent, or when there is strong evidence that the court’s precedent is based on a misreading of a statute. Also, an appellate court must overturn its precedent if an intervening Supreme Court decision requires it to do so.
9. What assurances or evidence can you give this Committee that, if confirmed, your decisions will remain grounded in precedent and the text of the law rather than any underlying political ideology or motivation?

Response: I can assure the Committee that if confirmed I would faithfully follow the applicable precedent and text of the law. My entire career has been apolitical. I have not served in political positions in the government, nor have I been involved in any political campaigning or advocacy. And political ideology or motivation would have no role in my decision-making as a judge.

10. What assurances or evidence can you give the Committee and future litigants that you will put aside any personal views and be fair to all who appear before you, if confirmed?

Response: It is essential for the administration of justice and public confidence in the court system that judges treat all parties equally, fairly, and respectfully. Judges and lawyers should also perform their respective roles without regard to their personal views. I believe that my professional reputation, which I have developed while working in both the government and private practice, reflects a commitment to those principles. If confirmed, I would continue to adhere to those principles and apply the law in a neutral, impartial manner.

11. You have spent most of your legal career as an advocate for the United States Government. As a judge, you will have a very different role. Please describe how you will reach a decision in cases that come before you and to what sources of information you will look for guidance. What do you expect to be most difficult part of this transition for you?

Response: If confirmed as a judge, my role would be to apply the governing law to the facts of a case in a neutral, impartial manner. I would study the record and briefs before me to ensure that I understand each side’s arguments. For guidance, I would look to all applicable legal authority, including the Constitution, statutes, and precedent. I understand that the role of a judge is very different from that of an advocate, in the sense that an advocate is necessarily outcome-oriented, whereas a judge must keep an open-mind. I anticipate that the most difficult part of the transition for me will be to quickly become knowledgeable in the non-patent areas of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.

12. Do you think that collegiality is an important element of the work of the Federal Circuit? Please explain how you would approach your work and interaction with colleagues on the Court.
Response: Yes, I believe collegiality is one of the most important attributes of a circuit judge. If confirmed, I would approach my work in the same way I have conducted myself throughout my career, by carefully considering the views of the other judges on the same panel, engaging in respectful discussions, and striving for consensus.

13. At your hearing, you and Senator Lee had a conversation about the law providing a “right answer” in cases. At a speech in 2005, Justice Scalia said, “I think it is up to the judge to say what the Constitution provided, even if what it provided is not the best answer, even if you think it should be amended. If that's what it says, that's what it says.”

a. Do you agree with Justice Scalia?

Response: Yes, I agree. I understand Justice Scalia to be explaining that a judge’s role is to faithfully apply the law as it is, not as it should be in the eyes of the judge.

b. In your view, is it possible in a case to arrive at the “right answer” even though it might not be the “best answer?”

Response: Yes, it is possible that the law may require a “right answer” for resolving a dispute that differs from what the judge believes is the “best answer.” In that situation, a judge is bound by that “right answer” even if the judge personally disagrees with it.

c. Do you believe a judge should consider his or her own values or policy preferences in determining what the law means? If so, under what circumstances?

Response: No. When determining what the law is, a judge must always avoid injecting his or her own personal policy preferences. The legislature retains the role of designing laws based on its policy judgments, and a judge may not second-guess those judgments.

14. What is your judicial philosophy on applying the Constitution to modern statutes and regulations?

Response: My philosophy is that constitutional interpretation follows the same mode of analysis regardless of whether the challenged statute or regulation is new or old. I would follow any controlling Supreme Court or Federal Circuit precedent on the particular issue. If no controlling precedent exists, I would look to the text of the applicable
constitutional provision to discern what its plain meaning is and also consider it in the context of the Constitution as a whole. I would also follow the established methodology for interpreting the Constitution set forth by the Supreme Court. If any other circuit courts have opined on the matter, I would also consult those decisions for their persuasive value.

15. Some people refer to the Constitution as a “living” document that is constantly evolving as society interprets it. Do you agree with this perspective of constitutional interpretation?

Response: If confirmed as an appellate judge, I would follow the methodology set forth in governing Supreme Court precedent for resolving a constitutional question. The Constitution itself changes only by constitutional amendment.

16. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, Justice Breyer supplemented his opinion with appendices comprising scientific articles on the sociological and psychological harm of playing violent video games. When, if ever, do you think it is appropriate for appellate judges to conduct research outside the record of the case?

Response: If confirmed as an appellate judge, I would not reach a decision based on evidence developed outside the record of a case.

17. Please describe with particularity the process by which these questions were answered.

Response: I received these questions on May 1, 2013, and I drafted my answers to them. On May 3, 2013, I sent my draft to an attorney at the Department of Justice for review and made revisions to the draft after receiving comments.

18. Do these answers reflect your true and personal views?

Response: Yes.
Response of Raymond T. Chen  
Nominee to be United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit  
to the Written Questions of Senator Ted Cruz

Judicial Philosophy

Describe how you would characterize your judicial philosophy, and identify which US Supreme Court Justice's judicial philosophy from the Warren, Burger, or Rehnquist Courts is most analogous with yours.

Response: My judicial philosophy would be best characterized as an unwavering commitment to the rule of law. Regardless of personal views, a judge is bound by the applicable statutes and precedent, and must apply the law in a consistent, impartial manner. Furthermore, an appellate judge may not remake the record created below or substitute his views for those of the lower tribunal on a fact finding.

I have not sufficiently analyzed the philosophies of the Supreme Court justices who served on these particular Courts to single out any one as analogous to my own conception of a judge’s role. At my hearing, I identified Judge Learned Hand as a judicial role model because of his insistence on judicial restraint as well as his contributions to patent law.

Do you believe originalism should be used to interpret the Constitution? If so, how and in what form (i.e., original intent, original public meaning, or some other form)?

Response: When interpreting the Constitution, a court applies the established tools of interpretation set forth by the Supreme Court. In several cases, including District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court has recognized the need to interpret the terms in the Constitution as they were understood at the time of the Constitution’s ratification.

If a decision is precedent today while you’re going through the confirmation process, under what circumstance would you overrule that precedent as a judge?

Response: If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed as a Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, I would be bound by Supreme Court precedent and could not overrule it. I would also be bound by prior panel and en banc decisions of the Federal Circuit, which that court could overrule only when it is sitting en banc. Exceptional circumstances may warrant en banc review, such as when there are conflicting decisions in the court’s precedent, or when there is strong evidence that the court’s precedent is based on a misreading of a statute. Also, I would follow any intervening Supreme Court decision that overruled Federal Circuit precedent.

Congressional Power

Explain whether you agree that "State sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially

Response: In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Supreme Court explained that the Constitution and the structure of the Federal government protect the States’ sovereign powers. If confirmed, I would follow Garcia, as I would any Supreme Court precedent, regardless of my personal views.

Do you believe that Congress' Commerce Clause power, in conjunction with its Necessary and Proper Clause power, extends to non-economic activity?

Response: The Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate three areas: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). If called upon to determine whether a statute exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, I would faithfully follow all applicable precedent, including United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In both cases, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress lacked the authority to regulate certain types of non-economic activity.

Presidential Power

What are the judicially enforceable limits on the President's ability to issue executive orders or executive actions?

Response: In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), the Supreme Court held that the President’s ability to issue an executive order “must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Id. at 585. Justice Jackson’s concurrence provided a framework that courts continue to apply in assessing the validity of an executive order. Id. at 635-38. If confirmed, I would follow that precedent and other Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent outlining the limits of Presidential power.

Individual Rights

When do you believe a right is "fundamental" for purposes of the substantive due process doctrine?

Response: The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights and liberties that are “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’” and “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’” such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed[,]” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). Included among those fundamental rights are the right to marry, to have children, to marital privacy, and to bodily integrity. Id. at 720.
When should a classification be subjected to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause?

Response: Under the Equal Protection Clause, strict scrutiny applies “when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The same is true for state laws that infringe personal rights protected by the Constitution. Id. Intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications regarding gender and illegitimacy, because such classifications “bear[] no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.” Id. at 441.


Response: I do not have a personal view or expectation as to whether, within a certain time frame, the use of racial preferences in public higher education will continue to be necessary. If confirmed, and called upon to confront this issue, I would follow Grutter, as I would with any binding precedent, regardless of my own views.