

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING ON “NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: THE NEED FOR GREATER
ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT”

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Testimony of Michael J. Woods

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: I am very pleased to have an opportunity to appear before you this morning. As one of a very small group of people who have both an academic interest in and substantial practical experience with national security letters, I am happy to offer both my research and my FBI experiences as resources for the Committee.

Like the other witnesses this morning and, I am sure, members of the Committee, I see in the constantly-evolving digital environment an enormous challenge for our government. Each of us now generates an increasing large and complex body of digital information in the course of our daily lives. Every time we communicate using an electronic device, reach out for information on the Internet, and nearly always when we make a purchase, we leave behind a digital record of our activity. The simple act of walking around with a cell phone or other wireless device in your pocket can create digital footprints since that device constantly transmits and receives operating signals. Taken together, this cloud of transactional information, though it does not contain the direct content of our private communications, reveals a steadily more detailed picture of our daily activities, personal habits and social networks. This information largely resides in the custody of third parties, in quantities, formats and conditions of which most of us are unaware. The constant expansion in the capacity of storage systems and in power of search engine technology makes this transactional information more permanent, and more easily accessible, than ever before.

The challenge presented by this environment is particularly acute in the area of counterintelligence and counter-terrorism. On the one hand, the explosion of transactional information has opened a new front in the fight against terrorists and foreign intelligence services. Sophisticated adversaries that have long since learned to conceal their direct communications may be detected by their digital footprints. After the 9/11 attacks, we used transactional information to reconstruct quickly the details of terrorists' operation. Suspicious transactions are likely to be one of the more effective means of detecting an imminent attack or the existence of a new terrorist cell. On the other hand, the compromise of privacy by the acquisition of transactional data seems greater now than

the quantity and detail of that information has increased. Under what circumstances should the government be able to access this information? What standards for the handling and retention of such information should apply to the government? Even assuming proper implementation within the FBI, do the current forms of the national security letter statutes adequately answer these concerns? My hope is to contribute something to your discussion of these questions today.

I would like to begin by offering my perspective on the development of the national security letter statutes over the years, with particular emphasis on the evolution of the legal standards embodied in those statutes. What I am offering here is really a summary of much more detailed material that I have published in an article in the Journal of National Security Law & Policy. I have submitted a copy of the full article as an attachment to my written testimony and it is also available on the Journal's website at http://www.mcgeorge.edu/documents/publications/jnslp/03_Woods_Master.pdf. I will follow this background narrative with observations from my direct experience with the national security letter process in the FBI and, finally, some thoughts on the revision of these authorities.

The legal authorities that we now refer to as "national security letters" were, in their origin, not the result of any carefully considered plan. Rather, they were ad hoc responses to legislative developments – responses that were intended simply to enable the FBI's national security components to keep doing what they had been doing previously. Up through the 1970s, FBI counterintelligence agents who needed transactional records held by third parties (bank records, telephone toll records, etc.) simply asked for them. This was sometimes done in a formal letter stating that the materials were needed for national security reasons. The term "national security letter" actually derives from this older practice, and not from the statutes themselves. In 1976, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Miller, ruled that financial records held by a bank were not protected by the account holder's Fourth Amendment protections and later made a similar ruling with respect to telephone records (Smith v. Maryland in 1979). Subsequent to these decisions, Congress enacted statutory protections for financial information (in the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978), telecommunications data (the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986), and credit information (through various amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act).

One effect of these new laws was to limit the ability of third-party record holders to honor the FBI's informal "national security letter" requests. Accordingly, the FBI sought language in the three relevant statutes that would enable it to issue letters to record-holding third parties requiring the production of transactional records without notification of the person to whom the record pertained. Eventually, each of these statutes were amended to allow production to the FBI upon a certification that there existed "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe" that the target was (or, in some cases, had been a person in contact with) an "agent of a foreign power," as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. With a few minor technical modifications, these statutes were the authority for FBI national security letters up until the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001.

I think there are several features of pre-Patriot Act NSLs that merit attention here. The first is the unusual legal standard employed. "Specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe" was a largely undefined legal standard when it was integrated into these statutes. Unlike the standard of "probable cause" or "relevance," it is not used elsewhere in criminal law and has no body of jurisprudence to explain it. The inspiration for this standard appears to have been the then relatively new Executive Branch oversight rules for the intelligence community, in particular the language of the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (or "FCI Guidelines") mandated by Executive Order 12,333. The essential language of those Guidelines was, and remains, classified, but the legislative history of NSL statutes strongly implies that the "specific and articulable facts" standard corresponded to Attorney General guideline language. The NSL language (and presumably the language of the Guidelines) reflected the nature of contemporary FBI national security operations. Prior to the late 1990s, those operations were dominated by traditional counterintelligence. The FBI's principal counterintelligence function was to keep tabs on foreign intelligence officers operating inside the United States and to detect any spies that those operatives may have recruited. Counter-terrorism was, of course, a concern of the FBI at the time, but was, until the 1990s, seen as a relatively small subset of traditional counterintelligence (a fact reflected in the FBI's organizational structure during this era). In the 1990s, of course, this relationship was inverted, with counter-terrorism functions eventually coming to equal, and then surpass, counterintelligence. My point is that the "specific and articulable facts" standard was particularly suited to the counterintelligence operations of the era in which it was created. A FBI counterintelligence investigation involved examining a linear connection between a foreign intelligence officer (about whom much was known) and his contacts (potential spies). The information known about the intelligence officer was specific in nature, and could be readily used to meet the NSL legal standards. The "specific and articulable facts" standard was particularly well suited to the situation in which an agent needed to obtain information about an already identified agent of a foreign power and his contacts.

A second feature of the pre-Patriot Act NSLs was the restricted manner in which they were generated. Between the creation of these authorities and their Patriot Act makeover in 2001, the statutes authorized, at most, about twelve officials in the FBI to sign NSLs. The majority of NSLs were, prepared, reviewed and approved within the National Security Law Unit at FBI Headquarters, with a relatively small number of NSLs prepared in the FBI's New York, Los Angeles, and Washington DC field offices (each of these offices having one of the authorized officials in residence). As Chief of the National Security Law Unit, I oversaw the production and approval of NSLs. The NSLs were prepared by a handful of analysts in my office, whose principal duty was to master this process. The attorneys who reviewed the NSLs, either in my office or in the three designated field offices, were specialists in national security law. In short, NSLs were produced and reviewed by a relatively small group of people, all of whom had substantial experience with these specific authorities. Under these circumstances, it was possible to monitor directly the quality and accuracy of the NSLs produced. Problems of the sort noted in the recent IG reports were far less likely to occur in that environment.

Finally, the recipients of NSLs in the 1980s and early 1990s differed substantially from those encountered later. Most NSLs were served on a small handful of telecommunications companies that had long-standing relationships with the FBI and were well equipped to comply with compulsory process, whether in the form of criminal subpoenas, surveillance orders, or NSLs. In addition, the transactional information these recipients held was far more limited and predictable in its nature than that encountered today. These recipients understood what an NSL was and knew what they could produce in response. I believe that understanding this background helps to explain the rather underdeveloped form of the original NSL statutes. Given the stable relationship with recipients, there was little perceived need for the statutes to contain clear enforcement mechanisms, detailed definitions, or a means to limit or challenge the secrecy requirements attached to the NSL. The legislative history of these provisions indicates to me that they were relatively simple "fixes," just intended to reconcile pre-existing practices with the new statutory protections. The statutes did not appear to contemplate numbers of NSLs much greater than that experienced at the time, or a recipient base that was more diverse and perhaps less cooperative.

As noted above, the operational environment began to change in the mid to late 1990s. I joined the FBI's National Security Law Unit in 1997, becoming its chief in 1999 and remaining until early 2002. During my tenure, the NSL process experienced increasing stress as a result of changed conditions. The rapid growth in the number of counter-terrorism investigations significantly elevated the demand for NSLs. At the same time, these investigations began to present more complex factual scenarios. Unlike the traditional linear counterintelligence case, in which the foreign agent tried to recruit the domestic spy using infrequent and highly secure forms of communication, many counter-terrorism cases involved complex networks generating a much larger volume of communication and financial transactions. In counter-terrorism cases, the starting point was often not a clearly identifiable agent of a foreign power (as in counterintelligence); indeed, the relevant "foreign power" was itself an imperfectly understood terrorist organization that might defy precise definition. As a consequence, counter-terrorism investigators often had a far more difficult time meeting the "specific and articulable facts" standard. The analysts preparing NSLs often had to send the requests back to the agents multiple times because the information provided did not meet the legal requirements. Many NSLs took months to make it through the process, and many requests were ultimately denied. Though we repeatedly took steps to streamline and improve the production process, the volume of requests continued to overwhelm the available resources.

The NSL process was also beginning to experience difficulties arising from new NSL recipients. By the late 1990s, the FBI had occasion to serve NSLs not just on the traditional telecommunications providers and financial institutions, but also on an ever-expanding number of Internet service providers and other web-based businesses. In so doing, the FBI encountered recipients who were completely unfamiliar with national security legal authorities. In this environment, the lack in the NSL statutes of clear definitions, enforcement provisions, and judicial review occasionally became an issue.

The exponential increase in the amount and detail of retained transactional data also affected the NSL process at this point.

By the time of the 9/11 attacks, I believe there was a widespread perception within the FBI that NSLs were simply too difficult to obtain to be of much operational use, particularly in fast-moving counter-terrorism investigations. The frustration manifested itself in frequent complaints about bottlenecks in the process and calls for broader delegation of signature authority than was allowed by the statutes at the time.

After the 9/11 attacks, I became responsible for preparing the FBI's proposals in the legislative process that would ultimately generate the USA PATRIOT Act. In reference to NSLs, the FBI requested three changes. First, the standard for NSLs was to be changed from "specific and articulable facts" to a standard of simple relevance to a properly authorized investigation (which is the standard used for obtaining the same information in criminal cases). Second, the FBI asked for permission to delegate NSL signature authority to the field office level, so that NSLs could be prepared quickly and locally. Third, the FBI proposed a general administrative subpoena authority that would allow the FBI to obtain business records that did not fall within the specific categories covered by NSLs. Congress essentially adopted the first two proposals into the Patriot Act. The administrative subpoena idea was apparently integrated into the language that became the new Section 215 "Business Records" language in FISA.

In November 2001, the FBI Director delegated NSL signature authority to the field office level. This meant that NSLs could now be prepared, reviewed, and issued independently by each of the FBI's 56 field offices. I drafted the initial legal guidance to the field offices, which contained detailed instructions for the preparation of NSLs, required legal review by the lawyer in each field office (the "Chief Division Counsel" or "CDC"), and contained model NSL documents. In those chaotic months following 9/11, I think that there was a general understanding that the new Patriot Act authorities needed to be deployed as quickly as possible, and that more comprehensive guidance and training would have to wait. This was true, I believe, not just with respect to NSLs, but also with the multitude of other changes that came through the Patriot Act. I would add that during the whole Patriot Act process and thereafter, NSLs were the subject of very little attention, especially in comparison to the higher profile and more volatile FISA issues.

I left FBI headquarters for my position at the National Counterintelligence Executive early in 2002 and my direct experience with the FBI's use of NSLs ended at that point. After reviewing the Inspector General reports, it is obvious to me that the training, comprehensive guidance, and internal controls that were required for the effective implementation of the new NSL authorities and postponed in 2001 simply did not occur until public attention was focused on this issue in late 2005. I have no particular insight into why that happened, since I had no significant access to the FBI during that period.

Having provided this background narrative on the evolution of NSLs, I want to offer some general thoughts on the question of whether changes in the existing statutes are now appropriate. My understanding is that the goal of change encompasses both addressing the problems identified in the Inspector General Reports and generally enhancing the privacy protections integrated into the statutes. I think that the current crop of legislative proposals offers an opportunity to open a much broader discussion about the legal status of non-content transactional information and the manner in which it should be protected. I have four general comments on changing the current statutes.

First, I believe the legal standard for NSLs should remain that of relevance to an authorized investigation and not, as some proposals suggest, be returned to the pre-Patriot Act standard of "specific and articulable facts." Based on my own experience with FBI national security operations, I am convinced that counter-terrorism operations are qualitatively different from the traditional counterintelligence operations for which the "specific and articulable facts" standard was originally crafted. Further, I believe this distinction has become even more pronounced since 9/11, given the imperative for the FBI to take a more preventative approach to counter-terrorism and recent revision of the Attorney General guidelines that govern those investigations. These changes actually increase the probability that FBI agents will be required to assess threat information in environments where the quality of available information falls far short of "specific." FBI counter-terrorism operations will suffer if the FBI cannot expeditiously obtain relevant information in these settings and I think that the need for the harmonization of criminal and national security legal standards for the acquisition of transactional information remains as vital now as it was at the time of the Patriot Act. Furthermore, I think that vast majority of the problems noted in the IG reports flow more from the delegation of signature authority to the field office level than from the change in the legal standard.

Second, I think that any increase in privacy risks posed by the continued use of the relevance standards are better dealt with by measures other than an across-the-board increase in the legal standard. What is needed is a much more nuanced and tailored approach that acknowledges the need for the FBI to obtain quickly all relevant counter-terrorism information (particularly that relating to threats), but also recognizes that much of the information so collected may relate to individuals of no lasting investigative interest. Such information needs to be segregated and discarded as efficiently as possible, and in a manner that inspires public confidence in its effectiveness. The FBI needs to see this task as integral to the NSL process, and not as an afterthought or a task to be accomplished when time permits. The way to achieve this result is to integrate more robust minimization and retention procedures into the NSL authorities. These mechanisms should involve, as they do in FISA, some degree of judicial review and external auditing. Some of the legislative proposals addressing retention provide a good starting point for movement in this direction. A proposal that would further restrict the current ability to disseminate NSL information to law enforcement, however, would be a thoroughly unwarranted revival of the "wall" separating intelligence and law enforcement that operated to such crippling effect prior to 9/11, and is not justified by the specific interests at stake here.

Third, I believe the current NSL statutes could be much improved if Congress would more fully outfit them. For example, many of the difficulties that recipients of NSLs have been experiencing could be alleviated if more, and more up to date, definitions were added to the statutes. In particular, the use of the undefined term "electronic communication transactional information" in the ECPA NSL seems to be at the root of many deficiencies noted by the IG. Just as Congress used the Patriot Act reauthorization legislation to clarify the enforcement and judicial review of NSLs, as well as the ability of recipients to consult legal counsel, the present situation could allow for the insertion of more complete definitions and additional clarifying language. Language in some of the current proposals certainly represents a step in this direction, but I think that much more extensive and difficult work needs to be done on defining key terms.

Fourth, I think that the secrecy provisions of all the NSL statutes need to be revised in a manner that recognizes as a default position the need for secrecy, but also provides for the routine elimination of those requirements after a time certain. I believe the correct approach here is that embodied in the classification system used throughout the government. NSL information should remain subject to secrecy rules for a substantial, but finite period, which can be extended upon a specific showing of need by the FBI. I oppose proposals that would presumptively release security controls after a short period of time as having only the effect of creating a burdensome requirement for court filings in every case. An additional problem with such proposals is that it has a court making what is essentially a classification determination.

Finally, I note that comments here presume that the acquisition of transactional information will continue to be governed by the patchwork of NSL statutes and FISA provisions. I think there is also great merit in considering whether a simpler and more unified approach, such as that represented by a generic national security administrative subpoena authority for the FBI, could eliminate many of the issues noted by the Inspector General as well as provide a more effective and properly regulated investigative tool.

I hope the background information and comments that I have provided prove helpful to the Committee. I would be happy to answer any questions.

Michael J. Woods

Michael J. Woods is a national security lawyer with specific expertise in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the USA PATRIOT Act, and legal authorities relating to intelligence and counterintelligence operations. In government, Mr. Woods served as Chief of the FBI's National Security Law Unit (1997-2002), as counsel to the National Counterintelligence Executive (2002), and as a Department of Justice prosecutor (1993-1997). During his time at the FBI, Mr. Woods and the lawyers under his supervision were responsible for providing legal advice to agents and analysts involved in counterintelligence and counter-terrorism operations, and for the production and review of national security letters. In private practice, Mr. Woods has advised Department of Defense clients on matters of national security policy and, until recently, served as the chief operating officer of a company that supplied professional services to the defense and intelligence community. He has published law review articles on national security law issues, including those relating to national security letters and the Patriot Act. Mr. Woods is a graduate of the Harvard Law School (1992) and Oxford University (1987).

Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215

Michael J. Woods*

The USA PATRIOT Act¹ has sparked intense public debate, with proponents claiming that the Act is a necessarily hard-minded response to a national crisis,² while opponents see unwarranted, even opportunistic, expansion of state power.³ Perhaps no provision of the Act has generated more controversy than §215, which authorizes the FBI to seek a court order compelling the production of “any tangible things” relevant to certain counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations.⁴ Like many other provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, §215 will expire on December 31, 2005, unless reauthorized by Congress.⁵ The controversy, therefore, is likely to intensify over the coming months.

The rhetoric swirling about this provision has been extreme, despite the paucity of evidence that it has ever actually been used⁶ – which suggests that the section is neither the deadly threat to civil liberties nor the vital operational

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1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. The name of the Act became controversial almost immediately. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-236(I), at 433 (2001) (comments of Rep. Frank on the awkward and chilling effect of the name).

2. See, e.g., Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks at the Federalist Society National Convention (Nov. 15, 2003), available at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/m_speeches.htm. The Justice Department Web site <http://www.lifeandliberty.gov> contains a collection of speeches, articles, and other materials defending the USA PATRIOT Act.

3. See, e.g., Ann Beeson & Jameel Jaffer, *Unpatriotic Acts: The FBI’s Power to Rifle Through Your Records and Personal Belongings Without Telling You* (American Civil Liberties Union 2003), available at <http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13246&c=206>. The ACLU Web site has a section, <http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12126&c=207>, which collects materials generally critical of the Act.

4. Pub. L. No. 107-56, §215, 115 Stat. 272, 287-288 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§1861-1862 (Supp. II 2002)).

5. *Id.* §224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2510 note (Supp. II 2002)).

6. The Attorney General announced that between the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001, and September 18, 2003, the Justice Department had presented no applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for a §215 order. See Letter of May 19, 2004, filed by the defendant in *Muslim Community Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft*, Civil No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. filed July 30, 2003), available at <http://www.aclu.org/Files/getFile.cfm?id=15842>. The Department has implied, however, that §215 may have been used subsequent to September 18, 2003. *Id.*

necessity that its detractors and defenders, respectively, contend. Section 215, removed from its context in national security law, might be regarded as ominous, but placed in the larger context of operational counterintelligence authorities⁷ for access to transactional information, §215 emerges as an understandable, though arguably incomplete, evolutionary step. This article is intended to supply that context, and then to examine both criticism and potential revisions of §215.

The difficulty in accomplishing this task is that, as in so many discussions of national security law, the practical relationship and functional roles of the various legal authorities are embedded in government operations that remain classified. Because few counterintelligence operational authorities have been the subject of litigation,⁸ debates over these authorities tend to occur on a theoretical level, with outsiders parsing the statutory text and gleaning clues from what little exists in public records, and with insiders limiting themselves to high-level policy talk bereft of any concrete details. Since September 11, 2001, however, the FBI and the Department of Justice have declassified and released a number of key documents in response to various inquiries, investigations, and lawsuits.⁹ I believe that enough information now exists in the public domain to allow an “insider” to convey a reasonably accurate picture of §215’s evolution using open source material.¹⁰

In Section I, I will provide an overview of pre-USA PATRIOT Act authorities governing counterintelligence access to transactional information. In Section II, I will discuss the creation of §215 and address some of the principal concerns raised by critics of the USA PATRIOT Act. Finally, in Section III, I will examine potential modifications or alternatives to §215 as it currently exists.

7. In this article I sometimes refer to procedures for obtaining certain information as “authorities,” since that term is used within the Federal Bureau of Investigation as shorthand for the statutory or regulatory authorization pursuant to which intelligence operations are conducted.

8. The one noteworthy exception concerns the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1862 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)), which authorizes electronic surveillance and physical searches for intelligence purposes upon a showing of probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power. The propriety of intelligence collection under FISA is frequently litigated in espionage or terrorism prosecutions when the fruit of a FISA surveillance or search is introduced as evidence. *See, e.g.,* United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 532 U.S. 971 (2001); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 485 U.S. 937 (1988).

9. A number of relevant documents are available in the Freedom of Information Act “electronic reading rooms” on the Justice Department Web site, <http://www.usdoj.gov>. Other useful collections, including materials released in the course of recent litigation, can be found on the Web sites of the American Civil Liberties Union, at <http://www.aclu.org>, the Federation of American Scientists, at <http://www.fas.org>, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, at <http://www.epic.org>, and the Center for Democracy and Technology, at <http://www.cdt.org>.

10. All the factual material in this article comes from publicly available documents, as indicated throughout. No reference to any classified material is intended.

I. AN OVERVIEW OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONAL AUTHORITIES

A full understanding of §215 begins with the role of counterintelligence within the larger landscape of national security law. National security law includes a range of authorities granted to the executive branch for the defense of the nation from foreign powers. These legal authorities, subject to congressional regulation and oversight, are the basis for military operations, the collection of foreign intelligence, and covert activities.¹¹ “Counterintelligence” describes a subset of these activities, specifically, “information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities.”¹² Examples of typical counterintelligence¹³ operations are the monitoring of foreign intelligence officers, the identification of possible espionage activities, the identification of international terrorist cells, and the monitoring, prevention, and disruption of terrorist activities. The distinguishing feature of a counterintelligence operation is that the target is a foreign power (state, quasi-state, or international terrorist group) or its agent;¹⁴ targets with no tie to a foreign power are not counterintelligence targets and typically are handled through criminal investigative channels.¹⁵

Counterintelligence within the United States is primarily the responsibility of the FBI,¹⁶ which conducts counterintelligence operations under guidelines

11. See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, *Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance*, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10-31 (2001) (historical overview of this process).

12. Exec. Order No. 12,333, §3.4(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981). A slight variant of this definition is codified in the National Security Act of 1947 at 50 U.S.C. §401a(3) (2000).

13. Although the term “counterintelligence” encompasses operations targeting all types of foreign powers (both traditional state powers and international terrorist groups), many documents, and the organizational structure of some agencies, distinguish between two facets of counterintelligence, namely, operations against foreign states and their intelligence services as “counterintelligence” or “foreign counterintelligence,” and operations targeting international terrorist groups as “counterterrorism.” In this article I use “counterintelligence” to include both types of operations.

14. “Foreign power” and “agent of a foreign power” are key terms of art in counterintelligence. Definitions of both terms may be found in FISA at 50 U.S.C. §1801(a)-(b).

15. The FBI’s pre-USA PATRIOT Act investigative guidelines made this distinction clear. “Domestic terrorism” was handled under the criminal investigative guidelines. Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (March 21, 1989), *available at* <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/generalcrimea.htm>. Foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and international terrorism were handled under the national security guidelines. Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (May 25, 1995) [hereinafter FCI Guidelines], *redacted version available at* <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/terrorismintel2.pdf>.

16. Exec. Order No. 12,333, *supra* note 12, at §1.14.

issued by the Attorney General.¹⁷ Counterintelligence operations occur outside the structure of the criminal law, although they may lead to criminal prosecutions for espionage or terrorism-related crimes.

Historically, counterintelligence operations were subject to very little oversight. The revelation of abuses by the FBI, CIA, and DOD during the 1960s and 1970s, however, prompted Congress to bring counterintelligence activities under a higher degree of regulation.¹⁸ The use of electronic surveillance in counterintelligence became subject to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),¹⁹ which set boundaries on use of the technique and introduced judicial supervision. The same era saw the beginning of substantial executive branch regulation of U.S. counterintelligence and foreign intelligence activities.²⁰

One legacy of this period of regulation was an enduring concern that the tools available to counterintelligence should not be used to subvert the constitutional protections of the criminal law. This concern, which had its roots in pre-FISA case law,²¹ led to the creation of a “wall,” built of legal and policy requirements and reinforced by culture, that separated counterintelligence officers from criminal investigators. But the wall, prior to its partial dismantlement through the operation of the USA PATRIOT Act²² and a subsequent court decision,²³ had the unintended consequence of depriving counterintelligence operators of some of the basic tools of criminal investigation.²⁴

17. See The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter NSI Guidelines], *redacted version available at* <http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/nsiguilines.pdf>. These replace the FCI Guidelines cited *supra*, note 15.

18. The principal investigations of the abuses were conducted by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the “Church Committee”) and the House Select Committee on Intelligence (the “Pike Committee”). See Richard A. Best, Jr., *Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization 1949-2004* (Cong. Res. Serv. RL32500) (Jul. 29, 2004), at 17-25, *available at* <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf>. See also Banks & Bowman, *supra* note 11, at 31-35.

19. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1862 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).

20. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, *supra* note 12; see also Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 18, 1976); Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (Jan. 24, 1978) (both superseded by Exec. Order No. 12,333); Banks & Bowman, *supra* note 11, at 68-74.

21. See *United States v. Truong Dinh Hung*, 629 F.2d 908, 915-916 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding a warrantless surveillance only so long as it was conducted “primarily” for foreign intelligence reasons).

22. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§203, 218, 504, 115 Stat. 272, 278-281, 291, 364-365.

23. *In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 2002).

24. There are many descriptions of the history and effects of the “wall” as it existed prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. See, e.g., *id.* at 721-728; Final Report of the Attorney General’s Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation, ch. 20 (May 2000), *available at* <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/bellows20.pdf> (commonly called the “Bellows Report,” this document examines the FBI investigation of Dr. Wen Ho Lee; Chapter 20 contains a detailed description of the “wall”); THE 9/11 COMMISSION

FBI counterintelligence agents were authorized by FISA to conduct electronic surveillance and physical searches. However, such methods are generally used only in the end stages of an investigation, after the probable cause required for FISA surveillance is established through the use of less intrusive techniques. Indeed, FBI counterintelligence agents are under a formal requirement to use the least intrusive means first.²⁵ These less intrusive means include interviews, review of publicly available information, surveillance in areas where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, consensual monitoring, “mail covers,” and the use of undercover operatives.²⁶ They also include the use of “national security letters” to obtain information for counterintelligence purposes.²⁷

Congress approved the use of national security letters in response to the need for counterintelligence agents to obtain transactional information about investigative subjects. “Transactional” information broadly describes information that documents financial or communications transactions without necessarily revealing the substance of those transactions. Telephone billing records that list the numbers dialed by a particular subscriber, records from an Internet service provider showing when a user logged onto an account or to whom the user sent email, records of bank accounts or transfers of money between financial institutions, and credit records are all examples of transactional information.

Transactional information has developed into an extraordinarily valuable source of data for counterintelligence analysts, particularly in their efforts to identify international terrorists. Terrorists can limit their exposure to the interception of the content of communications by using counter-surveillance techniques that run the gamut from the ancient (human couriers, secret writing, simple word codes) to the modern (computer-based encryption and steganography).²⁸ It is far more difficult for them to cover their transactional

REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 78-80, 270-271 (2004).

25. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, *supra* note 12, at §2.4; NSI Guidelines, *supra* note 17, at 7.

26. The actual descriptions of investigative techniques remain classified, but their inclusion in the NSI Guidelines can be inferred from definitions found in unclassified portions of the document. See NSI Guidelines, *supra* note 17, at 33-38. A “mail cover” is an investigative technique in which the FBI obtains copies of the outside surfaces of mail delivered through U.S. postal channels.

27. National security letters are described *infra* in the text accompanying notes 45-85.

28. “Steganography” refers to the practice of concealing messages within innocuous documents, images, or other media. The frequency with which computer-based encryption and steganography are actually used by terrorists has been debated since before the September 11 attacks, but indications of such use regularly emerge in public reports. See, e.g., *The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Dale L. Watson, FBI Exec. Asst. Director), available at <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm> (FBI view on use of encryption by terrorists); Nick Fielding, *Al-Qaeda Betrayed by its Simple Faith in High-Tech*, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 8, 2004, at 14; Ariana Eunjung Cha & Jonathan Krim, *Terrorists’*

footsteps. Therefore, counterintelligence analysts seek to use information about financial, credit, and communications transactions to construct link diagrams of terrorist networks.²⁹ A good example of this technique is the extensive, and tragically retrospective, link analysis of the nineteen September 11 hijackers.³⁰

The legal status of transactional information has evolved dramatically since the mid-1970s, following public awareness that nearly all transactional information resides beyond the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In *United States v. Miller*, the Supreme Court held that the government can use a grand jury subpoena to obtain a defendant's financial records from a bank without intruding into an area protected by the Fourth Amendment.³¹ The Court pointed out that "'no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment' is implicated by governmental investigative activities unless there is an intrusion into a zone of privacy, into 'the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area.'"³² The checks, deposit slips, and bank statements produced in response to the subpoena were not the defendant's "private papers," the Court held; rather, they contained "only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business."³³ By handing over this information to a third party, the defendant took the risk that it would be conveyed to the government by that third party.³⁴ Finally, the Court noted that the lack of notice to the defendant that the government had obtained his information did not infringe upon a protected interest.³⁵

To be sure, expectations of privacy may have changed in the three decades since *Miller* was decided. Commercial enterprises and financial institutions today commonly allow customers to state a preference about how their personal information will be used, and they often market guarantees of

Online Methods Elusive, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2001, at A14; Declan McCullagh, *Bin Laden: Steganography Master?*, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 7, 2001, available at <http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,41658,00.html>. See generally Allan Cullison, *Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive*, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2004, at 55-72.

29. This analytical process can range from simple "link analysis" to far more ambitious "data mining." These techniques and the legal environment relevant to the underlying transactional information attained some notoriety when featured in the Defense Department's "Total Information Awareness" program. See Gina Marie Stevens, *Privacy: Total Information Awareness Programs and Related Information Access, Collection, and Protection Laws* (Cong. Res. Serv. RL31730) (2003), available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31730.pdf>; Mary DeRosa, *Data Mining and Data Analysis for Counterterrorism* (Center for Strategic and International Studies) (2004), available at <http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300csis.pdf>.

30. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, *supra* note 24, at 215-253.

31. *United States v. Miller*, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

32. *Id.* at 440, citing *Hoffa v. United States*, 385 U.S. 293, 301-302 (1966).

33. 425 U.S. at 440, 442.

34. *Id.* at 443.

35. *Id.* at 443 n.5; see also *Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984).

privacy. From this, a customer now could reasonably conclude that he or she retained control over data entrusted to these third parties. In spite of criticism that it needs re-examination in light of these and other technological developments,³⁶ however, *Miller* remains the law for now.

The *Miller* decision prompted Congress in 1978 to enact the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA).³⁷ In broad terms, the RFPA created statutory protection for the records that the *Miller* Court found were beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment. The Act defined the scope of the records protected and generally required that notice be given to account holders when records were disclosed in response to legitimate government inquiries.³⁸ The statute aimed to “strike a balance between customers’ right of privacy and the need of law enforcement agencies to obtain financial records pursuant to legitimate investigations.”³⁹ Congress included an exception for foreign intelligence investigations, allowing requests for protected information by government authorities who were “authorized to conduct foreign counter- or foreign positive-intelligence activities for purposes of conducting such activities” to be honored without notice to the targeted customers.⁴⁰ Writing just two years after the Church and Pike Committees had completed their work, however, Congress remained wary of counterintelligence, and it noted that the exception should “be used only for legitimate foreign intelligence investigations; investigations proceeding only under the rubric of ‘national security’ do not qualify.”⁴¹

By the mid-1980s, the FBI had begun to push for authority to compel the production of financial records in counterintelligence matters without a judicial order. The existing RFPA language allowed the FBI (and other counterintelligence agencies) to make requests for information, but it did not require financial institutions to comply. The FBI argued that while most such

36. See, e.g., *Anti-Terrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment After September 11: Where and When Can the Government Go to Prevent Terrorist Attacks?*, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of James X. Dempsey, Exec. Director, Center for Democracy and Technology), available at <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/dempsey052003.pdf>.

37. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Title XI of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rates Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. §§3401-3422 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)). See *O’Brien*, 467 U.S. at 745. See also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9306.

38. The RFPA contained a general prohibition on government access to protected records, see Pub. L. No. 95-630, §1102, 92 Stat. 3697, 3697-3698, although it defined exceptions to the prohibition for subpoenas, search warrants, and formal requests. *Id.* §§1102, 1105-1108, 92 Stat. 3697, 3697-3702. Use of these exceptions required notice to the customer, although that notice could be delayed in certain circumstances. *Id.* §§1105-1109, 1112, 1113, 92 Stat. 3697, 3699-3703, 3705-3707.

39. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 33.

40. Pub. L. No. 95-630, §1114(a)(1)(A), 92 Stat. 3697, 3707; see H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 55.

41. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 55.

institutions did comply, in “certain significant instances” they did not, often citing the constraints of state constitutions or banking privacy laws.⁴² The congressional response⁴³ was to give the FBI⁴⁴ specific authority to compel the production of financial records using a “national security letter.”⁴⁵

With the introduction of compulsory process, Congress also created safeguards to govern the FBI’s use of that authority. The statute required that a high-ranking FBI official certify: (1) that the information is sought “for foreign counterintelligence purposes,” and (2) that “there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the customer or entity whose records are sought is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.”⁴⁶ The new provision, like the original RFPA, however, both failed to require notification of the target and affirmatively prohibited the financial institution from disclosing the existence of the national security letter to anyone.⁴⁷ The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found that the “FBI could not effectively monitor and counter the clandestine activities of hostile espionage agents and terrorists if they had to be notified that the FBI sought their financial records for a counterintelligence investigation.”⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the legislators expressed a preference that the Director of the FBI restrict the delegation of national security letter authority and that the requirements for handling information obtained through the RFPA be integrated into the Attorney General’s guidelines for FBI counterintelligence.⁴⁹

Congress seemed far more receptive to the idea of FBI counterintelligence access to financial records in 1986 than it did in 1978. In part that could reflect a greater confidence in the regulation of counterintelligence activities. Executive Order 12,333⁵⁰ was by that time firmly established as the basis for jurisdiction and operational rules within the U.S. intelligence community. Pursuant to that order, the FBI was operating under Attorney General guidelines that governed all counterintelligence activity and that set standards

42. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-690(I), at 15-16 (1986), *reprinted in* 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5327, 5341-5342.

43. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, §404, 100 Stat. 3190, 3197 (1986) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §3414(a)(5)(A)-(D) (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).

44. Only the FBI has *compulsory* authority, although the request provision in 12 U.S.C. §3414(a)(1)(A) remains available to other agencies. The request provision is used, for example, by counterintelligence components within the Department of Defense. See Department of Defense Dir. No. 5400.12, *Obtaining Information from Financial Institutions* (Feb. 6, 1980), at encl. 5, *available at* <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/540012.htm>.

45. The term “national security letter” does not appear in the statute, but the legislative history indicates that it was in common use by that time. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-690(I), at 15.

46. Pub. L. No. 99-569, §404.

47. *Id.*

48. H.R. REP. NO. 99-690(I), at 15.

49. See *id.* at 17; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-690 (III), at 24, *reprinted in* 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5371, 5384. This language was integrated into the guidelines. See FCI Guidelines, *supra* note 15, at 29-30.

50. Exec. Order No. 12,333, *supra* note 12, at §3.4(a).

and approval authority for the various facets of counterintelligence investigations.⁵¹ The 1986 legislation may also reflect a change in attitude about the need for counterintelligence. The early 1980s saw a dramatic increase in espionage cases, and interest in counterintelligence rose accordingly.⁵² Moreover, Congress began to see international terrorism as a serious national security threat.⁵³

In granting compulsory process to FBI counterintelligence in 1986, Congress created a new, hybrid legal standard: “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe” that the targeted person is an “agent of a foreign power.”⁵⁴ The “agent of a foreign power” criterion was not new; it had been established in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 as a way to identify proper subjects of counterintelligence electronic surveillance.⁵⁵ The

51. See FCI Guidelines, *supra* note 15.

52. The media dubbed 1985 the “Year of the Spy” after some fifteen people (including Jonathan Pollard, Larry Wu-Tai Chin, Edward Lee Howard, and the members of the Walker spy ring) were arrested for espionage that year. See Defense Personnel Security Research Center, *Recent Espionage Cases: 1975-1999* (Oct. 1999), available at <http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage/>.

53. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-690(I), at 14-17. The analogous discussion in 1978 contained no mention of terrorism and referred only to the “intelligence operations of foreign governments.” See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 55.

54. Pub. L. No. 99-569, §404.

55. FISA authorizes electronic surveillance (and, since 1994, physical searches) of foreign powers and their agents when the government demonstrates, *inter alia*, probable cause that the targets meet the relevant definitions. See generally 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1829. FISA defines “agent of a foreign power” as:

- (1) any person other than a United States person, who –
 - (A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
 - (B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or
- (2) any person who –
 - (A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
 - (B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
 - (C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power;
 - (D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
 - (E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to

innovation was in the quantum of proof required: “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe.” The Conference Report noted that the standard was “significantly less stringent than the requirement of ‘probable cause,’” and it indicated that the “reason to believe” standard should “take into account the facts and circumstances that a prudent investigator would consider insofar as they provide an objective, factual basis for the determination.”⁵⁶ An earlier report indicated that the House considered the higher standard of “probable cause” inappropriate, given the holding in *Miller*.⁵⁷

Shortly before Congress modified the RFPA to provide national security letter authority, it enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).⁵⁸ ECPA broadly updated the law governing electronic communications by refining prohibitions on their interception, extending legal protections for traditional telephone service to include all wire and electronic communications services, and regulating stored wire and electronic communications.⁵⁹

In many respects, ECPA was an attempt to keep pace with evolving technology. It represented the first significant legislation to address what would become the Internet.⁶⁰ In particular, ECPA was concerned with the invasive potential of advancing technology. The Senate report opened by quoting the prescient dissent in *Olmstead v. United States*: “Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.”⁶¹ The report continued by observing that the growing use of computers enabled the proliferation of personal information stored in areas beyond the control of the individual. Citing *Miller*, the report concluded that, absent statutory protection, such information “may be open to possible wrongful use and public disclosure by law enforcement authorities as well as unauthorized private parties.”⁶²

ECPA addressed this problem by extending statutory protection to electronic and wire communications stored by third parties (for example, on the servers of an Internet service provider or corporate network) and to

engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).

50 U.S.C. §1801(b).

56. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-952, at 23 (1986).

57. H.R. REP. NO. 99-690(I), at 17.

58. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§2701-2712 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004)).

59. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1-3 (1986), *reprinted in* 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-3556.

60. See *id.*

61. *Id.* at 2, *quoting* *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

62. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3.

electronic communication transactional records.⁶³ The Act also restricted the government's access to live telephone transactional data (commonly known as "pen register" and "trap and trace" data), requiring it to obtain a court order based upon a certification of relevance to an ongoing criminal investigation.⁶⁴

Like the RFPA, ECPA contained a special provision for counterintelligence access. Section 201 of ECPA allowed the FBI to compel the production of "subscriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic communication transactional records" from a "wire or electronic communications service provider."⁶⁵ The issuance of a national security letter under this provision required the certification of a high-ranking FBI official⁶⁶ that the information sought was relevant to a foreign counterintelligence investigation and that there were "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe" that the target was a foreign power or agent of a foreign power under the FISA definitions.⁶⁷ The ECPA provision thus mirrored the standard in the 1986 amendment to the RFPA.

ECPA's drafters also aimed for a "carefully balanced provision" that addressed operational necessities.⁶⁸ The "specific and articulable facts" standard emerged as an appropriate balance for counterintelligence access: criminal investigators could obtain information upon a certification of relevance (but generally with notice to the target), while counterintelligence investigators could obtain the information in secret,⁶⁹ but only after meeting

63. Pub. L. No. 99-508, Title II, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-1868 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§2701-2709, 2711 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004)).

64. Pub. L. No. 99-508, §§301-302, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868-1872 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). A pen register is a device that records the numbers that a target telephone is dialing. A trap and trace device captures the telephone numbers that dial a target telephone. See 18 U.S.C. §3127. The USA PATRIOT Act provides that this authority also applies to Internet accounts and other computer-based communications. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, §216(c), *amending* 18 U.S.C. §3127.

65. Pub. L. No. 99-508, §201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1867 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2709).

66. Though not explicit in the statute, the legislative history indicates that signature authority should be limited in the FBI to Deputy Assistant Directors and above. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 44.

67. Pub. L. No. 99-508, §201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1867 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2709).

68. The Senate report provides in part:
Section 2709 is a carefully balanced provision that remedies the defect in current law that the FBI cannot gain access on a mandatory basis to telephone toll records maintained by communications common carriers, for counterintelligence purposes. As a result, especially in states where public regulatory bodies have created obstacles to providing such access, the FBI has been prevented from obtaining these records, which are highly important to the investigation of counterintelligence cases.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 44.

69. Like the RFPA, ECPA prohibited the recipients of a national security letter from disclosing its existence. Pub. L. No. 99-508, §201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1867 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2709(c)). [Author's note: After this article was written, a district court held §2709 unconstitutional based on its interpretation of the secrecy provision in §2709(c). See *Doe v. Ashcroft*, 2004 WL 2185571 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2004), *available at* <http://www.nysd.uscourts>.

the more stringent standard. The standard was viewed as consistent with the investigative standards imposed on FBI counterintelligence by the Attorney General guidelines.⁷⁰

The counterintelligence provision of ECPA was amended twice prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. It originally gave the FBI access to subscriber information, toll billing records, and electronic communications transactional records of anyone who met the FISA definition of a foreign power or agent of a foreign power (to the “specific and articulable facts” standard).⁷¹ The FBI subsequently sought authority to obtain subscriber information in order to identify (or to confirm the identity of) people who contacted or were in contact with agents of a foreign power.⁷² The FBI offered three operational examples: (1) persons whose phone numbers were listed in an address book seized from a suspected terrorist; (2) persons who called a foreign embassy and asked to speak to an intelligence officer; and (3) callers to the home of a suspected intelligence officer or terrorist.⁷³ In each case, the FBI’s use of ECPA’s counterintelligence provision or other authorities against a foreign intelligence officer or terrorist target would yield the phone number of the caller, but the FBI could not obtain subscriber information about that caller. A 1993 amendment to ECPA gave the FBI the authority it sought, with some limitations.⁷⁴ Congress amended the provision again in 1997, expressly

gov/rulings/04CV2614_Opinion_092904.pdf. The court found that §2709 lacks sufficient procedural protections, given the nature of the information subject to its compulsory process. *See id.* at 45-82. After extensive discussion, the court also concluded that the §2709(c) secrecy provision violates the First Amendment, because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interests. *See id.* at 83-116. The decision, if upheld in its entirety, will merit extensive analysis. Given its timing, however, and the unknown outcome of the pending appeal, I merely cite *Doe* briefly here and in other footnotes where it would most affect arguments in the text.]

70. The portions of the Attorney General guidelines setting out the standards for opening the various forms of counterintelligence investigations remain classified. ECPA’s legislative history notes cryptically that “the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has informed the Judiciary Committee that the language contained in the bill would not significantly alter the application of the current FBI investigative standard in this area.” S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 45.

71. Pub. L. No. 99-508, §201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1867. “Subscriber information” in the 1986 version was replaced with “name, address, and length of service” in a 1993 amendment. Compare Pub. L. No. 99-508, §201 with Pub. L. No. 103-142, §§1-2, 107 Stat. 1491, 1491-1492 (1993).

72. H.R. REP. NO. 103-46, at 2 (1993), *reprinted in* 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1913, 1914.

73. *Id.* at 3.

74. The new language gave the FBI access to subscriber information on anyone who was in contact with a terrorist, but it limited that access to situations in which circumstances “gave reason to believe that the communication concerned” terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. *See* Act of Nov. 17, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-142, §2, 107 Stat. 1491, 1492 (1993). This distinction was meant to clarify that the authority not be used to target innocent contacts with agents of foreign powers, such as routine calls to foreign embassy staff about visas or other general information matters. *See* H.R. REP. NO. 103-46, at 2-3.

defining the phrase “toll billing records” to mean “local and long distance toll billing records.”⁷⁵

The final type of national security letter emerged in 1995, when the FBI sought counterintelligence access to credit records.⁷⁶ The FBI stated that RFPA national security letters had proven very useful, but that counterintelligence agents still had to employ intrusive or time-consuming techniques (physical and electronic surveillance, mail covers, and canvassing of local banks) simply to determine where targeted individuals maintained accounts.⁷⁷ The same information was readily available from credit bureaus (“consumer reporting agencies”) and was commonly obtained in criminal investigations through the use of a subpoena.⁷⁸ Congress’s response was to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)⁷⁹ by giving the FBI national security letter authority to obtain certain information from credit reporting agencies.⁸⁰ The authority essentially replicated that granted in the 1993 ECPA amendment, employing the same legal standard: “necessary for the conduct of an authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation” and “specific and articulable facts” giving reason to believe the target was (or was in contact with) an agent of a foreign power.⁸¹ Similarly, the new FCRA provision embodied two levels of access to information: if the target was an agent of a foreign power, the FBI could get the identity of all financial institutions at which the target maintained an account; if the target was merely in contact with an agent of a foreign power, the FBI got “identifying information” limited to “name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of employment.”⁸²

The one departure from the RFPA and ECPA models was in the area of disclosure. The FCRA language prohibits disclosure of the national security letter by employees of the credit reporting agency “other than [to] those officers, employees, or agents of a consumer reporting agency necessary to fulfill the requirement to disclose information” to the FBI.⁸³ This language was intended to clarify what is apparently assumed in the other statutes, namely, that employees may disclose the existence of the national security

75. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-293, §601(a), 110 Stat. 3461, 3469 (1996); see S. REP. NO. 104-258, at 22-23 (1996), *reprinted in* 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3945, 3967-3968.

76. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-427, at 34-36 (1995), *reprinted in* 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 983, 996-998.

77. See *id.* at 36.

78. See *id.* at 35-36.

79. Pub. L. No. 91-508, Title VI, 82 Stat. 1127 (1970).

80. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, §601(a), 109 Stat. 961, 974-977 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1681u (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).

81. Pub. L. No. 104-93, §601(a), 109 Stat. 961, 975.

82. *Id.*

83. *Id.* The ECPA and RFPA provisions prohibit disclosure to “any person.” 18 U.S.C. §2709(c) (ECPA); 12 U.S.C. §3414(a)(5)(D) (RFPA).

letter in compliance with the credit bureau's internal policies.⁸⁴ Presumably, this language would permit disclosure to relevant managers or the consumer reporting agency's legal counsel. Finally, the FCRA amendment gave the FBI access to a consumer's full credit report, but only if a court found that the FBI's information met the same legal standard – "specific and articulable facts" – as in the other section of the amendment.⁸⁵

In addition to the national security letter authorities just described, in a 1998 amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act the FBI acquired two new tools to collect transactional information.⁸⁶ The amendment for the first time permitted "pen register" and "trap and trace" authorization to be obtained through the FISA process.⁸⁷ This change addressed a longstanding anomaly in the counterintelligence environment: unlike criminal investigators who could use Title 18 authority to install pen registers and trap and trace devices,⁸⁸ counterintelligence agents could not prospectively collect telephone transactional information on suspected spies or terrorists.⁸⁹ The new FISA pen register and trap and trace authority mirrored the criminal investigative authority that had existed since 1986.⁹⁰ Unlike the criminal statute, however, the standard for a FISA pen register or trap and trace order was not "relevance" to an ongoing investigation. Rather, it was set at something like the hybrid standard for national security letters: "relevance" plus "information which demonstrates that there is reason to believe" that the targeted telephone line "has been or is about to be used in communication with" a person engaged in international terrorism, a person engaged in clandestine intelligence activities, or any foreign power or agent of a foreign power under circumstances indicating clandestine intelligence or terrorist

84. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-427, at 39; see also *Doe v. Ashcroft*, *supra* note 69, at 51-55 (comparing non-disclosure language in FCRA to that in ECPA).

85. Pub. L. No. 104-93, §601(a). The provision was largely useless prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, since FBI counterintelligence agents did not have ready access to a court that could issue such an order. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court likely had no jurisdiction to entertain a request under this section. See 50 U.S.C. §§1803(a), 1822(c) (defining jurisdiction of the court). Recourse to a federal district court would have involved interaction with prosecutors, and thus triggered elaborate "wall" restrictions meant to keep counterintelligence agents and prosecutors at arm's length. See *supra* note 24. Obtaining a simple credit report typically would not have justified the efforts and risks associated with those restrictions.

86. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, Title VI, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404-2413 (1998).

87. *Id.* at §601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404-2410.

88. See 18 U.S.C. §§3121-3127.

89. Counterintelligence agents could, however, collect historical transactional data using the ECPA national security letter authority. See 18 U.S.C. §2709.

90. See generally Pub. L. No. 105-272, at §601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404-2410. The analogous criminal law authority is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§3121-3127 and authorizes the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices upon a government certification that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. *Id.* at §3123(a).

activities.⁹¹ The FISA amendment also created procedures for emergency use of the authority, certain restrictions on the use of information obtained through the authority, and a notification and challenge procedure triggered when information obtained is used in a subsequent proceeding.⁹² The notification and challenge procedure mirrors those found elsewhere in FISA for electronic surveillance and physical searches.⁹³

The 1998 amendment to FISA also created the direct antecedent of §215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. It allowed the FBI to seek a FISA court order compelling the production of business records from common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities.⁹⁴ The standard was set at the now-familiar “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.”⁹⁵ Like the new pen register authority and all of the existing national security letter authorities, this provision imposed a non-disclosure requirement on the recipients of the court order.⁹⁶ In stating the duties of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge, it simply replicated the language of the pen register and trap and trace provision: “Upon application made pursuant to this section, the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified . . . if the judge finds that the application satisfies the requirements of this section.”⁹⁷

There is almost no legislative history for these two new provisions. They emerged in the Senate version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, but they are not otherwise mentioned in the conference report or floor debate.⁹⁸ The congressional debate and the press tended to focus on another section, which amended the criminal electronic surveillance law (commonly called “Title III”) to facilitate “roving” surveillance.⁹⁹ It is reasonable to assume that, as in prior instances, the FBI argued that it needed authority to compel production of materials not then accessible through the use of national security letters. Since counterintelligence agents were

91. Pub. L. No. 105-272, §601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2405-2406 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §1842(c)). With only slight variations, this new authority adopted the standard for ECPA national security letters established in 18 U.S.C. §2709.

92. Pub. L. No. 105-272, §601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2407-2410 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1843-1845).

93. See 50 U.S.C. §§1806, 1825.

94. Pub. L. No. 105-272, §602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410-2412.

95. *Id.*

96. *Id.* The non-disclosure provision incorporated the clarifying language (“other than those officers, agents or employees . . . necessary to fulfill the requirement”) developed for the FCRA national security letter. *Id.*; see *supra* text accompanying notes 83-84.

97. Pub. L. No. 105-272, §602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411.

98. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-780 (1998), at 32.

99. Pub. L. No. 105-272, §604, 112 Stat. 2396, 2413; see, e.g., Vernon Loeb, *Anti-Terrorism Powers Grow, “Roving” Wiretaps, Secret Court Orders Used to Hunt Suspects*, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1999, at A23. The fact that the change to Title III (a criminal authority) occurred via the intelligence authorization act was particularly controversial and dominated the public debate.

“walled” off from the use of criminal authorities like grand jury subpoenas, a records custodian could effectively stall a counterintelligence investigation by refusing to release records absent compulsory process.¹⁰⁰ Such a refusal could have been motivated by a concern over the effect of state laws or civil liability, or it could have been an act of civil disobedience or simple unwillingness to cooperate.¹⁰¹

In summary, on the eve of the September 11 terrorist attacks the FBI had five separate legal authorities that addressed the need to compel production of transactional information in counterintelligence investigations: three types of national security letters (under RFPA, ECPA, and FCRA),¹⁰² the FISA pen register/trap and trace authority, and the FISA business records authority. All of these authorities specified the types of records that could be obtained, and all the records specified were, according to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in *Miller*, outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment. All of the authorities required, in essence, that the information sought be relevant to an authorized counterintelligence investigation and that the FBI demonstrate “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe” that the investigative targets were foreign powers or agents thereof.

II. THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND SECTION 215

Much has already been written about the creation of the USA PATRIOT Act in the chaotic weeks following September 11, 2001.¹⁰³ The Bush

100. There is some hint of this argument in an FBI document released subsequent to passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. In it, speaking of USA PATRIOT Act §215 but possibly referring to the background of the 1998 FISA amendment as well, the FBI Office of the General Counsel wrote:

In the past, the FBI has encountered situations in which the holders of relevant records refused to produce them absent a subpoena or other compelling authority. When those records did not fit within the defined categories for National Security Letters or the four categories then defined in the FISA business records section, the FBI had no means of compelling production.

Communication from the FBI Office of the General Counsel to All Divisions, New Legislation, Revisions to FCI/IT Legal Authorities, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Oct. 26, 2001), attached to Letter from Assistant Attorney General Bryant to Senator Feingold (Dec. 23, 2002), available at <http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-fisa-patriot-122302c.pdf>.

101. See *supra* notes 42, 68.

102. Occasionally, a separate Title 50 authority granted to counterintelligence and security investigators also is referred to as “national security letter” authority. See 50 U.S.C. §436. However, it is beyond the scope of this discussion, because the authority is consent-based, and it applies only to executive branch employees who hold, or are seeking, a security clearance. *Id.*

103. The Act inspired a flood of notes, commentary, and symposia in the legal community. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Copeland, *War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the Lines of Intelligence Gathering in Post-September 11 America*, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, *Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn't*, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 607 (2003); Panel Discussion, *The USA-PATRIOT Act and the American Response to Terror: Can We Protect Civil Liberties After*

administration began developing a legislative proposal within days after the attacks.¹⁰⁴ Congress acted with great speed: the House version of the Act was introduced on October 2 and passed ten days later;¹⁰⁵ the Senate version was introduced on October 4 and passed in just seven days.¹⁰⁶ The final version of the Act was introduced on October 23, 2001, and was signed into law on October 26, 2001.¹⁰⁷ The end product is massive, running to 130 printed pages.¹⁰⁸

A very considerable portion of the Act is devoted to changes in criminal, immigration, and money laundering statutes.¹⁰⁹ Within the sections that affect counterintelligence authorities, the revisions to national security letter and related authorities are generally overshadowed by enhancements to the FISA search and surveillance provisions and new rules for information sharing.

The USA PATRIOT Act revisions to authorities governing counterintelligence access to transactional information are spread across three sections: §214 (“Pen register and trap and trace authority under FISA”), §215 (“Access to records and other items under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act”), and §505 (“Miscellaneous national security authorities”). The cumulative effect of these three sections is to make an across-the-board adjustment of the legal standard for access from “relevance” plus “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe” the target was a foreign power or an agent of one, to simple “relevance” to an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities (provided such an investigation of a U.S. person is not based solely on protected First

September 11?, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501 (2002); Symposium, *First Monday – Civil Liberties in a Post-9/11 World*, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (2002); Alison A. Bradley, Comment, *Extremism in the Defense of Liberty? The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Significance of the USA PATRIOT Act*, 77 TUL. L. REV. 465 (2002); Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, *Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001*, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933 (2002); Nathan C. Henderson, Note, *The Patriot Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications*, 52 DUKE L.J. 179 (2002); Jacob R. Lilly, Note, *National Security at What Price?: A Look into Civil Liberty Concerns in the Information Age Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and a Proposed Constitutional Test for Future Legislation*, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2003); Stephen D. Lobaugh, Note, *Congress’ Response to September 11: Liberty’s Protector*, 1 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2002); Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, *How the USA PATRIOT Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement Upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of “Intelligence” Investigations*, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651 (2002); Jeremy C. Smith, Comment, *The USA PATRIOT Act: Violating Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Protected by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing National Security*, 82 N.C. L. REV. 412 (2003).

104. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,991 (2001) (comments of Sen. Leahy on timing of legislation); 147 CONG. REC. S11,020-S11,021 (2001) (comments of Sen. Feingold on truncated legislative process).

105. H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. (2001).

106. S. 1510, 107th Cong. (2001).

107. H.R. 3162, 107th Cong., enacted as Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

108. See *id.*, 115 Stat. 272-402.

109. See *id.*

Amendment activity).¹¹⁰ Section 505 also lowers the signature authority for the three types of FBI national security letters from Deputy Assistant Director to Special Agent in Charge.¹¹¹ The apparent intent of Congress here was to make the legal standard for basic counterintelligence investigations analogous to that for the corresponding criminal investigations, a change viewed as appropriate in light of the evolving terrorist threat.¹¹² In a different section, the Act creates a broad new investigative authority by inserting language in the FCRA that compels consumer reporting agencies to furnish

a consumer report of a consumer and all other information in a consumer's file to a government agency authorized to conduct investigations of, intelligence or counterintelligence activities or analysis related to, international terrorism when presented with a

110. The wording of the new standard varies slightly depending on which statute is being amended. The FISA pen register/trap and trace provision requires a certification that "the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution." Pub. L. No. 107-56, §214(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 286 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §1842(c)(2)). The new ECPA language requires that the records sought be "relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Pub. L. No. 107-56, §505(a), 115 Stat. 272, 365 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2709(b)(1)-(2)). The new RFPA language requires that the information be "sought for foreign counter intelligence purposes to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Pub. L. No. 107-56, §505(b), 115 Stat. 272, 365-366 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §3414(a)(5)(A)). The new FCRA language requires a certification that the information is "sought for the conduct of an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Pub. L. No. 107-56, §505(c), 115 Stat. 272, 366 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1681u(a)-(c)).

111. Prior to 2001, only about ten FBI officials (mostly located in Washington, D.C.) were authorized to sign national security letters. This meant that agents seeking to use a letter had to submit the request and supporting materials through a long chain of approvals. Section 505 authorized "Special Agents in Charge," that is, heads of the FBI's fifty-six field offices, to sign national security letters. The change makes national security letters far more accessible to counterintelligence agents. *See generally* FBI Communication from General Counsel to All Field Offices, National Security Letter Matters (Nov. 28, 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/patriot_foia/FOIA/Nov2001FBImemo.pdf; and *see Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary*, 107th Cong. 57-58 (2001) (describing the delays caused by limited NSL signature authority prior to 2001), available at <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/75288.pdf>.

112. *See* 147 CONG. REC. S11,003 (2001) (comments of Sen. Leahy). In the absence of any Senate reports on the USA PATRIOT Act, Senator Leahy, as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, made extensive floor comments explaining the legislation. *See id.* at S10,990-S11,0015; *see also* 147 CONG. REC. S10,586 (2001) (comments of Sen. Hatch).

written certification by such government agency that such information is necessary for the agency's conduct of such investigation, activity, or analysis.¹¹³

Of the various revisions, those in §215 go farthest. Like the other counterintelligence authorities for transactional information, §215 incorporates the new "relevance" standard, but it lacks language limiting its application to specific types of records. Section 215 replaces the old "business records" authority in Title V of FISA with new language (*italics indicate changes made by the USA PATRIOT Act*):¹¹⁴

§1861. Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations

- (a) (1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an application for an order *requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.*
- (2) *An investigation conducted under this section shall –*
 - (A) *be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333 (or a successor order); and*
 - (B) *not be conducted of a United States person solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.*

113. See 15 U.S.C. §1681v. This extraordinary provision, which has attracted surprisingly little notice, was buried in the money laundering provisions of Title III of the Act. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, §358(g)(1)(B), 115 Stat. 272, 327-328 (2001). Unlike other national security letters, the authority is limited to international terrorism matters, but it extends to agencies other than the FBI. The language of the provision and its position in the Act suggest that it was developed in isolation from the other changes to counterintelligence authorities. The new authority, for example, is not noted in the FBI's initial summary of the USA PATRIOT Act changes. See *supra* note 100.

114. Unless otherwise noted, citations to USA PATRIOT Act §215 hereinafter are to its provisions as codified in the U.S. Code.

- (b) Each application under this section –
 - (1) shall be made to –
 - (A) a judge of the court established by section 103(a); or
 - (B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code, who is publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to hear applications and grant orders for the *production of tangible things* under this section on behalf of a judge of that court; and
 - (2) shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an *authorized investigation conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.*
- (c) (1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds that the application *meets* the requirements of this section.
- (2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose that it is issued for purposes of an investigation described in subsection (a).
- (d) No person shall disclose to any other person (other than those *persons necessary to produce the tangible things* under this section) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained *tangible things* under this section.
- (e) A person who, in good faith, produces tangible things under an order pursuant to this section shall not be liable to any other person for such production. Such production shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any other proceeding or context.

While the old language allowed the FBI to seek “an order authorizing a common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility to release records in its possession,”¹¹⁵ the new section allows an order requiring the production of “any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items).”¹¹⁶ The new language, like the new national security letter language, includes the caveat that the material sought must be “for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis

115. Pub. L. No. 105-272, §602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411 (1998).

116. 50 U.S.C. §1861(a)(1).

of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.”¹¹⁷ A new paragraph curiously repeats the First Amendment constraint from the preceding paragraph.¹¹⁸ The old standard that there be “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power” is replaced by a specification that the records sought be for an “authorized investigation,” as defined in an earlier paragraph.¹¹⁹ There are no changes to the role of the court (“the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested”), and the changes to the non-disclosure language simply recognize the broader scope of the records sought.¹²⁰ Section 215 adds a “good faith” defense against civil liability for those who comply with the orders, and it specifies that production shall not be deemed a waiver of privileges in other proceedings or contexts.¹²¹ The congressional notification requirements are substantially unchanged.¹²²

Unfortunately, there is very little in the way of legislative history for §215. The provision appeared in the House version of the USA PATRIOT Act,¹²³ but its substance is discussed neither in the House report nor in any floor debate.¹²⁴ The one fact that emerges from the House materials is that §215 was a substitute for “administrative subpoena” authority that the government had originally sought.¹²⁵ The Senate record is even less illuminating, consisting only of transcripts of two floor debates.¹²⁶ However, the Senate debated an amendment to §215 offered by Senator Feingold which, though defeated, raised key criticisms that served to shape the subsequent public debate.¹²⁷

Public criticism of the USA PATRIOT Act began almost immediately, with expressions of concern over the speed with which the legislation was produced and the lack of public hearings.¹²⁸ Some members of Congress suggested that the Administration, and particularly the Attorney General, were exploiting the chaotic post-9/11 environment to accomplish a dramatic expansion of executive branch authority.¹²⁹ Although criticism of the Act in general, and of §215 in particular, has proliferated since passage, the key issues remain those first identified in the Senate debates surrounding the

117. *Id.*

118. *Id.* §1861(a)(2).

119. *Id.* §1861(b)(2).

120. *Id.* §1861(c)-(d).

121. *Id.* §1861(e).

122. *Id.* §1862.

123. See H.R. 2975, §156, 107th Cong. (2001).

124. As legislative history, the House published a nearly 300-page transcript of the mark-up session for H.R. 2795, along with related documents. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-236 (Part I) (2001).

125. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-236 (Part I), at 61.

126. A debate on October 11, 2001, addressed the Senate version of the Act (S. 1510). 147 CONG. REC. S10,547-S10,630. Another on October 25, 2001, considered the final version of the Act (H.R. 3162). 147 CONG. REC. S10,990-S11,059.

127. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,583-S10,586 (2001).

128. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,585 (2001) (comments of Sen. Cantwell); *supra* note 104.

129. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H6,762-H6,763 (2001) (comments of Rep. Waters).

Feingold amendment.¹³⁰ There are three general criticisms: (1) §215 violates the Fourth Amendment and/or various statutory protections because it allows the government to compel production of personal information without a showing of probable cause; (2) §215 is impermissibly broad, in that it allows the FBI access to information about innocent third parties upon a showing of mere relevance to an investigation; and (3) there is no effective oversight of the use of §215.

The broad scope of the “any tangible things” language prompted charges that the section violates the Fourth Amendment by “not requir[ing] the government to get a warrant or establish probable cause” before it demands “personal records or belongings” and by failing to satisfy the notice requirements of the Fourth Amendment.¹³¹ In somewhat more muted terms, Senator Feingold emphasized the way the provision overrides state and federal laws that protect records “containing sensitive personal information such as medical records from hospitals or doctors, or educational records, or records of what books somebody has taken out of the library.”¹³²

Library records have emerged as the most controversial example of “tangible things” covered by §215, especially since government access to them seems to raise state law, First Amendment, and Fourth Amendment issues.¹³³ Library and bookseller associations are probably now the most aggressive opponents of §215, with the libraries motivated, in part, by their historical experience with FBI counterintelligence operations.¹³⁴ Not all of their legal arguments withstand a closer look, however. For example, the

130. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,583-S10,586 (2001) (debate on Sen. Feingold’s proposed amendment to §215). After his amendment was rejected, Senator Feingold reiterated his concerns during the final Senate debate on the Act. See 147 CONG. REC. S11,019-S11,023 (2001). Senator Feingold was the only member of the Senate to vote against passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. Reports prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union subsequent to the passage of the Act incorporate and expand upon Senator Feingold’s criticisms of §215. See Beeson & Jaffer, *supra* note 3.

131. See Beeson & Jaffer, *supra* note 3, at 7.

132. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,583-S10,584 (2001).

133. There is an extensive collection of legal pleadings, articles, and documents relating to §215 and libraries available on the American Library Association Web site, <http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/ifissues/fbiyourlibrary.htm>. See also Anne Klinefelter, *The Role of Librarians in Challenges to the USA PATRIOT Act*, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 219 (2004); Kathryn Martin, Note, *The USA PATRIOT Act’s Application to Library Patron Records*, 29 J. Legis. 283 (2003).

134. During the Cold War, the FBI established a counterintelligence program known as the “Library Awareness Program.” FBI agents visited libraries (particularly technical and academic libraries) for the purpose of monitoring foreign intelligence officers who were exploiting open source information from library collections. FBI counterintelligence agents attempted to recruit library staff to monitor and report on “suspicious” activities by library patrons. FBI agents also sought library circulation records and other materials. When the program came to light, there was widespread opposition to it. Litigation and congressional inquiries followed and persisted into the 1980s. Despite several attempts to craft legislation to address the issues raised by this episode, Congress never enacted a federal statute protecting library records. See generally HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, *SURVEILLANCE IN THE STACKS: THE FBI’S LIBRARY AWARENESS PROGRAM* (1991).

claim that library patron records are protected by the Fourth Amendment is not convincing, even to sympathetic commentators.¹³⁵ Rather, library patron records fall squarely into the category identified in *United States v. Miller*, that is, information that ceases to be a person's "private papers" by virtue of its being handed over to a third party who may convey it to the government.¹³⁶ The Justice Department certainly espoused this view, arguing that "[a]ny right of privacy possessed by library and bookstore patrons in such information is necessarily and inherently limited since, by the nature of these transactions, the patron is reposing that information in the library or bookstore and assumes the risk that the entity may disclose it to another."¹³⁷ Indeed, this same view was expressed in the congressional debate on the USA PATRIOT Act.¹³⁸

The controversy over library records might not be nearly so acrimonious if the First and Fourth Amendment issues could be addressed by separating the names of borrowers from the titles (and by inference from the contents) of the books they borrow. Such "anonymization" of personal reading habits might be required if §215 provided access only to purely transactional information. Thus, information that would identify a library borrower, such as name and address, would be held strictly apart from a book's title. Only if intelligence analysts subsequently linked either the book or the borrower to a credible threat would the two kinds of data be re-associated, perhaps with the approval of a neutral magistrate. Given that §215 was clearly part of a set of parallel revisions to all FBI counterintelligence authorities for access to transactional information (national security letters, pen register/trap and trace, and business records), it seems reasonable to conclude that Congress saw §215 as applying only to transactional information that is not subject to constitutional protections. The limitation of §215 to transactional records also would be consistent with the historical development of FBI counterintelligence authorities sketched out in Part I.

Whatever the intention of Congress or the understanding of the executive branch, however, there is no indication in the language of §215 that it is so limited. The lack of clarity about this point has created significant confusion. The FBI, for example, notes the uncertain scope of §215 (and the problem of library records) in its legal instructions to FBI agents on the use of §215 authority.¹³⁹ In this respect, §215 parts company with the other "transactional" counterintelligence authorities, all of which specify the data to which they

135. See Klinefelter, *supra* note 133, at 225-226. But see Martin, *supra* note 133.

136. *United States v. Miller*, 425 U.S. 435, 440-442 (1976).

137. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Bryant to Senator Leahy (Dec. 23, 2002), encl. at 2, available at <http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-fisa-patriot-122302b.pdf>.

138. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,993 (2001) (comments of Sen. Leahy) (the Fourth Amendment "does not normally apply" to techniques such as the FISA pen register and access to records authority).

139. FBI Memorandum from General Counsel to All Field Offices, Business Records Orders Under 50 U.S.C. §1861 (Oct. 29, 2003), at 3, available at http://www.aclu.org/patriot_foia/2003/FBImemo_102903.pdf.

apply, either explicitly or by their incorporation into the very statutes that protect the information at issue.¹⁴⁰

How did this departure from the established pattern of clear limitation to transactional information occur? I suggest that a clue is to be found in Congress's rejection of the Administration's proposal for "administrative subpoena" authority to obtain business records.¹⁴¹ Congress rejected that proposal in favor of the §215 language, apparently concluding that the requirement of a court order in §215 was more protective of privacy interests.¹⁴² In the process it may have felt that the involvement of a neutral magistrate made a limitation on the type of information less important. There are, however, some hints in the text of §215 that elements of the "administrative subpoena" proposal were simply inserted into the existing FISA business records provision. For example, the phrase "production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)"¹⁴³ closely tracks language in the Attorney General's administrative subpoena authority for use in drug investigations, which requires "production of any records (including books, papers, documents, and other tangible things)."¹⁴⁴ If so, Congress might have thought it was prescribing the kind of limited scope found in the administrative subpoena authorities.

Whatever the provenance of the §215 text, abandonment of the administrative subpoena option foreclosed one proven path to securing constitutionally permissible access. Administrative subpoenas have long been available to executive branch agencies, and they now exist in at least 335

140. See 12 U.S.C. §3414(a)(5)(A) (specifying "financial records"); 18 U.S.C. §2709(a) ("subscriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic communication transactional records"); 15 U.S.C. §1681u(a)-(b) ("identity of financial institutions" and "identifying information"); 50 U.S.C. §1842(a) ("pen register" and "trap and trace" information); Pub. L. No. 105-272, §602 (specifying records of "common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility").

141. The text of the Administration's legislative proposals is not publicly available, but it is described by various references in the legislative history and congressional debates. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 107-236 (Part I), at 61. In addition, a "Consultation Draft" containing a version of the Administration's proposal appears in materials prepared by the House Judiciary Committee. See *Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001*, *supra* note 111, at 45-90. The Consultation Draft includes a proposed amendment to FISA that would have replaced the old business records authority with language allowing the Attorney General to require the production of any tangible things "by administrative subpoena." *Id.* at 74.

142. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,586 (2001) (comments of Sen. Hatch).

143. 50 U.S.C. §1861(a)(1).

144. 21 U.S.C. §876(a). Section 876 subpoenas are commonly used by the DEA and FBI, and they would serve as a logical model for a counterintelligence administrative subpoena. In the Consultation Draft prepared for the House Judiciary Committee, §876 is identified as the "model" for the Administration's business records proposal, although the draft language provided is less detailed than that found in §876. See *Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001*, *supra* note 111, at 57, 74. Following enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, a bill creating an administrative subpoena in terrorism matters (modeled explicitly on 21 U.S.C. §876) was introduced in the House but not passed. See Antiterrorism Tools Enhancements Act of 2003, H.R. 3037, 108th Cong., §3.

different forms.¹⁴⁵ There is a substantial body of case law approving the use of administrative subpoenas, including Supreme Court decisions establishing general standards.¹⁴⁶ A key feature of administrative subpoena authority is its bifurcation of the authority to issue (held by the agency) and the authority to enforce (held by a court).¹⁴⁷ This arrangement may facilitate testing the proper scope of a particular subpoena authority in court (provided the target whose records are obtained is given notice), especially if the authority is applied in a novel or controversial context.¹⁴⁸ Despite the diversity of administrative subpoena authorities, moreover, the distinct enforcement role of the courts, coupled with internal agency guidelines on subpoena use, dissemination of information, and compliance with other privacy or notice requirements, are effective mechanisms to police the use of administrative subpoena authority.¹⁴⁹

Unlike authorities for administrative subpoenas, national security letter authorities do not include explicit enforcement mechanisms.¹⁵⁰ If the recipient of a national security letter refuses to comply, the government must approach a federal court for enforcement.¹⁵¹ There are no reported decisions indicating that this has occurred, but if it did happen, the court could draw on existing administrative subpoena case law to resolve questions of scope and proper use.¹⁵²

145. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, *Report to Congress on the Use of Administrative Subpoena Authorities by Executive Branch Agencies and Entities* 4-5 (May 13, 2002), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/>.

146. See, e.g., *United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank*, 437 U.S. 298, 313 (1978); *United States v. Powell*, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964); *Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling*, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).

147. See *Report to Congress on the Use of Administrative Subpoena Authorities*, *supra* note 145, at 7-14.

148. See *id.*; see also, e.g., *In re Sealed Case (Administrative Subpoena)*, 42 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing the limits placed on an administrative subpoena by relevance and investigatory purpose).

149. See *Report to Congress on the Use of Administrative Subpoena Authorities*, *supra* note 145, at 5, 9-25 (discussing standards for enforcement, dissemination, and notice relevant to various administrative subpoena authorities).

150. Compare 21 U.S.C. §876(c) (providing for judicial enforcement of administrative subpoenas) with 12 U.S.C. §3414(a)(5), 18 U.S.C. §2709, and 15 U.S.C. §1681u (making no provision for judicial enforcement of national security letters).

151. But cf. *Doe v. Ashcroft*, *supra* note 69, at 47-51 (discussing the absence of a clear enforcement mechanism for national security letters). Despite the counterintelligence context, the FBI could not seek the aid of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, since that court's jurisdiction is limited to considering applications made pursuant to the FISA. See 50 U.S.C. §§1803(a), 1822(c).

152. There are several factors that may explain the lack of national security letter enforcement cases. Since the national security letter authorities specify the data to which they apply, and since they are directed to entities accustomed to receiving legal process (financial institutions, credit bureaus, communications providers), there may have been little occasion for controversy over the scope or application of the authority. It could also be the case that the FBI simply does not pursue enforcement in order to avoid any risk of compromising ongoing counterintelligence operations through litigation in federal courts. This situation could change as national security letter authorities are applied to a wider range of entities. See *Intelligence*

In contrast to the administrative subpoena authority sought by the Administration, the language of §215 seems to rule out an easy test of its scope. Under §215 a records custodian immediately receives a FISA Court order to provide government access to “tangible things,” so failure to comply does not trigger an enforcement proceeding, but instead places the recipient in peril of being held in contempt.¹⁵³

The second major criticism of §215 concerns the movement from the standard of “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe” that the target is an agent of a foreign power to a standard of “relevance to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”¹⁵⁴ Critics charge that this change gives the FBI too much authority, allowing the Bureau to conduct “fishing expeditions” by seeking the records of people who are not actual targets of an investigation.¹⁵⁵ Some of these critics illustrate their point with hypotheticals based on imagined applications of the section.¹⁵⁶

It is undeniable, of course, that the USA PATRIOT Act lowered the standards for counterintelligence collections. This change was carefully considered, however, and it apparently was influenced by the FBI’s supply of examples from actual operations. Even Senator Patrick Leahy, who is generally suspicious of expanded FBI authorities,¹⁵⁷ found that the “FBI has made a clear case that a relevance standard is appropriate for counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations, as well as for criminal investigations.”¹⁵⁸ Other members echoed the idea that counterintelligence agents pursuing terrorists should have tools at least as readily available as those open to criminal investigators.¹⁵⁹

There are two additional considerations relevant to this criticism. First, the more strident critics assume that the government, in the interest of

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-177, §374, 117 Stat. 2599, 2628 (2003) (expanding the definition of “financial institutions” to which the RFPA national security letter authority applies). While it is not an enforcement case *per se*, *Doe v. Ashcroft*, *supra* note 69, contains a lengthy discussion of issues surrounding the enforcement of national security letters. *Id.* at 45-83. The holding that ECPA national security letters are unconstitutional rests, in part, on the lack of any clear procedural protections or review mechanism for this authority. *Id.* at 118-119.

153. The court would have the power to punish the contempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §401 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Concerning the possibility of civil disobedience, see Klinefelter, *supra* note 133, at 226.

154. Compare Pub. L. No. 105-272, §602 with 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2).

155. See Beeson & Jaffer, *supra* note 3, at 1-3; see also 147 CONG. REC. S10,583-S10,584, S11,022 (2001) (comments of Sen. Feingold).

156. See, e.g., Beeson & Jaffer, *supra* note 3, at 1.

157. Senator Leahy prefaced his introduction of the USA PATRIOT Act with a lengthy recitation of counterintelligence abuses dating back to the 1960s and 1970s, 147 CONG. REC. S10,992-S10,994 (2001), and he referred at one point to J. Edgar Hoover’s “totalitarian control” of the FBI. 147 CONG. REC. S11,015 (2001).

158. 147 CONG. REC. S10,557 (2001).

159. See *supra* note 112.

unjustified “fishing expeditions,” would be willing to collect information on innocent people not truly “relevant” to any authorized investigation.¹⁶⁰ If this were true, however, the pre-USA PATRIOT Act standard offered no greater protection. The old version of the FISA business records authority did not require the court to find that there were “specific and articulable” facts; the government simply had to present a certification that “specific and articulable” facts existed.¹⁶¹ Unlike a FISA court judge considering an application for an electronic surveillance or physical search, the judge considering a business records application was not required to examine the facts supporting the government’s certification.¹⁶² For counterintelligence access to transactional information, both before and after the USA PATRIOT Act, the determination of whether the legal standard (“specific and articulable facts” before the Act, or “relevance” after) has been met rests solely with the FBI.

Second, the permissiveness of the new “relevance” standard in allowing the collection of information about persons who are not the targets of investigations is not necessarily a dramatic departure from the pre-USA PATRIOT Act environment. The FCRA and ECPA national security letters,¹⁶³ as well as the FISA pen register/trap and trace authority,¹⁶⁴ allowed some collection on persons who were merely in communication with targets that met the “specific and articulable” standard. The relevance standard does, of course, broaden the scope of the collection (and the persons subject to it),¹⁶⁵ but its adoption is consistent with the general intention to make counterintelligence authorities comparable to criminal investigative ones.

It may be argued that the value of pre-USA PATRIOT Act authorities as investigative tools was unduly limited by the constraints on their availability. A clear goal of counterintelligence is to identify spies and international terrorists. If an investigator has specific and articulable facts that a target is an international terrorist, she has already achieved that goal. The authorities that incorporated the “specific and articulable” standard were useful to help

160. See Beeson & Jaffer, *supra* note 3, at 1.

161. Pub. L. No. 105-272, §602.

162. Compare 50 U.S.C. §§1805(a), 1824(a) (judge shall enter an order authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search if the judge finds that the relevant factual standards have been met) with Pub. L. No. 105-272, §602 (judge shall enter an order if the FBI application contains the required certification that “specific and articulable facts” exist).

163. Pub. L. No. 104-93, §601, 109 Stat. 961, 974-975 (1996) (authorizing use of FCRA national security letter to collect information on person who “has been, or is about to be, in contact with a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”); Pub. L. No. 103-142, §1, 107 Stat. 1491, 1491-1492 (1993) (authorizing use of ECPA national security letters to collect information on certain persons “in communication” with a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power).

164. See Pub. L. No. 105-272, §601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2406 (1998) (authorizing collection of pen register/trap and trace data on a communication instrument that “has been used or is about to be used in communication with” a foreign power or agent of a foreign power).

165. The new standard apparently would allow collection on persons who were relevant to the investigation but who were not necessarily in communication with the agent of a foreign power.

build “probable cause” to conduct a search or electronic surveillance of an identified target, but they did not help in the perhaps more pressing task of sorting through the target’s associates to determine whether others were involved in the terrorist activity. Criminal investigators also perform this task, but they have access to compulsory legal process (grand jury or administrative subpoenas) to obtain relevant investigative information.¹⁶⁶ While it may appear that counterintelligence agents operated successfully under such conditions for the twenty years prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, there is a growing consensus that, whatever the FBI’s capacity to deal with traditional intelligence and espionage threats, it was not properly equipped to meet the counterterrorism challenges of the late 1990s.¹⁶⁷

The third major criticism of §215 is that it lacks effective oversight for the exercise of such an expansive power, in the form of judicial approval, executive branch or congressional review, or notice to surveillance targets. Critics claim that although exercise of the power requires a court order, the judge has no meaningful discretion in considering a §215 application. While the plain language of §215 directs the judge to issue the business records order if the judge finds “that the application meets the requirements” of the section,¹⁶⁸ the only “requirement” (aside from making the application to a FISA judge or a specially designated magistrate)¹⁶⁹ is that the application specify that “the records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation.”¹⁷⁰ The language describing the judge’s role is essentially the same as that found in FISA’s pen register/trap and trace provisions (both the pre- and post-USA PATRIOT Act versions),¹⁷¹ which appear to be derived from the criminal pen register statute.¹⁷² The Justice Department has made statements implying that the court does exercise some discretion, but it points to no support for this proposition.¹⁷³ In the context of criminal pen registers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has found that the limited judicial review of a pen register request does not render the statute

166. The standard for a grand jury subpoena is not probable cause but relevance to a criminal investigation. Moreover, the relevance standard applied in the context of grand jury subpoenas is very broad. See *United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc.*, 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (subpoenas are not irrelevant if there is any reasonable possibility that they will produce information relevant to the general subject of the investigation).

167. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, *supra* note 24, at 263-277, 350-360.

168. 50 U.S.C. §1861(c)(1).

169. *Id.* §1861(b)(1). There is no indication that the Chief Justice has ever designated a magistrate as permitted by §1861(b)(1)(B).

170. *Id.* §1861(b)(2).

171. *Id.* §1842(d)(1).

172. 18 U.S.C. §3123(a).

173. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Bryant to Senator Leahy (Dec. 23, 2002), encl. at 3, available at <http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-fisa-patriot-122302.pdf> (“The FISA Court will not order the production of business records unless it can be shown that the individual for whom the records are being sought is related to an authorized investigation.”) (emphasis in original).

unconstitutional.¹⁷⁴ The Court recognized, but did not decide, the question of whether, despite the language of the statute, the reviewing court could inquire into “the government’s factual basis for believing” that the request is relevant.¹⁷⁵ The criticism of §215 on this point remains valid: the practical nature of the FISA court judge’s review of a business records application remains uncertain, as does the propriety of the standard of review, in light of the broad scope of §215 authority.

The oversight criticism also manifests itself in concern over what constitutes an “investigation.” Some commentators imply that the FBI can initiate investigations at will and that it can use such investigations as a pretext to “go fishing” in the great pool of personal information.¹⁷⁶ Such criticisms often ignore, or discount the effect of, the regulations applicable to counterintelligence activities. The FBI is only authorized to conduct counterintelligence in compliance with regulations established by the Attorney General.¹⁷⁷ Those regulations, in the form of guidelines, limit the subject matter of investigations,¹⁷⁸ set standards for the various levels of investigation,¹⁷⁹ and require that investigations be conducted in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.¹⁸⁰ The guidelines also require extensive reporting of FBI counterintelligence activities to oversight components within the Justice Department.¹⁸¹ By executive order, the FBI and Justice Department also must report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, which has the authority to review intelligence activities and guidelines.¹⁸²

174. *United States v. Hallmark*, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990). The decision rested, at least in part, on the holding that pen register data are not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. *See id.*, citing *Smith v. Maryland*, 442 U.S. 735, 739-746 (1979).

175. *Hallmark*, 911 F.2d at 402 n.3.

176. *See supra* note 155.

177. Exec. Order No. 12,333, *supra* note 12, at §1.14

178. *See* NSI Guidelines, *supra* note 17, at 6-7 (authorizing investigations to protect against defined threats to the national security).

179. *See id.* at 3. The Guidelines authorize three levels of investigative activity: threat assessments, preliminary investigations, and full investigations. The specific standards for initiating each level of investigation remain classified. *See id.* at 11-17.

180. The Guidelines provide in part:

These Guidelines do not authorize investigating or maintaining information on United States persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Rather, all activities under these Guidelines must have a valid purpose consistent with these Guidelines, and must be carried out in conformity with the Constitution and all applicable statutes, executive orders, Department of Justice regulations and policies, and Attorney General guidelines.

Id. at 7-8.

181. *See id.* at 14 (reporting of preliminary and full investigations), 17 (periodic summaries of full investigations), 25-27 (reporting of all information relevant to national security threats or crimes).

182. Executive Order No. 12,863 requires the reporting of intelligence activities that violate any executive orders or presidential directives to the Intelligence Oversight Board, an independent body reporting to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. *See* Exec.

Matters relating to FBI misconduct in counterintelligence activities are subject to investigation by the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility¹⁸³ and by the Inspector General of the Justice Department.¹⁸⁴ All FISA authorities and all national security letter authorities contain a congressional reporting requirement and fall within the oversight of the House and Senate intelligence committees.¹⁸⁵ Despite common perceptions, therefore, FBI counterintelligence actually functions within a highly regulated environment,¹⁸⁶ and the language of §215 explicitly invokes such oversight.¹⁸⁷

Another criticism concerns the lack in §215 of a requirement for notice to the individual whose records have been obtained. Without knowledge of the government's actions, the individual cannot challenge the legality of those actions, nor can the individual resist the further use or dissemination of records obtained.¹⁸⁸ Notice is not constitutionally required, however, where the government is obtaining information about a person from a third party outside the context of a criminal proceeding.¹⁸⁹ There is also a broad policy reason for secrecy, and this is reflected in the integration of non-disclosure provisions into all counterintelligence legal authorities.¹⁹⁰ Unlike criminal

Order No. 12,863, §2.4, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,441 (1993).

183. Attorney General Order No. 1931-94, *Jurisdiction for Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct by Department of Justice Employees*, Nov. 8, 1994, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/agencymisconducta.htm>; see also Letter from Asst. Attorney General Bryant to Senator Leahy (Dec. 23, 2002), *supra* note 173, encl. at 3 (referring to investigation of a FISA matter by the Office of Professional Responsibility).

184. In particular, §1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act requires the Inspector General to report to Congress on any abuses of civil rights and civil liberties by Department of Justice employees (including the FBI). See Pub. L. No. 107-56, §1001, 115 Stat. 272, 391. A collection of these reports is available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/>.

185. See 12 U.S.C. §3414(a)(5)(C) (RFP national security letter); 15 U.S.C. §1681u(h) (FCRA national security letter); 18 U.S.C. §2709(e) (ECPA national security letter); 50 U.S.C. §§1808, 1826, 1846, 1862 (FISA electronic surveillance, physical search, pen register, and business records authorities).

186. This "highly regulated environment" has been in place since the late 1970s. When referring to FBI counterintelligence abuses, critics frequently cite examples from the 1960s and early 1970s. See *supra* note 157 (comments of Sen. Leahy); Beeson & Jaffer, *supra* note 3, at 9-11. Senator Leahy, referring to Exec. Order No. 12,333 and the Attorney General's Guidelines, noted the effect of the regulatory environment. 147 CONG. REC. S10,993 (2001) ("These guidelines and procedures have served for the past 25 years as a stable framework that, with rare exceptions, has not allowed previous abuses to recur.").

187. See 50 U.S.C. §1861(a)(2)(A) (investigations must "be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333 (or a successor order)").

188. See Beeson & Jaffer, *supra* note 3, at 8.

189. See *Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 735, 741-744 (1984).

190. See 12 U.S.C. §3414(a)(5)(D) (RFP national security letter); 15 U.S.C. §1681u(d) (FCRA national security letter); 18 U.S.C. §2709(c) (ECPA national security letter), and 50 U.S.C. §§1805(c)(2)(B)-(C), 1824(c)(2)(B)-(C), 1842(d)(2)(B), 1861(d) (FISA electronic surveillance, physical search, pen register, and business records authorities). The non-disclosure provisions of the ECPA national security letter were recently held unconstitutional in *Doe v. Ashcroft*, *supra* note 69, a decision which, if upheld, would have significant implications for all the national security letter authorities cited here.

investigations, where the existence of the investigation is often known publicly, or it is widely presumed since it follows a criminal act, counterintelligence operations typically cease to exist when they are revealed.¹⁹¹ The goal of counterintelligence is to detect and monitor the activities of the foreign power or its agent without the knowledge of the foreign power. If the counterintelligence operation is revealed, the government typically turns to overt tools like criminal investigations and prosecutions, immigration proceedings, administrative processes, or diplomatic activity to respond to a threat.

Secrecy has been recognized as essential since the very beginning of American intelligence operations.¹⁹² In many respects, the regulatory scheme governing counterintelligence, the higher legal standards for counterintelligence authorities, and even the “wall” separating intelligence and criminal law enforcement have all functioned to counter-balance and contain a tendency toward excessive secrecy in this area. The USA PATRIOT Act alters some of these constraints by lowering the legal standards for transactional information authorities and by largely dismantling the “wall.” It should certainly prompt a re-examination of some secrecy provisions. However, the operational and policy concerns that consistently tipped the balance in favor of secrecy, even during the counterintelligence reforms of the 1970s, are even more pressing in the post-9/11 environment.

My goal in Section II has not been to defend §215 against its critics, but rather to place those criticisms within the larger context of the counterintelligence legal authorities and the evolution of access to transactional information. The review of history in Section I and this contextualization in Section II are intended to better inform the revision of §215 proposed below.

III. REVISING SECTION 215

Within the next year, Congress will have to decide whether or not to retain §215 (along with other parts of the USA PATRIOT Act) in its present form. The sunset clause of the Act was intended to give Congress a chance to re-

191. In enacting the non-disclosure provisions for counterintelligence authorities, Congress appeared to accept this as axiomatic. *See, e.g.*, H.R. REP. NO. 99-690(I), at 15 (“The FBI could not effectively monitor and counter the clandestine activities of hostile espionage agents and terrorists if they had to be notified that the FBI sought their financial records for a counterintelligence investigation.”).

192. In often-quoted directions to some of the first American intelligence operatives, George Washington wrote: “All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue.” Letter to Elias Dayton, July 26, 1777, *reprinted in 8 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799* (John C. Kirkpatrick ed., 1931-1944), available at <http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/WasFi08.html>.

evaluate the necessity of these expanded authorities.¹⁹³ In the case of §215, it appears that Congress will have very little operational data upon which to base its decision.¹⁹⁴ The FBI and Justice Department will doubtless continue to insist that the capability provided by §215 is necessary, even if it is rarely employed. Critics of the Act will argue that the potential for abuse is so great that it should be eliminated or severely curtailed. Both sides begin from sound premises. The nature of the terrorist threat demands that our counterintelligence legal tools be effective, flexible, and readily available. However, these tools also represent compulsory, secret government access to personal information, and therefore they should be available only under conditions that minimize their potential for abuse.

I suggest that by drawing from the evolution of these tools and other counterintelligence authorities over time, §215 can be revised to accommodate the concerns of both sides. I make two assumptions in proposing these revisions. First, I assume that the FBI will continue to have an actual need for the general capability to compel production of transactional information, beyond that already provided for in national security letter and FISA pen register authorities. Some might argue that the USA PATRIOT Act's near-complete demolition of the "wall" between counterintelligence and criminal investigations renders the "business records" authority entirely unnecessary. Now that sharing of grand jury information with the intelligence community is permitted, it could be said, counterintelligence agents who encounter the need for business records can simply use grand jury subpoenas to obtain them. I find that view unconvincing for several reasons. Although the USA PATRIOT Act permits the sharing of grand jury information under certain circumstances, it does not compel it.¹⁹⁵ The availability of a grand jury also depends upon the existence of an open criminal investigation; counterintelligence operations address many situations in which there is not yet sufficient indication of criminal activity to open such an investigation.¹⁹⁶ Finally, although the grand jury sharing provision in the USA PATRIOT Act

193. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,991-S10,992 (2001).

194. See *supra* note 6. Although it is possible that the FBI has used §215 since September 18, 2003, the fact that the FBI made no use of the authority in the two years immediately following the September 11 attacks (presumably a period of high investigative activity) is telling.

195. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, §203(a) (codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)). Furthermore, sharing of the most sensitive grand jury information (that identifying U.S. persons) occurs only pursuant to guidelines issued by the Attorney General. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, §203(c). These guidelines, finally issued by the Attorney General on September 23, 2002, allow prosecutors to place use restrictions on the information shared and to seek modifications of the guidelines for "exigent or unusual circumstances." See Memorandum from the Attorney General, Guidelines for Disclosure of Grand Jury and Electronic, Wire, and Oral Interception Information Identifying United States Persons (Sept. 23, 2002), at 3, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/section203.pdf>.

196. See U.S. Attorney's Manual, §§9-11.010 to 9-11.120 (Sept. 1997) (describing functions and limitations of the grand jury), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/.

is not subject to sunset, several other provisions critical to the removal of the “wall” are.¹⁹⁷ If they are altered or allowed to expire, the availability of criminal tools to counterintelligence agents could change radically.

My second assumption is that the §215 business records authority rarely will be used. If the authority is properly limited to transactional information, the need to invoke it should be uncommon. The most useful, and therefore frequently sought, types of transactional information are already available to the FBI through the more accessible national security letter authorities. A great deal of the remaining transactional information is subject to no legal protection at all, and it can be provided voluntarily.¹⁹⁸ The compulsory authority will therefore be used only when the operation of some other law, concern over civil liability, or the resistance of the records custodian prevents voluntary production. Since that authority likely will be used infrequently, creation of a more demanding process for the government could be assumed to have a relatively minor impact on operations.

My first revision to the business records authority would be to limit its application to transactional records that are truly relevant to authorized investigations. This could be accomplished by amending §1861(b)(2) and (c)(1) as follows (proposed new language in *italics*):

- (b) Each application under this section – . . .
 - (2) shall *recite facts demonstrating* that the records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.
- (c) (1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, the judge shall enter an *ex parte* order as requested, or as modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds
 - (A) *that the records sought are relevant to an authorized investigation conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2),*
 - and*
 - (B) *that the records sought are not subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and are not otherwise protected from disclosure to the FBI by the laws of the United States.*

This revision would improve the statute in several ways. First, it would restrict the application of the authority to genuinely transactional records. Second, it would establish the authority of the FISA judge considering an application to assure compliance with the legal standard. Finally, the language

197. Section 218, which added the “significant purpose” language to FISA, is subject to the sunset provision. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§218, 224(a); *supra* note 24.

198. The FBI apparently has sought library records by voluntary production. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Bryant to Senator Leahy, *supra* note 173, encl. at 2.

would accommodate other statutes controlling the privacy of particular types of information. Should Congress decide to protect library records specifically, or any body of transactional information, the business records authority could continue to function. Similarly, the language would not require alteration should the Supreme Court revisit *Miller* or otherwise modify the notion of transactional information. This new language would alleviate concerns over the scope of the authority and over the expansiveness of the “relevance” standard. The court would be in a position to detect and terminate unwarranted “fishing expeditions.” Decisions of the FISA judge on these applications would be subject to review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review established in §103(b) of FISA, thus allowing further refinement of the legal standard.

My second revision would address the question of notice to the person to whom the information pertains. While the counterintelligence value of the authority would vanish if notice were commonly required, there is precedent for giving the affected person notice when the government uses the information for a purpose other than counterintelligence. The other three FISA-based counterintelligence authorities (electronic surveillance, physical search, and pen register/trap and trace) all contain provisions restricting the use and dissemination of information gained through the FISA authority,¹⁹⁹ requiring notice to the person affected if the government intends to “enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States” information so obtained,²⁰⁰ and giving the aggrieved party a specific procedure through which to challenge the use of the information in a criminal proceeding.²⁰¹ The text of these provisions could easily be inserted into the business records section, with the phrase “business records order” replacing the phrase “pen register or trap and trace device” throughout. This change would defuse some of the criticism over notice, and it would allow for the development of additional case law as application of the authority was examined in the criminal courts.²⁰²

199. 50 U.S.C. §§1806 (electronic surveillance), 1825 (physical search), 1845 (pen register/trap and trace).

200. This language, found in the pen register section, 50 U.S.C. §1845(c), is typical.

201. The procedure is designed to afford the government an opportunity to protect sensitive national security information while allowing the defendant to challenge the legality of the particular application of the FISA authority. *See, e.g.*, 50 U.S.C. §1845(e)-(h).

202. The notice and challenge provisions for FISA pen registers (50 U.S.C. §1845) have yet to be examined in the context of a criminal case, but the analogous provisions for FISA electronic surveillance (§1806) have been. *See United States v. Isa*, 923 F.2d 1300, 1305-1307 (8th Cir. 1991); *United States v. Badia*, 827 F.2d 1458, 1462-1464 (11th Cir. 1987); *United States v. Ott*, 827 F.2d 473, 475-477 (9th Cir. 1987); *In re Kevork*, 788 F.2d 566, 568-571 (9th Cir. 1986); *United States v. Belfield*, 692 F.2d 141, 143-149 (D.C. Cir. 1982); *United States v. Megahey*, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1193-1194, 1196-1197 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), *aff'd sub nom. United States v. Duggan*, 743 F.2d 59 (2nd Cir. 1984); *United States v. Falvey*, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1315-1316 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).

These two revisions, if adopted, would place §215 more firmly in the tradition of carefully circumscribed counterintelligence authorities. Like national security letters and the FISA pen register authority, the scope of §215 authority would then be defined as limited to transactional materials. The definition, of course, would be dynamic, shaped by the action of the courts. The authority therefore could remain flexible, while concerns about its application to protected data would be removed. The revisions would also maintain the principle that the use of counterintelligence authorities calls for greater control than does application of analogous criminal investigatory approaches. The revised authority would function at roughly the legal standard of the grand jury subpoena, but with direct, rather than indirect, judicial oversight.

The changes proposed in this article, or something like them, are essential if Congress chooses to retain §215. The law as written simply does not inspire sufficient confidence to overcome the fear of abuse. During the congressional debates on the USA PATRIOT Act, there was extensive quotation of revered patriots, led by a warning attributed to Benjamin Franklin that “if we surrender our liberty in the name of security, we shall have neither.”²⁰³ Franklin’s actual words are more nuanced and present a more direct challenge to §215 in its present form: “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”²⁰⁴ Careful attention to the actual history of counterintelligence authorities, arcane and inaccessible though it may be, will yield the raw materials needed to construct an effective, balanced authority to replace the current §215. An appropriate narrowing of the statute will both protect what is essential to our freedoms and enhance our long-term security.

203. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,991 (2001) (remarks of Sen. Leahy). See also 147 CONG. REC. S10,548, S11,014, S11,019 (2001) (remarks of Sen. Leahy).

204. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, November 11, 1755, reprinted in 6 PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963), available at <http://www.bartleby.com/73/1056.html>.

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