Senator Chuck Grassley
Questions for the Record

Jennifer Klemetsrud Puhl
Nominee, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit

1. **At your hearing, I asked you about a presentation you gave entitled "Computer Searches" at the DOJ's Regional Project Safe Childhood Training where you observed that "so long as [an] affidavit is worded appropriately you can justify taking the entire system plus any additional storage media located during your search." Understandably, you did not recall the specifics of the presentation given several years ago, hopefully you have had a chance to review the slides.**

   a. **In light of those slides, in your view, what limitations exist on searches of computers or information stored by an electronic device in a cloud server?**

      Response: The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be supported by probable cause and that they "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. This means that a warrant may be obtained to search a computer or an electronic device in a cloud server only if there is probable cause to believe that the computer or electronic device contains contraband, evidence of a crime, or is an instrumentality of a crime. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41; 18 U.S.C. § 2703. Such searches are further limited to a search for specific evidence and specific crimes, as set forth in the search warrant. <u>United States v. Gleich</u>, 397 F.3d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that search warrants for computers sufficiently satisfied the particularity requirement because the language in the affidavit limited law enforcement's search to the items specifically prohibited by statute).

   b. **What role do you believe the exclusionary rule should play in these type of searches?**

      Response: The exclusionary rule was created by the Supreme Court "to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule's general deterrent effect." <u>Arizona v. Evans</u>, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995). The Supreme Court has explained that the exclusionary rule "should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." <u>Davis v. United States</u>, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011). However, if the information set forth in the search warrant affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause and law enforcement officers exhibit "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for the Fourth Amendment," the exclusionary rule will apply to any evidence obtained as a result of the search of the computer or electronic storage device. <u>Id.</u> at 238 (quoting <u>Herring v. United States</u>, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)) (internal quotations omitted).

2. **You have spent your career prosecuting criminal offenses. Please describe your familiarity with federal civil statutory regimes.**

   Response: The bulk of my legal experience has been in the area of criminal law, during which time I have litigated and written a substantial number of briefs on a variety of constitutional and evidentiary issues. Nevertheless, many of these constitutional and evidentiary issues are applicable to the areas of criminal and civil law. In addition, I have experience with both the False Claims Act and Federal Tort Claims Act, having either litigated or collaborated with civil Assistant United States Attorneys on cases brought under these statutes. I also have familiarity with the federal bankruptcy code and the tax code as a result of prosecuting cases involving bankruptcy fraud and tax fraud as well as complex white-collar schemes.

3. **On appellate review, should judges restrict themselves to considering facts in the record?**

   Response: On appellate review, judges are restricted to the reviewing record, specifically, original papers and exhibits filed in the district court, transcripts of the proceedings, and certified copies of the docket entries prepared by the district court. See Fed. R. App. P. 10 and 16. If confirmed, I would apply Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent in interpreting the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

   a. **Under what circumstances should circuit judges take notice of facts not in the record?**

      Response: A court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction, or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Eighth Circuit has said that caution must be used in determining that a fact is beyond controversy under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) "[b]ecause the effect of judicial notice is to deprive a party of the opportunity to use rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument to attack contrary evidence." American Prairie Construction Co. v. Hoich, 560 F.3d 780, 797 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(e) ("On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed.").

4. **During the hearing, you were asked about the circumstances under which you would examine legislative history and congressional intent. Please expand on the answers you provided.**

   a. **Do you believe legislative history to be useful? Why or why not?**

Response: When a particular statute is ambiguous, courts may examine legislative history in determining legislative intent but they should do so cautiously, if at all, because the legislative history is not necessarily an accurate reflection of congressional intent. “Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms. Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious criticisms. First, legislative history is itself murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. Judicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow, Judge Leventhal’s memorable phrase, an exercise in ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’ Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.” Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah, 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Given these concerns, I would instead rely on the statutory language in determining legislative intent.

b. What do you understand the phrase “congressional intent” to mean?

Response: The phrase “congressional intent” refers to Congress’s reasons for passing legislation. Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah, 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).

c. Do you believe that legislative history reflects “congressional intent”?

Response: I believe that legislative history does not always accurately reflect congressional intent because it is often ambiguous. Therefore, the Supreme Court has cautioned courts about relying on legislative history in determining congressional intent. Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah, 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).

5. Your practice has consisted of both state and federal litigation. As a federal judge, when would you certify a question to a state supreme court?

Response: I would follow Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent in determining whether to certify a question of state law to a state supreme court. Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital, 701 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1983).

a. What factors would you consider in deciding whether to certify a question?

Response: The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized certain guidelines in determining whether certification of a question of state law is appropriate: (1) whether the legal question is an “extremely close one;” (2) whether the court would be required to determine state law from one or two questionable precedents; and (3) whether the case is primarily a federal case, and not strictly a diversity case. Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital, 701 F.2d 1266, 1268 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing State of Fla. ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1976)). The court further recognized that certification may be warranted if there is a likelihood of recurrence of the particular issue. Id. If confirmed, I would consider such guidelines in determining whether to certify a question but "absent a 'close' question and lack of state sources enabling a nonconjectural determination, a federal court should not avoid its responsibility to determine all issues before it." Perkins v. Clark Equipment Co., 823 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir. 1987).

b. What problems, if any, do you see in the practice of certifying questions?

Response: Certifying a question of state law to a state supreme court would most likely result in more delays and additional expense than would a decision on the question of state law by the federal court.

c. What benefits, if any, do you see in the practice of certifying questions?

Response: As recognized by the Supreme Court in Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974), the certification process helps establish "cooperative judicial federalism."

d. What other judicial tools or doctrines would you consider using to resolve a question of state law, consistent with the *Erie* doctrine?

Response: Federal courts are bound by the decisions of a state supreme court in applying state law. However, when the state supreme court has not spoken on an issue, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that it may consider "relevant state precedent, analogous decisions . . . and any other reliable data." David v. Tanksley, 218 F.3d 928, 930 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

6. Have you ever litigated any questions involving the following jurisdictional issues? If so, what, if anything, did you learn from these cases about the limits of federal jurisdiction?

a. The Collateral Order Doctrine

b. *Younger* abstention

c. *Colorado River* abstention

d. *Pullman* **abstention**

e. The *Rooker-Feldman* Doctrine

f. Sovereign Immunity

g. Ripeness

h. Mootness

Response: I have either litigated cases or collaborated with other civil attorneys on cases involving the Collateral Order Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity, and Mootness. Based upon these experiences, as well as my understanding of federal judicial power as set forth in Article III of the Constitution, I recognize and appreciate that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Therefore, a federal court must conclude that it has the authority to decide a case or controversy before it renders a decision. The above-referenced doctrines are some examples of a federal court's limited jurisdiction. If these doctrines are not satisfied, it would be inconsistent with the Constitution or federal statutes for a federal court to nonetheless decide the case.

7. As a judge on an appellate panel, under what circumstances would you see fit to author a dissenting an opinion? Why would you author a dissenting an opinion? Under what circumstances would you author a separate concurring opinion? Why would you author such an opinion?

Response: If confirmed, it would be appropriate for me to author a dissenting opinion if, after applying the applicable law to a particular set of facts, I reached a different conclusion than the majority of the court. It would also be appropriate to author a separate concurring opinion if, after applying the applicable law to a particular set of facts, I reached the same conclusion as the majority of the court, but for a different reason, or if I believed it was necessary to provide further explanation for the basis of my decision.

8. Do you believe that a judge's gender, ethnicity, or other demographic factor has any or should have any influence in the outcome of a case? Please explain.

Response: No, a judge's gender, ethnicity, or other demographic factor does not change the law nor does it change how the law should be applied.

9. What is the most important attribute of a judge, and do you possess it?

Response: The most important attribute of a judge is humility. Judges exercising sincere humility recognize judicial restraint and do not substitute their judgment for the rule of law or comment on matters of public policy. Rather, they always adhere to the applicable law, regardless of their personal views. Humble judges also treat the parties, attorneys, witnesses, and court staff with dignity and respect. I believe I possess this attribute.

10. At times, judges are faced with cases of first impression. If there were no controlling precedent that was dispositive on an issue with which you were presented, to what sources would you turn for persuasive authority? What principles will guide you, or what methods will you employ, in deciding cases of first impression?

Response: When faced with a case of first impression, I would begin my inquiry with the plain language of the statute. If the language was clear, I would apply the statute as written. If, however, the language was ambiguous, I would apply the canons of statutory construction as established by the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. I would also review Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit decisions wherein they examined analogous provisions as well as decisions from other circuit courts regarding the text of the governing authority.

11. What would you do if you believed the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals had seriously erred in rendering a decision? Would you apply that decision or would you use your best judgment of the merits to decide the case?

Response: If confirmed, I would faithfully heed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, regardless of any personal views that I may hold about those decisions.

12. Under what circumstances do you believe it appropriate for a federal court to declare a statute enacted by Congress unconstitutional?

Response: All federal statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Therefore, federal courts should only address a constitutional challenge if it is necessary. That is, courts should attempt to resolve the case based upon an alternative basis. If it becomes necessary to address the constitutionality of a statute, then a court should only declare a statute unconstitutional if Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting the statute or the statute violates a provision of the Constitution.

13. Please describe your understanding of the workload of the Eighth Circuit. If confirmed, how do you intend to manage your caseload?

Response: The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decides a substantial number of cases, and it routinely renders timely decisions. If confirmed, I would work diligently to continue the court's tradition of rendering decisions in an effective and timely fashion. I would also seek the assistance of my colleagues and staff regarding effective case management practices and tools.

14. In your view, is it ever proper for judges to rely on foreign law, or the views of the "world community", in determining the meaning of the Constitution? Please explain.

Response: Unless explicitly directed to do so by the United States Supreme Court, judges should not rely on foreign law or the views of the "world community" in determining the meaning of the Constitution.

15. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe an appellate court should overturn precedent within the circuit? What factors would you consider in reaching this decision?

Response: An appellate court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and its circuit. In the Eighth Circuit only an *en banc* court may overturn the circuit's precedent. United States v. Cruz-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 2009). To receive *en banc* consideration, a party must demonstrate very rare and exceptional circumstances, such as an intervening Supreme Court decision that is in conflict with circuit court precedent, or if there is conflict among the lower courts in applying the circuit's precedent. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).

16. At a speech in 2005, Justice Scalia said, "I think it is up to the judge to say what the Constitution provided, even if what it provided is not the best answer, even if you think it should be amended. If that's what it says, that's what it says."

a. Do you agree with Justice Scalia?

Response: Yes, a judge should apply the Constitution as written, regardless of whether he or she agrees with the result.

b. Do you believe a judge should consider his or her own values or policy preferences in determining what the law means? If so, under what circumstances?

Response: No.

17. Do you think judges should consider the "current preferences of the society" when ruling on a constitutional challenge? What about when seeking to overrule longstanding Supreme Court or circuit precedent?

Response: No, judges should not consider "current preferences of the society" in ruling on constitutional questions or in applying Supreme Court or its circuit precedent.

18. What is your judicial philosophy on applying the Constitution to modern statutes and regulations?

Response: I would apply the Constitution to modern statutes and regulations in accordance with Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent. Although such statutes and regulations may implicate scenarios not addressed explicitly by the Constitution nor imagined by the Framers of the Constitution, a court should nonetheless apply the text of the Constitution to these scenarios. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (applying the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches to law enforcement's installation of a GPS tracking device to monitor a defendant's vehicle).

19. What role do you think a judge's opinions of the evolving norms and traditions of our society have in interpreting the written Constitution?

Response: A judge's opinions of evolving norms and traditions of our society should not be considered in interpreting the written Constitution.

20. What is your understanding of the current state of the law with regard to the interplay between the establishment and free exercise clause of the First Amendment?

Response: In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) the Supreme Court recognized that the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment "express complementary values" but nonetheless "are frequently in tension." Despite this tension, the Supreme Court held that "there is room for play in the joints between" the two clauses such that the government can accommodate religion without offense to the Establishment Clause. Id.

21. Do you believe that the death penalty is an acceptable form of punishment?

Response: The United States Supreme Court has determined that the death penalty is an acceptable form of punishment. If confirmed, I would faithfully apply this precedent.

22. Do you believe there is a right to privacy in the U.S. Constitution?

Response: The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guarantees certain privacy interests, such as the First Amendment's protection of privacy in certain communications and associations, see National Assoc. for the Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy in the home, see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001), and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protection of privacy in the right to marry, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).

a. Where is it located?

Response: Please see Response to Question 22 above.

b. From what does it derive?

Response: Please see Response to Question 22 above.

c. What is your understanding, in general terms, of the contours of that right?

Response: As explained above, it is my understanding that the Supreme Court has defined the contours of privacy rights through its precedent.

23. In *Griswold,* Justice Douglas stated that, although the Bill of Rights did not explicitly mention the right to privacy, it could be found in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of the Constitution.

a. Do you agree with Justice Douglas that there are certain rights that are not explicitly stated in our Constitution that can be found by "reading between the lines"?

Response: If confirmed, I would not seek to interpret the Constitution by "reading between the lines." Rather, I would apply the plain meaning of the Constitution and any binding precedent of the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, faithfully applying the doctrine of *stare decisis*.

b. **Is it appropriate for a judge to go searching for "penumbras" and "emanations" in the Constitution?**

Response: No. If confirmed, I would not search for "penumbras" or "emanations," but instead apply the plain language of the Constitution.

24. What would be your definition of an "activist judge"?

Response: An activist judge does not recognize his or her limited role in deciding cases based upon the applicable law and the facts as established on the record and only the record. Rather, an activist judge substitutes his or her personal opinion and judgment for the rule of law.

25. Please describe with particularity the process by which these questions were answered.

Response: On June 28, 2016, these questions were provided to me by the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy. I prepared responses to these questions and subsequently reviewed my responses with a representative of the Office of Legal Policy. Thereafter, I requested that the responses be submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

26. Do these answers reflect your true and personal views?

Response: Yes.

Questions for the Record
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Senator Thom Tillis

Jennifer Klemetsrud Puhl
Nominee, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit

1. **Some individuals have argued that the United States Constitution is a "living document," subject to different interpretations as society changes. Do you subscribe to this point of view?**

   Response: No.

2. **What role, if any, should societal pressure or popular opinion play in interpreting statutes or the United States Constitution?**

   Response: Societal pressure and popular opinion should not play any role in interpreting statutes or the Constitution.

3. **Please define judicial activism. Is judicial activism ever appropriate?**

   Response: As I understand the term, it refers to judges who do not recognize their limited role in deciding cases based upon the applicable law and facts as established by the record. Judges exercising judicial activism substitute their personal opinions and judgment for the rule of law rather than adhering to the law as set forth in the Constitution, statutes, and binding precedent. Judicial activism is never appropriate.

4. **When, if ever, is it appropriate for a federal court to rule that a statute is unconstitutional?**

   Response: All federal statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Therefore, federal courts should only address a constitutional challenge if it is necessary. That is, courts should attempt to resolve the case based upon an alternative basis. If it becomes necessary to address the constitutionality of a statute, then a court should only declare a statute unconstitutional if Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting the statute or the statute violates a provision of the Constitution.

5. **What is a fundamental right? From where are these rights derived?**

   Response: Fundamental rights are those rights that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist" in their absence. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that many of these rights are set forth in the Bill of Rights and Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

6. **Do you believe the First Amendment or any other provision of the United States Constitution protects private citizens and businesses from being required to perform services that violate their sincerely held religious beliefs?**

   Response: The Supreme Court has said that private citizens and businesses have a First Amendment protection to exercise sincerely held religious beliefs, and it has established guidance in determining whether a particular government statute or regulation places an undue burden on an individual's exercise of religious practice. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that city ordinance suppressing individuals' right to exercise religion was not neutral and generally applicable and was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest); see also, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that Health and Human Services contraceptives mandate, as applied to for-profit closely held corporations, violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 because it did not meet the least-restrictive means test). If confirmed, I will faithfully apply the doctrine of stare decisis as established by the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit in determining whether the right to exercise freedom of religion is unduly burdened.

7. **What level of scrutiny is constitutionally required when a statute or regulation related to firearms is challenged under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution?**

   Response: Although the Supreme Court has not determined what level of scrutiny is applicable to statutes and regulations that place restrictions on the Second Amendment's right to possess firearms, it has made clear that a heightened scrutiny must apply, and a rational basis test is not sufficient. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2010).

8. **Do you believe it is constitutional for states to require voters to show photo identification before being eligible to cast their vote?**

   Response: The Supreme Court upheld an Indiana state law requiring government issued photo identification to vote because it did not impose "excessively burdensome requirements" on any class of voters, and the state had a valid interest in protecting "the integrity and reliability of the electoral process." Crawford v. Marion County (Indiana) Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 202-04 (2008). If confirmed, I would faithfully adhere to the Supreme Court precedent, as established in the Crawford case, as well as the law of the Eighth Circuit.

9. **One challenge you will face as a federal judge is managing a demanding caseload. If confirmed, how will you balance competing priorities of judicial efficiency and due**

process to all litigants involved in the cases on your docket? Will you give certain cases priority over others? If so, please describe the process you will use to make these decisions.

Response: If confirmed, I would work diligently to render a fair and just determination in an efficient and timely manner in order to balance competing priorities of judicial efficiency and due process. Pursuant to the Eighth Circuit's internal operating procedures, I would prioritize certain cases that warranted an accelerated schedule as well as criminal cases. See Eighth Circuit Internal Operating Procedures III.D. and III.E. (stating that clerk's office prepares schedules for every case which includes consideration of accelerated schedules where warranted and expediting all criminal cases by striving to decide all criminal appeals within eight to ten months after the notice of appeal is filed). In addition, I would seek guidance and advice from my colleagues as to how they effectively manage and prioritize their cases.

10. Do you believe the death penalty is constitutional? Would you have a problem imposing the death penalty?

Response: The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the death penalty is an acceptable form of punishment. If confirmed, I would have no problem affirming a lower court's criminal judgment imposing the death penalty, provided the lower court adhered to the law in imposing such a penalty.

Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Tuesday, June 21, 2016
"Nominations"

Questions for the Record: Senator Amy Klobuchar

1) **Questions for Ms. Puhl:**

You have served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of North Dakota since 2002.

- **How will your experience as a federal prosecutor benefit your service as a federal judge?**

  Response: As a federal prosecutor I have extensive experience in federal court at both the trial court and appellate court levels. I have prosecuted a wide-array of criminal cases, including complex white-collar schemes, violent crimes in Indian Country, child exploitation, computer crimes, and drug crimes, among others. I also have written a substantial number of appellate briefs on a variety of constitutional, statutory, and evidentiary issues, and I have argued before the Eighth Circuit on several occasions. If confirmed, I will draw upon all of these experiences in considering the arguments of the parties and applying the applicable law to a particular set of facts before rendering a clear decision in a case. I think my experience in prosecuting Indian Country crime will be especially helpful to the Eighth Circuit due to the fact that it routinely considers appeals in Indian Country cases.

I understand that you have done significant work to combat the increase in human trafficking in North Dakota, including working to create a statewide human trafficking task force and prosecuting a man charged with trafficking women on Backpage.com. This issue has been a priority for me, and bipartisan legislation that I led with Senator John Cornyn – the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act – was signed into law last year.

- **Why has taking on this issue been important to you, and what lessons have you learned from these cases that you will take with you to the bench?**

  Response: My work in this area has been one of the most rewarding experiences for me as a federal prosecutor because it has directly impacted the safety and well-being of human trafficking victims who are extremely vulnerable given their young age and disadvantaged backgrounds. In my experience, human trafficking cases are the most difficult cases to prosecute because the victims frequently have complex relationships with their traffickers. These cases are not easily discoverable because the victims do not self-identify and they rarely affirmatively seek assistance from law enforcement. Therefore, a proactive approach is necessary to identify such victims in order that service providers and law enforcement can address their needs through quality services. In working with victims of human trafficking, I have learned to be increasingly patient, recognizing that not all victims will immediately, if ever, disclose their trafficking experiences. I have also learned that collaboration is crucial in addressing the human trafficking epidemic because no one agency can address and resolve the problem. All of the agencies have limitations and, therefore, the various service providers and law enforcement agencies must work together to rescue human trafficking victims and investigate and prosecute those who are responsible for committing these crimes. If confirmed as a judge, I will draw upon these experiences by seeking the advice and assistance of my colleagues in resolving cases.