KEL20946 9RS S.L.C.

AN	ENDMENT NO Calendar No
Pu	rpose: In the nature of a substitute.
IN	THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—116th Cong., 2d Sess.
	S. 4632
То	amend title 17, United States Code, to establish an alternative dispute resolution program for copyright small claims, to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to modify the scope of protection from civil liability for "good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material, and for other purposes.
R	eferred to the Committee on and ordered to be printed
	Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed
A	MENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended to be proposed by Mr. Blumenthal
Viz	:
1	Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-
2	lowing:
3	SECTION 1. FINDINGS.
4	Congress makes the following findings:
5	(1) Voting by mail is a safe, secure, and suc-
6	cessful method for voters to participate in the demo-
7	cratic process.
8	(2) Voting by mail is commonplace and well-
9	tested in presidential elections. According to the
10	Election Assistance Commission, 23.7 percent of all

KEL20946 9RS S.L.C.

ballots in the 2016 presidential election were cast using vote-by-mail or absentee voting. In five States—Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah, and Washington—voting by mail is the primary method of casting a ballot.

- (3) As States take precautions to prevent the spread of the COVID–19 pandemic, including during the Georgia runoff election in January 2021, voting by mail remains a vital means of participating in the democratic process while keeping communities safe and healthy.
- (4) According to the Election Assistance Commission, voting by mail is an "essential part of the elections process for citizens away from home, such as our military and overseas voters," adding urgency to the need to ensure that members of our armed forces have the ability to vote.
- (5) According to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, during the 2016 presidential election, the Russian Internet Research Agency sought to suppress electoral participation, including through spreading "expressly voter suppressive content intended to dissuade African-American voters from participating in the 2016 presidential election." During the 2016 election, such disinformation was

KEL20946 9RS S.L.C.

spread through paid advertisements, automated bots, and front groups impersonating American citizens on social media.

- (6) During the November 2020 general election, residents of several States received robocalls and text messages with false information about mail-in ballots and voting that were intended to suppress participation or confuse voters. In at least one case, these messages primarily targeted predominately African-American communities and sought to intimidate voters based on the threat of arrest for voting.
- (7) According to a September 3, 2020, Department of Homeland Security bulletin, entitled "Russia Likely to Continue Seeking to Undermine Faith in US Electoral Process," Russia amplified "criticisms of vote-by-mail and shifting voting processes amidst the COVID–19 pandemic to undermine public trust in the electoral process." Further, the memo documents that Russian media have "denigrated vote-by-mail processes, alleging they lack transparency and procedural oversight, creating vast opportunities for voter fraud," and that the Department of Homeland Security assesses that "social media trolls are likely to promote allegations of corruption, system failure, and foreign malign inter-

KEL20946 9RS S.L.C.

1 ference to sow distrust in democratic institutions 2 and election outcomes." 3 (8) According to a joint statement by the Elec-4 tion Infrastructure Government Coordinating Coun-5 cil (GCC) Executive Committee, representing Fed-6 eral and State election and cybersecurity officials, 7 "the November 3rd [, 2020] election was the most 8 secure in American history". The statement refuted 9 unfounded claims of fraud and misinformation about 10 vote counting, explaining "there is no evidence that 11 any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed 12 votes, or was in any way compromised." 13 SEC. 2. REQUIRED BRIEFING. 14 Not later than December 23, 2020, the Assistant At-15 torney General for National Security shall brief the Senate 16 Judiciary Committee regarding— 17 (1) the sources, tactics, and examples of foreign 18 influence operations with respect to the integrity of 19 voting by mail processes, campaigns that seek to 20 suppress voter participation, or disinformation that 21 misleads about the election process; 22 (2) the extent of cooperation between social 23 media platforms and other communication firms, 24 and the Federal Government, law enforcement, and 25 elections officials, in any efforts to identify, remove,

5

KEL20946 9RS S.L.C.

and alert the public about foreign disinformation re-1 2 garding voting and attempts to suppress voter par-3 ticipation; and 4 (3) the status of investigations into attempts to 5 disenfranchise and intimidate voters through 6 robocalls, social media posts, text messages, and 7 other communications channels during the 2020 8 general election.