

**Questions for the Record for Craig Adelman**  
**Hearing on “Biden’s Afghan Parolee Program – A Trojan Horse with Flawed Vetting and**  
**Deadly Consequences”**  
**Submitted January 21, 2026**

**QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR COONS**

1. In the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) report OIG-22-64, your first recommendation read as follows:

“We recommend the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner:

- a. Immediately identify evacuees from Afghanistan who are in the United States and provide evidence of full screening and vetting based on confirmed identification – especially for those who did not have documentation; and
- b. Ensure recurrent vetting processes established for all paroled evacuees are carried out for the duration of their parole period.”

I appreciated your written and oral testimony explaining that OIG closed this first recommendation. Please elaborate on that testimony by explaining, for both parts of this first recommendation, the information that the Department submitted to OIG in response to this first recommendation and OIG’s rationale for closing this first recommendation in response to the information provided.

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**DHS OIG RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD**

The information that the Department submitted to OIG in response to recommendation 1:

On July 3, 2024, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) National Targeting Center (NTC) gave the OIG access to the results of recurrent vetting it conducted during Operation Allies Welcome (OAW) subjects’ periods of CBP-authorized parole.

The seven-step recurrent vetting process consolidated information from CBP, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and DHS’ Office of Biometric Identity Management systems to generate an identity card for each OAW parolee. The identity card represents a more accurate and complete dataset than what CBP provided during the audit (OIG-22-64). The identity card contains known biographic and biometric identifiers, classified and unclassified recurrent vetting results, and any interagency referrals based on potentially derogatory information identified during recurrent vetting; this information is hyperlinked to underlying systems of record as evidentiary support.

Although the work was generally outside of CBP's authorities and responsibilities, the NTC led an effort within DHS to recurrently vet OAW parolees for the duration of their CBP-authorized parole until a permanent process is established as recommended by DHS OIG. Based on our review, the NTC manually reviewed 8,319 parolees against system-identified potentially derogatory information. As appropriate, all positive matches were referred to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

**OIG's rationale for closing recommendation 1 in response to information provided:**

The OIG reviewed the documentation provided by the NTC and followed up with CBP on the documentation and on procedures in place to continue to vet the OAW population before deciding to close the recommendation.

We held multiple meetings with CBP to understand its recurrent vetting process. We also conducted data analysis and held meetings to confirm OAW parolees were vetted. As part of our analysis of the information received from CBP, we selected a judgmental sample of 25 individuals whose data/information we had previously reviewed during our audit. We reviewed the NTC's documentation for records of these same individuals. Of these 25, 18 remained eligible for recurrent vetting (5 individuals were in ICE custody, and 2 individuals were admitted as lawful permanent residents and were no longer on parole). We confirmed that 17 of the 18 individuals were part of the group being vetted by the NTC, while 1 individual should have received recurrent vetting but did not. CBP performed manual checks, did not find any derogatory data, and explained this person is likely deceased.

Based on these findings and our review of the recurrent vetting snapshots, we determined CBP had addressed our recommendation as best it could given the data challenges identified in our report. Therefore, we closed this recommendation.

CBP was unable to provide a formal policy or guidance regarding the recurrent vetting process. We also did not confirm what, if any, actions were taken once CBP referred an OAW parolee with potentially derogatory information to ICE because it was beyond the scope of the recommendation.

To ensure CBP continued conducting recurrent vetting despite the lack of a formal process, DHS OIG launched a new audit to determine the extent to which the Department conducts recurrent vetting and acts when derogatory information is identified for OAW participants. This audit is currently underway, and we plan to issue a report with our findings in 2026.

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**Senator Peter Welch**  
**Senate Judiciary Committee**  
**Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security and**  
**Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism**  
**Written Questions for Deputy Inspector General Craig Adelman**  
**Joint Hearing on “Biden’s Afghan Parolee Program – A Trojan Horse with Flawed Vetting and**  
**Deadly Consequences”**  
**Wednesday, January 21, 2026**

1. According to a November 2025 *New York Times* report analyzing Department of Homeland Security (DHS) statistics, DHS investigators worked 33% fewer hours on child exploitation cases from February to April 2025. These agents have instead spent five times as many hours working on immigration cases than they did during President Trump’s first term.
  - a. You have worked for DHS since 2008. Have you ever seen a wholesale reassignment of DHS employees’ duties—at this scale—during your time at DHS? Please explain.

**DHS OIG RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD**

During my time at the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), we have not conducted an audit on wholesale reassignments of DHS employees, nor do we have current work in this area. Therefore, I cannot make an informed statement about the situation or provide a comparison of the current scale and previous reassignment of DHS employees’ duties.

Although we have not conducted DHS-wide audits on reassignments, we have completed audits and inspections focused on reassignments and details of specific components and operations. In 2023, we published an audit report about the intensifying conditions at the Southwest border and how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel were detailed to and working overtime supporting operations at the border (OIG-23-24). Based on interviews and survey responses from 9,311 law enforcement personnel, the details and overtime negatively impacted the health and morale of law enforcement personnel, who felt overworked and unable to perform their primary law enforcement duties. We found that several factors (including unsustainable staffing

models, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a surge of border traffic) combined to exacerbate staffing challenges at the border.

In 2024, we completed an inspection to determine the operational impacts on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) associated with deploying air marshals to support security on the Southwest border and the costs associated with the deployment (OIG-24-35). During the inspection, we determined TSA could not assess the operational impacts to its primary mission of safeguarding the Nation's transportation system while TSA deployed air marshals to assist CBP at the Southwest border. We also found TSA incurred approximately \$45 million in travel and payroll costs associated with deploying air marshals to the Southwest border from May 2019 to August 2023. CBP reimbursed these costs.

- b. **Is the DHS Office of Inspector General tracking how these reassignments are impacting DHS' other critical duties, such as preventing child trafficking? If not, why not?**

#### **DHS OIG RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD**

As we are not currently conducting work on this topic, I cannot definitively say whether these reassignments are impacting DHS' other critical duties. However, we do have ongoing work related to other critical mission areas including:

- *DHS Fentanyl Prevention Efforts* – The project objective is to determine the extent to which ICE Homeland Security Investigation's (HSI) technologies, intelligence, and information sharing counter fentanyl entering the United States.
- *ICE Processes to Monitor and Check Unaccompanied Alien Children* - The project objective is to determine the extent to which ICE can monitor and confirm the current location, status, and safety of Unaccompanied Alien Children.

If we find these mission areas, or others, are affected by staffing reassignments within the Department, we will report these challenges and make recommendations to the Department to help resolve the conditions.

These projects, like all our work, are selected as part of a risk-based planning process. Given the high volume of requests, allegations, and complaints we receive, as well as the large scale of Departmental operations, we leverage the risk-based approach to evaluate new projects and ensure our limited resources are applied to the highest risk areas. We weigh several factors as a part of our risk-based approach, including congressional interest; impacts to health, life, or safety; and the program's financial impact, media accounts, and reports to our Hotline, among others.

- c. How have DHS key priorities been affected by the diversion of personnel and resources to immigration efforts? Please specify which priorities have been impacted, and to what extent.

**DHS OIG RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD**

As noted in my prior responses, we have ongoing work across the Department and in multiple mission areas. Where relevant, our reports will note challenges and impacts based on personnel reassignments. Our reports will also make recommendations, as appropriate, to help the Department resolve these challenges. If urgent or emergent challenges are found, we will alert the Department before we issue any report so that these areas may be addressed as soon as possible.

- d. In the same investigation, the *New York Times* reported that DHS' law enforcement academy has delayed training for many agencies to prioritize new immigration officers. Please explain, to your knowledge, how law enforcement training managed by DHS has been impacted by recent immigration enforcement efforts.

**DHS OIG RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD**

Based on changes to hiring and training for DHS law enforcement personnel, our office recently initiated related projects:

- *CBP Interior Immigration Enforcement* - The project objective is to determine whether CBP conducts interior immigration enforcement in accordance with Federal requirements and Department policies and guidance.

- *ICE Hiring and Training* - The project objective is to determine the extent to which ICE can surge its hiring and training efforts to meet operational needs.

As these projects progress, we hope to be able to provide better information in this area. Additionally, given the changing nature of the Department's operations, we are considering further work in this area.

Finally, for any specific questions on changes to curriculum, I would encourage you to work with DHS directly as it has purview over the day-to-day management of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers and curriculum for its associated training programs.

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Link to NY Times Article: [2025.11 NYTimes DHS Article.pdf](#)