

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Combat Service Support Group-26
2d Force Service Support Group (REIN)
Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 28542

DEK/rls
4000
28 Dec 1981


From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Battalion Landing Team 1/6

Subj: CSSG-26 After Action Report

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1E
(b) FSSGO 5750.3


Encl: (1) Embarkation
(2) Operations
(3) Communications
(4) Supply Operations

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b) enclosures one (1) through four (4) are submitted.


D.E. KOLBERG
1stLt USMC

Copy to:

Plans & Deployment
2d LSBn



Problem:


CSSD personnel on the USS Fort Snelling were billeted in seperate troop berthing compartments.

Discussion:

Seven (7) CSSD Marines were billeted in the foremost troop compartment in the bow of the ship. Nineteen CSSD Marines were billeted in the aft portion of the ship. This arrangement created command and control problems. Passing instructions and insuring everyone received all necessary information required runners between the fore and aft troop compartments. Not having all CSSD personnel in one (1) area prevented forming a cohesive unit under one command. In addition control of and accountability of weapons was unnecessarily complicated because of the billeting arrangement.

When I inquired as to why all of CSSD did not have one (1) area of the ship for billeting no one knew CSSD was an autonomous command within the BLT. The billeting officer assumed the FSSG battalions were provided seperate detachments, each with their own command and control.

ENCLOSURE (1)




Conclusion:

When Embarked on a ship billet all Service Support personnel in one (1) area of the ship.

Recommendation:

That assignment of billeting areas aboard ship be published and passed to OIC's of the units prior to embark to insure everyone understands who comes under who's control. Officers responsible for billeting on a ship should famialiarize themselves with the mission and command structure of the boarding units before assigning compartments to insure unit integrity.

ENCLOSURE (1)



Operations

Problem:

TAC-LOG was at times non-existent and always bypassed CSSD-26 Communications.

Discussion:

All rapid requests went to the BLT/S-4 including requirements for repair parts. The BLT/S-4 then called PCS to have the part pulled from the block thus controlling inventory and distribution.

The CSSD should have received the rapid requests from the BLT/S-4. CSSD would then through ship to shore comm, pull the part from the supply block. This would have allowed the CSSD OIC to control the inventory of supplies he signed for.


Conclusion:

TAC-LOG rapid request procedures were not coordinated prior to embarkation.

Recommendation:

That more detailed planning of TAC-LOG procedures be done prior to embarkation. TAC-LOG procedures, communications and rapid request format should be rehearsed thoroughly with all personnel involved in TAC-LOG functions prior to embarkation.

ENCLOSURE (2)



Communications

Problem:

CSSD-26 did not have UHF radios due to no requirements for these assets listed on the LOI.

Discussion:

At times during training operations ship to shore nets were UHF. This meant the CSSD was without means to monitor message traffic or function as a link in the supply chain.


Conclusion:

A UHF comm capability is a must for all Service Support detachments regardless of size.

Recommendations:

That battalion LOI's include UHF radios for all future CSSD Operations.

ENCLOSURE (3)



Supply Operations

Problem:

Supply Requirements were made known to CSSD too late to conduct inventories of the maintenance float block and Deployment Support block prior to embarkation.

Discussion:

The time between notification of DSU and Direct Exchange of repair part requirements and the two block's ready for pick up was not enough to allow for a complete inventory by the CSSD Responsible Officer. This meant signing for the block and immediately staging it for transport to Morehead City without verifying the contents of the supply block.

Conclusion:

Such procedures in the future could cause at least misunderstandings, and worse, loss of gear with no ability to trace a clear line of responsibility.

Recommendation:

That Supply requirements be identified and passed on to DSU and Direct Exchange as early as possible so there is sufficient time to inventory the contents and verify the NSN Listing.

ENCLOSURE (4)

