Mr. Robert Sachs

February 11, 2004

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT SACHS
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
NATIONAL CABLE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION
on
COMPETITION AND OVERBUILDS IN THE VIDEO MARKET
Before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST,
COMPETITION POLICY AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY 11, 2004
Mr. Chairman, Senator Kohl, and members of the committee, my name is Robert
Sachs and I am President & CEO of the National Cable & Telecommunications
Association. NCTA is the principal trade association of the cable television industry in
the United States. It represents cable operators serving more than 90% of the nation's
73.4 million cable television households and more than 200 cable program networks, as
well as equipment suppliers and providers of other services to the cable industry. Thank
you for providing us with the opportunity to testify this morning.
Introduction
In assessing the subject of this hearing - namely, the competitive effect of
wireline overbuilders on incumbent cable operators - it is appropriate at the outset to
establish the context. There are more than 9,000 cable systems serving 33,000
communities in the United States. As is documented by the Federal Communications
Commission's recent ten-year review of the status of competition in the video
marketplace, virtually all those systems face vigorous competition from two wellestablished
national Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) providers who together serve more
than 21% of the multichannel video programming market. And, as the General
Accounting Office has pointed out, this competition has resulted in an explosive growth
of new video and non-video services, as well as slightly lower prices for cable
subscribers.
While fierce competition from DBS is ubiquitous, competition between wireline
cable operators is scarce - and often precarious. Only about 400 of the 33,485 cable
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communities nationwide have two competing franchised wireline providers. Many of
these franchised overbuilders, however, have either never deployed and launched their
services, launched and failed, or are in danger of bankruptcy.
GAO's most recent study of cable overbuilds is based on a tiny percentage of
these rare communities. GAO examined only six overbuild communities, and compared
them with six other communities that appeared to share certain characteristics with the
overbuild communities but had only a single cable operator. The half dozen overbuilds
exemplified many of the difficulties faced by overbuilders, and GAO identified the
reasons for these problems.
Cable Franchised Communities
N = 33,485
33,052
433 6
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
Non-Overbuild Communities Overbuild Communities Overbuild Communities in GAO
Study
433
6
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Overbuild Communities Overbuild Communities in
GAO Study
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A major reason was that overbuilders simply underestimated the extent to which
the marketplace they chose to enter was already fiercely competitive. Overbuilders may
have assumed that they could easily and profitably capture customers from incumbent
providers with lower prices. But sustainable competition from DBS, which enjoys
nationwide economies of scale, had already ensured that cable operators were providing
the services that best met consumer demand, at competitive prices. So, overbuilders were
caught in an economic bind. To entice customers away from the incumbent, they might
have to charge lower prices than the incumbent. But those lower prices were insufficient
to cover their costs and investment risk and were economically unsustainable for more
than an introductory period.
Moreover, the vast majority of overbuilders only came into existence in the last
few years. As rare as overbuilds are now, they were even less prevalent during the first
four decades of cable's existence. Cable television is an extremely capital-intensive
business. To serve a community, cable operators typically must deploy facilities that
pass and extend to all households in the community, whether or not particular households
choose to purchase their service.
The viability of such an investment required that a substantial portion of the
homes passed by the system did choose to purchase the system. Competing builders,
such as in the well known example of Allentown, Pennsylvania, who constructed systems
simultaneously in an area where off-air reception was poor, had the best chance of being
viable. But for many years, the prospect that multiple cable operators could build such
facilities and each capture a sufficient number of subscribers to support their investment
was, in most cases, implausible. Therefore, few overbuilds were deployed.
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But several developments in the last decade of the twentieth century encouraged
new overbuild ventures. For example, the technological ability to provide voice, video
and data services over shared broadband facilities - and the emergence of the Internet as
a new source of data services for consumers - altered the economics of overbuilds.
Existing telephone companies, whose narrowband facilities were not particularly
well suited to the provision of video and Internet broadband services, made significant
investments in new stand-alone broadband facilities so that they could offer video (and
cable modem) service along with the telephone and DSL Internet services provided over
their existing facilities. Meanwhile, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 encouraged the
emergence of new "competitive local exchange carriers." With new broadband facilities,
these new companies saw opportunities to offer competing cable television service and
cable Internet service along with telephone service.
In short, the bundling of video, Internet and telephone services over shared
facilities was expected to make it possible to provide an economically viable competing
wireline cable service. But just as they may have underestimated the competitive effects
of DBS, overbuilders also faced more competition and less demand for their non-video
services than they anticipated.
The boom in wireless telephony (and the increasing availability of telephone
service from incumbent cable operators and other competitive local exchange carriers)
reduced potential revenues from telephone service. Similarly, vigorous competition
between cable operators' cable modem service and telephone companies' DSL reduced
the ability of overbuilders to subsidize their video prices with revenues from high-speed
Internet service. And in this competitive environment, overbuilders have had serious
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difficulty obtaining the capital they anticipated and need to deploy and build out their
systems.
What all this suggests is that the prices and service offerings of overbuilders at
any recent point in time can hardly be viewed as representative of a "competitive"
standard that all cable operators would meet if only they faced effective competition. To
the contrary, cable operators do face effective competition in all the services that they
provide. It's the prices and services offered across the nation by cable operators that face
strong competition from DBS, DSL and competing telephony providers that provide the
best indication of a competitive marketplace at work. There is no basis for looking to the
prices offered by an anomalous handful of unprofitable overbuild systems as an
appropriate benchmark for video prices.
Why Overbuild Prices Are Artificially or Uneconomically Low
With the foregoing in mind, it may still be useful to take a closer look at the small
number of overbuild systems that have come into (and out of) existence in order to see
why some recent studies - including GAO's most recent reports - have found that a
snapshot of average prices of overbuilders tend to be lower than the prices charged by
cable operators in areas without overbuilds. NCTA has done such an analysis.
Unlike GAO's most recent study, which looked at only six overbuild
communities, we examined all of the 433 communities with identifiable overbuild
systems for which information was obtainable. We confirmed that most of them did, in
fact, display anomalous characteristics that explain why their prices (and the prices of
competing cable operators in those communities) may, at least temporarily, be lower than
prices in other communities. As analyzed more fully by Steven S. Wildman, Professor of
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Telecommunication Studies at Michigan State University, in a white paper attached to
this testimony, those anomalous characteristics show that lower rates do not indicate that
those overbuild markets are more "competitive" than other markets. To the contrary, as
Professor Wildman concludes, "[a] close look at overbuilders and the communities they
serve shows that it would be imprudent to use prices in these communities as benchmarks
for evaluating prices in other cable communities."1
1. Overbuild prices are often unsustainable. First of all, the vast majority of
overbuilds have only been in existence for a very short time. 388 of the 433 overbuilds
did not exist before 1996 - and 92 of them did not exist before 2001. This means that it's
impossible to view a snapshot of prices at any given point in time as representative of the
stable prices of long-term, established competitors. (Typically, cable franchises are
awarded for 15 years and then are eligible for successive renewal periods of 10 years.) A
"moment in time" snapshot does not show whether the reported prices were sustainable
for even an initial franchise term. It does not show how many overbuilders failed to
survive with such prices. Nor does it show whether such prices were merely temporary
and soon rose to higher levels.
In fact, 83 of the overbuilds that we identified either have failed and are no longer
operational or are not yet operating to any meaningful extent. In a competitive market,
companies are expected to charge prices sufficient to cover their costs and to earn a fair,
risk-adjusted return on their investment over time. The prices of companies that have
failed or are failing obviously cannot be viewed as benchmarks for what competitive
systems should charge.
1 S. Wildman, "Assessing the Policy Implications of Overbuild Competition," February 9, 2004, at 27.
-7-
The overbuild landscape is populated with such failed or failing companies.
Some, like Altrio, Everest Connections, TOTALink, and WINfirst briefly got started
operating overbuild systems before they went bankrupt and/or stopped further
construction. Other well-financed companies like Ameritech and GTE constructed and
operated systems only to sell them for a small fraction of their original cost.
In addition, a large number of overbuilders never even built their systems and
launched their services. For example:
? American Broadband
American Broadband announced that it would overbuild cable systems in
major cities in Rhode Island as well as Baltimore, Buffalo, Jacksonville
and other medium size markets on the East Coast. When it initially filed
in January 2000 with the Rhode Island PSC, American Broadband told the
PSC that it would cost $170 million to build systems in 20 markets serving
80% of the state's households in the towns of Barrington, Bristol, Central
Falls, Coventry, Cranston, Cumberland, East Greenwich, East Providence,
Johnston, Lincoln, North Providence, North Smithfield, Pawtucket,
Providence, Scituate, Smithfield, Warren, Warwick, West Warwick and
Woonsocket.
American Broadband initially received a commitment for $50 million in
equity capital from Great Hill, and expected to receive another $120
million in equity and debt for the Rhode Island project. Great Hill
Partners and venture capital companies pulled back on their initial
commitment. CIBC World Markets that in 2000 committed to provide the
company up to $150 million in senior debt financing opted not to make the
loan. In addition, $50 million in equity promised by Great Hill Partners, a
Boston venture capital firm was placed on hold. Great Hill owned 83
percent of ABI.
Unable to attract other financing, American Broadband decided not to go
into business in January 2001.
? Carolina Broadband
Carolina Broadband was formed in 2001 and targeted major markets in
North and South Carolina including: Charlotte (pop. 540,828),
Raleigh/Durham (pop. 276,093 and 187,035 respectively), Winston-Salem
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(pop. 185,776), Greenville/Spartanburg (pop. 56,002 and 39,673
respectively), and Columbia, SC (pop. 116,278).
In 2001, the company received $402 million from Charlotte's Carousel
Capital and the venture capital arms of banks such as Bank of America
Corp. and First Union Corp. Other investors included M/C Ventures,
Spectrum, Chase, JH Whitney, Haborvest and Providence.
After raising $402 million in equity, Carolina Broadband was unable to
obtain another $400 million in debt financing. The investors did not want
to commit all of the money until the company received additional loans
needed to fully fund its construction projects.
Carolina Broadband spent about $40 million before the company folded
without significant construction.
? DeCom
DeCom was a Midland Park, NJ-based firm headed by a veteran cable
operator. In mid-2000, DeCom announced that it hoped to be OVS
provider in Charlotte, NC (pop. 540,828). The company never moved
forward with its plans to provide service.
? Digital Access Corporation
Digital Access announced plans to overbuild cable systems in
Indianapolis, IN (pop. 781,870), Kansas City, MO (pop. 441,545),
Milwaukee, WI (pop. 596,974), and Nashville, TN (pop. 1,270,520) in
1999. The company's major investors included Bachow & Associates,
CALPERS, Cornerstone Equity, First Union Capital, Goldman Sachs,
M/C Venture Partners, Norwest Equity, Providence Equity, M/C Venture
Partners, Navis Partners (formerly Fleet Equity Partners) and Spectrum
Equity Investors. Digital Access was able to raise $450 million in equity
but unsuccessfully sought $850 million in debt financing. Digital Access
went out of business in early 2001 after trying for two years to obtain debt
financing.
? Digital Union
During mid-2000, Digital Union (affiliated with a Local Utility)
announced that it was going to overbuild the incumbent cable system in
Austin, TX (pop. 656,562). After a few months, Digital Union
abandoned its plan to provide service.
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? LyncStar
LyncStar was a private company that planned to overbuild the cable
system serving Little Rock, AR (pop. 183,133). The company never
moved forward with its plans to compete in this market.
? Quality Entertainment
Quality Entertainment was a private company with plans to provide
service in Poteau, OK (pop. 7,939). The Company never proceeded with
these plans.
What seems apparent is that the investment community has not been persuaded
that the overbuild business model, which is built on capturing market share with low
prices, is an economically sound and sustainable model. As Professor Wildman points
out, "[t]he fact that only a tiny fraction of a percent of cable communities attract
overbuilder entry in any given year in itself suggests that most knowledgeable potential
investors see little prospects for profit in the overbuilder strategy."2 And the recent
failures of existing overbuilders confirms that this is the case. Thus, as Altrio stated two
months ago when informing the City of Los Angeles of the company's decision to shut
down the company, "the capital markets are not friendly to early stage
telecommunication companies today. After six months of effort, we have been unable to
raise the necessary capital to continue operations."3
Even some of the more established and recognizable overbuild companies have
been on or over the brink of bankruptcy. For example, Knology, which has 127,500
subscribers, went through bankruptcy in 2002. On September 18, 2002, Knology filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection with debts that exceeded $473 million. On
November 7, 2002, Knology announced that the bankruptcy allowed it to exchange $444
2 Wildman at 28.
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million in bonds for $193.5 million in newer bonds and a 19.3% equity ownership in the
company. In total, the bankruptcy reduced Knology's debt by $250 million.
Meanwhile, RCN, the largest and most established overbuilder, is reportedly in
serious economic peril and "skating on thin ice."4 Its stock has not bounced back even as
the telecommunications sector has begun to recover. RCN's stock plummeted from a
high of $72 per share in February 2000 to 68 cents per share as of December 31, 2003.
On January 15, 2004, RCN missed a $10.3 million payment on senior debt. According to
one trade publication report, RCN's cash supply is rapidly disappearing: "Its most recent
available results show in Q3 it lost $110.5 mil[lion]. RCN in Oct. 2001 had $1 bil[lion]
in cash. It now holds $289.5 mil[lion] in cash, and is burning through its onceformidable
fund at a clip of about $70 mil[lion] per quarter."5
Moreover, just two weeks ago, regional power company Pepco Holdings Inc.,
RCN's partner in Washington, DC area overbuilder Starpower Communications LLC,
announced that it was that it was "getting out of the telecommunications and cable TV
business by selling its 50 percent stake in" the venture.6
As mentioned, even some of the large, established telephone companies that
promised to compete with incumbent cable operators in their telephone service areas have
ultimately backed away from those plans and have emphasized the marketing of DBS
services instead.7 As the FCC recently noted,
3 Letter from David G. Rozzelle and Stephen R. Ross to Ms. Liza Lowery, Chief Information Officer,
City of Los Angeles, Dec. 10, 2003.
4 "RCN Skating on Thin Ice," Broadband Technology, Jan. 21, 2004, p. 10.
5 Id.
6 "Pepco to Sell Starpower; Shedding Cable Stake Will Come at a Loss," Washington Post, Jan. 30, 2004,
p. E1.
7 See "Bells Fight Cable War with Satellite-TV Deals," Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2004, p. B1.
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The 1996 Act amended Section 651 of the Communications Act in
order to permit telephone companies to provide video services in their
telephone service areas. . . .As a result the presence of LECs in the MVPD
market grew. By 1998 the Commission indicated that "LECs are already
or are becoming significant regional competitors." Ameritech (later
acquired by SBC) was a significant overbuilder in the Midwest, BellSouth
was an overbuilder and MMDS operator in the southeast, . . . and Bell
Atlantic (now Verizon) and SBC were selling, marketing and installing
DirectTV DBS video service. Additionally, LECs briefly owned and
operated two joint programming and packaging ventures, but by 1998 both
of these efforts were ended or scaled back, and today no longer exist.
Today facilities-based cable franchise services provided by the
large, former "baby bells" are much less prominent . . ., with only
BellSouth and Qwest offering such services. Some LECs have come full
circle, however, and are marketing DBS service as they did in 1998.8
There have also been many reported examples of overbuilders entering markets
with very low prices but, before long, implementing substantial price increases. As
Professor Wildman points out,
It is not uncommon for firms entering a market to offer their products or
services at prices too low to cover their costs over the long term. They do
this to rapidly build their customer base to a level large enough to ensure
profitability once prices return to sustainable levels. Incumbents often
respond to such tactics with lower prices of their own. Because market
prices frequently rebound to higher levels once entrants' initial pricecutting
strategies have run their course, it is important that prices in
markets with recent entry not be used as competitive benchmarks for
prices in other markets.9
One example is RCN's system in Boston. Since entering the market there in 1997 RCN's
price for the expanded basic tier has nearly doubled
2. Overbuilders often targeted communities where cable operators had not
yet rebuilt their systems. While cable operators nationwide have been rapidly
8 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming,
Tenth Annual Report, MB Docket No. 03-172, ¶¶ 113-115 (released January 28, 2004).
9 Wildman at 11.
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rebuilding and upgrading their facilities to provide more channels and advanced
broadband services, at least 107 of the overbuilders targeted communities where the
incumbent operator had not yet rebuilt its system. In those markets, overbuilders might
have expected to be able to lure customers away from the incumbent to a more advanced
system with artificially low prices and advanced services that the incumbent was not (yet)
able to offer. But it does not follow that either the rates or the overbuild itself would be
sustainable after the incumbent rebuilt its system. And, as the FCC's recently released
Tenth Annual Report on video competition shows, communities with non-rebuilt systems
are quickly disappearing. Just between 2001 and 2002, the percentage of systems with at
least 750 MHz leapt from approximately 64% to approximately 73%,10 and the
percentage continues to grow.11 This is, in other words, a strategy available only in a
rapidly dwindling number of communities and only for a very limited period of time.
3. Many overbuild systems were purchased at a substantial discount from
failing companies. In many cases, overbuilders faced costs significantly lower than
those of incumbent cable operators for artificial reasons that had nothing to do with
competitive efficiency. For example, in 77 communities - almost 20% of the cases - the
systems were purchased from failed or failing overbuild companies at pennies on the
dollar.
These cases include the sale of systems and assets owned by the bankrupt
Western Integrated Networks ("WIN"). While WIN had announced plans for building
all-fiber networks in many southwestern and western cities, it only built and began
operating a system in Sacramento. WIN sold its Sacramento assets to SureWest
10 Id., ¶ 25, Table 3.
11 Id., ¶ 25 n.58.
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Communications for less than 15% of what it had invested in the system - and a much
smaller percentage of what the assets were worth at the time of sale. WIN's assets in
Sacramento were worth $200 million; they were sold to SureWest for $12 million.
Similarly, in December 2001, SBC sold the assets of the stand-alone cable systems that
Ameritech had built in the 1990's. WideOpenWest acquired those mid-western systems
at fire-sale prices far below the costs of building them. Likewise, in December 2003,
Verizon Media Ventures Inc., a subsidiary of Verizon Communications Inc., sold off its
cable television systems in Pinellas County, Florida and Cerritos, California to Knology
for a price dramatically below the value of the assets. When companies purchase
systems for much less than what it cost to build them, they, of course, can charge prices
that reflect this discount. But there is no reason to view such prices as in any way
indicative of what an economically efficient incumbent or new cable operator facing
marketplace competition would or should charge. They are, in effect, subsidized by the
initial overbuilder who mistakenly invested in a system that should never have been built
in the first place, given the real costs of construction and operation.
4. Franchising authorities often impose fewer requirements on overbuilders.
Many overbuilders faced significantly less extensive and costly franchise requirements
than those imposed on incumbent cable operators. Although NCTA has not been able to
review all the franchises in overbuild communities, we have identified 96 communities in
which the overbuilder does not have the same requirements as the incumbent. It may be
possible for local governments to create a price differential between overbuild and nonoverbuild
communities simply by creating a cost differential between overbuilders and
incumbent cable systems. But where this is the case, there is no reason to suppose that
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the lower prices in overbuild communities are any more "competitive" than the prices of
incumbents in non-overbuild communities.
5. Overbuilders often target high-density areas. We found 103 instances in
which the overbuilder was not required to build out and serve the entire franchise area.
In Montgomery County, Maryland, for instance, Starpower was not required to extend
service to lower density areas of the county despite the fact that the incumbent's franchise
requires universal service. Not surprisingly, given this green light to cream skim, we
found 175 instances where the overbuilder targeted high density areas to provide service.
By picking and choosing areas that are less costly to serve on a per-household basis
because density is greater overall, overbuilders can charge rates that are lower than if
they, like virtually all incumbent cable operators, were required to serve all areas of a
community.
6. Some overbuilders operate on a not-for-profit basis. In some cases,
overbuilders' prices may be artificially low because the overbuilder is a not-for-profit
entity that has no need even to project, much less recover, a profit. For example, we
identified 31 municipally-owned overbuilders and ten overbuilders owned by
cooperatives.
7. Many overbuilders are owned by utilities or telecommunications
companies. In 20 cases, the overbuilder is owned by a utility. And in 91 cases, the
overbuilder is affiliated with a local telecommunications company. These operations
present unique cost advantages of shared facilities for similar, plant-intensive businesses.
They also present cross-marketing advantages that accompany such utility ownership.
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And the rates of such overbuilders may be artificially low to the extent that they can be
cross-subsidized by the ratepayers of the regulated utility service.
8. Most overbuilders bundle video services with other services. Finally, a
large number of overbuilders entered the market offering bundled video, Internet and
telephone services. More than ¾ of them - 310 - offer high-speed Internet service. And
179 offer all three services. When multiple services are offered over the same shared
facilities, prices for the service offerings will be based on projected demand for all the
bundled services. The shared cost of common plant may make the attributable costs for
video lower, assuming that buy rates for the Internet and telephone services are sufficient
to contribute to support of the system's costs. But if overbuilders' projections regarding
their telecommunications and Internet offerings were unduly optimistic (as may well
have been the case during the recent years when most overbuilds were initiated), then the
prices for their video programming services may have been lower than necessary to cover
costs - i.e., lower than economically competitive levels.
As the foregoing discussion shows, there are a number of clearly identifiable
circumstances in which the prices of overbuild systems may be artificially and
uneconomically low - and these circumstances apply in a large number of overbuild
communities. The chart below illustrates how the vast majority of observations in the
Overbuild sample involve anomalous situations.
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.
Breakdown of Overbuild Communities
N= 433
425
8
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Anomalous Communities Non- Anomalous Communities
* Anomalous Communities: Includes Failed/Failing, Purchased assets below value, targeted non-rebuilds, targeted high density,
unique ownership issues (telco, utility, co-op, municipal), different franchise or buildout requirements, or offers bundled services.
In fact, according to Professor Wildman, "it is striking how few communities
remain in the comparison sample [of overbuild communities] when all identifiable
sources of potential bias are eliminated."12
GAO's Survey of Six Overbuilders Is Not a Useful Indicator of Competitive Rates
Even if there were no such multiple explanations for the price differentials
between overbuild and non-overbuild communities, it would still be necessary to take any
price comparisons in GAO's most recent study with a large grain of salt. That study only
examined six overbuild communities - only about 1.5% of all overbuild communities,
and a very small fraction of one percent of all cable communities - and compared their
12 Wildman at 19 (emphasis in original).
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prices with the prices of six superficially similar cable systems in non-overbuild
communities. It's hard to see how the differentials between the overbuild and nonoverbuild
systems in such a minuscule number of cases could possibly be deemed to have
any statistical significance.
In any event, not surprisingly, the six overbuilders in GAO's study - like most of
the overbuilders nationwide - appear to share one or more of the identifiable
characteristics, described above, that are likely to result in artificially and anomalously
low prices.
For example, Everest Connections is, first of all, owned by an energy utility
company (Aquila, Inc.). In addition, it is a company facing serious economic difficulties.
Everest, which was formed in 2000, initially planned overbuilds in Amarillo, Lubbock
and several smaller Texas communities. It also was granted franchises in the Kansas City
and Minneapolis-St. Paul regions and had applied for more than a dozen franchises in the
Grand Rapids, Michigan area. But it has never expanded beyond its two systems in
Lenexa and Mission, Kansas.
During the first half of 2003, Everest's energy company parent restructured
Everest and terminated 160 of its employees. It recently told the FCC that it had stopped
funding Everest because of the company's poor long-term prospects. And Everest has
told the Federal Communications Commission that it will "soon cease all construction in
Kansas City due to lack of funding."
Grande, the overbuilder in Waco, Texas, offers bundled video, Internet and
telephony services. It acquired its system from a financially impaired company,
ClearSource, two years ago. Although the sale price was not reported, it is reasonable to
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assume that the assets were purchased at a substantial discount, reducing Grande's costs -
and potentially supporting prices - substantially below what would have been sustainable
if the company had to cover the true costs of the system.
Seren Innovations is another utility-owned and funded overbuilder. It was
founded in April 1996 as a subsidiary of Northern States Power Co. and is now owned by
Xcel Energy, Inc., which was formed by the merger of NSP and New Century Energy of
Colorado.
PrairieWave is an investment company formed in 2002, which is affiliated with
local telephone companies. It was formed to purchase the assets and operations of
McLeodUSA Incorporated, a financially impaired operator of incumbent telephone
systems in South Dakota and competitive telephone, cable and Internet services in South
Dakota, southwestern Minnesota, and northwestern Iowa. Again, it is likely that the
cable systems were acquired at a substantial discount to their initial cost.
The two remaining overbuild companies in the GAO study are Knology and RCN
- both of which have already been described above in the discussion of companies that
have gone through bankruptcy (Knology) or are in economic distress (RCN). Both
systems offer bundled video, Internet and telephony services. And RCN, as noted above,
has been around long enough to demonstrate - with rate increase after rate increase - that
the low rates charged by overbuilders when they enter a market are far from sustainable.
Conclusion
The bottom line is that overbuilders are the results of anomalous circumstances in
nearly all cases and often exist, if at all, in financial distress or as the aftermath of
financial distress - unless they are tied to a utility or not-for-profit cooperative. In the
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rare circumstances where they exist, incumbent cable operators cannot afford to ignore
such wireline competition. But they already face vigorous competition from DBS in
virtually every community that they serve. And the services they offer and the prices
they charge are already dictated and driven by such competition - whether or not they
face an additional wireline competitor.
Overbuilders may enter the market with prices that are lower than these
competitive prices. And incumbent cable operators may have no choice but to reduce
their prices to such levels. But, as we have shown, these lower prices are either not
economically sustainable by the overbuilders or are sustainable only because of
anomalous artificial cost advantages and subsidies that are not available to incumbent
operators. Whether or not overbuilders ever figure out a sustainable business model,
their current model cannot serve as a benchmark for assessing the prices and conduct of
cable operators in today's highly competitive video marketplace.
1
Assessing the Policy Implications of Overbuild Competition
Steven S. Wildman
Michigan State University
February 9, 2004
I. Introduction
Unlike the situation prior to the emergence of the national direct broadcast
satellite (DBS) television services in the mid-1990's, it is indisputable that cable
operators face direct competition in the provision of their primary service, multichannel
television. Today the local cable operator competes directly with two highly successful
DBS services who, nationwide, have captured approximately 22 percent of all
multichannel television service customers.1 Most operators also now offer a high speed
Internet service for which they face competition from the incumbent local telephone
company and frequently a number of other suppliers of high speed data services as well.
And a small but growing fraction of cable operators offer voice telephony in competition
with at least one, and increasingly, several telephone companies. The question now is
whether this multifaceted competition, and especially the competition between the cable
and DBS providers of multichannel video services, is intense enough to provide
consumers with the benefits of lower prices and better services policymakers expect
competition to provide.
1 Federal Communications Commission, Annual Assessment of the Status of Video
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Tenth Annual
Report, MB Docket No. 03-172, Released January 28, 2004, Appendix B, Table B-1.
2
In a tiny fraction (less than two percent) of the communities they serve,
incumbent cable operators also compete with newer wireline providers of multichannel
video service, commonly known as "overbuilders." Although it is not always the case, a
few empirical studies have suggested that on average prices are lower in markets with
overbuild competition than in markets where the incumbent is the only wireline provider
of multichannel video service.2 These studies have not systematically controlled for short
run factors, such as low introductory prices charged by recent entrants and the presence
of competitors who are not viable long-term, that might drive prices below their
competitive equilibrium levels. Nevertheless, their findings have been offered as
evidence that prices charged by cable operators in non-overbuild communities are too
high.
Unfortunately, the world is more complex than this simple argument would imply
and the evidence offered is not, by itself, sufficient to support the claim that is made.
While the claim that lower prices in overbuilt communities are an indicator that prices in
other cable communities are too high might be true, it may also be false. Because there
are situations in which market prices may fall below the efficient market standard
2 The most recent published study is an article by J. A. Karikari, S. M. Brown and A. D.
Abramowitz, "Subscriptions for direct broadcast satellite and cable television in the US:
an empirical analysis," Information Economics and Policy, vol. 15 (2003), pp. 1-15.
Karikari, Brown and Abramowitz estimate that overbuild competition produces an
approximately 10 percent reduction in cable prices. Their coefficient estimate is similar
in magnitude to that found in an empirical study using earlier data by Dertouzos and
Wildman, but the price effect in the Dertouzos and Wildman study was not statistically
distinguishable from zero by commonly applied criteria for statistical significance. See,
J. N. Dertouzos and S. S. Wildman, "Regulatory Standards: The Effect of Broadcast
Signals on Cable Television," in R. Noll and M. Price, eds., A Communications
Cornucopia, Brookings Institution, 1998. In its October 2003 Report, "Issues Related to
Competition and Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry," the GAO reports
finding that overbuild competition reduced cable TV rates by about 15 percent.
3
associated with a competitive equilibrium, policymakers must take care to determine that
the lower prices are in fact the efficient competitive prices and that the market structures
generating those prices are sustainable in the long term. While consumers may benefit if
supracompetitive prices are lowered, they may also be hurt by deteriorating quality and
the exit of service providers if companies are forced to set prices below their competitive
levels.
To convincingly demonstrate that lower prices in overbuild markets show that
prices in non-overbuild markets are too high it would be necessary to provide: (1)
evidence that cable prices charged in overbuild communities might reasonably be
interpreted as competitive equilibrium prices, and (2) empirical support for the
proposition that the prices (and numbers of competitors) observed in these markets would
also be sustainable long-term in communities currently not served by overbuilders. Until
evidence supporting the existence of both of these relationships is provided, the argument
that lower prices in overbuild markets show that prices in other cable markets are too
high must be considered empirically unsubstantiated. On the other hand, this argument
would be empirically refuted by a demonstration that either of these relationships does
not hold.
To this end, I have reviewed data on overbuild competitors and the communities
they serve compiled from a NCTA-commissioned study by Kagan World Media3 and
data descriptive of cable communities and markets from trade data sources. My review
of this evidence suggests that it is highly likely that prices in overbuild communities are
below long-run competitive levels and that, unless recent and/or new technological
3 Kagan World Media, "Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild
Communities," January 2003. See Attachment A.
4
developments substantially change the economics of competition in multichannel video
services, the overbuilders in these communities are not equilibrium features of the
markets they serve. Furthermore, based on the US experience with overbuild competition
to date, it would be dangerous to assume that overbuilders could profitably enter and
offer services in the typical community in which a single cable company currently
competes with the two satellite services.
The analysis that lead me to these conclusions is presented in the remainder of
this report, which is organized as follows. Section II briefly describes the properties of a
competitive equilibrium and identifies factors unrelated to differences in competitiveness
that may lead to departures from a competitive equilibrium. Indicators of when such
factors may be influencing overbuild markets are then discussed. Section III uses the
framework presented in Section II to classify overbuilders and assess the long-term
viability of overbuilders in current overbuild communities. The implications of this
exercise for the interpretation of earlier studies comparing cable prices in communities
with and without overbuild systems is then discussed. Section IV builds on the findings
presented in Section III to examine the usefulness of the experience with overbuild
services in the United States for assessing how close prices for cable services in
communities without overbuilders come to their competitive equilibrium values. The
findings of the study are summarized in Section V.
5
II. Competitive Prices and the Competitive Market Standard
A. Using the competitive market standard to judge market performance
The competitive price standard commonly employed in policy analyses is the
long-run equilibrium price of the textbook model of a perfectly competitive market. In a
perfectly competitive market in equilibrium, each buyer pays no more than the cost of the
output purchased and sellers' revenues are just sufficient to cover their costs. Because
price paid is a measure of value delivered to the buyer, this equation of cost with value at
the margin indicates that the market is providing the maximum value possible with the
resources at hand. The market output associated with this desirable state is the
competitive equilibrium output or supply. Departures from equilibrium values for prices
and outputs may rightly be interpreted as evidence that the societal resources employed to
serve a market are not delivering the value they should. 4
Policy intervention may be warranted if departures from equilibrium are not
naturally corrected by market forces. Thus, for example, if output was held below its
competitive equilibrium value for an extended period of time, the increase in price
attendant on the reduction in supply would be a measure of how much the added value to
consumers from increasing output might exceed the cost of doing so. Similarly, if supply
exceeded its competitive equilibrium value, price would fall to less than the cost of
delivering the market's product or service, and the excess of cost over price could be
4 For a straightforward presentation of the basic argument for the efficiency advantages
of competitive equilibrium prices and quantities, see F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance, Second Edition, Rand McNally Publishing
Company: Chicago, 1980, Chapter 2.
6
interpreted as a measure of how much more value the resources employed could
contribute to society if used to create other goods and services.
Because observed prices may be above or below their competitive market values,
the simple observation that the price for a product or service is lower in one market than
in another is not sufficient to determine which, if either, is closest to the competitive
equilibrium price. For this reason, policy-driven comparisons of prices in different
markets must be sensitive to the implications of factors that may cause prices (and
numbers of competitors) to depart from their equilibrium values. Analysts must also be
sensitive to the possibility that differences in underlying demand and/or cost conditions
may lead to differences among markets in equilibrium prices and numbers of
competitors, which is considered in Section IV. The remainder of this section focuses on
factors that may cause prices and numbers of competitors to differ from equilibrium
values and how these might be incorporated in a study of competition in the supply of
multichannel subscription television services.
Four types of factors other than deficiencies in the competitive process may cause
prices and numbers of competitors to depart from their competitive equilibrium values.
These are: (1) Errors in judgment by entrants, potential entrants and incumbents, which
may include bets on new technologies, (2) Changes in market conditions, (3) Low, but
unsustainable, introductory prices, and (4) Government policies. Each of these four types
of factors should be considered in constructing a sample of communities with
overbuilders, which I will call a comparison sample, to be compared with communities
not served by overbuilders to assess the competitive performance of the latter.
7
B. Errors in judgment by entrants, potential entrants, and incumbents
The ideal of a competitive equilibrium that has become a touchstone of
competition policy analysis is an analytical abstraction, the properties of which rest on a
set of assumptions that are at best only approximated in real world markets. Critical
among these assumptions is that market participants be completely informed about cost
and demand conditions and about the strategies employed by their competitors. The
reality, of course, is that market participants are never perfectly informed and are
constantly scouring the market and the larger economic and political environment for bits
of information that might help them better align their strategies with the true states of the
markets they serve. Because they must work with incomplete information, the decision
to commit resources to provide service in a market always entails some risk of loss as
well as the possibility of gain. 5 This is true for firms already serving a market as well as
for firms contemplating entry.
Entry in competitive markets is always an uncertain prospect because entrants
must predict on the basis of incomplete information the reception their products will
receive once they are introduced and the costs they will incur in supplying them.
Potential entrants may err by both underestimating the profits they might earn if they
enter and by overestimating their post-entry profits. Both types of mistakes will be
corrected by the market in the long run, but the short term impacts will be quite different.
The first type of mistake will be corrected either through the entry of other firms who
more accurately assess their prospects, or as high prices and high profits earned by
5 For a recent treatment of how uncertainty about demand conditions influences firms'
entry strategies, see G. Pacheco-de-Ameida and P. Zemsky, "The Effect of Time-to-Build
on Strategic Investment Under Uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34
(2003), pp. 166-182,
8
incumbents cause initially unenthusiastic potential entrants to change their minds. The
short-term consequences of potential entrants' failures to take advantage of opportunities
for profitable entry will thus be prices that exceed their competitive equilibrium values.
It is important to note, however, that prices that exceed competitive equilibrium levels are
not evidence that markets that are less than competitive if there is nothing to prevent the
entry of new competitors to bring about the efficient competitive outcome in the long
term.
The price-effects of entry spurred by overly-optimistic predictions of post-entry
profits are just the opposite of those for overly pessimistic forecasts that delay entry in
markets where entrants could prosper. When the number of firms in a market exceeds the
number the market can realistically support, the competition to determine who remains in
the market will often drive prices to levels that are too low to cover the costs of
investments and ongoing operations in the long term. Visible signs of failed investments
of this type would include business closures, reorganizations under the protection of
bankruptcy, and the sale of assets at less than their original cost. However, not all failed
investments will be publicly revealed because owners with sufficient resources may
choose to keep open business that cover their operating costs even if they don't fully
recover their sunk investments.
Just as entrants may misjudge market circumstances or their own capabilities and
enter when it is inefficient to do so, so may incumbents invest in new services or capacity
that fail to generate revenues commensurate with their costs. Depending on their
magnitude, incumbent mistakes of this type may lead to the same financial consequences
just described for failed entrants.
9
Incumbents may also make mistakes that encourage entry in situations in which it
would not normally occur. For example, an incumbent cable operator, whether through
inattentiveness, lack of capital, or a wrong bet on the direction and implications of
technological change, may fail to upgrade its plant in a timely manner, leaving it unable
to supply the quality, breadth and variety of services a more up-to-date operator could
profitably provide. Because a market served by such an operator is in effect underserved,
an opening may be created for profitable entry that would not have arisen had the
incumbent been on its toes. The consequences of entry of this type are good for
consumers, and, because the threat of entry by suppliers using more advanced technology
gives incumbents an incentive to continually improve their services, beneficial to society
at large.
Nevertheless, as long as entry in response to incumbent inefficiency remains the
exception rather than the rule, it would be inappropriate to regard prices in markets where
this occurs as reliable benchmarks for evaluating cable prices generally. The competitive
equilibrium standard assumes a market served by efficient competitors and in the long
run it must be expected that inefficient cable operators will exit the markets they
currently serve. Evidence that entrants were responding to opportunities created by
inefficient incumbents would include entry concentrated in markets where incumbents
failed to keep up with the rest of the industry in upgrading their services and facilities.
10
C. Changes in market conditions
Equilibrium prices and the number of firms a competitive market can support may
both change with changes in market demand and changes in the costs firms incur in
supplying the market. Increased demand is typically associated with a larger number of
firms in equilibrium while increases in costs tend to increase equilibrium prices and may
reduce the number of viable competitors. Of course the opposite is true when demand
and costs fall. Because entry and exit are both time consuming processes, new equilibria
may lag considerably the changes that produced them and prices during the transition
may differ considerably from their values in either the original or the new equilibrium.
New technologies are important agents of market change. 6 Advances in
technology may lower costs or make possible delivery of combinations of services that
were not feasible with earlier generations of technology. New firms can be expected to
adopt these technologies from their inception, while incumbents may find it more prudent
to adopt them more slowly over time as they replace or enhance existing facilities.
Anticipated cost savings and the possibility of selling different mixes of services may
stimulate entry in markets where entry otherwise would not have occurred. Optimism
based on the allure of new technologies often turns out to be unfounded, however, and
ventures built on them may fail, as we recently witnessed with the implosion of so may of
the early dotcom businesses. But even when the investments supporting technologydriven
entry are proved wise in hindsight, it is inappropriate to view post entry prices as
6 For example, D. Clark shows how evolution in the local loop technology underlying
Internet access may change the nature of competition to provide Internet access to
consumers. D. Clark, "Implications of Local Loop Technology for Industry Structure,"
in S. E. Gillett and I. Vogelsang, eds., Competition, Regulation, and Convergence:
Current Trends in Telecommunications Policy Research, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Publishers: Mahwah, NJ, 1999, pp. 283-296.
11
evidence of what competitive prices would have been pre-entry with the older
technology. Instead, costs and prices are likely to depend on the technology employed.
Furthermore, entrants employing new technologies should not be counted as permanent
features of their markets until they have demonstrated the viability of their business
plans.
D. Low, but unsustainable, introductory prices
It is not uncommon for firms entering a market to offer their products or services
at prices too low to cover their costs over the long term. They do this to rapidly build
their customer base to a level large enough to ensure profitability once prices return to
sustainable levels. Incumbents often respond to such tactics with lower prices of their
own. Because market prices frequently rebound to higher levels once entrants' initial
price-cutting strategies have run their course, it is important that prices in markets with
recent entry not be used as competitive benchmarks for prices in other markets.
E. Government policies.
Due to their powers of taxation and regulation, decisions made by governments at
all levels may significantly affect the costs of doing business and the prices charged by
firms serving local markets. As a result, differences in local government policies may
lead to substantial differences in local prices and the numbers of firms serving local
markets
Privately-owned cable operators must acquire franchises to provide service from
local regulatory authorities, and franchises are typically awarded contingent on the
operator meeting obligations specified by the local authority. Such obligations may
12
substantially increase the cost to an operator of providing service in a local community.
Variation in franchise obligations is one reason cable prices may differ among
communities. Because franchise obligations influence costs, they also affect the
prospects for entry by new cable providers. Results of the survey described in more
detail later in this report suggest that in a number of communities franchise authorities
have favored entrants with less onerous, and thus less costly, franchise obligations than
those of the incumbent operators already serving these markets. While the cost
advantages of more favorable regulatory treatment may be a powerful inducement to
entry in some markets, and prices may fall when entry occurs, it clearly would be a
mistake to attribute either entry or any subsequent reductions in prices to the workings of
competitive forces when the entry occurs in response to a regulatory advantage.
In a number of overbuild communities, the competition to a privately-owned
incumbent operator comes from a government-owned system. Because a cable system
operated as a government service serves both political and economic goals, and
especially because the economic constraint of earning a market-return on capital
investments cannot be assumed to apply to government-owned enterprises, it would be
inappropriate to use prices in markets with government-owned systems as benchmarks
for competitive prices.
III. Overbuilder Viability and the Questionable Value of Price Comparisons
The discussion of Section II makes clear that a number of factors might cause the
prices and numbers of competitors in a market to depart from their long-run competitive
values. For this reason, if comparisons of overbuild markets to markets without
overbuilders are employed to inform a policy analysis, it is important that the overbuild
13
markets employed be ones for which the likelihood is small that prices and numbers of
competitors differ substantially from the competitive equilibrium values for these
markets. While it is not possible in practice to guarantee that prices and the number of
competitors observed in any given market are at their long-run equilibrium values, it is
possible with the framework developed in Section II to identify markets mostly likely to
be tainted by factors known to be potential sources of bias and exclude them from any
comparison samples.
This section reports the results of such an exercise using data for a sample of 433
communities with an overbuilder presence7 (the overbuild data set), based on a study of
overbuilders by Kagan World Media commissioned by NCTA,8 which was supplemented
with additional information from trade data sources compiled by NCTA. The analysis
presented in this report is a secondary analysis of this data. The sample and the
methodology employed in constructing it are described in Section III.A. A set of
potential comparison samples constructed using the framework developed in Section II is
described in Section III.B. The implications of this exercise in classification and
comparison sample construction for policy interpretations of comparisons of prices in
cable communities with and without overbuild services are discussed in Section III.C.
7 Some of the overbuild franchises awarded were not built out or never offered service.
The data set includes these communities along with those built out that offered service as
communities with an overbuilder presence.
8 Kagan World Media, "Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild
Communities," January 2003.
14
A. The overbuild data set
NCTA retained veteran cable industry analyst John Mansell of Kagan World
Media to conduct and supervise the data collection regarding overbuilds from the
incumbent cable operator in each overbuild market with the goal of identifying and
gathering information on all of the wireline systems that compete with incumbent cable
television systems in the United States. NCTA used Kagan World Media data from the
2003 Broadband Cable Financial Databook9 to identify 465 "Cable TV competitive
franchises," which Kagan considers a near-comprehensive listing of existing overbuild
franchises as of mid-2003 when the data in the Databook was compiled. The Kagan data
lists the City and State and name of each Overbuilder. NCTA used a Nielsen Media
Research database (FOCUS) to identify the incumbent cable system operators in each of
these communities. NCTA then developed a survey instrument to collect information
about the challenger in each market. Specifically, the survey included questions
addressing the following overbuilder characteristics:
1. Name of current overbuilder.
2. The year in which overbuild commenced service.
3. Capacity of overbuilder (in MHz)
4. List of services offered by overbuilder .
5. Ownership Information. Is the overbuild owned by local government (town, city
or county), a utility company (gas, electric), a local telephone company, a co-op,
or privately owned.
6. Name of incumbent at the time of overbuild.
7. Similarity of build-out requirements.
8. Demographics of neighborhoods where overbuild currently offers service.
9. The population density of the markets targeted.
9 Kagan World Media, 2003 Broadband Cable Financial Databook, pp.81-84.
15
10. Sales/acquisition information. Whether current owner is the original owner and
sales price if not.
11. Similarity of franchising requirements to those of incumbent.
The survey of incumbent cable operators was conducted between October 21,
2003 and January 2, 2004. Each MSO (or individual system if not affiliated with the Top
10 MSOs) was provided an electronic copy of the questionnaire and a list of communities
where their companies faced a wireline competitor according to the Kagan data. In some
cases, the MSOs collected the data directly from their cable systems and forwarded their
results on to John Mansell and in other cases the data was collected by Mansell at the
system level. Since a few overbuilders have exited the business in recent years, public
information about these companies was used to collect data for these observations. All
data gathered from the questionnaires and public sources were tabulated electronically by
Mansell to create the spreadsheet attached to this report.
In total, information on 433 communities was collected and compiled. Because
survey respondents identified several overbuilders that had entered their communities in
late 2003 or early 2004 after Kagan stopped collecting information for the 2003
Databook, the final tally was 470 identified communities with an overbuilder presence.
Survey respondents did not provide information for 39 of the 114 former Ameritech New
Media franchises sold by SBC to WideOpenWest, which is two more than the difference
between the 470 communities identified and the 433 in the sample for which information
was collected. This suggests that two of the former Ameritech New Media franchises
16
may have been missed in the Kagan census of cable communities, or, perhaps shut down
since their sale to WideOpenWest.10
B. Constructing comparison samples
Of the 433 overbuild communities identified by the survey, 62 had overbuilders
that had already failed,11 six were identified as failing,12 and 15 had not yet begun to
build out their franchises or were not yet offering service at the time of the survey.
Clearly failed and failing franchises do not belong in a comparison sample, and systems
that are not operating provide no performance measures. Therefore all 83 communities
with failed, failing and not built systems were eliminated from the comparison sample.
These deletions reduced the sample to 350.
While not classified as failed or failing systems because they are still in business
and offering service, an additional 76 communities were served by overbuilders who
purchased their plant from previous owners at a small fraction of the original construction
cost. (Systems serving 77 communities were sold for less than cost, but one of them also
failed.) The fact that the original owners of these systems were forced to sell them for
substantial discounts relative to their investments in them shows that that the markets
they served did not generate revenues sufficient to both cover their operating costs and
provide a fair return on upfront investments. There are numerous potential buyers
capable of operating these systems. Therefore, the ability of the actual buyers to pick up
10 All 114 of the former Ameritech New Media systems are assumed to still be providing
service in their franchise communities in various calculations reported below.
11 This includes operators who failed after offering services, which is the majority of this
category, and operators who experienced financial failure before commencing service.
12 These operators were either in the process of filing for bankruptcy or in negotiations
with creditors.
17
them up at pennies on the dollar shows that they would not have been willing to pay the
full costs of building these systems if that were the price of entry. Systems in these
communities are properly classified as the types of investor mistakes that will be
eliminated from competitive markets in the long run. Subtracting the 76 systems
purchased for less than original construction costs leaves 274 systems in the comparison
sample.
31 of the communities with overbuilders were served by municipally-owned
systems, but one is one of the failed systems eliminated above. Because such systems are
likely to be operated to address political as well as economic goals, and because access to
public funding is likely to be reflected in both build and pricing decisions, these systems
must also be eliminated from the comparison sample, leaving a total of 244.
244 is the absolute maximum number of overbuild communities that might
retained in the comparison sample. Call this sample CS1. There are several reasons to
believe that the number of communities served by overbuilders where two cable services
might plausibly be viable in a competitive equilibrium is substantially smaller than the
244 communities in CS1. One reason is the 107 communities identified by survey
participants where the overbuilder came in with new plant to compete against an
incumbent who had fallen behind industry standards in upgrading its facilities. As
explained in Section II, an inefficient incumbent may create an attractive opportunity for
a more efficient entrant, but the competitive equilibrium used as a standard for
policymaking is one in which efficient firms compete against each other. To ensure that
the comparison sample is not tainted by the inclusion of communities whose overbuilders
entered in response to incumbent incompetence, overbuild communities where the
18
incumbent operates outdated plant should be eliminated from the comparison sample as
well.
Overbuilders in eight of the 107 overbuild communities with incumbents
operating outdated systems were municipally owned, 52 were purchased at a fraction of
construction cost, four had failed or failing systems, and one had a failed/failing system
purchased at a fraction of its buildout cost. As all of these communities were already
excluded from CS1, we are left with an additional 42 overbuild communities served by
inefficient incumbents that probably should be subtracted from CS1 to ensure that
inefficient incumbents do not bias the sample. Call the resulting sample CS2. CS2 has
202 cable communities.
A second reason to believe that that CS1 includes many communities where
overbuild competition is not likely to be sustained in a competitive equilibrium is that the
76 communities served by overbuilders who purchased prior operators' assets for less
than construction cost were identified through publicly-available documents. These are
all the communities for which system cost and purchase price was found. An additional
39 communities served by systems operated by second or subsequent owners were
identified by survey respondents. Given the numbers of failed and failing systems and the
fact that systems for which information on construction cost and sales price was found
were sold at less than cost, it seems likely that many, if not most, of the resold systems
for which construction cost and purchase price were not available were also sold at a loss.
At any rate, the strong possibility that they were sold for less than cost suggests that they
should be eliminated from the comparison sample. In six of the communities served by
these second (or subsequent) owner systems, the incumbent was operating outdated plant
19
and thus was already eliminated from the comparison sample. If we subtract the
remaining 33 communities from CS2 to completely eliminate the possibility that failed
systems are included in the comparison sample, we are left with 169 communities. Call
this sample CS3.
The possibility that local politics played a role in entry decisions must be also be
considered in situations in which overbuilders' franchise authority-imposed conditions
for operation differ from those required of the incumbent. This is a third reason to
believe that CS1, as well as CS2 and CS3, includes communities in which overbuilders
would not be viable in a true competitive equilibrium. While cost advantages based on
regulatory favoritism may be a reason for entry, entry in such cases cannot be considered
the outcome of a competitive process. Respondents to the survey identified a total of 96
communities for which the overbuilder did not have the same franchise requirements as
the incumbent and 103 communities where the overbuilder was not required to serve the
entire franchise area. To eliminate the possibility that the overbuilder's entry decision
was based on favorable regulatory treatment, communities where the overbuilder and the
incumbent have different franchise and build-out requirements should also be eliminated
from the comparison sample. Subtracting these communities from CS1, CS2 and CS3
would produce the most restricted, but methodologically purest, comparison samples.
Call these purer samples CS1P, CS2P and CS3P. CS1P has 131 communities, CS2P has
109 communities, and CS3P has 94 communities. It is striking how few communities
remain in the comparison sample when all identifiable sources of potential bias are
eliminated.
20
Table 1
Eliminating Sources of Bias from Comparison Samples
Complete
Sample
CS1 CS2 CS3 CS1P CS2P CS3P
433 244 202 169 131 109 94
A fourth reason to believe that all the comparison samples just described,
including the last three, include communities served by systems that are not long-term
viable is that the vast majority of systems for which no financial information was
available were assumed to be viable. That is, if some of the systems for which no
financial data was available were failing, they would have been misclassified as viable.
If overbuilders for which financial data is not available experience financial difficulties
and failure at the same rate as those for which data is available, then most of these
systems have been misclassified. In addition, the newness of many of the overbuilders in
the sample also introduces a bias against a failed or failing classification because the
process of failure has not yet had time to work itself out, which is a fifth reason to believe
that the comparison samples include communities served by systems that in the long run
will be proved nonviable.
C. The questionable relevance of overbuild price studies for cable policy
The question of whether overbuild competition lowers cable prices is relevant for
policymaking only if the overbuilders in the overbuild communities examined are
realizing market returns on their infrastructure investments. The results of the study of
21
overbuilder viability reported in Section III.B show that it would be incautious to assume
long-term viability for more than a small fraction of existing overbuilders. For the
remaining systems, any effects they might have on prices in the markets they serve
should be considered departures from equilibrium prices. Because studies of the price
effects of overbuild competition reported to date did not control for viability with
anything close to the rigor applied in the study reported in Section III.B, the odds are high
that many, and perhaps most, of the overbuilders included in these studies were the
products of failed investments. This being the case, it would be inappropriate to rely on
the findings of these studies to assess the competitiveness of cable prices in communities
without overbuilders.
IV. The Real Lessons from the US Experience with Overbuild Competition
The statistics on indicators of overbuilder viability presented in Section II.B provide
strong reasons to suspect that most of the current crop of overbuild services likely are not
viable participants in the markets they serve in the long term. The 365 communities
currently served by privately-owned overbuilders constitute just 1.1% of the
approximately 33,000 cable-served communities in the United States.13 The fact that
overbuilders are offering services in such a small fraction of US cable communities
suggests that in general potential investors in such services view their prospects as poor.
The trend of overbuilder entry over time tells the same story. Table 2 presents data on
the number of communities in the entire Kagan sample entered by privately-owned
overbuilders for two-year intervals from 1995 through the present.
13 365 is calculated as 433 communities in the sample minus a total of 77 that either never
offered service or failed minus 30 operating municipally-owned systems plus 39 former
Ameritech New Media franchises not in the sample but assumed to still be operating.
This count includes a handful of co-operatives that may be non-profit.
22
Table 2
Overbuilder Entry Over Time
(built-out commercial systems)
Pre-1995 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002 2003-2004 No Entry
Date
33 46 66 77 70 17 42
The Cable Act of 199214 eliminated any statutory authority local franchise
authorities may once have had to restrict franchise awards to incumbent providers and the
Telecommunications Act of 199615 (Telecom Act) provided further encouragement to
entry in local markets for communications services, including cable. The pace of
overbuilder entry did increase beginning in 1997, but this also coincided with increased
adoption of new technologies that would allow the provision of high speed data and
telephone services over cable plant throughout the cable industry, so it is difficult to
know to what extent the Telecom Act, as opposed to the lure of new technologies,
influenced the pace of overbuilder entry.
Missing data on entry dates for some communities make it impossible to
determine exactly how much entry occurred in each of the periods listed in Table 2, but
we can determine reasonable upper bounds on the rate of entry. The 17 startups
identified for 2003-2004 represent Kagan observations for a little more than the first half
of 2003 plus a few additional entrants identified by survey respondents after that time. If
14 47 USC § 541 (a) (1).
15 47 USC §§ 251et seq.
23
we assume all 17 started up in the first half of 2003, this would reflect a two-year entry
rate of 68, which is close to the pace of entry for the prior three two-year periods. Entry
date is provided for 74 of the 75 former Ameritech New Media communities in the
sample, and all were from 1996 to 2001. If we assign the remaining 39 Ameritech New
Media franchises to the six years from 1977 through 2002, total private entry would have
been 252, or 42 per year. This pace amounts to entry into just under thirteen onehundredths
of one percent (0.0013) of US cable communities annually.
Data on the technology deployed in communities with overbuilders presented
later in Table 3 shows that a higher percentage of the 42 communities for which date of
overbuilder entry was not provided are served by overbuild systems utilizing last
generation technology with no advanced features than is indicated for the pre-1995
communities in the built-out sample. If we assume instead that entry in all of these
communities occurred from 1997 through 2002, total entry during the period would have
been 294, the average annual rate of entry would have been 49, and the average fraction
of cable communities entered annually would have been fifteen one-hundredths of one
percent (0.0015).
These figures on the pace of overbuilder entry may be interpreted in either of two
ways. If, counter to the evidence developed in Section III, overbuilders are assumed
viable in all of the communities they serve, the failure of the overbuild strategy to catch
on elsewhere suggests that potential investors in overbuild systems have serious doubts
that they can be profitable in other cable communities. That is, the capital market
response to the experience with overbuild operations accumulated in the US to date
24
suggests that there is little confidence a second cable system can be viable in a typical
cable community.
The second interpretation of the data on entry presented above is more consistent
with the evidence on overbuilder viability presented in Section III.B. That is that the
capital market has seen overbuild operations fail repeatedly and has concluded that in
general overbuild systems are not good business opportunities. By both interpretations of
the entry data, it seems clear that investors have concluded that in general competitive
markets that include two satellite services will not support a second cable provider of
multichannel video services, at least with the technologies currently available.
If there are exceptions to this general conclusion, the best bets would seem to be
overbuilds operated by telephone companies and co-operatives in small rural
communities. Of the 382 communities in the sample with built out systems, a total of
244 survived the various elimination criteria to be included in CS1, for a survival rate of
64 percent.16 Yet of the 89 communities with built out systems currently operated by
telephone companies, 86 are in CS1. These communities are predominantly small and
rural. Community population is available for 76 of the 86 communities in CS1 served by
telco-owned systems. Nearly 59 percent have fewer than 15,000 residents, 47 percent are
communities with fewer than 10,000 residents, and approximately 36 percent are
communities with fewer than 5,000 residents. Over six percent of these telco-served
communities have fewer than 1,500 residents. All ten built-out communities served by
16 The 39 former Ameritech New Media systems not included in the larger sample would
not have been in CS1 in any case because Ameritech New Media sold its systems to
WideOpenWest for substantially less than the cost of building them.
25
cable co-operatives are in CS1.17 Nine of these communities had fewer than 10,000
residents, six had fewer than 5,000. (Population was not listed for one of the co-op
communities.)
It is not clear why rural telephone companies and co-operatives may be more
successful than other types of owners as operators of overbuild systems. One possibility
is that closer relationships with customers in smaller communities make it easier for rural
telephone companies to sell new services, and perhaps the co-operative organizational
form may have advantages in small, close-knit communities. It may also be the case that
with convergence the natural long-run market structure in small communities is one with
a single wireline provider of video, high speed data and voice services and what we are
witnessing is a necessary step toward that future if the local telephone company is to be
the surviving wireline competitor. Whatever the reason, the character of these rural
settings likely is not replicable in the more typical urban cable communities.
A closer look at the data collected in the Kagan study suggests that most of the
more recent overbuild experiments were inspired by the capabilities of relatively recent
technological advances that make it possible to use cable plant to provide telephony and
high speed Internet service in addition to more traditional video services. Table 3 adds to
the entry data reported in Table 2 numbers and percentages of entrants offering the
combination of video, high-speed Internet and telephony (the three bundled services) and
the numbers of entrants offering either the three bundled services or the two services of
video plus high speed Internet service.
17 Systems serving two of the overbuild communities operated by telephone co-operatives
were counted as co-op operated rather than telephone company operated.
26
Table 3
New Technology and Overbuild Entry Decisions
(built-out commercial systems)
Pre-
1995
1995-
1996
1997-
1998
1999-
2000
2001-
2002
2003-
2004
No Entry
Date
Number of
Communities
33 46 66 77 70 17 42
# 3 Bundled
Services
7 15 30 61 38 14 3
% 3 Bundled
Services
21.2% 32.6% 45.5% 79.2% 54.3% 82.4% 7.1%
# HSD or 3
Bundled
Services
23 40 61 70 63 15 12
% HSD or 3
Bundled
Services
69.7% 87.0% 92.4% 90.9% 90.0% 88.2% 28.6%
Table 3 shows a heavy reliance on high-speed data or high-speed data and
telephony technology strategies by overbuilders, including those who entered prior to the
Telecom Act, and that reliance on multi-service platforms has in general been increasing
over time. Notable is the growing percentage of overbuilders offering video services,
high speed Internet service, and telephony, which has averaged well over 50 percent from
1999 on.
As was discussed in Section II, new entrants into established markets are often
inspired by the potential they perceive in new technologies. It is also frequently the case
27
that pre-entry optimism is shown unwarranted by the post-entry market responses to the
entrants' products and services. At least at this point, capital markets appear to have
concluded that the overbuilder strategy is not one that can profitably be applied in most
cable markets, even when it is supported by advanced distribution technology and triple
play service offerings. However, even if this were not the case and we restricted our
attention to overbuilders with the most technologically advanced systems, it would still
be inappropriate to assume that prices observed in overbuild communities are the prices
that should prevail in communities without overbuild systems. If the future is one in
which all wireline competitors offer multi-service bundles, we are still early in the
transition to that future. Because the new technologies imply different cost structures
and, with multi-service offerings, new strategies for exploiting demand, there is no way
to know how competitive prices with the new technologies will compare to competitive
prices with the old technologies, or how prices might move during a period of transition.
V. Conclusions
A close look at overbuilders and the communities they serve shows that it would
be imprudent to use prices in these communities as benchmarks for evaluating prices in
other cable communities. The competitive price standard employed for policy analysis
assumes competition among firms able to cover their investment and operating costs from
the revenues they generate. The evidence reviewed in this report suggests that this likely
is not the case for many, and perhaps most, of the overbuilders operating in the United
States today. To the contrary, the evidence for a high rate of financial failure is
compelling and it would be analytically inappropriate to view the effects on price of
28
systems that can't recover their own investment costs as evidence of how competitive
multichannel video markets should behave.
The fact that only a tiny fraction of a percent of cable communities attract
overbuilder entry in any given year in itself suggests that most knowledgeable potential
investors see little prospects for profit in the overbuilder strategy. Empirical studies of
the price effects of overbuild competition have not controlled for overbuilder viability or
for the possibility that new overbuilders may be charging low introductory prices to
rapidly build market share. For this reason, these studies shed no light on what
competitive cable service prices might be. Even if this was not the case, the failure of
capital markets to support a broad rollout of overbuild systems suggests that the
conditions under which overbuild operations can thrive are quite different from those in
the typical cable community.
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
20 cities RI ABI
La Crescent MN ACE Comm. 4,239 2003
Camarillo CA Adelphia 57,077
Encinitas CA Adelphia 58,014 1991
Malibu CA Adelphia 12,575 1996
Oxnard CA Adelphia 170,358
Port Hueneme CA Adelphia 21,845 1998
San Marcos CA Adelphia 54,977 1991
Ventura CA Adelphia 100,916
Flora IL Advance Technologies 5,086 2002
Alameda CA Alameda Power 72,259 2002
Algona IA Algona Municipal Util. 5,741 2002
Evanston WY All West Comm. 11,507 2001
Alta IA Altatec 1,865 2000
Arcadia CA Altrio 53,054 2001
Monrovia CA Altrio 36,949 2002
San Gabriel Valley CA Altrio 39,084 2001
Sierra Madre CA Altrio 10,578 2004
Ann Arbor MI American Broadband 114,024
E. Lansing MI American Broadband 46,525
Lansing MI American Broadband 119,128
St. Joseph Twp. MN Astound Broadband 4,681 2001
Pultney OH Bellaire Cable TV 4,892 1978
Bartlett TN BellSouth
South Dade County FL BellSouth 2,253,362 1999
Winder GA BellSouth 10,201
Cherokee County GA BellSouth Entertainment 141,903 1996
Cobb County GA BellSouth Entertainment 607,751 1996
Duluth GA BellSouth Entertainment 22,122 1996
Gwinnett County GA BellSouth Entertainment 588,448 1996
Roswell GA BellSouth Entertainment 79,334 1996
Woodstock GA BellSouth Entertainment 10,050 1996
Chamblee GA BellSouth Interactive 9,552
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 1
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
DeKalb GA BellSouth Interactive 665,865
St. John's County FL BellSouth Interactive 1999
Fallowfield PA Bentleyville Cable 2,502 1998
Albany NY Berkshire Tel 1,275 1995
Rapid City SD Black Hills GLA 59,607 2001
Skagit County WA Black Rock Cable 102,979
Snohomish County WA Black Rock Cable 606,024
Whatcom County WA Black Rock Cable 166,814
Braintree MA Braintree Elec. Light 33,828 2001
Elizabethtown/Hardi KY Brandenburg Telecom 22,542 2001
Ocala FL BrightHouse 45,943 1979
Abington VA Bristol Virginia Utilities 7,780 2003
Glade Spring VA Bristol Virginia Utilities 1,374 2003
Horton Twp. PA Brockway TV 1997
Kane PA Brockway TV 4,126 1997
Bryan OH Bryan Municipal Cable 1,833 1999
Waterville OH Buckeye Cable 4,828 1999
Maryland Hts MO Cable America 25,756 1991
Mesa AZ Cable America 396,375 1988
Sacramento CA Cable America 407,018 1990
Cameron LA Cameron Tel. 1,965 2003
Hackberry LA Cameron Tel. 1,699 2003
Charlotte NC Carolina Broadband 540,828
Columbia SC Carolina Broadband 116,278
Durham NC Carolina Broadband 187,035
Greensboro NC Carolina Broadband 223,891
Greenville SC Carolina Broadband 56,002
Raleigh NC Carolina Broadband 276,093
Spartanburg SC Carolina Broadband 39,673
Winston Salem NC Carolina Broadband 185,776
Cedar Falls IA Cedar Falls Utilities 36,145 1996
Clearview WV Centre TV 590 1979
Ohio County WV Centre TV 47,427 1979
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 2
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Warwood WV Centre TV 1979
Urbana OH Champaign County Tel 11,613 2001
Denver CO Champion Broadband 554,636 2000
Lakewood CO Champion Broadband 144,126 2000
Kanawha County WV Charter 200,073 1985
Terre Haute IN Charter 59,614 1992
Danville VA Chatmoss Tel. 48,411 1991
Hayward MN Chequamegon Coop 249 2001
Barron WI Chibardun Coop 3,248 1998
Camron WI Chibardun Coop 1,546 1998
Chetek WI Chibardun Coop 2,180 1998
Unity Twp. PA Citizens Cable 1997
Daleville AL City Cablevision 4,653 1994
Bridgeport CT City of Bridgeport 139,529
Galesburg IL City of Galesburg
Lebanon OH City of Lebanon 16,962 1999
Negaunee MI City of Negaunee 4,576 1985
Clear Lake IA CL Tel 8,161 2002
Lake County FL Clear Link 210,528 2001
Bellmead TX ClearSource (Grande)
Lacy-Lakeview TX ClearSource (Grande)
Monroe LA CMA Cablevision 53,107 1985
Coldwater MI Coldwater BPU 12,697 1998
Columbus Grove OH Columbus Grove Tel. 1997
Dothan AL Comcast 57,737 1981
Monroe MI Comcast 22,076 1995
Parkersburg WV Community Antenna 33,099 1998
Ashtabula VA Conneaut Tel. 20,962 2001
Painesville OH Conneaut Tel. 17,503 2001
Big Lake MN Connections 6,063 2001
Barrington RI Cox 16,819 2002
Bristol RI Cox 22,469 2002
Central FL Cox 2001
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 3
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Central FL Cox 2003
Claremore OK Cox 15,873 1998
Spotsylvania VA Cox 1991
Warren RI Cox 11,360 2002
Arma KS Craw-Kan Tel. Coop 1,529 2002
Franklin KS Craw-Kan Tel. Coop 2002
State College PA D&E Comm. 1997
Britton MI D&P Cable 699 2002
Morenci OH D&P Cable 2,398 1998
Darien GA Darien Cable 1,719 2003
Middleburg NJ DeCom
Charlotte NC DeCom Corp 540,828
Blissfield MI Deerfield Farmers Tel 3,223 1996
Delhi NY Delhi Tel. 2,583 2001
Indianapolis IN Digital Access 781,870
Kansas City MO Digital Access 441,545
Milwaukee WI Digital Access 596,974
Nashville TN Digital Access 1,270,520
Austin TX Digital Union 656,562
Chippewa Twp. OH Doylestown Comm. 1997
Doylestown Village OH Doylestown Comm. 2,799 1997
Elberton GA Elberton Utilities 4,743 2001
Willmar MN En-Tel 18,351 2000
Eden Prairie MN Everest
Edina MN Everest
Hopkins MN Everest
Minnetonka MN Everest
Lenexa KS Everest Connections 40,238 2001
Mission KS Everest Connections 9,727 2001
Mission KS Everest Connections
St. Charles County MO Everest Connections
O'Fallon MO Everest/WideOpenWest
Fairburn GA Fairburn Utilities 5,464 1997
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 4
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Bridgeport CT FiberVision 139,529
Hartford CT FiberVision 121,578
New Haven CT FiberVision 123,626
Elk Grove CA Frontier 59,984 2004
Laurens IA Future Net 1,476 1998
Blackwell OK Get LLC 7,688 1998
Dothan AL Graceba 57,737 1999
Dothan AL Graceba 57,737 2000
Alamo Heights TX Grande Comm. 7,319 2000
Austin TX Grande Comm. 656,562 2003
Balcones Heights TX Grande Comm. 3,016 2000
Castle Hilles TX Grande Comm. 4,202 2000
Cibolo TX Grande Comm. 3,035 2000
Corpus Christi TX Grande Comm. 277,454 2000
Houston TX Grande Comm. 1,953,631 new
Kirby TX Grande Comm. 8,673 2000
Leon Valley TX Grande Comm. 9,239 2000
Live Oak TX Grande Comm. 9,156 2000
Midland TX Grande Comm. 94,996 2000
Odessa TX Grande Comm. 90,943 2000
Olmos Park TX Grande Comm. 2,343 2000
San Antonio TX Grande Comm. 1,144,646 2000
San Marcos TX Grande Comm. 34,733 2003
Schetz TX Grande Comm. 18,694 2000
Selma TX Grande Comm. 788 2000
Terrell Hills TX Grande Comm. 5,019 2000
Waco TX Grande Comm. 113,726 1999
Windcrest TX Grande Comm. 5,105 2000
Greenville TX Greenville Elec. Util. 23,960 1999
Grundy Center IA Grundy Center Munic. 2,596 1998
Savannah GA Hargray Comm. 33,862 2001
Harlan IA Harlan Municipal Util. 5,282 1996
Hartwell GA Hart Cable 4,188 2002
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 5
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Winona MN Hiawatha Broadband 27,069 1999
Hawarden IA HiTec Municipal 2,478 1997
Mason County WA Hood Canal Cable 49,905 1993
Shelton WA Hood Canal Cable 8,422 1993
Chillicothe OH Horizon Telecom 21,796 2000
Conway SC Horry Tel. Coop 11,788 1999
Georgetown SC Horry Tel. Coop 8,950 2001
Horry County SC Horry Tel. Coop 196,629 1980
N. Myrtle Beach SC Horry Tel. Coop 10,974 2001
Cecil PA HTC Comm. 9,756 1996
Houston PA HTC Comm. 1,314 1996
Mt. Pleasant PA HTC Comm. 4,728 1996
Independence IA Indep. Light & Power 6,014 2000
Kenmore NY Intertech Private Cable
Kenton-Boone City KY Kenton Boone City
Augusta GA Knology 195,182 1998
Charleston SC Knology 173,890 2000
Huntsville AL Knology 158,216 1993
Knoxville TN Knology 173890 2000
Louisville KY Knology 96,650 1998
Nashville (Mid. TN) TN Knology 704,431
Panama City FL Knology 36,417 1993
Summerville/Dorches. SC Knology 27,752 2000
Durand MI Lennon Tel. Co. 3,933 1998
Lexington NC LexCom
Davidson County NC Lexicom Cable Ser. 147,246 1997
Fallsburg KY Lycom 2,018
Little Rock AR Lyncstar 183,133
Sauk Centre MN Mainstreet Comm. 3,930 1999
Milledgeville GA Mallard Cablevision 18,575 1996
Naples FL Marco Island Cable 14,879 1990
Cedar Rapids IA McLeod 120,573 1998
Memphis TN Memphis Networx
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 6
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Shelby County TN Memphis Networx
Albany NY Midtel Cable TV 1,398 1995
Anne Arundel Cnty MD Millennium 489,656 1999
Social Circle GA Monroe Utilities 3,379 1996
Walton County GA Monroe Utilities 11,407 1979
Morristown NJ Morristown Util. System 18,544
Dodgeville WI Mount Horeb Telecom 4,220 2002
Murray KY Murray Electric 2,400 2001
Minster OH New Knoxville Tel. 2,794 1995
Moulton OH New Knoxville Tel. 2001
Bakersfield CA Newhouse 247,057
Coweta County GA Newman Utilities 89,215 1996
Tyrone GA Newman Utilities 3,196 2001
Iron Mountian MI Northside Cable TV 8,154 2000
Norwood MA Norwood Elec. Light 28,578 2002
New Ulm MN NuTel 13,594 2001
Ft. Worth TX One Source 13,594 1997
Osage IA Osage Municipal Util. 3,451 2002
Livingston TN Overton County Cable 3,498 1986
Auburn ME Oxford Networks 23,203 2004
Lewiston ME Oxford Networks 35,690 2004
Bemidji MN Paul Bunyan Tel 11,917 2000
Lower Burrell PA PCOM Comm. 12,608 2003
Pembroke WV Pembroke Tel 1991
Houston TX Phonoscope 1,953,631 1986
Colman SD Prairie Wave 2001
Flandreau SD Prairie Wave 2,376 2001
Gayville SD Prairie Wave 2001
Luverne MN Prairie Wave 4,617 2000
Marshall MN Prairie Wave 12,735 1999
Pipestone MN Prairie Wave 4,280 1999
Slayton MN Prairie Wave 2,072 2000
Storm Lake IA Prairie Wave 10,076 2000
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 7
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Tracy MN Prairie Wave 2,268 1999
Worthington IA Prairie Wave 2000
Yankton SD Prairie Wave 13,528 2000
Albany NY Princetown Cable 61,821 1990
Rupert ID Project Mutual Tel Coop 5,645 1995
Provo UT Provo Cable/Provo 105,166 1993
Poteau OK Quality Entertainment 7,939
Boulder CO Qwest 94,673 1999
Chandler AZ Qwest 176,581 1999
Douglas County CO Qwest 175,776 1999
Gilbert AZ Qwest 109,697 1999
Glendale AZ Qwest 218,812 1999
Maricopa County AZ Qwest 3,072,149 1999
Omaha NE Qwest 390,007 1995
Paradise Valley AZ Qwest 13,664 1999
Peoria AZ Qwest 108,364 1999
Phoenix AZ Qwest 1,321,043 1999
Scottsdale AZ Qwest 202,705 1999
Eatonville WA Ranier Group 2,012 1995
Pierce County WA Ranier Group 700,820 1995
Arlington MA RCN 42,389 1997
Bayonne NJ RCN 61,842
Beverly Hills CA RCN 33,784
Boston MA RCN 589,141 1997
Brookline MA RCN 57,107 1997
Burlingame CA RCN 28,158 2000
Burlington MA RCN 22,876 1997
Carson CA RCN 89,730 2001
Chicago IL RCN 2,896,016 1999
Daly City CA RCN 103,621 1999
Dedham MA RCN 23,464 1997
Delaware County PA RCN 550,864 2000
Framingham MA RCN 66,910 1997
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 8
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Gardena CA RCN 57,746 2001
Hermosa Beach CA RCN 18,566
Hoboken NJ RCN 38,577
Lexington MA RCN 30,355 1997
Marlborough MA RCN 36,255 2001
Milton MA RCN 26,062 2000
Natick MA RCN 32,170 1997
Needham MA RCN 28,911 1997
New York NY RCN 8,008,278 1999
Newton MA RCN 83,829 1997
Quincy MA RCN 88,025 1999
Randolph MA RCN 30,963 2000
Redwood City CA RCN 75,402 2003
S. San Francisco CA RCN 776,733 1999
San Carlos CA RCN 27,718 2000
San Mateo CA RCN 92,482 2001
Saugus MA RCN 26,078 2001
Somerville MA RCN 77,478 1997
Stoneham MA RCN 22,219 2000
Stoneham MA RCN 22,219 1997
Wakefield MA RCN 24,804 1997
Waltham MA RCN 59,226 1997
Watertown MA RCN 32,986 1997
Weymouth MA RCN 53,988 2001
Winchester MA RCN 20,810 2000
Woburn MA RCN 37,258 1997
Falls Church VA RCN Starpower 10,377 1999
Fredricksburg VA RCN Starpower 19,279 1999
Reinbeck IA Reinbeck Tel. & Util.
St. John the Baptist LA Reserve Telecom 43,044 2000
Archbold OH Ridgeville Tel 4,290 2001
Colby KS S&T Comm. 5,450 2003
Cave City KY S.Central Rural Tel. 1,880 2002
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 9
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Hiseville KY S.Central Rural Tel. 222 2002
Horse Cave KY S.Central Rural Tel. 2,252 2002
Concord CA Seren Innovations 121,780 2001
St. Cloud MN Seren Innovations 59,107 1998
Walnut Creek CA Seren Innovations 64,296 2002
Plaquemine LA Service One 7,064 1993
Newburgh IN Sigecom 3,088 2000
Spanish Fork UT Spanish Fork Com. Net 20,246 2001
Spencer IA Spencer Munic. Util. 11,317 2000
Arlington VA Starpower 189,453 2000
Montgomery Cnty MD Starpower 873,341 1999
Prince George's Cnty MD Starpower 801,515
Washington DC Starpower 572,059 2000
Sacramento CA Strategic Technologies 407,018 1996
Houston County GA SunTel 110,765
Sacramento CA Sure West 407,018 2003
Pierce County WA Tacoma Power 7,000,820 1998
St. Marys OH Telephone Service Co. 8,324 2003
Wapakoneta OH Telephone Service Co. 9,474 1999
Dothan AL Time Warner 57,737
Louisville KY TotalLink (Utilicom/Vectren)
Houston TX TV Max 1,953,631 1989
Cincinnati (N. Ohio) OH TWC 331,285 1999
Citrus County FL TWC 118,085
Leander TX TWC 7,596
Mount Airy NC TWC 8,484 1996
Orlando FL TWC 185,951
Pflugerville TX TWC 16,335
Poway CA TWC 48,044 1961
San Diego CA TWC 1,223,400 1961
Tampa FL TWC 303,447
Chula Vista CA Ultronics 173,556 1987
National City CA Ultronics 54,260 1987
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 10
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Cobb County GA United Telesystems 607,751 2001
Park Rapids MN Unitel (W.Central Tel.) 3,276 1998
Salem IL US Sonet 7,909 2003
Centerville GA Watson Cable 4,278
Lake Wildwood GA Watson Cable 1991
Macon GA Watson Cable 97,255
Warner Robins GA Watson Cable 48,804
Berea OH WideOpenWest 18,970 1996
Berkley MI WideOpenWest 15,531 2001
Bexley OH WideOpenWest 13,203 1996
Brentwood MO WideOpenWest
Brook Park OH WideOpenWest 21,218 1998
Brooklyn OH WideOpenWest 11,586 1998
Canton MI WideOpenWest 76,366 1996
Centerline MI WideOpenWest 8,531 2001
Chicago IL WideOpenWest 2,896,016 1998
Chicago Heights IL WideOpenWest 32,776 1998
Clawson MI WideOpenWest 12,732 2001
Clinton MI WideOpenWest 95,648 2001
Clinton Twp OH WideOpenWest 1,337 1996
Colorado Springs CO WideOpenWest
Columbus OH WideOpenWest 711,470 1996
Crestwood IL WideOpenWest 11,251 1998
Creve Coeur MO WideOpenWest
Des Plaines IL WideOpenWest 58720 1998
Dublin OH WideOpenWest 31,392 1996
Eastpointe MI WideOpenWest 34,077 2001
Elgin IL WideOpenWest 94,487 1998
Fairview Park OH WideOpenWest 17,572 1997
Ferndale MI WideOpenWest 22,105 2001
Fraser MI WideOpenWest 15,297 2001
Gahanna OH WideOpenWest 32,636 1996
Garfield Heights OH WideOpenWest 30,734 1999
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 11
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Glen Ellyn IL WideOpenWest 2,699 1998
Glenview IL WideOpenWest 41,847 1998
Grandview Heights OH WideOpenWest 6,695 1996
Hammond IN WideOpenWest 83,048 1998
Harrison Twp MI WideOpenWest 24,461 2001
Harvey IL WideOpenWest 30,000 1998
Hilliard OH WideOpenWest 24,230 1996
Jackson Twp. OH WideOpenWest 6,184 1996
Kirkwood MO WideOpenWest
Lakeville MN WideOpenWest
Macomb MI WideOpenWest 50,478
Madison Hts MI WideOpenWest 31,101 2001
Manchester MO WideOpenWest
Maple Heights OH WideOpenWest 26,156 1999
Maplewood MO WideOpenWest
Marble Cliff OH WideOpenWest 646 1996
Middleburg Heights OH WideOpenWest 15,542 1997
Mifflin Twp. OH WideOpenWest 705 1996
Minerva Park OH WideOpenWest 1,288 1996
Mount Clemens MI WideOpenWest 17,312 2001
Mount Prospect IL WideOpenWest 56,265 1998
Naperville IL WideOpenWest 128,358 1998
New Rome OH WideOpenWest 60 1996
North Olmsted OH WideOpenWest 34,113 1996
North Royalton OH WideOpenWest 28,648 1997
Northville MI WideOpenWest 6,459 1996
Oak Forest IL WideOpenWest 28,051 1998
Obetz OH WideOpenWest 3,977 1996
Orland Park IL WideOpenWest 51,077 1998
Palos Park IL WideOpenWest 4,689 1998
Palos Park IL WideOpenWest 4,689 1998
Perry Twp. OH WideOpenWest 1,195 1996
Plymouth MI WideOpenWest 9,022 1996
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 12
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
Prospect Park IL WideOpenWest 17,081 1998
Riverlea OH WideOpenWest 499 1996
Robbins IL WideOpenWest 6,635 1998
Rochester MI WideOpenWest 10,467 2001
Rochester Hills MI WideOpenWest 68,825 2001
Royal Oak MI WideOpenWest 60,062 2001
Schaumburg IL WideOpenWest 75,386 1998
Shaker Heights OH WideOpenWest 29,405 1999
Sharon Twp. OH WideOpenWest 1996
South Holland IL WideOpenWest 22,147 1998
St. Ann MO WideOpenWest
St. Clair Shores MI WideOpenWest 63,096 2001
St. Louis MO WideOpenWest
St. Peters MO WideOpenWest
Sterling Hts. MI WideOpenWest 124,471 2001
Streamwood Village IL WideOpenWest 36,407 1998
Strongsville OH WideOpenWest 43,858 1998
Troy MI WideOpenWest 80,959 2001
University City MO WideOpenWest
Upper Arlington OH WideOpenWest 33,686 1996
Utica MI WideOpenWest 4,577 2001
Valley View OH WideOpenWest 2,179 2001
Vernon Hills IL WideOpenWest 20,120 1998
Warren MI WideOpenWest 138,247 2001
Westlake OH WideOpenWest 31,719 1997
Wheeling IL WideOpenWest 34,496 1998
Worthington OH WideOpenWest 14,125 1996
Minneapolis MN WideOpenWest/Everest
Richfield MN WideOpenWest/Everest
Austin TX WIN 656,562
Houston TX WIN 1,953,631
Phoenix AZ WIN 1,321,045
San Diego CA WIN 1,223,400
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 13
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER Population Began
Not Orginial
Owner
Offers High-
Speed
Internet
Offers
Bundled
Services
(Voice,
Video, Data)
New Firm that
purchased
assets for
small fraction
of orginal costs
San Francisco CA WIN 776,733
Las Vegas NV WIN 478,434
Seattle WA WIN/RCN 563,374
Texline TX XIT Comm. 7,237 2001
Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 14
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
20 cities RI ABI
La Crescent MN ACE Comm.
Camarillo CA Adelphia
Encinitas CA Adelphia
Malibu CA Adelphia
Oxnard CA Adelphia
Port Hueneme CA Adelphia
San Marcos CA Adelphia
Ventura CA Adelphia
Flora IL Advance Technologies
Alameda CA Alameda Power
Algona IA Algona Municipal Util.
Evanston WY All West Comm.
Alta IA Altatec
Arcadia CA Altrio
Monrovia CA Altrio
San Gabriel Valley CA Altrio
Sierra Madre CA Altrio
Ann Arbor MI American Broadband
E. Lansing MI American Broadband
Lansing MI American Broadband
St. Joseph Twp. MN Astound Broadband
Pultney OH Bellaire Cable TV
Bartlett TN BellSouth
South Dade County FL BellSouth
Winder GA BellSouth
Cherokee County GA BellSouth Entertainment
Cobb County GA BellSouth Entertainment
Duluth GA BellSouth Entertainment
Gwinnett County GA BellSouth Entertainment
Roswell GA BellSouth Entertainment
Woodstock GA BellSouth Entertainment
Chamblee GA BellSouth Interactive
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop











Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 15
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
DeKalb GA BellSouth Interactive
St. John's County FL BellSouth Interactive
Fallowfield PA Bentleyville Cable
Albany NY Berkshire Tel
Rapid City SD Black Hills GLA
Skagit County WA Black Rock Cable
Snohomish County WA Black Rock Cable
Whatcom County WA Black Rock Cable
Braintree MA Braintree Elec. Light
Elizabethtown/Hardi KY Brandenburg Telecom
Ocala FL BrightHouse
Abington VA Bristol Virginia Utilities
Glade Spring VA Bristol Virginia Utilities
Horton Twp. PA Brockway TV
Kane PA Brockway TV
Bryan OH Bryan Municipal Cable
Waterville OH Buckeye Cable
Maryland Hts MO Cable America
Mesa AZ Cable America
Sacramento CA Cable America
Cameron LA Cameron Tel.
Hackberry LA Cameron Tel.
Charlotte NC Carolina Broadband
Columbia SC Carolina Broadband
Durham NC Carolina Broadband
Greensboro NC Carolina Broadband
Greenville SC Carolina Broadband
Raleigh NC Carolina Broadband
Spartanburg SC Carolina Broadband
Winston Salem NC Carolina Broadband
Cedar Falls IA Cedar Falls Utilities
Clearview WV Centre TV
Ohio County WV Centre TV
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop




Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 16
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Warwood WV Centre TV
Urbana OH Champaign County Tel
Denver CO Champion Broadband
Lakewood CO Champion Broadband
Kanawha County WV Charter
Terre Haute IN Charter
Danville VA Chatmoss Tel.
Hayward MN Chequamegon Coop
Barron WI Chibardun Coop
Camron WI Chibardun Coop
Chetek WI Chibardun Coop
Unity Twp. PA Citizens Cable
Daleville AL City Cablevision
Bridgeport CT City of Bridgeport
Galesburg IL City of Galesburg
Lebanon OH City of Lebanon
Negaunee MI City of Negaunee
Clear Lake IA CL Tel
Lake County FL Clear Link
Bellmead TX ClearSource (Grande)
Lacy-Lakeview TX ClearSource (Grande)
Monroe LA CMA Cablevision
Coldwater MI Coldwater BPU
Columbus Grove OH Columbus Grove Tel.
Dothan AL Comcast
Monroe MI Comcast
Parkersburg WV Community Antenna
Ashtabula VA Conneaut Tel.
Painesville OH Conneaut Tel.
Big Lake MN Connections
Barrington RI Cox
Bristol RI Cox
Central FL Cox
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop




Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 17
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Central FL Cox
Claremore OK Cox
Spotsylvania VA Cox
Warren RI Cox
Arma KS Craw-Kan Tel. Coop
Franklin KS Craw-Kan Tel. Coop
State College PA D&E Comm.
Britton MI D&P Cable
Morenci OH D&P Cable
Darien GA Darien Cable
Middleburg NJ DeCom
Charlotte NC DeCom Corp
Blissfield MI Deerfield Farmers Tel
Delhi NY Delhi Tel.
Indianapolis IN Digital Access
Kansas City MO Digital Access
Milwaukee WI Digital Access
Nashville TN Digital Access
Austin TX Digital Union
Chippewa Twp. OH Doylestown Comm.
Doylestown Village OH Doylestown Comm.
Elberton GA Elberton Utilities
Willmar MN En-Tel
Eden Prairie MN Everest
Edina MN Everest
Hopkins MN Everest
Minnetonka MN Everest
Lenexa KS Everest Connections
Mission KS Everest Connections
Mission KS Everest Connections
St. Charles County MO Everest Connections
O'Fallon MO Everest/WideOpenWest
Fairburn GA Fairburn Utilities
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop










Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 18
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Bridgeport CT FiberVision
Hartford CT FiberVision
New Haven CT FiberVision
Elk Grove CA Frontier
Laurens IA Future Net
Blackwell OK Get LLC
Dothan AL Graceba
Dothan AL Graceba
Alamo Heights TX Grande Comm.
Austin TX Grande Comm.
Balcones Heights TX Grande Comm.
Castle Hilles TX Grande Comm.
Cibolo TX Grande Comm.
Corpus Christi TX Grande Comm.
Houston TX Grande Comm.
Kirby TX Grande Comm.
Leon Valley TX Grande Comm.
Live Oak TX Grande Comm.
Midland TX Grande Comm.
Odessa TX Grande Comm.
Olmos Park TX Grande Comm.
San Antonio TX Grande Comm.
San Marcos TX Grande Comm.
Schetz TX Grande Comm.
Selma TX Grande Comm.
Terrell Hills TX Grande Comm.
Waco TX Grande Comm.
Windcrest TX Grande Comm.
Greenville TX Greenville Elec. Util.
Grundy Center IA Grundy Center Munic.
Savannah GA Hargray Comm.
Harlan IA Harlan Municipal Util.
Hartwell GA Hart Cable
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop




Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 19
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Winona MN Hiawatha Broadband
Hawarden IA HiTec Municipal
Mason County WA Hood Canal Cable
Shelton WA Hood Canal Cable
Chillicothe OH Horizon Telecom
Conway SC Horry Tel. Coop
Georgetown SC Horry Tel. Coop
Horry County SC Horry Tel. Coop
N. Myrtle Beach SC Horry Tel. Coop
Cecil PA HTC Comm.
Houston PA HTC Comm.
Mt. Pleasant PA HTC Comm.
Independence IA Indep. Light & Power
Kenmore NY Intertech Private Cable
Kenton-Boone City KY Kenton Boone City
Augusta GA Knology
Charleston SC Knology
Huntsville AL Knology
Knoxville TN Knology
Louisville KY Knology
Nashville (Mid. TN) TN Knology
Panama City FL Knology
Summerville/Dorches. SC Knology
Durand MI Lennon Tel. Co.
Lexington NC LexCom
Davidson County NC Lexicom Cable Ser.
Fallsburg KY Lycom
Little Rock AR Lyncstar
Sauk Centre MN Mainstreet Comm.
Milledgeville GA Mallard Cablevision
Naples FL Marco Island Cable
Cedar Rapids IA McLeod
Memphis TN Memphis Networx
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop







Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 20
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Shelby County TN Memphis Networx
Albany NY Midtel Cable TV
Anne Arundel Cnty MD Millennium
Social Circle GA Monroe Utilities
Walton County GA Monroe Utilities
Morristown NJ Morristown Util. System
Dodgeville WI Mount Horeb Telecom
Murray KY Murray Electric
Minster OH New Knoxville Tel.
Moulton OH New Knoxville Tel.
Bakersfield CA Newhouse
Coweta County GA Newman Utilities
Tyrone GA Newman Utilities
Iron Mountian MI Northside Cable TV
Norwood MA Norwood Elec. Light
New Ulm MN NuTel
Ft. Worth TX One Source
Osage IA Osage Municipal Util.
Livingston TN Overton County Cable
Auburn ME Oxford Networks
Lewiston ME Oxford Networks
Bemidji MN Paul Bunyan Tel
Lower Burrell PA PCOM Comm.
Pembroke WV Pembroke Tel
Houston TX Phonoscope
Colman SD Prairie Wave
Flandreau SD Prairie Wave
Gayville SD Prairie Wave
Luverne MN Prairie Wave
Marshall MN Prairie Wave
Pipestone MN Prairie Wave
Slayton MN Prairie Wave
Storm Lake IA Prairie Wave
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop











Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 21
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Tracy MN Prairie Wave
Worthington IA Prairie Wave
Yankton SD Prairie Wave
Albany NY Princetown Cable
Rupert ID Project Mutual Tel Coop
Provo UT Provo Cable/Provo
Poteau OK Quality Entertainment
Boulder CO Qwest
Chandler AZ Qwest
Douglas County CO Qwest
Gilbert AZ Qwest
Glendale AZ Qwest
Maricopa County AZ Qwest
Omaha NE Qwest
Paradise Valley AZ Qwest
Peoria AZ Qwest
Phoenix AZ Qwest
Scottsdale AZ Qwest
Eatonville WA Ranier Group
Pierce County WA Ranier Group
Arlington MA RCN
Bayonne NJ RCN
Beverly Hills CA RCN
Boston MA RCN
Brookline MA RCN
Burlingame CA RCN
Burlington MA RCN
Carson CA RCN
Chicago IL RCN
Daly City CA RCN
Dedham MA RCN
Delaware County PA RCN
Framingham MA RCN
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop





Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 22
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Gardena CA RCN
Hermosa Beach CA RCN
Hoboken NJ RCN
Lexington MA RCN
Marlborough MA RCN
Milton MA RCN
Natick MA RCN
Needham MA RCN
New York NY RCN
Newton MA RCN
Quincy MA RCN
Randolph MA RCN
Redwood City CA RCN
S. San Francisco CA RCN
San Carlos CA RCN
San Mateo CA RCN
Saugus MA RCN
Somerville MA RCN
Stoneham MA RCN
Stoneham MA RCN
Wakefield MA RCN
Waltham MA RCN
Watertown MA RCN
Weymouth MA RCN
Winchester MA RCN
Woburn MA RCN
Falls Church VA RCN Starpower
Fredricksburg VA RCN Starpower
Reinbeck IA Reinbeck Tel. & Util.
St. John the Baptist LA Reserve Telecom
Archbold OH Ridgeville Tel
Colby KS S&T Comm.
Cave City KY S.Central Rural Tel.
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop





Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 23
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Hiseville KY S.Central Rural Tel.
Horse Cave KY S.Central Rural Tel.
Concord CA Seren Innovations
St. Cloud MN Seren Innovations
Walnut Creek CA Seren Innovations
Plaquemine LA Service One
Newburgh IN Sigecom
Spanish Fork UT Spanish Fork Com. Net
Spencer IA Spencer Munic. Util.
Arlington VA Starpower
Montgomery Cnty MD Starpower
Prince George's Cnty MD Starpower
Washington DC Starpower
Sacramento CA Strategic Technologies
Houston County GA SunTel
Sacramento CA Sure West
Pierce County WA Tacoma Power
St. Marys OH Telephone Service Co.
Wapakoneta OH Telephone Service Co.
Dothan AL Time Warner
Louisville KY TotalLink (Utilicom/Vectren)
Houston TX TV Max
Cincinnati (N. Ohio) OH TWC
Citrus County FL TWC
Leander TX TWC
Mount Airy NC TWC
Orlando FL TWC
Pflugerville TX TWC
Poway CA TWC
San Diego CA TWC
Tampa FL TWC
Chula Vista CA Ultronics
National City CA Ultronics
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop















Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 24
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Cobb County GA United Telesystems
Park Rapids MN Unitel (W.Central Tel.)
Salem IL US Sonet
Centerville GA Watson Cable
Lake Wildwood GA Watson Cable
Macon GA Watson Cable
Warner Robins GA Watson Cable
Berea OH WideOpenWest
Berkley MI WideOpenWest
Bexley OH WideOpenWest
Brentwood MO WideOpenWest
Brook Park OH WideOpenWest
Brooklyn OH WideOpenWest
Canton MI WideOpenWest
Centerline MI WideOpenWest
Chicago IL WideOpenWest
Chicago Heights IL WideOpenWest
Clawson MI WideOpenWest
Clinton MI WideOpenWest
Clinton Twp OH WideOpenWest
Colorado Springs CO WideOpenWest
Columbus OH WideOpenWest
Crestwood IL WideOpenWest
Creve Coeur MO WideOpenWest
Des Plaines IL WideOpenWest
Dublin OH WideOpenWest
Eastpointe MI WideOpenWest
Elgin IL WideOpenWest
Fairview Park OH WideOpenWest
Ferndale MI WideOpenWest
Fraser MI WideOpenWest
Gahanna OH WideOpenWest
Garfield Heights OH WideOpenWest
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop






Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 25
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Glen Ellyn IL WideOpenWest
Glenview IL WideOpenWest
Grandview Heights OH WideOpenWest
Hammond IN WideOpenWest
Harrison Twp MI WideOpenWest
Harvey IL WideOpenWest
Hilliard OH WideOpenWest
Jackson Twp. OH WideOpenWest
Kirkwood MO WideOpenWest
Lakeville MN WideOpenWest
Macomb MI WideOpenWest
Madison Hts MI WideOpenWest
Manchester MO WideOpenWest
Maple Heights OH WideOpenWest
Maplewood MO WideOpenWest
Marble Cliff OH WideOpenWest
Middleburg Heights OH WideOpenWest
Mifflin Twp. OH WideOpenWest
Minerva Park OH WideOpenWest
Mount Clemens MI WideOpenWest
Mount Prospect IL WideOpenWest
Naperville IL WideOpenWest
New Rome OH WideOpenWest
North Olmsted OH WideOpenWest
North Royalton OH WideOpenWest
Northville MI WideOpenWest
Oak Forest IL WideOpenWest
Obetz OH WideOpenWest
Orland Park IL WideOpenWest
Palos Park IL WideOpenWest
Palos Park IL WideOpenWest
Perry Twp. OH WideOpenWest
Plymouth MI WideOpenWest
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop







Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 26
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Prospect Park IL WideOpenWest
Riverlea OH WideOpenWest
Robbins IL WideOpenWest
Rochester MI WideOpenWest
Rochester Hills MI WideOpenWest
Royal Oak MI WideOpenWest
Schaumburg IL WideOpenWest
Shaker Heights OH WideOpenWest
Sharon Twp. OH WideOpenWest
South Holland IL WideOpenWest
St. Ann MO WideOpenWest
St. Clair Shores MI WideOpenWest
St. Louis MO WideOpenWest
St. Peters MO WideOpenWest
Sterling Hts. MI WideOpenWest
Streamwood Village IL WideOpenWest
Strongsville OH WideOpenWest
Troy MI WideOpenWest
University City MO WideOpenWest
Upper Arlington OH WideOpenWest
Utica MI WideOpenWest
Valley View OH WideOpenWest
Vernon Hills IL WideOpenWest
Warren MI WideOpenWest
Westlake OH WideOpenWest
Wheeling IL WideOpenWest
Worthington OH WideOpenWest
Minneapolis MN WideOpenWest/Everest
Richfield MN WideOpenWest/Everest
Austin TX WIN
Houston TX WIN
Phoenix AZ WIN
San Diego CA WIN
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop








Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 27
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
San Francisco CA WIN
Las Vegas NV WIN
Seattle WA WIN/RCN
Texline TX XIT Comm.
Failed
Overbuild
Failing
Overbuild
Overbuilds
which have yet
to be built
Overbuild
targeted nonrebuilt
communities
Overbuild
is affiliated
with a
Utility
Overbuilder is
owned by Coop


Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 28
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
20 cities RI ABI
La Crescent MN ACE Comm.
Camarillo CA Adelphia
Encinitas CA Adelphia
Malibu CA Adelphia
Oxnard CA Adelphia
Port Hueneme CA Adelphia
San Marcos CA Adelphia
Ventura CA Adelphia
Flora IL Advance Technologies
Alameda CA Alameda Power
Algona IA Algona Municipal Util.
Evanston WY All West Comm.
Alta IA Altatec
Arcadia CA Altrio
Monrovia CA Altrio
San Gabriel Valley CA Altrio
Sierra Madre CA Altrio
Ann Arbor MI American Broadband
E. Lansing MI American Broadband
Lansing MI American Broadband
St. Joseph Twp. MN Astound Broadband
Pultney OH Bellaire Cable TV
Bartlett TN BellSouth
South Dade County FL BellSouth
Winder GA BellSouth
Cherokee County GA BellSouth Entertainment
Cobb County GA BellSouth Entertainment
Duluth GA BellSouth Entertainment
Gwinnett County GA BellSouth Entertainment
Roswell GA BellSouth Entertainment
Woodstock GA BellSouth Entertainment
Chamblee GA BellSouth Interactive
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities























Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 29
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
DeKalb GA BellSouth Interactive
St. John's County FL BellSouth Interactive
Fallowfield PA Bentleyville Cable
Albany NY Berkshire Tel
Rapid City SD Black Hills GLA
Skagit County WA Black Rock Cable
Snohomish County WA Black Rock Cable
Whatcom County WA Black Rock Cable
Braintree MA Braintree Elec. Light
Elizabethtown/Hardi KY Brandenburg Telecom
Ocala FL BrightHouse
Abington VA Bristol Virginia Utilities
Glade Spring VA Bristol Virginia Utilities
Horton Twp. PA Brockway TV
Kane PA Brockway TV
Bryan OH Bryan Municipal Cable
Waterville OH Buckeye Cable
Maryland Hts MO Cable America
Mesa AZ Cable America
Sacramento CA Cable America
Cameron LA Cameron Tel.
Hackberry LA Cameron Tel.
Charlotte NC Carolina Broadband
Columbia SC Carolina Broadband
Durham NC Carolina Broadband
Greensboro NC Carolina Broadband
Greenville SC Carolina Broadband
Raleigh NC Carolina Broadband
Spartanburg SC Carolina Broadband
Winston Salem NC Carolina Broadband
Cedar Falls IA Cedar Falls Utilities
Clearview WV Centre TV
Ohio County WV Centre TV
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities













Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 30
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Warwood WV Centre TV
Urbana OH Champaign County Tel
Denver CO Champion Broadband
Lakewood CO Champion Broadband
Kanawha County WV Charter
Terre Haute IN Charter
Danville VA Chatmoss Tel.
Hayward MN Chequamegon Coop
Barron WI Chibardun Coop
Camron WI Chibardun Coop
Chetek WI Chibardun Coop
Unity Twp. PA Citizens Cable
Daleville AL City Cablevision
Bridgeport CT City of Bridgeport
Galesburg IL City of Galesburg
Lebanon OH City of Lebanon
Negaunee MI City of Negaunee
Clear Lake IA CL Tel
Lake County FL Clear Link
Bellmead TX ClearSource (Grande)
Lacy-Lakeview TX ClearSource (Grande)
Monroe LA CMA Cablevision
Coldwater MI Coldwater BPU
Columbus Grove OH Columbus Grove Tel.
Dothan AL Comcast
Monroe MI Comcast
Parkersburg WV Community Antenna
Ashtabula VA Conneaut Tel.
Painesville OH Conneaut Tel.
Big Lake MN Connections
Barrington RI Cox
Bristol RI Cox
Central FL Cox
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities




















Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 31
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Central FL Cox
Claremore OK Cox
Spotsylvania VA Cox
Warren RI Cox
Arma KS Craw-Kan Tel. Coop
Franklin KS Craw-Kan Tel. Coop
State College PA D&E Comm.
Britton MI D&P Cable
Morenci OH D&P Cable
Darien GA Darien Cable
Middleburg NJ DeCom
Charlotte NC DeCom Corp
Blissfield MI Deerfield Farmers Tel
Delhi NY Delhi Tel.
Indianapolis IN Digital Access
Kansas City MO Digital Access
Milwaukee WI Digital Access
Nashville TN Digital Access
Austin TX Digital Union
Chippewa Twp. OH Doylestown Comm.
Doylestown Village OH Doylestown Comm.
Elberton GA Elberton Utilities
Willmar MN En-Tel
Eden Prairie MN Everest
Edina MN Everest
Hopkins MN Everest
Minnetonka MN Everest
Lenexa KS Everest Connections
Mission KS Everest Connections
Mission KS Everest Connections
St. Charles County MO Everest Connections
O'Fallon MO Everest/WideOpenWest
Fairburn GA Fairburn Utilities
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities













Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 32
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Bridgeport CT FiberVision
Hartford CT FiberVision
New Haven CT FiberVision
Elk Grove CA Frontier
Laurens IA Future Net
Blackwell OK Get LLC
Dothan AL Graceba
Dothan AL Graceba
Alamo Heights TX Grande Comm.
Austin TX Grande Comm.
Balcones Heights TX Grande Comm.
Castle Hilles TX Grande Comm.
Cibolo TX Grande Comm.
Corpus Christi TX Grande Comm.
Houston TX Grande Comm.
Kirby TX Grande Comm.
Leon Valley TX Grande Comm.
Live Oak TX Grande Comm.
Midland TX Grande Comm.
Odessa TX Grande Comm.
Olmos Park TX Grande Comm.
San Antonio TX Grande Comm.
San Marcos TX Grande Comm.
Schetz TX Grande Comm.
Selma TX Grande Comm.
Terrell Hills TX Grande Comm.
Waco TX Grande Comm.
Windcrest TX Grande Comm.
Greenville TX Greenville Elec. Util.
Grundy Center IA Grundy Center Munic.
Savannah GA Hargray Comm.
Harlan IA Harlan Municipal Util.
Hartwell GA Hart Cable
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities














Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 33
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Winona MN Hiawatha Broadband
Hawarden IA HiTec Municipal
Mason County WA Hood Canal Cable
Shelton WA Hood Canal Cable
Chillicothe OH Horizon Telecom
Conway SC Horry Tel. Coop
Georgetown SC Horry Tel. Coop
Horry County SC Horry Tel. Coop
N. Myrtle Beach SC Horry Tel. Coop
Cecil PA HTC Comm.
Houston PA HTC Comm.
Mt. Pleasant PA HTC Comm.
Independence IA Indep. Light & Power
Kenmore NY Intertech Private Cable
Kenton-Boone City KY Kenton Boone City
Augusta GA Knology
Charleston SC Knology
Huntsville AL Knology
Knoxville TN Knology
Louisville KY Knology
Nashville (Mid. TN) TN Knology
Panama City FL Knology
Summerville/Dorches. SC Knology
Durand MI Lennon Tel. Co.
Lexington NC LexCom
Davidson County NC Lexicom Cable Ser.
Fallsburg KY Lycom
Little Rock AR Lyncstar
Sauk Centre MN Mainstreet Comm.
Milledgeville GA Mallard Cablevision
Naples FL Marco Island Cable
Cedar Rapids IA McLeod
Memphis TN Memphis Networx
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities























Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 34
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Shelby County TN Memphis Networx
Albany NY Midtel Cable TV
Anne Arundel Cnty MD Millennium
Social Circle GA Monroe Utilities
Walton County GA Monroe Utilities
Morristown NJ Morristown Util. System
Dodgeville WI Mount Horeb Telecom
Murray KY Murray Electric
Minster OH New Knoxville Tel.
Moulton OH New Knoxville Tel.
Bakersfield CA Newhouse
Coweta County GA Newman Utilities
Tyrone GA Newman Utilities
Iron Mountian MI Northside Cable TV
Norwood MA Norwood Elec. Light
New Ulm MN NuTel
Ft. Worth TX One Source
Osage IA Osage Municipal Util.
Livingston TN Overton County Cable
Auburn ME Oxford Networks
Lewiston ME Oxford Networks
Bemidji MN Paul Bunyan Tel
Lower Burrell PA PCOM Comm.
Pembroke WV Pembroke Tel
Houston TX Phonoscope
Colman SD Prairie Wave
Flandreau SD Prairie Wave
Gayville SD Prairie Wave
Luverne MN Prairie Wave
Marshall MN Prairie Wave
Pipestone MN Prairie Wave
Slayton MN Prairie Wave
Storm Lake IA Prairie Wave
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities



















Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 35
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Tracy MN Prairie Wave
Worthington IA Prairie Wave
Yankton SD Prairie Wave
Albany NY Princetown Cable
Rupert ID Project Mutual Tel Coop
Provo UT Provo Cable/Provo
Poteau OK Quality Entertainment
Boulder CO Qwest
Chandler AZ Qwest
Douglas County CO Qwest
Gilbert AZ Qwest
Glendale AZ Qwest
Maricopa County AZ Qwest
Omaha NE Qwest
Paradise Valley AZ Qwest
Peoria AZ Qwest
Phoenix AZ Qwest
Scottsdale AZ Qwest
Eatonville WA Ranier Group
Pierce County WA Ranier Group
Arlington MA RCN
Bayonne NJ RCN
Beverly Hills CA RCN
Boston MA RCN
Brookline MA RCN
Burlingame CA RCN
Burlington MA RCN
Carson CA RCN
Chicago IL RCN
Daly City CA RCN
Dedham MA RCN
Delaware County PA RCN
Framingham MA RCN
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities



























Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 36
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Gardena CA RCN
Hermosa Beach CA RCN
Hoboken NJ RCN
Lexington MA RCN
Marlborough MA RCN
Milton MA RCN
Natick MA RCN
Needham MA RCN
New York NY RCN
Newton MA RCN
Quincy MA RCN
Randolph MA RCN
Redwood City CA RCN
S. San Francisco CA RCN
San Carlos CA RCN
San Mateo CA RCN
Saugus MA RCN
Somerville MA RCN
Stoneham MA RCN
Stoneham MA RCN
Wakefield MA RCN
Waltham MA RCN
Watertown MA RCN
Weymouth MA RCN
Winchester MA RCN
Woburn MA RCN
Falls Church VA RCN Starpower
Fredricksburg VA RCN Starpower
Reinbeck IA Reinbeck Tel. & Util.
St. John the Baptist LA Reserve Telecom
Archbold OH Ridgeville Tel
Colby KS S&T Comm.
Cave City KY S.Central Rural Tel.
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities














Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 37
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Hiseville KY S.Central Rural Tel.
Horse Cave KY S.Central Rural Tel.
Concord CA Seren Innovations
St. Cloud MN Seren Innovations
Walnut Creek CA Seren Innovations
Plaquemine LA Service One
Newburgh IN Sigecom
Spanish Fork UT Spanish Fork Com. Net
Spencer IA Spencer Munic. Util.
Arlington VA Starpower
Montgomery Cnty MD Starpower
Prince George's Cnty MD Starpower
Washington DC Starpower
Sacramento CA Strategic Technologies
Houston County GA SunTel
Sacramento CA Sure West
Pierce County WA Tacoma Power
St. Marys OH Telephone Service Co.
Wapakoneta OH Telephone Service Co.
Dothan AL Time Warner
Louisville KY TotalLink (Utilicom/Vectren)
Houston TX TV Max
Cincinnati (N. Ohio) OH TWC
Citrus County FL TWC
Leander TX TWC
Mount Airy NC TWC
Orlando FL TWC
Pflugerville TX TWC
Poway CA TWC
San Diego CA TWC
Tampa FL TWC
Chula Vista CA Ultronics
National City CA Ultronics
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities






















Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 38
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Cobb County GA United Telesystems
Park Rapids MN Unitel (W.Central Tel.)
Salem IL US Sonet
Centerville GA Watson Cable
Lake Wildwood GA Watson Cable
Macon GA Watson Cable
Warner Robins GA Watson Cable
Berea OH WideOpenWest
Berkley MI WideOpenWest
Bexley OH WideOpenWest
Brentwood MO WideOpenWest
Brook Park OH WideOpenWest
Brooklyn OH WideOpenWest
Canton MI WideOpenWest
Centerline MI WideOpenWest
Chicago IL WideOpenWest
Chicago Heights IL WideOpenWest
Clawson MI WideOpenWest
Clinton MI WideOpenWest
Clinton Twp OH WideOpenWest
Colorado Springs CO WideOpenWest
Columbus OH WideOpenWest
Crestwood IL WideOpenWest
Creve Coeur MO WideOpenWest
Des Plaines IL WideOpenWest
Dublin OH WideOpenWest
Eastpointe MI WideOpenWest
Elgin IL WideOpenWest
Fairview Park OH WideOpenWest
Ferndale MI WideOpenWest
Fraser MI WideOpenWest
Gahanna OH WideOpenWest
Garfield Heights OH WideOpenWest
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities

















Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 39
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Glen Ellyn IL WideOpenWest
Glenview IL WideOpenWest
Grandview Heights OH WideOpenWest
Hammond IN WideOpenWest
Harrison Twp MI WideOpenWest
Harvey IL WideOpenWest
Hilliard OH WideOpenWest
Jackson Twp. OH WideOpenWest
Kirkwood MO WideOpenWest
Lakeville MN WideOpenWest
Macomb MI WideOpenWest
Madison Hts MI WideOpenWest
Manchester MO WideOpenWest
Maple Heights OH WideOpenWest
Maplewood MO WideOpenWest
Marble Cliff OH WideOpenWest
Middleburg Heights OH WideOpenWest
Mifflin Twp. OH WideOpenWest
Minerva Park OH WideOpenWest
Mount Clemens MI WideOpenWest
Mount Prospect IL WideOpenWest
Naperville IL WideOpenWest
New Rome OH WideOpenWest
North Olmsted OH WideOpenWest
North Royalton OH WideOpenWest
Northville MI WideOpenWest
Oak Forest IL WideOpenWest
Obetz OH WideOpenWest
Orland Park IL WideOpenWest
Palos Park IL WideOpenWest
Palos Park IL WideOpenWest
Perry Twp. OH WideOpenWest
Plymouth MI WideOpenWest
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities










Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 40
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
Prospect Park IL WideOpenWest
Riverlea OH WideOpenWest
Robbins IL WideOpenWest
Rochester MI WideOpenWest
Rochester Hills MI WideOpenWest
Royal Oak MI WideOpenWest
Schaumburg IL WideOpenWest
Shaker Heights OH WideOpenWest
Sharon Twp. OH WideOpenWest
South Holland IL WideOpenWest
St. Ann MO WideOpenWest
St. Clair Shores MI WideOpenWest
St. Louis MO WideOpenWest
St. Peters MO WideOpenWest
Sterling Hts. MI WideOpenWest
Streamwood Village IL WideOpenWest
Strongsville OH WideOpenWest
Troy MI WideOpenWest
University City MO WideOpenWest
Upper Arlington OH WideOpenWest
Utica MI WideOpenWest
Valley View OH WideOpenWest
Vernon Hills IL WideOpenWest
Warren MI WideOpenWest
Westlake OH WideOpenWest
Wheeling IL WideOpenWest
Worthington OH WideOpenWest
Minneapolis MN WideOpenWest/Everest
Richfield MN WideOpenWest/Everest
Austin TX WIN
Houston TX WIN
Phoenix AZ WIN
San Diego CA WIN
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities














Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 41
Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities Attachment A
CITY ST CHALLENGER
San Francisco CA WIN
Las Vegas NV WIN
Seattle WA WIN/RCN
Texline TX XIT Comm.
Overbuild is
municipally
owned
Overbuild is
affiliated
with a
telecom
Overbuilder not
required to build
out the entire
franchise
Overbuilder
has different
franchse
requirements
Overbuilder
targeted high
density
communities

Source: Kagan World Media, Survey of Incumbent Cable Operators in Overbuild Communities, Oct 2003 - Jan 2004; public information and company data. 42
STEVEN S. WILDMAN
Curriculum Vitae
Michigan State University LECG, Inc.
Department of Telecommunication 1603 Orrington Avenue
409 Communication Arts & Sciences Suite 1500
East Lansing, MI Evanston, IL 60201
Tel. (517) 432-8004 Tel. (847) 475-1566
Fax (517) 432-8065 Fax (847) 475-1031
swildman@msu.edu
EDUCATION
Ph.D., STANFORD UNIVERSITY, Economics, 1980.
M.A., STANFORD UNIVERSITY, Economics, 1977.
B.A., WABASH COLLEGE, Economics, 1971.
PRESENT POSITIONS
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, Department of Telecommunication.
James H. Quello Professor of Telecommunication Studies
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, Quello Center for Telecommunication Management & Law.
Director
ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Northwestern University, Department of Communication Studies, 1988-1999.
Associate Professor
Northwestern University, Program in Telecommunications Science, Management & Policy, 1990-
1999. Director
ECONOMISTS INCORPORATED, 1983 - 1988.
Senior Economist
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Los Angeles, Department of Economics, 1979 - 1983.
Assistant Professor
RAND CORPORATION, 1981 - 1983.
Consultant
FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
Van Zelst Research Professor of Communication, Northwestern University, 1996-1997
McGannon Award for Social and Ethical Relevance in Communication Policy Research for 1992.
Steven S. Wildman
Page 2
Ameritech Research Fellow, Northwestern University, 1990 - 1991.
Ameritech Research Professorship, Northwestern University, 1989 - 1990.
National Science Foundation Fellowship, 1974 - 1977
PUBLICATIONS
Books
International Trade in Films and Television Programs, with Stephen E. Siwek, Ballinger, 1988.1
Video Economics, with Bruce M. Owen, Harvard University Press, 1992.2
Electronic Services Networks: A Business and Public Policy Challenge, co-edited with Margaret E.
Guerin-Calvert, Praeger Publishers, 1991.2
Making Universal Service Policy: Enhancing the Process Through Multidisciplinary Evaluation,
co-edited with Barbara A. Cherry and Alan H. Hammond, IV, Lawrence Erlbaum, Publishers,
1999.2
Broadband: Bringing Home the Bits, member of NRC committee authoring report, National
Research Council, 2002.
Edited Journal Special Issues
SPECIAL ISSUE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, Industrial and Corporate Change,
vol. 4, 1995. Co-edited with David J. Teece.1
SPECIAL ISSUE ON MEDIA AND MULTIMEDIA, Information Economics and Policy, vol. 10,
no. 2. 1998.
Journal Articles
"Rethinking Access: Introduction to the Symposium Theme and Framework," with Johannes M.
Bauer, Law Review of the Michigan State University Detroit College of Law, vol. 2002, No. 3 (Fall
2002).2
"The Market for Television Advertising: Model and Evidence," with B. D. McCullough and R.
Kieschnick, Review of Marketing Science, Vol. 1, Issue 2 (Nov. 2001).2
"Preventing Flawed Communication Policies by Addressing Constitutional Principles," with
Barbara A. Cherry, Law Review of the Michigan State University Detroit College of Law, vol. 2000,
No. 1 (Spring 2000).2
"An Institutional Perspective on Regulatory Regimes and Investment Decisions by
Telecommunications Providers," with Barbara A. Cherry, Telecommunications and Broadcasting
Networks under EC Law: The Protection Afforded to Consumers and Undertakings in the
1 Senior author.
2 Equal joint author.
Steven S. Wildman
Page 3
Information Society, Series of Publications by the Academy of European Law Trier, Vol. 27
(2000).2
"Institutional Endowment as Foundation for Regulatory Performance and Regime Transitions: The
Role of the US Constitution in Telecommunications Regulation in the United States," with Barbara
A. Cherry, Telecommunications Policy, vol. 23, no. 9 (1999).2
"Economic Theories of Tying and Foreclosure Applied--and Not Applied--in Microsoft," with
Debra J. Aron, Antitrust, vol. 14, no. 1 (1999), pp. 48-52.2
"Media and Multimedia: The Challenge for Policy and Economic Analysis," in Information
Economics and Policy, Vol. No. 1 (1998).
"Interconnection Pricing, Stranded Costs, and the Optimal Regulatory Contract", in Industrial and
Corporate Change, vol. 6, no 4 (1997).
"Introduction: Policy and Strategy for Rapidly Changing Telecommunications Markets," with
David Teece, Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 5, no. 4 (1996). 1
"The Pricing of Customer Access in Telecommunications," with Debra J. Aron, Industrial and
Corporate Change, vol. 5, no. 4 (1996). 2
"Network Programming and Off-Network Syndication Profits: Strategic Links and Implications for
Television Policy," with Karla Robinson, Journal of Media Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1995).1
"Trade Liberalization and Policy for Media Industries," Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol.
20 (1995).
"Network Competition and the Provision of Universal Service," with John C. Panzar, Industrial and
Corporate Change, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1995).2
"Funding the Public Telecommunications Infrastructure," with Bruce Egan, Telematics and
Informatics, Fall 1994.2
"Toward a New Analytical Framework for Media Policy: Reconciling Economic and Non-
Economic Perspectives," with R. Entman, Journal of Communication, Winter 1992. 2 Reprinted in
part in Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in Mass Media and Society, A.
Alexander and J. Hanson (eds.), The Duskin Publishing Group, Inc., 1993.
"Selecting Advanced Television Standards for the United States: Implications for Trade in
Programs and Motion Pictures," Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Spring 1991.
"The Privatization of European Television: Effects on International Markets for Programs,"
Columbia Journal of World Business, December 1987.1
"A Note on Measuring Surplus Attributable to Differentiated Products," Journal of Industrial
Economics, September 1984.
"Economic Consequences of the Informational Characteristics of Mass Media," The American
Economist, Spring 1981.
Steven S. Wildman
Page 4
Book Chapters
"Broadband Deployment: Toward a More Fully Integrated Policy Perspective", with
Johannes M. Bauer and Junghyun Kim, in A. Shampine (ed.), Down to the Wire: Studies in the
Diffusion and Regulation of Telecommunications Technologies, Nova Science Press, forthcoming.2
"Conditional Expectations Communication and the Impact of Biotechnology," in S. Braman (ed.),
Biotechnology and Communication: The Meta-Technologies of Information, Lawrence Earlbaum
Associates, Publishers, forthcoming.
"Effecting a Price Squeeze Through Bundled Pricing," with Debra J. Aron , in S. Gillett and I.
Vogelsang (eds.), Competition, Regulation and Convergence: Current Trends in
Telecommunications Policy Research, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1999.2
"Conceptualizing Universal Service Policy: Definitions, Context, Social Process, and Politics,"
with Barbara A. Cherry. In B. Cherry, S. Wildman and A. Hammond IV (eds.), Making Universal
Service Policy: Enhancing the Process Through Multidisciplinary Evaluation, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Publishers, 1999.2
"Unilateral and Bilateral Rules: A Framework for Increasing Competition While Meeting
Universal Service goals in Telecommunications," with Barbara A. Cherry. In B. Cherry, S.
Wildman and A. Hammond IV (eds.)., Making Universal Service Policy: Enhancing the Process
Through Multidisciplinary Evaluation, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1999.2
"Review of Federal Universal Service Policy in the United States," with Barbara A. Cherry, in B.
Cherry, S. Wildman and A. Hammond IV (eds.), Making Universal Service Policy: Enhancing the
Process Through Multidisciplinary Evaluation, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1999.2
"Towards a Better Integration of Media Economics and Media Competition Policy," in A
Communications Cornucopia: Markle Foundation Essays on Information Policy, R. Noll and M.
Price (eds.), Brookings Institution, 1998.
"Regulatory Standards: The Effect of Broadcast Signals on Cable Television," with James N.
Dertouzos, in A Communications Cornucopia: Markle Foundation Essays on Information Policy,
R. Noll and M. Price (eds.), Brookings Institution, 1998.2
"The Economics of Minority Programming," with Theomary Karamanis, in A. Garmer, ed.,
Investing in Diversity: Advancing Opportunities for Minorities and the Media, The Aspen Institute,
1998. 1
"A Structure and Efficiency Approach to Reforming Access and Content Policy," with Karen D.
Frazer, in C. Firestone and A. Garmer, eds., Digital Broadcasting and the Public Interest: Reports
and Papers of the Aspen Institute Communications and Society Program, Aspen Institute, 1998. 1
"Interconnection Pricing and Network Competition," in Progress in Communication Science,
Volume 15: Advances in Telecommunications Theory and Research, , H. Sawhney and G. A.
Barnett (eds.), Ablex, 1998.
"Funding the Public Telecommunications Infrastructure," with Bruce Egan, in Globalism and
Localism in Telecommunications, E. Noam and A. Wolfson (eds.), Elsevier, 1997.2
Steven S. Wildman
Page 5
"Information Technology, Private Networks, and Productivity," in Private Networks and Public
Objectives, E. Noam (ed.), Elcevier, 1996.
"One-Way Flows and the Economics of Audiencemaking," Audiencemaking: How the Media
Create the Audience, J. S. Ettema and D. C. Whitney (eds.), Sage, 1994. 1
"The Economics of Trade in Recorded Media Products in a Multilingual World: Implications for
National Media Policies," with Stephen E. Siwek, in The International Market in Film and
Television Programs, Eli M. Noam (ed.), Ablex, 1993.1
"Investing in the Telecommunications Infrastructure: Economics and Policy Considerations," with
Bruce L. Egan, in the 1992 Annual Review of the Institute for Information Studies.2
"Electronic Services Networks: Functions, Structures, and Public Policy," with Margaret E.
Guerin-Calvert, in Electronic Services Networks: A Business and Public Policy Challenge,
Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert and Steven S. Wildman (eds.), Praeger Publishers, 1991.1
"The Economics of Industry-Sponsored Search Facilitation," in Electronic Services Networks: A
Business and Public Policy Challenge, Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert and Steven S. Wildman (eds.),
Praeger Publishers, 1991.1
"Program Competition and Diversity in the New Video Industry," with Bruce M. Owen, in Video
Media Competition: Regulation, Economics, and Technology, Eli M. Noam (ed.), Columbia
University Press, 1985.1
Papers in Published Conference Proceedings
"Program Competition and Advertising Strategies in the Age of Digital Television," in The Future
of Digital Television: Market, Audience, and Policy, proceedings of the KISDI-KSJCS
International Conference of same title, held Nov. 29, 2001 in Seoul, Korea, pp. 29-45.
"Communication Technology and Productivity: The Role of Education," Annual Review of
Communication, National Engineering Consortium, Vol. XXXXVII (1993-94).
"Controlling Occupational Radiation: Alternatives to Regulation," with L.A. Sagan and R.
Squitieri, presented at the International Symposium on Occupational Radiation Exposure in Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Facilities, Los Angeles, CA, June 18-22. Published in proceedings of same conference.2
"Economic Issues in Mass Communication Industries," with J. N. Rosse, J. N. Dertouzos and M.
Robinson, presented at the FTC Symposium on Media Concentration, Washington, D.C., December
14-15, 1978. Published in the proceedings of same conference.3
"Vertical Integration in Broadcasting: A Study of Network Owned-and-Operated TV Stations,"
S.I.E. No. 97, Department of Economics, Stanford University, also published in the Proceedings of
the FTC Symposium on Media Concentration, Washington, D.C., December 14-15, 1978.
3 Joint author credited as a "with."
Steven S. Wildman
Page 6
Other Publications and Working Papers
Review of The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The "Costs" of Manged Competition, by Dale E.
Lehman and Dennis Weisman, Journal of Economic Literature (December 2002), vol. 40(4), pp.
1272-1273.
Review of Much Ado About Culture: North American Trade Disputes, by K. Acheson and C.
Maule, Journal of Economic Literature (September 2001), vol. 39(3), pp. 938-940.
"AOL-Time Warner Merger Will Redefine Business: Deal Gives AOL Access to Homes," Lansing
State Journal, Feb. 6, 2000, p. 11A.
"A Framework for Managing Telecommunications Deregulation while Meeting Universal Service
Goals," with Barbara A. Cherry. Presented at the Twenty-Third Annual Telecommunications
Policy Research Conference, Solomons, Maryland, October 2, 1995.
"Monopolistic Competition with Two-Part Tariffs," with Nicholas Economedes, August 1995.2
Review of Television in Europe, by Eli Noam, Journal of Economic Literature, December 1993.
"Competition in the Local Exchange: Appropriate Policies to Maintain Universal Service in Rural
Areas," with John C. Panzar, September 1993.
Review of The World Television Industry: An Economic Analysis, by Peter Dunnett, Journal of
Communication, Winter 1992.
"An Empirical Study of Broadcast Competition to Cable," with James N. Dertouzos, July 1990.2
"A Model of Supply and Demand for Information in a Competitive Market," October 1989.
"ATV Standards and Trade in Recorded Video Entertainment," paper presented at the Sixteenth
Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, October 30-November 1, 1988, Airlie,
VA, revised April 1989.
"Competition, Regulation and Sources of Market Power in the Radio Industry," with Duncan J.
Cameron, May 1982, revised October 1989.1
"Program Choice in a Broadband Environment," with Nancy Y. Lee, Working Paper, Center for
Telecommunications and Information Studies, Columbia University, May 1989.1
"Trade in Films and Television Programming," with Stephen E. Siwek, presented at Trade in
Services and Uruguay Round Negotiations, London, England, July 8, 1987, and Geneva,
Switzerland, July 18, 1987.1
Review of Oligopoly Theory, by James Friedman, Journal of Economic Literature, March 1985.
"Recruiter Incentives: Effects on Performance," Rand Cooperation Working Draft, April 1983.
"Anticipated Preemption and the Determination of Initial Structure in a Growing Market," UCLA
Working Paper No. 267, September 1982.
"A Spatial Model of Entry Deterrence," S.I.E. No. 103, Department of Economics, Stanford
University, November 1978, revised December 1980.
Steven S. Wildman
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"Advertising, Consumer Learning and Competitive Strategies," Dissertation filed January 1980.
Also published as S.I.E. paper No. 110 by Department of Economics, Stanford University,
December 1979.
"A Study of Economic Issues in the Recording Industry," with James N. Dertouzos. 2 Study
commissioned by the National Association of Broadcasters.
OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Co-convener, conference on telecommunications free trade zones, Northwestern University, March
30, 1992. Sponsored by the Annenberg Washington Program of Northwestern University and the
Illinois Commerce Commission.
Convener, half-day conference on electronic services networks at Northwestern University, April 9,
1990.
Co-convener, day-long Washington, D.C. conference on electronic services networks sponsored by
the Annenberg Washington Program, February 23, 1990.
Member, Editorial Board, Journal of Media Economics.
Member of Organizing Committee for the Nineteenth and Twentieth Annual Telecommunications
Policy Research Conference, Solomon Island, MD.
Member, Executive Committee, Consortium for Research in Telecommunications.
Organizer, 1996 Conference on Telecommunications Policy and Strategy of the Consortium for
Research in Telecommunications Policy, Evanston, IL, May 10,11, 1996
Co-organizer, Telecommunication Policy and Law Symposium: "Preventing Flawed
Communication Policies by addressing Constitutuinoal Principles", Washington, D.C., April 18,
2000.
Member, National Research Council Broadband Last Mile Committee, Fall 1999-present.
REFEREEING AND REVIEWING
American Economic Review, referee
Communication Law and Policy, referee
Communication Research, referee
Communication Theory, referee
Journal of Economics and Busines, referee
Information, Economics and Policy, referee
Information Systems Research, referee
International Journal of the Economics of Business, referee
International Journal of Industrial Organization, referee
International Journal on Media Management, Associated Reviewer and referee,
Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, referee
Journal of Communication, book reviewer
Journal of Information, Economics and Policy, referee
Journal of International Economics, referee
Journal of Economic Literature, book reviewer
Steven S. Wildman
Page 8
Journal of Industrial Economics, referee
Journal of Media Economics, editorial board, referee
National Science Foundation, proposal reviewer
The Rand Journal of Economics, referee